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Dorner on the Person of Christ.

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HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT

OF THE DOCTRINE OF

THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

BY

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DIVISION SECOND,

FROM THE END OF THE FOURTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT TIME.

VOLUME II.

TRANSLATED BY

REV. D. W. SIMON.

EDINBURGH:

T. AND T. CLARK, 38, GEORGE STREET.

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THE SECOND EPOCH OF THE SECOND PERIOD.

INTRODUCTION.

THE GERMANIC MYSTICISM.

WHILST Scholasticism was hastening to decay, and the spirit of Christianity was being almost stifled by the ecclesiastical forms in which it was clothed, under cover of the old, the germs of a new and more vigorous development of the life of the Church were being silently planted and fostered by the various mystical parties. The spirit which animated these parties, after having been subjected to the long preparatory process of purification, of which it stood in need, was one of the main causes of the Reformation. The existence of a connection between the Mysticism of Germany, even at its most flourishing epoch—to wit, about the fourteenth century—on the one hand, and minds of a negative tendency, such as Amalrich v. Bena (sec. 13) and the Manichæan sects, on the other hand, it is not at all our intention to question. We should as soon think of questioning its connection with the Pseudo-Areopagite and Erigena. But from that polemical bitterness against the Church, which stirred in Amalrich, in the Brethren of the Free Spirit, and in the Manichæans, the Mystics of Germany were mostly free. So strongly did they feel that they possessed a transcendent good, which the Church could neither give nor take away, that they took no interest at all in polemics, and but little even in the character and tone of society at large. Whilst, during the following century, which may be designated the Century of Great Councils, the Church gave its attention unweariedly, though in vain, to the question of Ecclesiastical Reform, the German Mystics were labouring for another, more modest, but not more easy, object. They were bent on a reform of their own soul, on the assurance

of their eternal salvation; and, providing they accomplished these purposes, it was a matter of little moment to them what course was pursued by the outside world. Accordingly, as they felt no desire to mix themselves up with the efforts making to bring about general ecclesiastical reforms, they were not stirred with impatience and anger at the Church. The secret of their behaviour was, that they no longer looked upon the Church as the sole depository of the highest good. In their view, the highest good was to be found elsewhere—in the depths of the soul. They did not, indeed, reject the rites and usages of the Church, or its rules of life; but—following the example set by the prophets relatively to the Jewish ceremonial law—peacefully reduced them to the rank of mere allegories or symbols of the true religion, of that mystical process, which is able to pursue its own course, either in conjunction with, or, as it were, behind and above, such exercises.

The Mysticism of Germany concentrated its chief interest and attention on the realization and intellection of true *personality*, and of that eternal image of God, which it ought to bear. To enjoy and gain the vision of God, to be absorbed in Him, had been the chief aim of Mysticism in its Romanic development; but this is no longer the case. Such sweet feelings, the experience and tasting of God and His enlightenment, are no longer regarded as the highest goal. Indeed, the German Mystics warned each other against such a pursuit of enjoyment, as against a great danger: they feared that it would lead to the abuse of the divine life, to the service of self, and retard the work of God in the soul.¹ They thus showed, even in this matter, that their Mysticism bore an ethical character. Not to lose themselves in God, and in the enjoyment of Him, was their anxiety; but to realize the true life of the true personality. The contrast between themselves and the God after whom their souls yearned,—they but finite, and He absolutely infinite,—did not trouble them: a domain of infinite possibilities had been opened up to them within their own souls; and no axiom appeared to them so thoroughly certain, as the axiom, that the human soul is, in itself, perfectly capable of receiving the divine. To their mind, in fact, it appeared rather in the light of a contradiction, that the soul should rest satisfied with a less good than God.

¹ Thauleri Sermones, ed. lat. Laur. Surius, Col. 1603, p. 260.

Let us first direct our attention to this very important principle,—a principle which broke down the entire foundation on which the Romanic Christology rested.

Master Eckhart says,¹—“I have a power in my soul which is thoroughly susceptible to, and receptive of, God: I am as certain as that I live, that nothing whatever is so near to me as God. God is nearer to me than I am to myself.” Eckhart the Younger also says,²—“A stone has by nature an inclination to the earth, to the lowest point: whoso should rob it of this bias, would rob it of its essence. Were it to be forced to hang a thousand years suspended in the air, it would retain its bias. Even so, is a leaning and tendency toward God inherent in man: he may be forcibly drawn to other accidental things, but he still retains his inclination towards God.” To the same effect, also, Tauler,³—“In the depths of the soul God always remains. He is indeed everywhere and always; but the soul is the noblest creature, because it is able to find, know, and love God.”⁴

But as it is the nature of man not to be capable of living without God, so, in the view of Eckhart, is it the nature of God not to be able to exist without the creature. God loves the soul with so powerful a love, that were any one to rob Him of this love, He would be deprived of His being and life. His very nature is set on being near to, and present with, me.⁵ For God is love, and love is God. The good God is animated by such love to men, that He behaves as though His entire Godhead hung on the salvation of man. For this reason he devotes Himself entirely, and gives Himself up, on behalf of man, without requiring anything more of man, than that he voluntarily give up himself, in substitutionary love for the sake of others. Nor does God require this for His own advantage, but solely for the good of man himself;—no sacrifice is more acceptable and pleasing to God than the denial of our own will. And, appealing to Master Eckhart, Tauler says,—The work which God works in souls that are empty, in souls which He finds simple,

¹ Compare Tauler's *Predigten*, ed. Frankfurt 1826, i. p. 58 ff. *Thauleri Sermones*, ed. Laur. Sur. p. 18 ff. Tauler, 4 *Weihnachtspredigt*,—“*Nihil tam occultum habet Deus quod animæ recipere impossibile sit.*”

² L. c. 99, in *Surius*, p. 46 ff.

³ *Dominic. iv. post Epiphan. and Epiphan. Serm. ii.*

⁴ Tauler's *Pred. l. c.* p. 58 (from Eckhart senior).

⁵ See as above, and *ii.* 65.

and bare, and sequestered, in that He seeks to be spiritually born in them, is a work far more pleasant to Him, and one which contains more of God in itself, than the work by which He created all creatures out of nothing.”¹ This, Tauler (or Eckhart the Younger) sums up as follows:—“Love is the noblest virtue; for it makes man God, and God man.”²

They then endeavoured to show that this essential unity and connectedness of God and man has its objective ground in the eternal, divine, ideal world, which is infolded in the Son,—nay more, which the Son Himself (according to Maximus and Anselm) is.³ Herein they followed the example of the old Mystics and theologians. Consequently, the essential nature of every man is contained in God. Not only is the human genus in God, as Plato held; but every individual personality also, as to its idea, as to its true essence, is in God. It is, furthermore, in God, not as in a stagnant, dead being; for then, a history would be an impossibility to personality, precisely where we should most expect it, namely, in connection with its true life and being. At the utmost, the only process possible to it, would be the cognition and maintainment of its eternal, fixed, immoveable being. But,—and in laying down this principle, the German Mystics made a decided advance towards a more living conception of God, and towards a more ethical estimate of man,—we must become sons of God, or be in God by birth; and God must be born in us. Both take place at the same moment, and neither without the other: simultaneously, we are born in God, and God is born in us. God’s birth in us is our birth; our birth is God’s birth.

The Divine Word, indeed, is everywhere; for God alone is the essence of the world, and in itself the world is nothing. So far is it from having being in and by itself, that God is not a whit more truly Being with the world than without it. But to the soul alone belongs the high dignity, not merely that God is in it, but also that the Word can, and is willing to, be born in it.

¹ Ib. i. 96.

² i. 104.

³ So all the more important Mystics; for example, Eccard. sen. de duodec. donis, etc. Nr. 5, 7, in Surius, pp. 781–783. Ecc. jun. ib. p. 12. H. Suso v. Diepenbrock, vol. ii. c. 4, p. 397. Ruysbroch, ed. Arnold, 1701. “Von der geistlichen Hochzeit” (“Of the spiritual marriage”), vol. iii. c. 4. “Spiegel des ewigen Heils” (“Mirror of eternal salvation”), c. 8.

Sooner could brightness be separated from light, or warmth from fire, than the soul from the Son.¹ God dwells constantly in the inmost depths of the soul; there, He is always to be found: and so, on the other hand, the soul inclines continually towards its place of rest.² We might therefore ask,—What more can be needed? What significance can still be attached to a process of growth, to the new birth? According to Master Eckhart, the Mystics answered,—“Were I a king, and did not know it myself, I should be really no king: but if I had a thorough conviction that I was a king, and if all men were of my opinion, and I knew, of a truth, that all men had this opinion and belief, I should be a king, and all the wealth of the king would thus be mine. In like manner, our blessedness depends on our confessing and knowing the highest good, which is God Himself. Man is not blessed merely because God is actually in him, and is so near him, and because he has God;—no, his blessedness consists in his confessing that God is very nigh unto him, and in existing in the knowledge and love of God.”³

There is, therefore, the need of a prior process on our side. The mere fact that God is in us, is not sufficient. “God is nigh unto us, but we are far from Him; God is within, we are without; God is at home (*heimlich*), we are strangers; God is at all times ready, we are very unready.”⁴ It is clear enough, however, that Master Eckhart represents this process predominantly as a theoretical, mystico-speculative, one. Nothing prevents God entering into us, save our cleaving to space and time. “Time and place are fragments, whereas God is one. Hence, if the soul is ever to know God, it must know Him above time and place. If I am ever to know the highest good, or the eternal goodness, verily, I must needs confess it in that in which it is good, to wit, in itself, not in the things in which goodness is divided. In God alone is the entire divine essence: the whole of humanity is not in one single man, for one man is not all men; but in God, the soul confesses the whole of humanity,

¹ See Tauler's *Pred.* iii. 34, *Eccard. sen.* p. 235.

² Eckhart's *Testament*, p. 670 and pp. 18, 235, in *Surius*: so also in Tauler's *Predigt.* iii. 34. Eckhart *jun.* in *Surius*, p. 11; Tauler, *Dom.* iv. post *Epiph.* and *Pasch. Serm.* iii.

³ 2 *Adv. Serm.* ii. p. 18, ed. *Frankf.* i. 58.

⁴ Eckhart *sen.* ed. *Frankf.* i. 61.

and all things in the Highest, for it confesses them according to their essence."¹ Leaving behind, forgetting, overpassing, time and place, we leave behind, forget, and overpass that which is in space and time; we recognise the nothingness of the world, and our own nothingness. "If the soul is ever to know God, it must forget itself and lose itself. For when it knows and sees itself, it does not see and know God."² The soul which is bound up with the body, cannot see God: we must be transported into the spirit, above time and space, in order to see Him. "When the soul is freed from time and space, the Father sends and begets His Son in the soul. It is God's nature to give, and His very essence inclines Him to give to us, when we are humble."³

Still, even according to the representation of Eckhart, this process contains some religious-moral elements. Under the denial of the world, he understood also the renunciation of worldly love:—a renunciation, too, which takes place in the power of the soul's own hunger and thirst after God the Living, and not merely in consequence of a divine gift. "For, whatever other gifts God bestows on it, it cares not for them. God must give Himself to me, to belong to me, even as He belongs to Himself; or else I have nothing, and nothing delights me. But whoso is minded to receive God entirely, must at the same time give himself, and have gone out (from himself): he then receives the like from God, to wit, all that God possesses as His own, in the same manner as He Himself possesses it."⁴

Their opinion was, therefore, by no means, that the noble

¹ See passage quoted in the last note.

² Ibid. and in Surius, p. 232. Dom. iii. p. Pasch.

³ Eckhart sen. on Joh. Evang. Day, in Taul. Pr. iii. p. 31 ff. ed. Frankfurt.

⁴ Meister Eckhart l. c. iii. 34. He describes resignation as self-forgetfulness, as an endeavour to become like a child (see in Surius, p. 780, 4). Still more distinctly does Ruysbroch express disapprobation, when describing the merely theoretical abstraction as compared with the ethical (see the Third Book of his work, "Von der geistlichen Hochzeit," c. 4 ff.). "There is also a leisure without images (bildlose Musse), of which nature is the source; but that which does not arise from grace, is without life, and either without operation, or works for and by itself. The image of glory, the Son of God, must rise forth out of the desert of the infinite ocean. We must be susceptible of becoming a mirror of the eternal parturition, of the eternal procession of the Son out of this desert (of void infinitude)."

destination of the soul can be realized by means of a mere intellectual process. In that case, the goal would be the extinction of the soul; whereas Eckhart says,—“As the soul, through God, loses itself and abandons all things, so does it find itself again in God: when it knows God, it knows itself, and all the things from which it has disjoined itself, perfectly in God.” It then learns, not merely to regard all things in the like manner, to wit, as nothing, but also to see God everywhere, in the least things, and in the greatest. “For God is every mode (of being), and is in all modes (of being) alike, if we only knew how to apprehend Him in all alike. Apprehendest thou God better in one thing than in another, it is well; but it is still better, if thou canst apprehend Him everywhere, for to that end do all things exist.”¹ From this it is clear, that the mystical process brings with it no annihilation: the result thereof, on the contrary, is that we know everything in its truth, that is, in God.² But still, does not the entire process appear to be a purely subjective one, the effect of which is to change merely the knowledge, not the being? And if this be the true state of the case, how can this process be described as the birth of God in us, and our birth in God?

The idea formed of this process by the Mystics was the following:—Man’s self-denial and resignation do but prepare the way for a vital process of God Himself, which is intended to be continued in us. God is not a torpid, stagnant existence; He is not a mere ocean, which receives the mystic into itself: God’s purpose is to *live in the world*: in that He loves the world, it is His desire that the world should know and love Him. But as He, and He alone, is love and wisdom, He must enter into the world by a self-parturient act (*sich in die Welt hineingebären*). Nay more, He can love nothing in the world save the wisdom and love which are He Himself,—that is, He can only love Himself (see Surius, p. 783): in the world, He loves His Son, or Himself considered as Object. The many

¹ Eckhart sen. ed. Frankf. i. 61. Testament in Surius, 670.

² Tauler in Surius, p. 62: “Deus non destructor naturæ est, imo perficit eam.” H. Suso, B. i. Thl. 2, c. 53. The profoundest subjection is the highest elevation, c. 52. Annihilation has no meaning for the soul. Ruysbroch very frequently employs similar language. All that the soul needs to do, is to cast away all images derived from the creature (*von der Creatur entbilden*); Suso, p. 203.

persons in the world cannot be said to be truly themselves, until they have attained to the knowledge of their essence; but their essential nature is their being in the Son, who comprises within Himself the intelligible world, and, along with it, all individual things. Now, so far as he who has entered into the very ground of his own being, into unity with the Son, does not thereby absolutely lose himself in God, but rather finds himself in Him, in that God is born in his knowledge and in his love, to that extent does sonship become a veritable actuality for such a soul. On the contrary, whilst man is distracted amidst many objects, and remains out of himself, sonship is an intralled potency. The Mystics, however, persisted in emphatically asserting, that the trinitarian process in God, by which the Son proceeded eternally from the Father, was one and the same thing with the birth of God in the soul, which is included in the Son, who is eternally undergoing parturition.¹ The essence or nature of God is related to the three Persons of the Trinity, as potential is to actual being (see Suso, c. 56). But the creature also, when it is truly itself, belongs to the latter. The trinitarian life-process of God is accomplished also in it. In the birth of the Son, in whom we live, we are to see also our own birth, our own procession from God. The eternal generation of the Son from the Father is not to be conceived as a fact of the past, and once for all fully accomplished; but as an eternally continuous process. Along with the Son, the ideal world also, which is in Him, and in which we too are infolded as to our true essence, proceeds eternally forth from God, without diminution and without increase. But when we refuse to sacrifice our will to God, this process of sonship comes to a standstill in reference to us, as we find to our misery. If, on the contrary, the process advances without hindrance, then the divine life becomes an actual fact, becomes a Son in us, and we are deified (*vergottet*). It is, therefore, God in us who loves and knows God out of us; and so God, on His side, when He knows and loves the sons, who are all one together, and participate in one sonship, simply knows and loves Himself, as realized or actual. (Note 1.)

¹ So Tauler in Surius, pp. 44, 77; Ruysbroch, "Spiegel des göttlichen Heils," c. 8 ff.; Eckhart the Younger, in Surius, p. 12; Meister Eckhart, *ibidem*, p. 781; and also H. Suso.

Thus Eckhart the Younger says (see Tauler's Pred. i. 56): "Not many sons! Thou mayest, indeed, and oughtest to be distinct from others according to thy physical birth, but in the eternal birth there must not be more than one Son; for in God there is no more than one natural origination, and therefore there is no more than one natural outgoing of the Son,—there are not two outgoing. Thou oughtest, therefore, to be one son with Christ; and thou must constitute one eternal outflow with the eternal Word." This is possible too, he proceeds to say, and Christ shows it to us. The Son of God took upon Himself, not this or that man, nor, indeed, any one particular human personality, but merely human *nature*, relatively to which the personality is a mere accident. Now, as there was in Christ the impersonal man, of which God became the personal centre, and as human nature in Him became, by consequence, God through grace; even so we can attain to the same thing, if we renounce our personality, and all that gives rise to distinctions, and become once more purely and simply nature, and take ourselves (*nehmen*) according to this nature. Inasmuch as the same nature, according to which we are to take ourselves, has become the Son of the Father through its assumption by the eternal Word, we also become a son of the eternal Father, in conjunction with Christ, because we take ourselves in the same nature which became God. Therein are involved, in the view of Eckhart the Younger, righteousness, sanctification, and freedom. (Note 2.)

From this it is clear, that the incarnation of God, though regarded in a pantheistic light, constituted the central feature of the speculations of these Mystics; and that, apart from it, the world seemed to them dead, and life not worth living. They regarded it as the jewel of their life; in it they saw the manifestation of their redemption and the blessedness of their soul. Taking, as they did, a more living view of God, the incarnation did not present itself to them in the light of a mere doctrine, before which we must stand awe-stricken, as before a speechless mystery. On the contrary, it seemed to them an inexplicable enigma, that men should not universally recognise the doctrine, that it should not be a source of universal joy and consolation. The doctrine of the Trinity, also, they endeavoured to set free from its traditional rigidity, torpor, and

unfruitfulness. For example, Tauler says, in his first Christmas Sermon: "To-day we celebrate three several births in holy Christendom.—The first and highest birth is that by which the heavenly Father brings forth His only begotten Son, divine in essence, distinct in person. The second birth is the motherly parturition (of the Virgin Mary). The third birth is that by which God is truly, spiritually, born, every day and every hour, in good souls, with grace and with love. Of this latter birth of love, we will now speak first of all; and we will inquire how we may and should act, in order that this excellent birth may nobly and fruitfully take place in us. This we are taught by the characteristics of the first fatherly birth, by which the Father brings forth His Son in eternity. For, in the abundance of the transcendent riches of His goodness, God was unwilling to keep Himself to Himself; He felt impelled to pour Himself forth, and make Himself common property. Augustine says: It is the nature and manner of God to pour Himself forth; and therefore the Father poured Himself forth in the procession of the Divine Persons, and has further poured Himself out into the creatures."

"The Father, in His character as a person, turns into Himself with His divine intelligence, and, with a clear comprehension of Himself, surveys Himself in the essential abyss of His eternal substance; and then, from the naked understanding of Himself, gives full utterance to Himself; and the Word is His Son, and the confession of His Word is the parturience of His Son in eternity. He abides in Himself, in essential unity; and yet He goes forth out of Himself, in personal distinction—into a parturience of His own image. He returns (out of this image) again into Himself, taking perfect pleasure in Himself; and this pleasure in Himself flows forth in the form of an unutterable love, which is the Holy Spirit. He thus remains within Himself, goes forth from Himself, and returns into Himself. All egressions take place for the sake of the reintroductions. For this reason, the course of the heavens, and the course of man, is the noblest of all and the most perfect, because it returns in the strictest sense to its fountain-head."¹

¹ Tauler's Predigten 1, 90, 91. Frankfurt. Compare also Fr. Spee's "Trutz Nachtigall," Berlin 1817, p. 175. "Das Geheimniss der hochheiligen Dreieinigkeit," etc. ("The mystery of the most Holy Trinity.")

The true life, consequently, is a circumrotatory course, the end of which runs into the beginning; it is not a rectilinear "progressus in infinitum," which would lead us into endless banishment. As for God, so also, according to Suso, is there for man a blessed retrogression to the fountain-head of his being, a diving into the depths of his own essence, into a world of intensive infinitude. But in man it is not merely a copy of the trinitarian process in God,—it is also a continuation of that process. The original process is eternally renewed; and, as it moves on in its course, the Mystic allows himself to be carried away by it,—he becomes, as it were, a wave of the tide.¹

That in these representations of the Trinity the three Persons are not really three Egos, is clear enough. But the distinction between our birth of God, and the trinitarian process in God, is also, with a few faint exceptions, still overlooked.

In the "Teutsche Theologie" ("Theologia Germanica"),² which is probably the most recent of the works hitherto mentioned, the Persons of the Trinity recede still further into the background: on the other hand, greater prominence is given to another distinction,—the distinction, to wit, between the Divine *nature* or essence, and the Divine *operation*. Suso, appealing to Augustine, had remarked,—The unity is actually realized in and through the triplicity, and the triplicity is possible on the ground of the unity. The "Teutsche Theologie," on the contrary, endeavours to bring God and man into greater nearness, by questioning the propriety of applying the category of actu-

¹ Compare Suso v. Diepenbrock i. 2, p. 217 f. He designates the Son, the counterpart or reflection of the Divine essence in the reason of the Father, its appearance in the form of knowledge, which is the substance (nature) of the Divine reason. The Holy Ghost, on the other hand, is an outflow of the will in love,—He is the bond of love in God. Compare p. 395. In the experience of the creature, also, its outflow or eruption ("Ausbruch") out of the essence of God, in which man and stone are still one, must be followed by the irruption, by the return, by the vanishment and reintgression of the creature. P. 397.

² Ed. Detzer, after Luther, 1827; F. Pfeiffer, "Theologie deutsch," 1851. Compare Ullmann, "Studien und Kritiken," 1852. [Pfeiffer's edition of the "Theologia Germanica" has been rendered into English by Miss Winkworth. In revising my translation of this account of the "Theologia Germanica," I have derived help from Miss Winkworth's beautiful version.—TR.]

ality to the immanent being of God, and by maintaining that the Divine attributes first attained to actuality in the world.

The noblest and most delightful thing in all creatures, says the "*Theologia Germanica*," is reason and will.¹ To God as Godhood appertains neither will, nor knowledge, nor revelation; neither This nor That: but to God as God pertains, that He should affirm (*bejahen*), declare, know, and love, and reveal Himself to Himself in Himself; and all this without the aid of creatures. And all this is still in God as an essence or substance, and not as a working. Out of this (inner) revelation of Himself to Himself, arises the distinction of persons. But when God as God is man, or where God lives in a godly or deified man, then something belongs to God which is His own property, and not that of the creatures. For it is in Him originally and essentially, apart from the creature, but not formally or actually. That which is thus essentially in Him, God is minded to put into practice and operation. If it lay idle, of what use would it be? But this may not take place apart from the creature. Should there be neither This nor That, and were there no work nor actuality, nor anything of the like nature, what would or could God be Himself, or whose God would He be?² Without creatures, God would be merely an essence and fountain-head, not a work: all virtue, light, knowledge, will, love, righteousness, is in God merely an essence, and not one of them is put in exercise and wrought out into deeds without creatures. But when the One, who whilst One is all these, even God, takes a creature to Himself, and has it in His power, that it may become conscious of its own, how it is one will and one love, then is He (God) instructed concerning Himself. Without the creature, God could not really, actually become conscious of that which He really possesses; and yet this is both fitting and necessary to perfection (p. 104, ed. Pfeiffer). The eternal will, which in God is of the nature of a substance, and is entirely without works and actuality, is an actuality and has volitions in the creature. But precisely for this reason, the

¹ C. 48, ed. Luther; Pfeiffer, c. 31.

² C. 29 according to Luther's edition; c. 31 according to Pfeiffer's. He concludes,—At this point we must turn round and stand still; for, if we were to follow and grope after such things, even at a distance, we should not know where we were, and how we were to return.

will of the creature belongs solely to God; and the creature ought not to will with the same will, but God alone, whose property the created will is, quite as truly as the eternal will. The creature that falls in herewith, is man as to his will and as to his reason. It takes place in the deified man, who, having perfectly relinquished his own Ego and self, loves God for no other reason than that He is the good, even as God also loves Himself, not as Himself, but because He is good. Were he, and did he know, aught better than God, he would love that same thing, and not himself.¹

From this we see that deification (*Vergottung*) is the universal destiny of men: or it is already an actual fact, because God wills to become man in their will and spirit. Even the very origin of humanity is a commencement of this goal: humanity, however, when it proceeded forth from God, did not at once return to its source and origin, but gave itself up to self-seeking. This was sin, to abide in the love of the creature; and thus not merely to hinder its own process of deification, but also to bring to a standstill the process of the incarnation of God. Still, both the one and the other continue to be the destination of men.

But we are now the more compelled to ask,—*What place does this Mysticism assign to the incarnation in Christ?*

Master Eckhart, who in general confines himself more than any of the others to the domain of abstract speculation, furnishes scarcely anything in the way of an answer to this question. He does not, indeed, expressly undertake to controvert the doctrine of the Church; but yet, when he maintains, as he very distinctly does, that every man is capable of receiving the entire God, and that blessedness is impossible to men save as they do possess God entirely, he puts the true Mystic, or friend of God, on the very same footing as Christ. He scarcely ever speaks of Christ, but of God; and a number of passages of Scripture, which refer to Christ, he applies, without further explanation, to God. Even the holy Eucharist, concerning which he discourses at great length, is, at the close, treated by him solely as a feast of fellowship with God.² He also declares

¹ Pfeiffer, c. 32; Luther, 30; cll. 48, 49, in Pfeiffer, c. 51.

² See Note 64; and the *Instit. Tauler.* in Surius, c. 39, p. 778 ff., especially N. 5-8 and 12. Compare the explanation of the passage, Gal. iv. 1,

it to be a sign of a lower stage, to be able to apprehend God better in one than in another.¹

Even Tauler says,²—In the sacrament, we must penetrate through the sign to unity with God. We must even pass beyond the humanity of Christ, not allowing ourselves to be retarded by its beauty: we must allow ourselves to be transported above all created things, into that simple and pure being, in which are no distinctions. Suso also sets up the deepest abyss, the dark state of utter indeterminateness, in which all manifoldness and the spirit's own selfhood disappear, as the objective goal of man. That is the endless "where?" (John xii. 26), which is the termination of the *spirithood* (*Geisttheit*) of all spirits, and in which constantly to have lost oneself, is eternal blessedness (c. 56). Similarly also, says Ruysbroch,³—In persons, God is an eternal operation; but in nature, an eternal leisure and rest. Now, we also can become one blessedness with the Divine Persons, one love and one enjoyment. But there still remains the highest stage of knowledge to be attained,—the stage of ignorance, where there is neither God nor creature, as far as respects the distinction of persons; but where we in God, and God in us, form one simple blessedness, provided we have all lost ourselves, and have been diffused through, or even dissolved in, the unknown obscurity. This is the highest that can be attained in eternal blessedness, in life, death, enjoyment, love; and whoso teacheth differently, is unwise.

Such assertions as these, however, ought rather to be regarded as the not yet cast away scoriæ of the Mysticism of the Pseudo-Areopagite, which Suso, Ruysbroch, and Tauler believed themselves under obligation to honour,⁴ than as expressive of

of the birth of the eternal Son in the soul, l. c. 540. So also Matt. xxviii. 21, of God instead of, of Christ.

¹ Ecc. Testam. p. 670. Only in the "Notabiles aliquot Instit." l. c. 669 f. is the example of Christ mentioned—His purity of soul, to which we must conform ourselves.

² In Surius 241. Fer. Pasch. p. 203. There we are called upon to go back of the distinctions in God (the inner revelation), into the "*natura Dei sine distinctione*;" and, on the other hand, our "*gigni ex Deo*" is put on an equal footing with the "*gigni*" of the Son.

³ "Die Sieben Stufen der Liebe," l. c. pp. 174–179.

⁴ See, for example, Ruysbroch's "*das Königreich der Liebhaber Gottes*," c. 18.

their own distinctive and best views. The old Mysticism, absorbed as it was in a one-sided objectivity, deemed it its duty to laud that superessential God, who is unmixed darkness and a boundless waste, as the Highest, in which all things must disappear, or through which they must be dissolved into mere seeming: this German Mysticism, on the contrary, had far too strong a consciousness of personality, to rest contented with such views. Nor did it esteem the enjoyment of God or the bliss of His vision to be the main thing, as did the later Romanic Mysticism. On the one hand, it was too chaste to toy and trifle in such a connection as this; it was too grand and deep to treat God solely as a means to another end.¹ On the other hand, God was far too well known and too near to the heart of these Mystics, to permit them to be satisfied with the thought of the rigid and void absolute. Suso denounces the *ungodding* (Entgottung) of God as one of the most dangerous errors that can be cherished; and in doing so, also raises his voice against that empty idea of the absolute, which leaves no difference between it and simple nonentity. They were stirred by the same motives also, when they spoke with one accord against the men of the Free Spirit, against "vainglorious reason, which all things escape, be they hell or heaven, devils or angels, taken in their own proper nature; which also despises the humanity of Christ, as soon as it has found God therein." (Note 3.) Indeed, they well knew, especially Ruysbroch, that there is such a thing as a leisure without symbols, proceeding from nature (*bildlose Musse aus der Natur*).² The same Ruysbroch, who received the title, "Doctor Ecstaticus," and who desired to disappear entirely in God, in the whole God, expresses more clearly almost than any of the others what he means thereby. The altereity (*Anderheit*) between God and us, is to be removed by the unity; but, at the same time, he very frequently maintains, that the distinction between God and us cannot be extinguished. The task devolving upon us is simply this,—to enter into quietude, simplicity, and indeterminateness, to wit, into that purely passive state, in which it is possible for God to work. Now, if the condition,

¹ Suso displays most tendency to fall into a view frequently of a playful character; for example, p. 250.

² "Von der geistlichen Hochzeit," Buch iii. 4 ff. "Königreich der Liebhaber Gottes," c. 26, B. 3.

in which we are out beyond time and space, beyond the many, becomes a fixed one, and we are rapt into the eternal consciousness, without having yet experienced the revelation of the love of God to us, we look out, as it were, on a waste desert :—this is the abstract consciousness of eternity, which, when it does not attempt to work for and of itself, but is left over to God, does not allow us to rest satisfied with itself. The “desert,” measureless, modeless Being, may for the moment be supposed, by a species of optical delusion, to constitute an objective characteristic of God, although, strictly speaking, it expresses merely the emptying of the subjective consciousness : but this remainder of Areopagitic Mysticism finds an immediate corrective in their doctrine, that out of the waste ocean of infinitude there rises the clear and glorious image of the Son of God, who is born for us and in us, out of the dark abysmal ground.^{1*} Not by mere negation, but by “a dying life and a living dying,” do we enjoy God, and become blessedness. God is love, at once penurious and freehanded : He seeks to take, as well as to give. We would fain be dissolved in Him, but we cannot effect it : it is not His will, and He brings us again to ourselves. It is true, the image of God is in us, in its entirety, undivided ; and is impressed, in its totality, on every childlike face : we live in that same image, and it lives in us. Notwithstanding, as to our essence and nature, we remain ever divided, discriminated ;² though without reflection thereon, in childlike self-forgetfulness. Regarding the child of God, on the contrary, he expressly asserts, that he is conscious of his sonship, and has the assurance of eternal blessedness.³ Nay more, he advances onward to the knowledge, that every child of God is an unity of a peculiar kind ; and that in him therefore lives the intrinsically one, undivided image of God,—lives in him in its entirety, and yet in peculiar manner.⁴ The process of sonship is also a continuous one. As God’s love is invariably “penurious and freehanded” at one and the same time,—that is, is *holy* goodness, and not merely lavish goodness,—the children of God are both poor and rich, active and inactive—the one in the other. They are

¹ See above. * See Note A, App. II.

² “Der Spiegel des ewigen Heils,” c. 22.

³ “Von der Vollkommenheit der Kinder Gottes,” c. 8, p. 15.

⁴ “Das Königreich der Liebhaber Gottes,” c. 26, p. 58. c. 33.

not solely introverted, nor do they necessarily fall out of themselves, even when they apply themselves again to action. God bids them go forth, and to go forth is also God's love. The true absorption in God continues without intermission.¹

We see thus, that the special object of the love of these Mystics, is not the God of the undisclosed mystery; but the living God, the God of revelation, that is, of the inner revelation. It is true, indeed, that the idea of a God whose inmost essence is holy love, had not yet dawned upon them: they are still troubled by the shadow of the *"Ov*, which old authorities taught them to consider as the Highest; and they are therefore oftentimes untrue to themselves. But they do not reduce the revelation of God to a mere seeming, to a mere theophany: they regard it, on the contrary, as the accomplishment of an actual divine work, and as the production of an actual life of God:—this work is the birth from God, the child of God.

But the question returns with ever increasing force,—What place remains for the external revelation in Christ? Is the Christ in us, recognised by this Mysticism, merely the eternal Son of God, who is eternally born of the Father, and embraces us, as *momenta* of Himself, in His eternal birth; or does the historical Christ also retain His place?

In the first place, it must be remarked, that these Mystics do not handle the Christology of the Church critically, but in

¹ "Von der Vollkommenheit der Kinder Gottes," c. 9. Suso also maintains that the outmost and the inmost must intermingle. "Whoso realizes the inward in the outward, to him the inward becomes more inward than it does to him who merely realizes the inward in the inward." Even in the view of Master Eckhart, it is God's will "maximum in minimo largiri:" for the reflection, that the world is nothing, must be supplemented by that other reflection, that God is everywhere, and therefore can and should be everywhere apprehended. Ecc. Test. Sur. p. 670. Having been asked with regard to his secret friendship with God, and what he deemed the highest, he is said by Eckhart the Younger to have answered (l. c. p. 46 f.),—"Not the feeling, the experience, the tasting of God, and the reception of His enlightenment, did he esteem the highest that had happened to him; but that he should have overcome all the rebellion and disorder of his nature, all ability and inability, all hatred and love; that he should enjoy everywhere the presence of divine light, that he should do everything in this light, and that he should daily begin afresh, and daily be as a new-born child (*ἀπ' ἐννέου βρέφος*)."

part repeat it verbatim.¹ At the same time, it is somewhat remarkable, that they take particular pleasure in speaking of the impersonality of the human nature of Christ: that part of the doctrine of the Church was, to them, not a mere matter of traditional faith. So Eckhart the Younger, Tauler, Ruysbroch.² The reason thereof is plain from what we have previously advanced. According to the doctrine of the Mystics, to be mystically resigned to God, to give up all selfhood and speciality, and to become as it were impersonal, is the preliminary condition of our being made children of God. Whilst, therefore, Christ was, on the one hand, the eternal Son of God, who had entered into time, and had been born of Mary; He was also, even as man, God and the Son of God, because He was continually resigned to God, in "humility, poverty, and abasement." In this state of humiliation, He emptied His very soul of knowledge, and made Himself partaker of ignorance.³ Hence they attached great importance to the humanity of Christ. *Christ was the archetypal Mystic.* The abasement of Christ, which, during the Middle Ages, had been almost forgotten, in view of the majesty of His Kingship, and the glory of the gifts and power which He entrusted to the Church (see Div. II. Vol. i., pp. 270 ff.), was now represented as of essential and integrant significance for the Person of Christ Himself. Without humility and poverty of life and spirit, the Son of God could not possibly have been born in Jesus. By these Mystics, therefore, the humanity of Christ is regarded with peculiar affection; it is, indeed, their archetype of humanity. Souls which desire to be the daughters of God, must, according to Tauler, fix their gaze on the humanity of Christ.⁴ Says Ruysbroch,—Christ, as to His created soul, was and is the highest and most excellent contemplator and lover, and realized the highest possible degree of enjoyment. But as to His deity, He is that which we enjoy, and bestows

¹ Suso, p. 399. Tauler's Weihn. Pred. in Surius, pp. 40 ff. See further Ruysbroch's "Spiegel der ewigen Heils," c. 8, where the Church doctrine of the atonement is set forth, c. 20.

² Eckhart the Younger, in Surius, p. 12. Tauler's Dritte Osterpr. in Sur. pp. 206, 207. Ruysbroch l. c., and in the third book of the work, "Von der geistlichen Hochzeit."

³ Tauler's Sexag. i., pp. 117 ff.

⁴ "Vierte Weihnachtspredigt," in Surius, pp. 51, 52.

Himself on all who desire Him, in common.¹ In His humanity, through the contact of the Father, He was impelled without intermission to go forth from the unity, to all virtues, and all distresses, spiritual and corporeal; and again, stirred by the yearnings and impatience of love, He flowed back inwards,—without, however, being able to rest in the unity, because of the contact of the Father. Herein He did, and does still, resemble the most holy Three, who are fruitful in themselves, and cannot permanently abide in the unity of nature. If previously He had grace, now He has glory, in the measure of His created capacity.² Before the soul of Ruysbroch, stood especially the exalted Christ, in all His majesty. “The humanity of Christ was filled with all the glory of God; His deity was not merely veiled, but also revealed by His humanity; the humanity was the candlestick, on which the light is set to shine for the whole world.”³ He clothed Himself with the humanity of us all, as though a king should clothe himself with the garments of his servants. And yet He adorned His body and His soul with the royal garment of His deity. On humanity, the impersonal, He impressed His own personality and image.⁴ In virtue of its high union with the deity, His humanity has a fulness of all graces, gifts,⁵ and virtues. But even the glorious humanity of Christ, with all His household, and with all His and its capacity, is directed to show forth the honour of God the Father with praise, thanksgiving, and reverence.

Suso and Tauler, on the contrary, fix their thoughts more upon the suffering than upon the exalted Christ. The contemplation of the sufferings of Christ ought to lead the soul to resignation. “A high love, loves the sufferings of Christ; for they immoderately affect the heart.”⁶ Suso speaks much of suffering, especially of inner suffering, and puts it under the

¹ “Das Königreich der Liebhaber Gottes,” c. 35, p. 81.

² “Das Königreich der Liebhaber Gottes,” c. 26, p. 57.

³ “Der Spiegel des ewigen Heils,” c. 9, 20.

⁴ *Ibidem*, c. 8.

⁵ “Die Sieben Stufen der Liebe,” c. 5, p. 157. Compare further the “Drei Bücher von der geistlichen Hochzeit,” B. i. c. 2, p. 9, where His twofold humility, His love, His patience, and the poverty of His soul, on our behalf, are the subject of discourse. Further, B. 2, c. 34, p. 72 f.; c. 47, p. 86; c. 51, 61, 76.

⁶ Suso l. c. p. 580.

cross; for there the heart becomes tender, and forgiving, and penitent. But still he regards suffering after Christ's example, mainly as a mere suffering like Christ, as a reproduction of His sufferings in sympathy with and pity for Him: hence also he held it to be quite as important to contemplate the sufferings of the sorrowing mother, as to contemplate the sufferings of Christ. Christ, it is true, suffers for the whole world. But even the high love of man thirsts for suffering, and desires to suffer for the whole world.¹ In Suso, there are as yet no signs of a deeper consciousness of sin.²

As regards the consciousness of sin, Tauler occupies a higher position:³ he was also more the preacher of repentance. He gave prominence to the doctrines affecting us, which are infolded in the death of Christ. Christ, in that act, he thinks, showed the love which dies even for enemies, and which allows their sins to be heaped upon itself. The work entitled, "*Teutsche Theologie*," goes even a step further. It views the sufferings of Christ, not merely as the sufferings of His loving humanity, on behalf of His brethren,—sufferings which we also are to endure, following in His footsteps; but also as the sufferings of God. He denies, however, at the same time, that Christ's sufferings alone, were the sufferings of God.

God, in as far as He is God, can experience neither sorrow, nor grief, nor displeasure; and yet God is grieved on account of the sin of man. Now, as grief may not befall God apart from the creature, it must take place when God is man, or when God is in a deified man. Behold, then, how painful sin is to God!—it vexes Him so grievously, that He would willingly Himself be tortured and die a bodily death, if so be He could thus

¹ Compare, on p. 327, the, in a poetical point of view, very beautiful passage concerning the inexpressible suffering endured by the heart of the pure Queen of the kingdom of heaven. In that passage there is no allusion whatever to personal sin, but the climax of the whole is,—“Alas! which underwent the severer, the greater distress (Christ, or the Mother)? In both cases it was so unfathomable, that it can never be equalled!” Compare pp. 440, 580.

² Compare, for example, the passage treating of the play of love which God carries on with the soul,—a passage which, poetically, is also exceedingly beautiful. P. 280.

³ Compare in Surius, the Sermon on Sexag. p. 117; and for Parascuee, p. 183 ff.

destroy the sin of one man. And if one should ask Him, whether He would rather live and let sin continue, or die and blot out sin with His death? God would reply,—I would a thousand times rather die: for to God the sin of one man is more painful and grievous, than His own torture and death. And if the sin of one man is thus painful to Him, what must be the sin of all men? We ought to note, therefore, how greatly man distresses God with his sins. Hence, where God is man, or is in a deified man, nothing is matter of complaint save sin, and nothing else gives pain; for all that exists and takes place without sin, God approveth, and it is His. But the complaint and sorrow, which are on account of sin, ought to continue, and must continue, in a deified man till they end in bodily death, even though the man should live till the day of judgment, or for ever. This is the root of Christ's secret suffering, concerning which no one telleth or knoweth aught, save Christ alone;—therefore is it said to be, and is, secret. It is also an attribute of God, which it is His will to possess, which pleases Him in a man, and which is without doubt His own; for it appertains not to the man, and it is not possible for him. And where God findeth this, He loveth and esteemeth it more than ought else; whilst, at the same time, to man it is the bitterest and hardest.¹

But the "Theologia Germanica," in attributing to Christ this suffering on account of sin, does not mean to attribute to Him something which is exclusively His: it gives no prominence to the difference, that Christ did not suffer for His own sin, as we do. Whilst it views His sufferings as sufferings for the sin of the world, it, at the same time, requires of every deified man, that he suffer as Christ suffered. This is clear from the following quotations:² "Whoso is in disobedience, is in sin; and sin is never atoned and bettered, save by a return into God.—But if man enters into obedience, all is amended, and atoned, and forgiven: otherwise not.—Were it possible for a man to renounce himself and all things, and to live a life of purity and of true obedience, as did the humanity of Christ, he would be totally without sin, and one and the same thing with Christ,—he would be the same by grace that Christ was by nature. But some say,—That cannot be: no one is without sin. But be

¹ C. 35; in Pfeiffer's Ed. c. 37.

² C. 14; in Pfeiffer's Ed. c. 16.

that as it may,—it is still true, that the nearer we are to true obedience, the less sin ; the more Mine, I, Me—that is, Egoity and Selfhood—diminish, the more does God's I, that is, God Himself, grow in me. Were all men truly obedient, there would be no pain, no sufferings. But, alas! all men live in disobedience. Were a man as pure and complete in his obedience as Christ was, to him all disobedience would be a great and bitter pain. For, though all men should be against him, they could neither move nor trouble him ; for in virtue of such obedience, the man would be one thing with God, and *God Himself would also be that man*.—See then! Although it is not possible for any man to be so pure and perfect in his obedience as Christ, still it is possible for every man to approach so nearly thereto, that he shall be said to be, and shall really be, divine and deified. And the nearer a man draws to this goal of perfect obedience, the more painful and grievous to him is all disobedience, sin, wickedness, and unrighteousness."

In opposition to the Free Spirits, who were minded to decide freely and independently regarding all things, like God Himself, "who is unmoveable and without conscience, and what He does is well done," the author remarks,—“The devil also has no conscience, but is not the better on that ground. Show me the man who knows himself to be guiltless! Christ alone, and few besides. See then :—whoso is without conscience, is either Christ or the devil.” The distinctive feature of Christ, then, is, that in Him was complete sinlessness, complete deification ; and that, consequently, God Himself was the Man in Him. This is *not yet* the case with us. Christ loved neither this, nor that, nor Himself, but alone the eternal good ; God therefore was the one who loved in Him. Similarly also in relation to knowledge. The created soul of man has two eyes ;—the one is the possibility of seeing into eternity ; the other, the possibility of seeing into time and the creature, of knowing their distinctions, of satisfying the wants of the body, and of judging and ruling it. But these two eyes of the soul of man cannot both do their work at one and the same time. When it is the soul's business to look with the right eye into eternity, the left eye must throw up and quit all its work, and must hold itself as still as though it were dead. And if the left eye is then obliged to discharge its function towards external things, the right eye

must needs be hindered in its beholding. Whoso is minded to have the one, must let the other go; for no man can serve two masters. But in the soul of Christ it was not so. At the very moment when it was created, it turned its right eye into eternity and into the Deity, and stood immoveable in the complete use and vision of the Divine essence and of eternal perfection: it continued thus unmoved and unhindered by all the accidents, labours, tortures, and anguish which were experienced by the outward man. With the left eye, it saw into creation, and there recognised all things, and perceived distinctions in the creatures—what was better or worse, what was nobler or less noble; and according thereto was the outward man of Christ ordered.¹

Nevertheless, as it is the vocation of us all that God should become man in us, and that we should be deified *with* Christ, it is possible for the soul, during its bodily life, not merely to cast a glance into eternity, and to receive a foretaste of eternal life and blessedness; but if, as St Dionysius exhorts, the soul entirely separates itself from time, creatures, and fancies, it may come to pass, that a man shall even dwell therein, and gaze therein, as often as he is minded, and that things thereafter shall become very easy and trifling in his eyes, which he once deemed impossible. And as often as he returns into God's Spirit above time, all that is brought back in a moment, which had previously been lost.²

From the preceding it is clear, that, according to the "Theologia Germanica," the difference between Christ and us, although indeed it does still exist, is, at the same time, destined to disappear along with sin; inasmuch as God aims at becoming the personality in us also, and as the eternal Son of God is by

¹ C. 7. He adds,—“The inner man of Christ remained untouched by all the labour, suffering, and torture which His outward man went through: the former retained perfect exercise of its divine nature, continued to possess perfect gladness, joy, and eternal peace, no less than after the ascension or at the present time. Nor was the outward man and the left eye of the soul of Christ ever hindered or troubled by the inward eye in its works, and all that which belonged to it.” Evidently, the only result here arrived at, is a continuous juxtaposition, but not an interweaving of the outward and inward man. The latter is represented as remaining untouched by suffering; and that, although the author elsewhere teaches, that even God Himself purposed to suffer.

² C. 8.

no means born in Christ alone. But even the other forms of German Mysticism, with all the above-mentioned principles, do not advance beyond the idea of an essential co-ordination of the God-man Christ and the perfect Mystic. Indeed, the doctrine of the impersonality of the human nature of Christ is expressly employed to give force to the demand, that our nature shall also become impersonal in us, and surrender itself to be constituted personal by the entire God. In which same connection, attention is also partially directed to the fact, that, in Christ's impersonal humanity, humanity in its entirety, and consequently our individual humanity also, had already been assumed by God; and that we, therefore, only need to take ourselves, in that nature and essence of ours which was assumed by the Son, to become or to remain impersonal, and the eternal Son will become the personality in us.¹ Even Suso, although he distinctly declares that "a natural, human hypostasis (*Unterstanding*) can never be lost, nor can an hypostasis of the divine person ever be transferred" (p. 399), we find also saying,—“The only begotten Son is to be compared to an image which is infinitely manifold, and which denotes all men; for all men are His members, and either are or become sons, through Him and in Him” (p. 406). In like manner, also, he considers the eternal Son to be even the “*mundus intelligibilis*.” And yet Suso takes pains to give prominence to those features which distinguish Christ from all others. “Far higher than the union of souls in God is the union arising from the inflow-

¹ So Eckhart the Younger l. c. p. 12; see above. Tauler, on the contrary, says (in his Third Easter Sermon, p. 206 in Surius; see above),—“Christ, on His part, by assuming my nature, has already drawn me to Himself; but for me His nature is near, not His person. Woe unto us, if, content with our natural relationship, we do not unite ourselves with His person!” Ruysbroch, again, says (in his “*Spiegel des ewigen Heils*,” c. 8),—“We also must be clothed with the same divinity (as the humanity of Christ), in that we love Him so warmly as to be able to deny ourselves and surmount our created personality: then shall we be *personally* united with His personality,—that is, with the eternal Truth.” This Mysticism lacked a developed doctrine of the Holy Spirit; and for that reason almost identified the process of sonship with the incarnation. In recent times, Marheineke also has attached a significance to, and made an application of, the idea of the impersonality of the human nature of Christ, similar to these Mystics: see his “*System der christlichen Dogmatik*,” 1847, p. 285 ff

ing of Christ (of the Word into the humanity of Christ), since it is in a personal being. For, from the very beginning, when He was conceived as a man, He was the natural Son of God, so that He had no other selfstanding (*Selbststandung*) than that of the Son of the almighty, eternal God."—"This man, Christ the Lord, is distinguished above all other men, by being the Head of Christendom, which is His body (Rom. viii. 29). And, therefore, whoso desireth to attain to a true re-entrance, and to become son in Christ, let him turn from himself to Him with sincere resignation, and he shall come whither he ought to come" (p. 399). "Some regard the sufferings of Christ solely after an outward, and not after an inward manner; or with their reason, in a contemplative manner, and not operatively: instead of which, they ought to break through their own nature, by an *imitative exercise* of this image. Instead thereof, they make everything subservient to nature, to voluptuousness, and to mere joy" (p. 407).

Notwithstanding much vacillation, the Mystics of West Germany, from Costnitz and Basel to Holland, may be shown to have made progress in Christology. The two Eckharts, indeed, limited themselves mainly to the domain of the abstract "eternal consciousness," relatively to which the historical is not at all of vital significance; but still, as their entire interest was concentrated on the history of the birth of the individual man into the child or son of God, which they regarded as a *momentum* in the eternal filiation of God (*Sohnwerdung*), they, at all events, got partially quit of that rigid conception of God, which represented Him as void infinite Being. But, whilst these two were unable to assign to Christ other than a non-essential, adventitious, position, there arose on the horizon of Ruysbroch, out of the "Desert" of the emptied and resigned consciousness, the image of the Son in divine glory: and in that we are mirrors capable of reflecting the eternal parturience of the Son, we become also its continuation. The humanity of Christ, also, he was able to include; for he took special pleasure in giving prominence to its lustre, and to the fact of its participation in divine glory. Yet, even in his view, the divinity of Christ is that which we also enjoy. A more intimate relation to the historical Christ, however, was not established until the suffering, the anguish of the soul, began to be regarded with love,

and the moral significance of suffering began to be discerned. This result was mightily furthered by the decay and corruptions of the Church, which, as in the days of the prophets, drove the more earnest minds in upon their own inward being. The mystical principle,—that suffering is to be sought, not to be avoided,—now attained to ever greater importance, and bore ever fuller fruit. By this suffering was primarily and principally understood, indeed, that death in speculative abstraction, on which earlier Mystics had also insisted ;—that is, the suffering, in connection with the residue of a purely physical conception of God, was something which would have involved the destruction of the very personality, which was now beginning to assert itself so energetically, had its efforts not been directed to the goal of God becoming the personality of man. We have found, however, even in this “resignation,” an ethical element ; for, whilst the soul is transported, it also soars itself, above time and space :—it acts for itself, and is not merely acted upon. The more men are led, by the beholding of the birth of the child of God, to the knowledge of God as love, the more entirely must that passive resignation to God be changed into susceptibility to the communication of the divine love ; the more must passivity in relation to the loving God, become the negation, not merely of false activity, but also of false passivity. That the true, ethical, passivity is at the same time activity, yearning for love ; and that, as the unity of doing and suffering, it is susceptibility to the infinite good,—was taught especially by Ruysbroch and Tauler. Such views leave for Christ the position of archetype. He possessed what we need first to acquire : in Him the highest good became the property of man : He demonstrated the possibility of the humanification (*Menschwerdung*) of God in us also, which is the deification (*Gottwerdung*) of man. But if Christ stood before us solely in His glory, and in the majesty He had earned for Himself, He would again wear to us, in our present condition, and as we see ourselves in the light of love, the look of a judge and a stranger, did not the Mystic (see Tauler) look back to His abasement, gentleness, humility—to His earthly appearance. By the spectacle of His humiliation, of His sufferings, the eye of love is encouraged to look upwards. There He is like our selves, approachable. The “Imitation of the poverty of the

life of Jesus," became, therefore, the watchword of Mysticism in the ethical and practical forms, which it now more and more assumed. If we live with Him, sharing His abasement, His dignity also, will be made ours. Instead of an archetype, Christ now became a warm, living, enchaining, encouraging example.

But at this point also, there again occurs a premature equalization of man with Christ. That empirical imitation of Christ, which was aimed at in so many forms during the Middle Ages (among which are to be reckoned, not merely the stigmata and outward poverty of life, but also the efforts to copy and reproduce the pains of soul felt by Christ and Mary), looked at more deeply, was rooted in forgetfulness of the difference between the sufferings of Christ and ours. In fostering sympathy with Mary and Jesus, they were filled with the notion, that such an endurance of the pains of sympathizing love was in itself a good work pleasing to God : Christ, in His sufferings, was treated as though He needed our sympathy, or as though the suffering into which He seeks to draw us, ought to be of the same kind as His own,—an endurance of sorrow for the sin of the world. Sympathizing with Christ, the Mystic thought, through suffering, to rise to be a co-operator with Christ in the work of redemption.¹ Even at the best, what he looked to learn at the foot of the cross, was love, forgiveness, gentleness towards men; of his own sin, and especially of his own guilt, he was seldom reminded. He preferred rocking himself in the sweet pains of a natural sympathetic love, to seeing in the cross, on the one hand, the condemnation, and on the other hand, the atonement, of his guilt. This was especially the case with Suso. Tauler, indeed, with his deeper earnestness, speaks of a descent into hell, which we have to make. And yet he soon again returns to the view of this repentance, as itself possessing an atoning virtue, when conjoined with the daily confession of sin to God : he soon again requires love to God, after the example of Christ ; assuring us, that whoso possesses it, possesses blessedness, and that without the possibility of losing it. Then again, as though he doubted whether love to God would be enkindled by the mere fact of its requirement, or by the example of Christ, he says,—“For us in our exile, the only thing is pure

¹ Some of the later Mystics, even of the Protestant Church, fell partially back into this error.

and naked faith—not that faith which is unconnected with good works, but the faith which asks to receive no kind of sensible consolation.”¹ No man could employ this language who had felt the deepest kind of anguish—the anguish of a soul conscious of its guilt.

But when Christ is regarded solely as the archetype of mystical love or deification, and as the example of a love which embraces the world, the position assigned to Him cannot fail to be a merely adventitious and external one. In the view of Mysticism, He is, strictly speaking, merely an historical personage, not an object of religious faith. Even the expression, “Faith in Christ,” is scarcely once employed in the writings of the Mystics, although they did not actually break with tradition, and often concealed from themselves the real state of the matter, by confounding and interchanging the eternal Son with Christ. For this reason too, notwithstanding all the lofty words they employ and the promises they make, they never arrive at the one thing, peace: and that, although, as we remarked at the commencement, the blessedness of the soul was the very heart and core of their care. Complaints of the ceaseless vacillation between the temporal and the eternal consciousness, constantly reappear; they found no way of bringing the right and the left eye to vision at one and the same time. Their inner life alternated between seasons of the deepest woe—of a feeling of divine desertion, or of “existence without consolation,”—and seasons of the highest joy, during which they fancied themselves dissolving in blissful emotions and in the fulness of God: but the true union of the two, they failed to realize, because they had never truly sounded their moral depth. Had they experienced that deepest form of anguish, the consciousness of guilt; and had they seen in grace, which compassionates and pardons the guilty, the true object of joy,—the two would have sought, and fully met each other. Faith in Him who atoned for guilt, would have been the marriage of true sorrow and true joy; and these two, henceforth never separated, but indissolubly united, would have been fitted permanently to constitute the main feature of a new life. Thus even this, the noblest form of life and thought to be met with in the Middle Ages, bears in itself the marks of its origin, to

¹ Compare in Surius, pp. 237, 447 ff., 160, 692.

wit, unconciliated dualistic elements. And if we have seen how this unvanquished dualism manifested itself in the imperfect Christology which then existed—a Christology which vacillated between a higher kind of Ebionitism and Docetism,—we shall be justified in hoping that either now, that the principle of the conjunction of these dualistic elements has been attained, or never, a more perfect Christology will be constructed.

Mysticism was, in the main, only led away from the path, which necessarily ended in the Reformation, by the Bishop of Brixen, Cardinal Nicolaus Cusanus (from Cus in the province of Treves), and by Bertholdt's so-called "*Deutsche Theologie*" (see below). We discover here a Mysticism which is already bending its steps backwards to the dogmas of the Church, and which forms the Western correlate to the Mysticism of Nicolas Cabasilas in the East. Cusanus, who flourished about the time of the Council of Florence, attached great value to the works both of Master Eckhart¹ and of John Scotus Erigena (this latter he designates Scotigena); but he makes no allusion to the other heads of the German school of Mystics. From that ethical Mysticism, which, when it advanced in a direct line, made sin and guilt matter of ever more earnest consideration, he turns aside, and seeks to direct attention to that purely theoretical or speculative Mysticism, which regards the "*visio Dei*" as the thing of chief importance. For this reason, there is most inner affinity between him and the Pseudo-Areopagite (whom he held in the highest authority), and Erigena and David de Dinant, from whom he appropriated, in particular, the negative, apophatic theology, as also the idea of the intellectual vision. In his view, the task of the negative theology, is critically to analyze the traditional ideas and their contrarieties; to throw ordinary

¹ Compare the work by an enthusiastic admirer and disciple of Nicolaus, entitled, "*Apologia doctæ ignorantie*," in the "*Opera Nicolai Cusæ Cardin.*," Paris 1574, T. i. fol. 38, 39, where a whole series of works by Eckhart is adduced, all of which were at that time extant in libraries. He speaks, for example, of "*sermones multi, disputata multa, multa expositoria opera super plerosque libros bibliæ*:" amongst these latter, special mention is made of "*scripta super Joannem*," and of epitomes of the same made by foreign writers. Last of all allusion is made to a brief apologetic treatise of Eckhart's, which he, Nicolaus, had perused in Mayence at the house of Master Guldenschaf.

abstract thought into confusion ; to lead it out beyond itself, that is, beyond all merely fancied knowledge, by means of antinomies, and to force it to confess its own ignorance. This dialectical portion, he regards as the door of wisdom ; the result of this critical process, he considers to be the knowledge of the coincidence of contradictories (*coincidentia contradictoriorum*) in God,—for example, of the coincidence of “*universalia*” and “*particularia*” in the divine “*visio* ;” of being and knowledge ; of succession and its opposite ; of visibility and invisibility ; yea even, of creating and being created.¹ These antinomies, the later Nominalism had allowed to terminate in a pure scepticism ; whose professed aim, indeed, was to drive men more directly into the arms of the faith of the Church, but which really had the effect of shattering that faith to its very foundations, and of leaving in its place nothing but a spiritless, inert traditionalism : Nicolaus, on the contrary, battles zealously against both this latter Mechanicalism, and the former sceptical termination. Scepticism, he employs simply as a spur to the attainment of a higher form of knowledge through the medium of faith ; though, as we have observed, he attaches a purely theoretical significance to faith.² “*Ignorantia*,” he considers to be simply the ignorance of empirical thought ; and he makes far more energetic attempts than his predecessors to arrive at an affirmative knowledge. For the undertaking of this task, his naturally remarkably acute mind was fitted, partly by his observation of the fruits which Scholasticism had borne ; partly by his knowledge of the natural philosophy of the Arabians,—of such as Algazel, Avicenna, Avicenna,—to which little attention was paid during the Middle Ages ; but principally, and lastly, by his own studies in natural history and mathematics, which he endeavoured to apply to the purposes of theology by means of a kind of Mysticism of numbers.

We shall dwell on his system as a whole only so far as

¹ Compare the “*De docta ignorantia*,” L. i. 22, 24 ; “*De Visione Dei liber pius*,” c. 9–12.

² Compare the “*De filiatione Dei*,” where he arrives at the conclusion that the “*generatio filiorum Dei*” is the knowledge which springs from the faith, the hearing and the acceptance, of the Divine words. We find but very slight traces of the recognition of a religious-moral process. The religious aspect stands out more prominently in his most mystical work, the “*De Visione Dei*.”

is of importance for the understanding of his Christological views.¹

He deduces the necessity of the incarnation of the Word even from his theory of knowledge. We have, it is true, a sensuous knowledge also; but sensuousness makes us as it were crooked mirrors, which distort the image which falls upon them: for all sensuous knowledge lays hold of things insulatedly and partially. The formal understanding, then takes and works up these perceptions, and, by combining what is similar, arrives at the higher conceptions of "species" and "genera," at general ideas (universalia). Nominalism, when it had pointed out the subjective origin of these ideas, supposed itself to have proved the impossibility of objective truth and knowledge. Scepticism also was, in one aspect, perfectly right. But it should have gone still deeper; it should have called in question also the truth and sufficiency of sensuous knowledge. There is, namely, the rather, in us further the germ of an intellectual faculty (intellectus) which is higher than the merely natural intelligence (of the "ratio"); and it is precisely this faculty which is not satisfied by empirical and purely abstract knowledge. The "Intellectus" needs, indeed, first to be awakened to action: for which purpose, incitements from without (incitamenta) are necessary. Now, what kind of incitements? Were there none but sensuous finite things amongst these "incitamenta," instead of attaining to the vision of truth in its entirety, we should never advance beyond what was isolated and detached, and at the same time partial. But now, the Son, who became man, is the perfectly correct and true mirror of the whole truth,

¹ Compare Dr F. J. Clemens' "*Giordano Bruno und Nicolaus von Cusa*," Bonn 1847; a meritorious treatise, specially worthy of attention for the comparison drawn between the two men. It over-estimates, however, the originality of Cusa. That Cusa could not have been a man of such immense originality, ought to have been clear from the numerous works he quotes, to whose authors he appeals as to testimonies: compare especially the "*Apologia doctæ ignorantiae*," where the statements made by his pupil relatively to this point, unquestionably lay claim to credibility. The same conclusion may be deduced from what follows in the text.

The writings which it is particularly necessary to consider for his Christology, are the "*De doctâ ignorantia*" (Book iii.); "*De Visione Dei*," c. 19-25; the little work entitled "*de Filiatione Dei*;" and then some passages from his "*Excitationes*" and other works.

of God Himself. Through Him, therefore, it has become possible for us to participate in the whole truth. This participation, however,—considering that, relatively to Him, we are not, in the first instance, correct and true, but crooked, mirrors which distort,—we can only arrive at, by renouncing, with a wise Socratic ignorance, that sensuous, abstract semblance of knowledge, which abounds in antinomies, and by placing ourselves, in faith and quietude, before Him, the true mirror. United with Him, and through Him drinking in ever fuller draughts of divine life, we also shall become correct and true mirrors of truth, of God Himself, and in Him, of all things else. Thus shall we reflect all things and know all things, and God will be reflected in us.¹ In Christ, the eternal, all-embracing Word revealed Himself in a contracted form, in order that He might come near to us, and, by stimulating our intellectual faculty, lead us on to the higher grades of knowledge (Magisterium).

But now, what are the contents of this knowledge? God and the world, the one and the many,—both inseparably conjoined. The negative theology, which he also designates mystical, leads, in the first instance, to the analysis and overthrow of all privative and restrictive propositions: but it also conducts to that absolutely highest unity, in which all contraricties, the greatest as well as the least, meet in indifference. All things outside of God are susceptible of the gradations of more and less; they are, therefore, excluded both from the absolutely least (minimum) and the absolutely greatest (maximum), and can never reach either of these boundary lines, but oscillate constantly between them: they are empirically that which they are, and do not coincide with the idea, whether it be the absolutely greatest (maximum), or the absolutely least (minimum). God, on the contrary, is the absolute in every respect: He is, therefore, the least, though in such a sense that He is also the absolutely greatest; but this can only be intellectually apprehended. This One absolutely Highest (*identitas absoluta*) is

¹ In his “*De Filiatione Dei*,” he says,—“*Cognitio (the knowledge of the understanding) per similitudinem est; intellectus autem, cum sit intellectualis viva Dei similitudo, omnia in se uno cognoscit. Tunc autem se cognoscit, quando se in ipso Deo, ut est, intuetur. Hoc autem tunc est, quando Deus in ipso est ipse.*”

incommunicable, unfathomable, not contractible into this or that; eternally and intrinsically the same, and immoveable. It is primarily the possibility of everything; but, at the same time, all its possibilities are also perfectly actualities; and it is finally the unity or the bond of possibility and actuality. In the view of Cusanus, this is the Trinity. Whereas God is infinite in the negative sense, that there cannot exist anything less or greater than God, in that He alone is absolute in every respect; the world, on the contrary, is merely privatively infinite, it is *illimited*. An universe *actu* greater than the present world, and which, therefore, could encompass it, cannot exist. For, to suppose that the All might be always *actu* greater than it *actu* is, would be to maintain that it might become *actu* infinite, like God, which is impossible; for the absolute does not proceed forth from the potential (Können), but is eternally that which it is capable of being. That which arises, which becomes, on the contrary, issues from a potential, that is, it becomes that which it can become. This capability of becoming, points back to a capability of working, inherent in Him who, absolutely and eternally, is actually that which He is capable of being. The world, accordingly, is shut in between the maximum on the one side, and the minimum on the other; and is not permitted to touch either the one or the other. It could be conceived greater or less than it is; but it cannot *actu* become greater or less in infinitum; because, on such a supposition, it must be capable of being the absolute itself. If a world is to exist at all, there must be a restricted potency, a limited possibility. The "Universum" is characterized by condensation or contraction (*contractio*); for it exists in no other form than that of contraction, as This and That. Whilst, then, the unity of the Highest reposes absolutely in itself, the unity of the "Universum" exists solely in plurality and contraction.¹ But the manifold objects into which the "Universum" has *actu* contracted itself, cannot be perfectly the same; otherwise they

¹ This reminds one of Duns Scotus, and is a notably higher principle than that merely quantitative division of the absolute, from which Thomas Aquinas failed to free himself. Nicolaus v. Cusa, however, singularly enough neglects to make use of the freedom of the will as the principle of the "*contractio*;" although he endeavoured, relatively to this point, to combine the doctrine of Thomas and of Scotus.

would be coincident. What is not diverse is the same. Everything, therefore, must differ from the other, in regard to genus, species, number : and thus all things are discriminated by grades, so that no one coincides completely with another. No single contraction or condensation can exactly share the gradation of the other ; but each must, either surpass, or be surpassed by, the other. Everything contracted or condensed, stands accordingly between a maximum and the minimum. Whatever actually does exist, a greater and less degree of contraction is conceivable : but we must not proceed to the assumption of an actual “processus in infinitum actu ;” for that would involve an infinitude of gradations, to accept which would be equivalent to accepting none at all. To the absolutely highest, and to the absolutely lowest, it is impossible, therefore, for that which is contracted to arise or to descend ; it may be more or less contracted than it is ; it keeps, therefore, within limits which it does not touch. The first and most general condensation which the “Universum” undergoes, is that into *Genera* ; which must differ from each other by gradations. Genera, again, exist solely as contracted into *Species* : and Species exist only as contracted into *Individuals*. Now, as, according to the nature of that which is contracted, there exist no individuals save such as are subject to the limits of their species ; so, no individual is able to reach the limit of the genus, or of the “Universum,” although each is a peculiar contraction or condensation of the “Universum,” that is, is in itself the whole ;—not, however, actually, but in a condensed (restricted, limited) manner. Different individuals of the same species must have different degrees of perfection : no one, therefore, within its species, will be absolutely perfect or absolutely imperfect ; no one will touch or reach the limits of its species. So also no species can reach the limit of its genus ; no genus the limit of the Universum. There remains always a length or breadth of the possible outside of the actual ; and the Universum does not exhaust the absoluteness of the Divine power. All that is, moves between the maximum and the minimum, the greatest and the least ; and God is the Beginning, Middle, and End of the Universum and of individuals, in order that everything may approach to God, whether it arise or descend, or seek the middle. But all things, both genera and species, are so conjoined by Him, that

they coincide in the middle :—for example, the highest species of one genus coincides (*zusammenfällt*) with the lowest of the next higher genus, in order that they may form a “Continuum,” a perfect *Universum*. But all the articulation is by grades or stages: the highest is never reached, for that is God. But that which, in one aspect, is the highest species of one genus, and in another aspect, is the lowest of the next higher genus, must not be supposed to be a combination of two species, a composite participating equally in both :—it is a distinct and peculiar contraction or condensation, forming a connecting link. No species, therefore, descends so low as to be absolutely the least of its genus; but, ere it arrives at the absolutely least form of itself, it is converted, or it passes into another peculiar species: and the like is true of ascension. For example, in the genus of animated beings (*animalitatis*), the human species strives to reach a higher rank amongst the sensuously cognisable, and is accordingly carried upward towards mixture with intellectual natures. But in man, the sensuous nature still retains the predominance; whereas this is perhaps no longer the case with other beings, which would therefore be more correctly termed “*Intellectus*,” than animated beings. There is nothing in the “*Universum*” that does not possess distinctive characteristics (*singularitas*), discoverable in no other: no one thing surpasses all other things in every point; no one thing is like another in every point. For the principles of individuation are never combined in one individual in the same harmonic proportions as in another.¹

But if the entire world exists solely in the form of different kinds of contraction, it can never attain to the maximum, that is, to God; for the maximum is the maximum precisely because in it every possibility of perfection is also an actuality: whereas “*Contractio*,” without which there would be no world at all, in some way denotes a restricted possibility, which is not actuality, nor can *actu* become what it is potentially. And as, on the other hand, God, the maximum, cannot exist in a contracted form, an incarnation of God, which Cusanus had notwithstanding shown to be necessary, would seem to be in both aspects an impossibility.²

¹ “*De docta ignorantia*,” L. i. c. 4, 5, 10, 16, L. ii. 1–7, and iii. 1.

² *Ibid.* iii. 2.

In fact, he says also,¹ that the union of the human nature of Christ with the divine is not absolutely the highest and greatest; for it is not equal to the union existing between the Persons of the Trinity. For the union in the Trinity is essential and absolute identity; whereas human nature is incapable of entering into such an “*unio essentialis*” with the divine. The finite cannot be united with the infinite in an infinite manner; for otherwise it would pass over into identity with the infinite, and would cease to be finite, if it were truly infinite.

But the *Unio in Christ*, surpassing as it does all understanding, cannot be regarded as an union of the diverse (*diversorum*). For the absolute magnitude, which is God, cannot have another diverse opposed magnitude; inasmuch as it is itself all. Nor, again, may we conceive of the matter as of parts, which are united into a whole; for God cannot be a part. Nor can we conceive of God as the form (the formative principle, the soul), in relation to the material; for God cannot mix Himself up with matter. Nor can Christ have been compounded of God and the creature; for a composite of the absolute magnitude and of a contracted magnitude is an impossibility. Were we to regard Him as God Himself, we should deceive ourselves; for the creature never changes its nature: were we to regard Him as a creature, we should again be in error; for the absolute magnitude stands in no need of a nature.

We may thus see that he does not take his task lightly. How, then, does he solve the problem?

Whatever difference there may be now, and will eternally continue to be, between the “*Universum*” and God,—though it

¹ “*De Visione Dei*,” c. 20. “*Ostendis mihi, lux indeficiens, maximam unionem, qua natura humana in Jhesu meo est tuæ naturæ divinæ unita, non esse quovis modo infinitæ unioni similem. Unio enim, qua unione tu Deus pater es unitus Deo filio tuo, est Deus Spiritus Sanctus; et ideo est infinita unio. Non sic, ubi natura humana unitur divinæ. Nam humana natura non potest transire in unionem cum divina essentialem, sicut finitum non potest infinito infinite uniri; transiret enim in identitatem infiniti et sic desineret esse finitum, quando de eo verificaretur infinitum. Qua propter hæc unio, qua natura humana est naturæ divinæ unita, non est nisi attractio naturæ humanæ ad divinam in altissimo gradu. Itaque natura ipsa humana ut talis elevatius attrahi nequit: maxima igitur est unio ejus naturæ humanæ ut humanæ ad divinam, quia major esse nequit. Sed non est simpliciter maxima et infinite, ut est unio divina.*”

be such that God cannot become the world, nor the world God,—it would be contradictory to represent Him as merely outside of the “Universum,” and not also as the beginning, middle, and end of the world. It is both His will and a necessity, that there be an intimate relation between Himself and the contracted, the condensed. Were the “Contractio” itself not unitable with God, how could the contracted creature have sprung from the absolute being of God?¹ It must, therefore, be possible on the part of the creature, even as it is necessary for God, that he should unite himself with the “Universum;” and his union with the “Universum” must be an universal one: he must be united with all, as the beginning, middle, and end. Now, in what way can such an union be actually brought to pass? He answers,—Solely in the nature of humanity. The order of nature requires that some things be of a lower nature, as, for example, inanimate and irrational beings; others of a higher nature, as, for example, spirits; others of a middle sort. Now, if the absolute magnitude is, in the most general sense, the entity of all (*entitas generalissime omnium*), clearly that nature can be most readily united with the “Maximum” which has closest fellowship, most in common, with the “Universum.” Now to the “Universum,” corresponds most closely the middle; to wit, the human nature. As the middle, it combines within itself the extremes of the lower and the higher natures, being at once the highest of the lower, and the lowest of the higher, natures. On this ground, it alone is capable of being exalted by the power of the Most High, absolute God: and when once it has risen to union with the absolute magnitude, in all the aspects of its nature, all natures, and the entire Universum, will have attained, along with it, in every possible way, to the highest grade possible to them. Because the nature of man comprises within itself the sensuous and the spiritual, he has from of old been designated the Microcosm. When, therefore,

¹ “De docta ignorantia,” L. iii. 3,—“quomodo enim creatura esset contracta ab esse divino absoluto, si ipsa contractio ipsi unibilis non esset, —per quam cuncta, ut sunt ab ipso qui absolute est, contracta existerent, ac ipsa ut sunt contracta, ab ipso sint, cui contractio est summe unita, ut sic primo sit Deus creator, secundo Deus et homo creatâ humanitate supreme in unitatem sui assumptâ, quasi sit universalis omnium contractio, æqualitati omnia essendi (*i.e.* Deo, in quo maxima et minima coincidunt), hypostatice unita.”

human nature has been exalted to unity with the highest magnitude, all individuals and the Universum have actually realized their fullest perfection, everything has attained its highest grade in and with humanity.¹

Humanity, indeed, exists solely in the form of "Contractio," in This and That (in a multiplicity). How then does Cusanus arrive at the Unio with one? According to the principle of the identity of that which is not discriminable, previously laid down by him, he might say, —The absolute Unio, it is true, is possible in the Trinity alone; but the highest possible Unio with men, or even with the world, can only be realized at one point. He also seeks to show that this one point would be perfectly sufficient, if it existed at all. If the absolute magnitude can be united perfectly with one alone, the man with whom it should be united, would be as truly God as man, and *vice versâ*; and would be the perfection of the "Universum," in all things enjoying the pre-eminence. In him, if he existed at all, the least, the greatest, and the middle nature, being united with the absolute magnitude, would meet in such a manner as to constitute him the perfection of all; and everything, according to the manner of its contraction, would rest in him, as in its own perfection. Through him, everything would receive a beginning and an end of contraction; yea, through him, who would be the greatest among contracted existences, each thing would, on the one hand, go forth into its contracted existence, and on the other hand, would return into the absolute—through him as the

¹ "De docta ignorantia," c. 3. Not to mention Giordano Bruno, this thought recurs also in the writings of Marsilius Ficinus, and that too in a Christological connection. Compare his work, "De religione christiana et fidei pietate," Argent. 1507, c. 16-23; c. 16,—"*Summus opifex summum manifestumque debet opus efficere.*" This highest work cannot be an uncreated being, for then it would be more correctly regarded as God Himself; nor as a created being, for it would then be finite. But in the middle between God and the creature, there is room for a higher being than a mere creature, to wit, a composite of God and man. Man is adapted to this end, for "*anima hominis est quodammodo omnia, præsertim cum sit in corpore ex omnium viribus composito cœlique instar temperatissimo. Decet autem Deo communi omnium duci universam creaturam quodammodo jungi, non quidem sparsim, quia Deus summa unita est, immo vero summatim. Naturæ igitur humanæ Deus uniatur oportet, in qua sunt omnia.*" This conjunction, in virtue of its relation to the middle which unites all things, was supposed therefore to affect all things.

middle and end of return into God. He then proceeds to show that such a God-man, who is the living middle of the *Universum*,—nay more, who is (ideally, not temporally) the ground of its origin and its goal,—must have an actual existence; advancing, in addition to the arguments mentioned above (p. 33), the argument of God's goodness and power. Whatever can be brought to pass by the Perfect and All-merciful One, without involving an alteration or lessening of Himself, is not an incompatibility: on the contrary, it is in accordance with the infinitude of His goodness, that all things should be created by Him and for Him, in appropriate order, and in the best and most perfect manner. The operation of the Divine love cannot continue defective; but as He Himself is absolutely great, so also does His work approximate as nearly as possible to the greatest. But His power is not circumscribed by a creature; for nothing is beyond or outside of it,—it is infinite. And because no creature can mark the limit of His power, it is possible for Him to create a creature surpassing in greatness every creature actually existent. But when a man is exalted to unity with His power, so as to have his subsistence solely in unity therewith, that power is not limited by a creature, but continues limited solely by itself; and yet, the infinite, unconditioned, Divine power produces the most perfect effect—that effect, the non-production of which, would show that God was not the Creator, and that there was no such thing as a creature. From the Most High God, therefore, through the mediation of the universal "*Contractio*"—that is, of humanity, the third—to wit, the "*Universum*," in its contracted, condensed being, is supposed to proceed; not as though this arrangement were to be understood temporally, but supra-temporally, conformably to the essence and order of perfection.¹ It would seem, therefore, that God could not have created the "*Universum*" and its multiplicity at all, had He not had this God-man in view, in whom the world

¹ Ibid. c. 3. *Excitationum*, L. viii. Fol. 143, b. When God said, "Let Us make man," He thought of the true, substantial man (Christ); and Adam, although temporally prior to Christ, is "intellectualiter" subsequent to Him, and created in His image:—in which image, humanity was conceived in the entire fulness of its perfections. He, the truth of humanity, is consequently, "*principium, caput, primogenitus omnis creaturæ*."

for the first time loses its contingent multiplicity and nature, which might be greater or less, and receives in exchange the highest that is possible; and thus attains at once to unity and to perfection. Apart from Him, as its goal, the world would be a mere aimless manifestation of power, which neither can nor may attain to the highest point possible to it: for the world, in itself, must of necessity ever continue in that middle state, than which we can always conceive of something higher or something lower. In the God-man alone did the highest possibility become one with actuality:—this is not the case, however, because the finite attains in Him to the highest possible stage, by and of itself; but because it is taken up into the higher absolute personality of the Son of God. Here, therefore, we see, in a new way, how indispensably necessary to his whole system was the doctrine of the God-man; but we see also with equal clearness, that in order to gain a place for a God-man, he was compelled to assume the impersonality of the human nature.

Through Him, who is at once God and man, God is united with the “Universe,” and humanity and the “Universe” attain to the fullest perfection possible to them. To realize the absolutely highest stage possible to the human species, by the mere creation of human magnitudes of ever increasing greatness, was an impossibility; it was, therefore, also impossible for humanity to attain to perfection by that method. For a higher stage would always remain conceivable; seeing that the Divine power cannot be limited by anything that actually exists. In this direction, we should be driven to the supposition of a sorry “progressus in infinitum,” of bare creative omnipotence. On the other hand, if a determinate boundary line (for example, the boundary line between man and angels), towards which there exists an infinite number of degrees of approximation, were crossed, by such an exaltation, the human species would be changed into another species of beings; and thus the attainment by the human species of the absolutely highest possible degree of perfection, would be again out of the question. Then also would God’s work of creation remain incomplete, notwithstanding His eternal, but aimless fruitfulness. It is possible, on the contrary, for the human species to be brought to perfection, and through it, the world; and the only means by which this perfection can be realized, is that the absolute mag-

nitude, God, enter into the greatest union with humanity that is at all possible to it.

But if God is thus connected with the "Universum," in virtue of His union with the middle, with the Microcosm, how is the divine nature united with the human nature in Christ? Man, in the corporeal aspect of his being, may be regarded as a sensuous "contractio:" this "contractio" is, in itself, temporal and transient; it is, in itself, animality (animalitas). In man, however, the sensuous condensation is transposed, as it were, into the intellectual nature, and subsists therein (subsistit, suppositatur); and whilst, in one aspect, man is the highest grade in the sphere of "animalitas," he is, on the other hand, quite as truly of another and specifically diverse species. This now furnishes a distant image of the Unio in Christ. His humanity could not have possessed the highest possible perfection if it had not had its subsistence (its suppositari) in the Deity, even as our body has its subsistence in the spirit. This image, further, is the more appropriate, as the intellectual nature is something divine, something detached from the divided. Being entirely perfect, the intellectual nature of Jesus must have existed also entirely "actu:"—for which reason, it could have its subsistence in nothing, save in the intellectual nature of God, which alone is "actu" all. Potentially, indeed, the "Intellectus" of every man is the All, and grows gradually from possibility to "actus;" the greater it becomes "actu," the less it is potentially. But the greatest, in that he is the perfectly "actu" existent limit of the "potentia" of all intellectual natures, cannot exist otherwise than as he is the same that God is, who is all in all.* Cusanus uses, in addition, the image of a polygon, which is engraved in a circle. The circle denotes the deity; the polygon, the humanity. The polygon may be imagined to be the greatest possible. Such a polygon would not have its subsistence in the limited angles in themselves, but solely in the periphery; and would not be separable, even in thought, from the circular eternal figure. Yet the magnitude of the human nature must be referred not to accidents,—as to size, form, colour,—but to the substantial, that is, to *Wisdom*.¹ In Christ are the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. As a teacher, in order to feed the minds of his pupils, must reveal to them his

* See Note B, App. II.

¹ Ibidem, c. 4.

ideas, those inner words of the spirit; and can only accomplish his purpose, in that the inner words assume a sensible form, or in that the mind of the teacher forms a sound-figure out of the air he inspires, correspondent to the inward spiritual word: even so has the eternal Father caused His Word, the Son, to take upon Himself human nature by means of the Holy Spirit, in order that He might communicate to us, according to the measure of our susceptibility, the fulness of His knowledge.¹ Out of the pure blood of the fruitful Virgin the Holy Ghost wove the body, as the air is assumed, by giving it a soul; and He so united the Son with human nature, that a man was the Word of God the Father, and this Word was the centre of humanity: moreover, all this was done, not gradually, but supra-temporally, simultaneously, in the twinkling of an eye. The mother, however, must have communicated the very centre of her fruitfulness, not dividedly, to this her Son,—as, indeed, such an unique and most high Son had a right to expect: on this account she cannot have become a mother again, but must have remained eternally in her virginity.²

The human knowledge of Christ, however, always continued on earth different from the all-embracing divine knowledge of the Son, in which it had its roots and subsistence. For, although human knowledge also is capable of embracing all things, it needs sensuous images by way of incitement; whereas the divine knowledge contains and bears within itself, at the same time, the very essence of things. The grounds of the being of all things lie in the divine knowledge. In human knowledge, for example, the stone is not contained as a stone, but merely an image of a stone; and therefore all human knowledge is symbolical: the divine, creative knowledge, on the contrary, contains the thing itself. Christ's knowledge, then, was of such a

¹ Ibidem, c. 5. Exactly so Marsilius Ficinus l. c. c. 17, 18. The creatures also, in his view, are "*cogitationum Dei quasi quædam voces extra prolatae.*" (He, however, traces the necessity of the incarnation to the need of redemption, yea, to the need of a satisfaction being offered to the divine righteousness.) C. 18, — "*Decuit Deum omnium effectorem perficere quæ defecerant.*" C. 23, — "*Christus est idea et exemplar virtutum. Quid aliud Christus fuit, nisi liber quidam moralis immo divinæ philosophiæ vivens, de cælo missus, et divina ipsa idea virtutum humanis oculis manifesta?*"

² Ibidem, c. 5.

nature as to unite the most perfect symbolical, with divine knowledge. That there was no necessity for the former being swallowed up by the latter, we may judge from the circumstance, that in man also, a purely sensuous vision not only exists side by side with the spiritual, but can also act an independent part.¹

But this unity of the divine and human natures is, and continues, perpetual. Even the death of Christ did not interrupt it. The unity would not have been the closest possible, had it been dissoluble. But how was this compatible with the reality of the death of Christ; which must, at the very least, have involved the departure of the spirit of life from the body? His answer is as follows:—Our eye has power of vision: but the soul can either allow the power of attention (for example) to flow from it into the eye, or it can keep back that power of attention. In the latter case, the soul itself is not by any means separated from the eye; for then the eye would be dead: the soul's power of discrimination, indeed, is withdrawn,—not, however, its vital power. Augustine, in fact, speaks of a priest who had the capability of so withdrawing animating power from the body, that it appeared to be dead, and yet the soul continued in it. So also did Christ's soul cease to animate His body, and His body truly died,—without, however, being separated from the source of its life. There rather remained in Him the power to withdraw the vital spirit, and so to die; but also the power to take life again. Body and soul were, for the moment, locally separated from each other, but not from their personal principle; which, on the contrary, continued indissolubly the centre of both. Considered as an unity, His person was indestructible: in one aspect alone, and for a time, was it perishable. But because His humanity was rooted ineradicably in the divine indestructibility, it necessarily became conformed to its divine root, after it had accomplished its temporal motions. The truth and reality of His humanity was first revealed in its supra-temporal perfection, after the resurrection and ascension: then it was the perfect image of the divine truth which had united itself with it; whereas the earthly body was merely a shadow of that image.²

The fundamental thought of this form of Christology would

¹ "De Visione Dei," c. 22. For example, he who is absorbed in thought, sees sensuously, but yet perceives nothing.

² "De Visione Dei," c. 22. "De docta ignorantia," L. iii. 6, 7.

seem then to be the following:—That Christ could not have been the highest possible human magnitude, if in Him humanity had subsisted in itself, and if God had not constituted its personal centre. Through God becoming its personality, Christ became not merely the greatest among existing men (relatively), but the greatest possible man. For, as He subsisted in the divine nature, a certain *communication of attributes* took place, to the intent that the human might coincide with the divine:—not that the finite can ever be entirely and perfectly united with the infinite, but the union must be the most perfect possible.¹ With the human nature of Christ, human nature *in general* was put on by God (induta); in like manner, also, it died in Him to its appetites, and rose again: but God did not therefore assume the *personalities* of all. This latter can only take place, when man himself, voluntarily and through the medium of Christ's human nature, likewise enters into communion with God, by faith (that is, by a consenting knowledge, in an intellectual manner) and love, and agreeably to the order of the Church, which will perfect and complement him, when he becomes one of its members. (See the note, page 47.)

We conclude with a passage, which sums up the views of Cusanus on Christology in a particularly clear manner. God works everything for His own sake:²—for the sake of His intellectual nature, He created this entire world. He may be compared to an artist, who mixes different colours in order to paint himself, and to secure an image in which he may take pleasure, and in which his art may as it were find a resting-place; for, although He cannot multiply Himself, He can, at all events, multiply the image which bears the closest resemblance to Him. But He forms many figures, because by that means alone can He give a tolerably perfect embodiment of the likeness of His infinite excellencies. That which is revealed to one

¹ "De docta ignorantia," c. 7. "Ostendimus—hominem Jesum maximum in se, separatim a divinitate personam subsistendi habere non posse, quia maximus, et ob hoc communicatio idiomatum admittitur, ut humana coincident divinis, quoniam humanitas illa inseparabilis a divinitate quasi per divinitatem induta et assumpta." On the contrary, he remarks in his "De Visione Dei," c. 20, "Humana natura non potest transire in unionem cum divina essentiali, sicut finitum non potest infinito uniri, etc.:" compare the note, page 36.

² "De Visione Dei," c. 25.

of the spirits of God, is meant to become also equally the property of the rest. Not without Jesus, however, who is anointed above His fellows, would the work of God have been perfect. For in His spirit is found the perfection of created natures. He is the outmost, most perfect, and non-multiplicable image and likeness of God. More than one such image there cannot exist. All other spirits are likenesses of God through the medium of Him; for only according to the standard of the highest possible, which in Him is an actuality, can the worth of everything else be measured. Other things are the more perfect, the more they resemble Him. In that spirit, as in the utmost goal of the perfection of that likeness to God, of which all are images and stages, they find their resting-place.

The details thus given show that Nicolaus of Cusa, like the Mystics, was, in one aspect, very far from treating the human and divine natures as infinite antagonisms. On the contrary, he represents the humanity of Christ as being and having, in itself, all that God is and has, though in a constricted manner. He is advantageously discriminated also from Pseudo-Dionysius and Erigena, in that he assigns to the individual an eternal place in God, and seeks to show that singularity is based in God. The ideas in God are viewed by him, not as mere abstractions, generic ideas, of which individual things in the material world are copies, more or less, but unequally, like: the ideal world he rather holds to be the real being of all things, even of the individual things, in their eternal and true ground;—and God is not the merely abstract unity, into which true reflection at last reduces all things; but all things are in God Himself, in a pre-existent manner, that is, in His Reason, or more definitely, in His Son, who is Wisdom. Wisdom conditioned the unordered possibilities as it saw fit: it posited in itself, therefore, determinations, through which each particular thing became what it is, and all together combined to constitute a beautiful unity.¹ Because of the view thus taken, Cusanus was

¹ “De Venatione sapientiæ,” c. 27,—“Omnia ex determinatione mentis (divinæ) in se ipsa suum terminum sic et sic essendi acceperunt.” The material of which all things are created, he reduces to the possibility, which is not actuality:—matter, therefore, has no actual existence. The *ground* of possibility is God’s potence or power; which in Him is not merely a possible power, but all that is possible is in God also actual.

able to make so many excellent observations concerning individuality and its eternal right. In its bearings upon a theory of knowledge, we might describe this feature of his system as follows:—His efforts were not directed predominantly to the cognition of all things in their unity; he did not make the negative acosmistic theology his final goal;—what he desired, was to combine with that mystical knowledge, whose aim it is to grasp the supra-essential absolute in an intellectual intuitional perception (solely, it is true, by a kind of ecstasis), a real knowledge of the world, yea, further, a more concrete affirmative theology than the theology of the supranatural vision. We can scarcely say, however, that, as regards the latter, and the relation of God to the world, he has done more than to lay down postulates, or give expression to philosophical aspirations. He represents the world as having been created for God's sake, in order that God might paint His own image, and see Himself in it: as though He did not already see Himself in the eternal Son, who is the actuality of all divine possibilities; and as though Cusanus himself had not unweariedly repeated the doctrine,—that the world cannot, and was never intended to be more than an imperfect image of God; otherwise it must be God Himself, and infinite, which would contradict its true idea. But this leads to a dualism, which admits neither of a Christology essentially transcending a theophany, nor of a consummation and perfection of the world. In such a case, it would be permissible to speak of a world, which, despite its necessary imperfection, is the “best possible;” and of Christ, as the One who realized and exhibited the highest that is attainable within the sphere of humanity. But Christ could not be the absolute revelation of God: He could be nothing more than a symbol, even though the most perfect symbol, of God. In order to be perfect man, He must, according to this theory, transcend, as it were, the human personality, and be transported into the divine self;—a clear sign that humanity cannot attain to the perfection of its own proper self, but must pass into the divine Ego, or even, from the very commencement, be rapt out of itself. The intimate connection between such views and the religion and ethics of the Catholicism which stood in opposition to the Reformation, must be evident to all. Such ideas are impossible save to men who have not yet arrived at a knowledge of the

significance of the human personality : and to that knowledge none can attain who take as little notice of sin as did Nicolaus of Cusa, and the Neo-Platonists, his successors, who followed out the path into which he had struck. The necessary condition of the knowledge of freedom—of that freedom, the perfection of which requires, not that it be carried away out of itself, but that it be combined with its own true essence, to wit, the divine image—is a true knowledge of sin, as including personal imputation of guilt,—a knowledge which is unattainable save within the range of the economy of redemption.¹

If we further ask,—Why Cusanus maintains so distinctly the necessary imperfection of the *Universum* and of individuals, and why, in the last instance, he defines the essence or substance of a world, existing alongside of God, to be the limitation of potency, the restriction which never permits of the “*potentia*” becoming totally and completely “*actus*?”—the answer clearly is,—Whilst he regarded (with Thomas Aquinas) the world as possessed of divine being and essence, in every respect in which it is positively anything, he was at the same time anxious not to fall into a pantheistic or acosmistic identification of God and the world. By way of guarding against the disappearance of God in the world, he denies the latter to be the unfolded God ; feeling that if the world is God developed, God is really reduced to the potency of the world.

¹ The idea, that the scales of the lower and higher beings are connected by middle beings, and that through the highest grade of creatures the “*Universum*” is united with the Eternal, the Absolute Himself, is carried out as follows :—The Church is the mystical body of Christ, consisting of spirit, soul, body ; that is, of the sacraments, priesthood, and laity. The latter is the mass to be moved, the material to be formed. Through the priesthood, the laity, as also the *State with its laws and institutions*, are connected with Christ and with God. Nay more, the Church, with its hierarchical constitution and gradations, is designated the “*Christus explicitus*.” The Church, or connection with it, covers the *eternal* and necessary imperfection of the faith and love of the individual, so far as he subsists alone in it, which is united with Christ ; even as the imperfection which necessarily cleaves to human nature, in itself, is covered and abolished in Christ, by the human nature being impersonally implanted in the personality of the Word of God. “*De docta ignorantia*,” L. iii. 12. Christ’s humanity, therefore, “*virtualiter et perfectionaliter*” embraces the human species ; the Church is in Christ “*complicite* ;” and Christ is in “*Ecclesia explicite sicut unitas in magnitudine* ;”—*Excitationum*, L. viii. fol. 144.

God he regards as "actu" all that He can be, in Himself : in the world, on the contrary, that which is in God perfectly "actu," has attained, *so far as God willed*, to a second mode of existence, which is distinguished from the former by nothing save by limitation (imperfection). Giordano Bruno, perceiving the untenableness of this professedly essential distinction, renounced a principle which, on the one hand, allowed the world to appear *in concreto*, to be eternally in God, and God in the world ; and yet, on the other hand, digs an impassable gulf between the world as finite, and God as the infinite. He gives up the condition, "so far as God willed," and the opinion, that it must of necessity be possible for the world to be greater or less than it actually is. He rather looks upon God, or the Substance, as that, in a concentrated form, which the world, whose infinitude he teaches, is in an unfolded manner, in the form of separation or distinction. But if the world itself is the unfolded God, there can, of course, be left no special place for the incarnation of God in Christ. For an incarnation is substituted a general, yea, even a physically immediate, unity of God and the world. The path was followed out also by other Pantheists of the sixteenth century ;—for example, by Francis Puccius, who held Christ to be the universal "Ratio" (λόγος) in men ; by Cornelius Agrippa v. Nettesheim and several Cabalists. But the question arises,—Did Cusanus actually accomplish the praiseworthy object he had set himself, by the method he adopted ? He fancied he had exalted God above the world, by representing Him as possessed of a boundless capability or power, which, it is true, he also terms freedom. Assuming this, he justly recognised, that if God had actually made everything which it was possible for Him to make, the world would not only be undistinguishable from Him, who is essentially the actuality of all possibilities, but would also be the limit of His power : His power would have exhausted itself in the world, and, relatively thereto, God would no longer be the Free One, who comprises within Himself a multitude of entirely different possibilities, to which He does not give an actual existence, simply because it is not His will. But what can be clearer than that such a power is essentially arbitrary ; and that it, therefore, again forms that dark point in God, which, logically considered, may threaten the existence of all things, even of the

ethical? And how is it compatible therewith, that finite things should be eternally in God Himself, nay more, that they should be eternal self-determinations of God; whilst God is "actu" all that it is possible for Him to be? Nor, again, does this power possess freedom and self-certitude; for over it hangs, as it were, the law, that it shall not realize all that it is capable of realizing, because otherwise it would lose itself in the product, in the fact of the actualization of all its possibilities. If, then, the preservation of His unlimited and perfect power is the supreme principle observed by God in creation, He cannot have been perfectly free from envy therein, however frequently Cusanus may assure us to the contrary; nor can actual perfection be any longer regarded as the final goal of the world. Such a view necessarily shuts in the world within the limits of imperfection, and constitutes the divinely good a different thing from the world's good. It must and can be good solely in its kind; and even the greatest possible to it, in its kind, is only attainable, as the result of that leap by which God takes the place of its own Ego; that is, the price of perfection is the loss of itself. The state of the world, its nearness to God,—that is contingent, that is dependent on the Divine freedom: only in a secondary way do Goodness and Wisdom intervene. Through them, especially in Christ, the world is supposed to attain the nearest possible approach to God: but what is the nature of this approach, and what is its limit, we are not informed. For, if the sole distinction between God and the world is the partial contraction (*contractio*) of potency, and if the history of the world is nothing but the actualization of this potency, the world would seem in reality to have in reversion the becoming God, who is the actuality of the same potences. Considered from this point of view, the distinction between God and the world, which Cusanus holds fast, assumes the character of an act of violence against the proper essence (possibility) of mundane beings and of the "Universum;" from which it is, again, quite evident, that a firm discrimination of God and the world can never be effected, so long as we confine ourselves solely to the domain of the Absolute in general, or to that of the Divine power. On the other hand, however, the distinction laid down by the Cardinal is of such a nature, that its adoption would exclude the possibility of the realization

of an actual unity of God and the world in Christ; and, so far as man has a real existence, would raise an impassable wall of separation between him and God. Cusanus did indeed give up the principle of the absolute difference of the divine and human substances, sanctioned by the Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon: on the contrary, he held man to be nothing but a determinate “contractio” of the “Universum;” and as the “Universum” is the “maximum” in a contracted form, his ideas ought rather to be designated pantheistic. In order to avoid conceding this pantheistic character, he afterwards proceeds to deny that that positive, essentially divine, element, is the essence of the world, and says,—Its essence, as it were, its substance, is the limit,—this negative element, the limitation of its perfection. Such a notion, however, implies that the perfection of the world would be its destruction, its death in God: and in this connection, very striking evidence is afforded of the fact, that not merely Deism is dualistic, but also that views even of a fundamentally pantheistic character must represent the divine and the human as standing in a relation of exclusiveness to each other. The pantheistic *θεῖον* must be *φθονερόν*; and the world must be swallowed up at the very moment when it is conceived to be attaining perfection. This resorption we see taking place in the impersonality of the humanity of Christ, and in the ecstatic “Visio Dei” of believers. On the other hand, so far as the world actually *is*, its essence is limitation, and therewith God cannot unite Himself; so far as a *world is*, it is eternally separated from God by its essence.¹

To the reformatory line stood nearer, Raymond de Sebonde² and H. Savonarola. The former says, in his “Theologia Naturalis,”—Whoso doubts the incarnation of God, denies to human nature its highest dignity. (Tit. 74, 75.) For God, it was neither an impossibility nor a contradiction to assume man. This may be demonstrated even to the natural reason. For, like as it pleased, and was possible to, God, to combine the spiritual nature of man with flesh; so will He be able to bring any humanity into such symmetry with Himself (*sibi proportionare*), that it shall be susceptible of deity (*capax Deitatis*). As He was able so far to elevate

¹ See above, the note on page 36, and note 1, page 44.

² Raymundi a Sabunde Theologia Naturalis seu liber Creaturarum, ed. Solisbac. 1852; written about the year 1436.

the corporeal nature, that it became capable of receiving the intellectual nature, namely, the rational soul; so will He be able to elevate human nature to the point of being susceptible of very deity. And as God showed Himself able to constitute corporeality susceptible of His created image, the soul; so will He also be able to make human nature susceptible of His uncreated image. For there is almost a fuller harmony between the uncreated and the created image of God, than between His created image and corporeality. And as God was able to constitute the created image, in conjunction with the body, one person, so could He also constitute the uncreated image, in conjunction with a created rational humanity, one person, in a certain individual human being. The uncreated cannot become another person; but "*ipsa humanitas potest personari in persona imaginis, quia duæ personæ non possunt concurrere in unam.*" (Tit. 265, p. 449.) By way of showing how two natures might concur into a unity, without conversion, he uses the following illustration, which is peculiar to himself. Besides the consonants, says he, there are vowels, self-sounds, as it were "*personæ*:" the latter, "*per se sonant*;" the former, on the contrary, are sounded through the vowels. Of pure vowels, there are three—*a, e, o*; even as there are three persons in the Trinity: *i* and *u*, on the contrary, incline towards consonants, and correspond to the two classes of rational beings. Now, if the conjunction of the vowel *u* with a consonant may serve for the image of the conjunction of a created personality with the body; then the diphthong which arises out of the conjunction of a pure vowel with one of those which incline towards consonants, may serve as an image of the highest union between God and man—the union in Christ. (Tit. 264, p. 447 ff.) The tendency towards the doctrine of a human personality in Christ, evinced in this comparison, is particularly worthy of remark.

This tendency was not shared by Hieronymus Savonarola.¹ He rejects every comparison drawn from creation: in particular, the image of the unity of the soul and body in man. The incomparable and most distinctive feature of the human nature of Christ was this,—that whereas we find in every other complete substance, nature and "*suppositum*," it, according to the

¹ "*Triumphus Crucis*," L. iii. 7, pp. 211 f. "*Dialogus seu Solatium itineris mei*," L. iv., pp. 219–224, ed. Lugd. Bat. 1633.

faith of holy Church, had no "suppositum," or no personality, of its own. "Persona filii dei personam hanc" (which would exist in this case also, had not the "Unio" taken place) "in primo creationis instanti, ut in ea subsisteret, sibi ipsam uniens *præoccupavit*." Christ, nevertheless, corresponded to the definition of man; He was "suppositum in natura hominis subsistens." This "suppositum" was the Word, which, at the same time, continued omnipresent, as before, although the human nature was not omnipresent. He even maintains, that the Unio was a real relation, solely on the part of the humanity, not on the part of the Word;—a real relation, however, not merely to the hypostasis, but also to the nature of the Son.

More important, though not in harmony with these older principles, is his reply to the objection, that "there is less difference between black and white, between one opposite and another, than between God and the creature. Sooner, therefore, can black become white, than God become man." His reply is,—Even though God is farther removed from the creature than are two mutually contradictory things from each other; these latter are removed from each other after a *different sort*, for they contradict each other, and therefore cannot be one; but God and the creature do not contradict each other. And, although the union between two magnitudes, already complete, may seem of necessity to bear a purely adventitious, non-necessary character, it is not so in the present case: for that which is assumed is made part of the being (*Esse*) of Him who assumes, even as the Word who assumes is drawn to the "Esse" of man. Philosophy, indeed, teaches, that "the form (*forma*) confers the being; and the soul is the form of the body: consequently, the soul of Christ confers the "Esse," and is not unitable with the Word; for the Word, when it actually exists, must possess, not receive, "Esse." But he answers,—Precisely therein consists the incarnation, that the soul was allowed to participate in the "Esse" of the Word, and thus became more perfect: the "Esse" of the Word, and His hypostasis, pertained to the human nature, in so far as it participated in the divine. The incarnation was meant to prove to us, in a comforting manner, that the "Unio" of our spirit with God is a possibility; it was meant to manifest our dignity; and it is rational, because the blessedness of man consists in the vision of the divine essence.

TRANSITION TO THE REAL EQUIPONDERANCE OF THE TWO ASPECTS OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT TO THE SYMBOLICAL CLOSE OF
THE REFORMATION.

STADIUM FIRST.

TO THE DEATH OF LUTHER.

SECTION FIRST.

THE CHRISTOLOGY OF LUTHER.

HOWEVER noble the fruits borne by the Mysticism of Germany ; however powerful its tendency towards a God-filled personality ; however beautiful its teachings regarding the affinity of the divine and human natures,—regarding the continuous birth of God in the hearts of men, who are thus brought to the consciousness of their divine sonship,—nay, also, regarding Christ, as the archetypal Mystic, and our pattern in suffering and poverty of life ; and lastly, however bold it may have been in asserting that God took part in suffering, because He was minded to possess the virtue of suffering also ;—with all this, it was unable to conciliate the antagonistic elements of the old Christology, which Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus had last brought into view. Any view which represents God and man as standing in a relation of exclusiveness to each other, whether it be clothed in a more pantheistic or in a more deistic garb, whether it in-

cline chiefly to Thomism or to Scotism, leads to substantially the same result, to wit, the conversion of the true incarnation of God, either into a theophany, or into a Nestorian double being. By this dualism the doctrine of the Romish Church has continued to be characterized down to the present day, notwithstanding the alternating predominance of Thomism and Scotism. Both these systems, however contradictory their fundamental ideas may otherwise be, are equally opposed to a veritable communication of the divine to an actual humanity, and decide, either that the nature of man does not really need such a communication (thus following a Pelagian tendency), or that, though needing it, it cannot receive such a communication, without the loss of itself. Both Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus conceived God to be, as to His inmost essence, incommunicable: to the one, He was simply absolute Being, the infinite reality; to the other, He was merely absolute Will, the absolutely indeterminate freedom of the "*liberum arbitrium*." In both cases the categories were physical, and, like Deism and Pantheism, unbelieving Judaism and Heathenism, revolve in an eternal circle, the one constantly passing into the other; although, by being brought into juxtaposition, or by the various attempts which were made to mix or combine them, each seemed to be modified, and thus an illusory satisfaction was afforded. Till a new and loftier conception, alike of God and man, had been formed, justice could not be done to the fundamental idea of Christianity. Now Mysticism, although it in general had most affinity with Pantheism, did unquestionably, at all events in its German form, seek in God a free and blessed personality. But, as we have already intimated, it failed in its search. With their Judaizing opponents, the Mystics shared that Pelagianistic tendency to assert the supreme excellence, yea even, divinity of human *nature*, in its immediate and primary form. For, on the one hand, they supposed divinity to lie by nature in the depths of the soul, and merely the knowledge thereof to be lacking; and, on the other hand, they held that the realization of perfect union with God, and the fulfilment of their most fervid religious yearnings, would be their absorption into God in blessed ecstasy;—consequently, contrary to human nature. But that which contradicts the essential idea of a being, that is, of a genus of beings, cannot be universally claimed: to Sunday

children¹ alone is vouchsafed, along with that higher virtue which rises beyond itself, also a higher blessedness. From this we see that even the German Mystics had not yet pursued the ethical path with sufficient energy, but that the religious process of which they spoke still bore traces of an idealistic aristocraticism, pride, and eudæmonism, which prevented them from attaining to a perfect knowledge either of God or of themselves. Accordingly, though they constantly repeated their attempts, they never advanced a step further. Of a *history* of their inner life, they knew nothing; for a history presupposes a crisis, a turning-point: the only thing they were acquainted with was a process, an eternal alternation of rising and falling; for the elements of sorrow and joy, which, when united and consecrated, bring firmness, peace, and progressive sanctification to the inner life, were still regarded by them as mutually repulsive and antagonistic. Without such a living experience, that higher knowledge of God, which conducts us out alike beyond Pantheism and Deism, and which is the necessary condition of a true Christology, could never be attained.

It is a remarkable but characteristic feature of Mysticism, that it bears in itself few traces of a living sense of guilt. To perfection, to deification, it refers very frequently, but to the atonement little: it desired to gain the end ere it reached the beginning and middle. Many wonderful and transcendent things are said concerning the stages of the mystical life; but there is no mention of a stage of the atonement. This is the fundamental reason why Mysticism was incapable of inaugurating any reformation.

We have every reason for believing that the two tendencies which were a kind of anticipation of the Reformation, the simple biblical-practical and the mystical, met and, at an early period, were united in Luther. Accordingly, we find, on the one hand, that the place once assigned to mystical vision and enjoyment was now assumed by faith; and, on the other hand, that Faith acquired a much more inward and substantial significance than it had in the Greek and Romish Churches. The connec-

¹ Children born on Sunday are in Germany popularly supposed to be endowed with a gift of presentiment (Ahnung), and to be destined to much happiness and good fortune in life. The author seems to be alluding to this popular fancy.—Tr.

tion between piety and historical Christianity, the Word of God, became therefore a much more intimate one than in Mysticism; and, on the other hand, a higher spiritual view of the historical was attained.¹ Word and Faith, Faith and Word, were indissolubly conjoined, and after such a manner, in the piety of Luther (which has become a prototype), that whilst, on the one hand, he regarded each of the two as a distinct and peculiar thing, as a special work of God, he held each to be an inward and essential affirmation and confirmation of the other. As concerns, in particular, the advance from the mystical point of view to the point of view of Evangelical Faith, it is characteristic of Luther, that whereas even the noblest Mystics had failed in interweaving and blending sorrow and joy, he gave to these antitheses, from the very commencement, a more decidedly ethical turn. According to the earliest documents from his hand, his attention was especially turned to the relation between love and fear (*amor et timor*). "Timor" he regarded not merely as something which is to be abolished, got rid of; but rather as a thing whose existence is thoroughly justifiable, especially in the case of the sinful and guilty; and the law and justice of God he considered to be the objective correspondents to the subjective emotion of fear. On the other hand, however, knowing that love cannot consist with fear, he demands that the two be blended and interwoven. In his view, Christ, the atoner, is the one who brings about this blending and interweaving; or, more accurately, that union of righteousness and love, which through the atonement of Christ became a real power in the world, is the objective, productive principle of the desired combination. For Christ satisfied both justice and love. At the same time, this united holy love of Christ is a gift of God, having for its end a productive substitution for and in us.²

¹ See Walch iv. 1639 ff.

² Compare Löscher's "Vollst. Ref. Akten," Bd. I., from the year 1516, pp. 251, 259:—The one class of men "*dividit amorem et timorem, amans aliquid quod non timet, et timens Deum quem non amat.*" Another class "*miscet utrumque utrique,*" but instead of advancing *further*, qualifies each by means of the other. The third class, however, "*in eundem Deum colligit utrumque, scilicet amorem et timorem.*" In the second class, as well as in the first, we find "*servilem timorem,*" which "*semper dividit animam in duo scilicet, in id quod amat, et in id quod timet. Filialis autem solum unum habet quod amat et timet.*" His chief desire, therefore, is,

Luther did honour to *that* truth which is bitter and humbling, and therefore was it possible for him to see the truth of the Gospel in a new light. He entered uprightly and sincerely into the crushing and desolating sense of guilt, and not merely into the sense of misery or of finitude; and was enabled in consequence to rise superior both to mystical attempts at self-annihilation, and to the false, that is, the negative and unproductive, ideas about the substitution of the divine for the human personality, which had been associated with those attempts. The sense of guilt is, in a negative aspect, the establishment of the worth of the human personality. To guilt must be attributed an infinite significance, relatively to God Himself, and His justice; for it renders a propitiation necessary. Herein by itself is involved a distant approach to the knowledge of the value attached by God to the goodness of man.

A true and sincere sense of guilt is not anxious merely that guilt may be overlooked (indulgence), nor merely to escape punishment; but honestly desires that the divine justice should be propitiated on account of the evil that exists and should not exist, and the good that does not exist and should exist. When man is possessed by such a sense of guilt, he, for the first time, apprehends himself as a personality,—as an unworthy personality, indeed; but still, as a personality that, instead of being an object of indifference, is an object of deep and intense interest to God and His justice. The yearning for the atonement of guilt is the first purely ethical feature, even though it may take merely the form of a longing for the negation of the negation: ideal homage is thus paid to the just claims of the divine righteousness. Man's feeling of utter impotence to accomplish the propitiation himself, is now met by the joyous message of the divinely commissioned Mediator, and of that righteousness of His which answers to the divine righteousness. This righteousness, although primarily the personal being and property of the Mediator, may become ours also through faith,

that man should become an actual unity and totality; to designate which, he often, at this period, makes use of the expression, "*anima rotunda*." Noteworthy also, at this same period, is the mode in which he discriminates the three forms (stages) of *Faith*, as parallels to which may be mentioned the three forms of the *Word*: *ibidem*, pp. 231 ff., from the year 1515; and page 291, from the year 1517, with vii. 1390 ff., xi. 2730 ff., 200, § 3-5.

by which we personally consent to and affirm the love which led Him to take our place,—its righteousness, holiness, and virtue. In His mediation, Christ estimates the personality of man so highly, that instead of aiming to get rid of it, or to absorb it into Himself, He desires to present it as righteous before God by a productive substitution affirmatory of its distinct being as a personality. On the other hand, the personality becomes again by faith a docile child, and gives itself up to Christ to be transformed and regenerated into the image of God, in which the righteousness of God shall have its personal representation through atonement and sanctification.

By this Evangelical Faith, with its humility deepened into a sense, not merely of finitude, but also of unworthiness and guilt, on the one hand, and with its assurance of salvation on the other, that rise and fall of mystical feelings, that alternation of the states of the soul, was brought to a standstill. The interweaving of joy and sorrow was now effected, for their deeper moral significance was perceived; and both were brought into connection with the same object, to wit, the righteousness of Christ, which draws us into the spiritual death of repentance, of the consciousness of being judged in Him, whilst, at the same time, it reveals to us the divine will, to maintain and preserve our personality as a personality reconciled in Christ. By this righteousness of Christ, we attain, indeed, to joy and peace, we become conscious of having now first found a life worth living;—it is a joy, however, be it remembered, grounded in a perennial consciousness of guilt that is forgiven, and that cannot be renewed, because of the growing sanctification of the soul: and thus out of the righteousness of faith there grows the righteousness of the life of the new man.

How very decidedly Luther's mind was turned towards the atonement of sin and guilt, we learn from the history of his inner life, from his first thesis in the year 1517, and from his entire subsequent activity. But it becomes strikingly evident when we compare his meditations on the Passion of Christ with those of the Mystics—even of the German Mystics. (Note 4.)

Through this his faith in redemption Luther rose, first practically, and afterwards theoretically, subjectively or anthropologically, above the Dualism which had held sway during the Middle Ages; and the death-blow was thus given to the alter-

nation between a physical and magical view of grace, which treated man as an impersonal being, on the one hand, and a Pelagian subjectivity, on the other, by the certainty of a personal salvation wrought by grace. He confesses his great indebtedness to the nobler forms of Mysticism, especially to Tauler and the "Theologia Germanica;" and in particular, during the years which preceded his public appearance, had drunk gladly of their living waters. But, in his humility, he did not properly know how far he had left them behind him; and, indeed, we may seriously question whether he would have become the Reformer, had he not fought out the inner conflict, and gained the victory of faith, prior to making a closer acquaintance with the writings of the Mystics. It thus became possible that he, on the one hand, should read *himself* into them; and that they in turn should render him essential aid in his efforts to present, in the form of doctrine, that which he already possessed in the form of faith. This service they were fitted to render on account of the originality, freshness, and freedom from the rubbish accumulated around them by the Church, which characterized their mode of presenting their ideas—ideas undoubtedly justifiable when based on the atonement, as we learn from the doctrine of the "Unio mystica," which at a later period received ecclesiastical sanction.

In Luther's principle of faith lay also the germs of a loftier idea of God; for by faith "a man looks into the heart of God." Luther directed his attention as a teacher, it is true, predominantly to anthropology and soteriology (*σωτηρία*, salvation); but with the principle of faith, he planted also seeds which were destined, as conjoined with a renewed study of the Holy Scriptures, and of the first centuries of the Christian Church, to bear the fruit of a thorough regeneration of the doctrine of the Person of Christ and of God. We must therefore enter more into detail, especially at this point.

In seeking to form a more distinct conception of the Christology which hovered before Luther's mind, and of the changes and developments which he felt it needed to undergo, our best course will be to glance at his profound, vigorous, and vital doctrine of faith. For if it be right in general to judge of God's nature by man, who bears His image and likeness, we are still more justified in drawing conclusions, regarding Luther's feel-

ings and views relative to Christ, from that which he supposes the Christian to become through Christ, especially as he believed the inmost and distinctive characteristic of Christ to be His unwillingness to retain anything for Himself, and His purpose that His people should share in all that He Himself was and possessed. Indeed, we may say that the sketch he gives of true faith is through and through saturated with Christological ideas; and, as he considered Christ to be the formative or even immanent principle of faith, the features of Christ must be discernible in it. This method is at the same time also the most fitted to show us how easy—one might almost say, how natural—it was for Luther to assert for Christ the possession of a true and full humanity, not despite, but because of, his attribution to Him of the full measure of the truly divine. A later, dry, and pretendedly orthodox period (like the rationalistic), indeed, felt little sympathy for, and were little able to understand, Luther's utterances on this subject; they buried them out of sight beneath accusations against such men as John Arndt; and the "Unio mystica," and with it Christianity, was either made a matter of the future world, or entirely rejected. Utterances of this kind, however, are traceable back to the very fountain of the Reformation itself; for then its waters flowed forth most freshly, it still stood wide-opened, and a narrow sectarian fear of sects had not yet shut it in behind rusty bars and bolts. But what is especially refreshing to observe in this connection, is, that notwithstanding the close proximity into which he brings the human to the divine nature by faith, the thoroughly ethical character of his representations preserves him entirely from pantheistic elements. To Luther, the basis, nay more, the soul of the whole matter, both of Christology and faith, is that divine love and grace which manifests itself in willing the existence of personalities bearing the image of God and full of God; or, to use his favourite expression, in willing the existence "of a people of God."

In this connection, Luther's conception of sonship is deserving of special consideration. He attached a much greater importance to it than was usual; and least of all did he consider its significance exhausted by a merely legal relation to God.¹

¹ Compare "Lutherus Redivivus, d. i. Christenthum Lutheri." Durch Mart. Statius. Stett. 1654, pp. 182-327. In addition to the above-men-

That is the highest, says he, which He has done for and bestowed on us from above, that He has made us His children, so that we are, and are termed, born children of God: not by nature, not by works of the law, but by faith in His word, and by the invisible divine power of the Holy Spirit, who works through the word. This is something that cannot be cut and patched. A Christian must be a man who is what he is by birth; Christians must be new men, who are styled born children of God. But what else is a Christian character, than a beginning of eternal life? But if thou professest to be a child of God and confessest such a faith, Caiaphas, out of zeal for the service of God, will rend his clothes and cry out, "Blasphemasti;" and all the others with him will exclaim, "Reus est mortis," for he has made himself the Son of God; Crucify him!¹

Of this new birth all men alike stand in need; but, considered in regard to it, all are equal. "Behold how well the Scripture handles this matter! Everything has life and reality, and is not useless, empty talk. And because we are new-born children, and heirs of God, we enjoy equal dignity and honour with St Paul, St Peter, the blessed Virgin, and all the saints." How can we have greater glory and confidence in heaven and on earth, than to be called the children of the Most High Majesty, and to have all that He is and has: as St Peter nobly boasts, that we have become partakers of the divine nature? For, although we are not children by nature, as Christ is, still we share with Him the same honour. Luther regarded Christ as the Child of God who gives Himself up to believing souls, that they may be indued with divine sonship. This child was, in his view, the formative principle, which forms numberless children by means of the word and faith.

But what is this divine nature of which we become partakers through Christ? "This is a saying," says he, "the like of which cannot be found elsewhere in the New or in the Old Testament; although unbelievers look upon it as a light thing, that we should even become partakers of the divine nature." In explaining the saying, he does not start with absolute Being, or with the infinitude of God and the like attributes; but—and

tioned Catena, compare Walch, T. xi. xii. xiii.; especially his "Kirchenpostille," and the "Freiheit eines Christenmenschen."

¹ See the "Kirchenpostille" for New Year's Day, the Conclusion.

this is well deserving of attention—regards the spiritual and moral attributes of God as constituting His inmost essence. Then, for the first time, could he feel that on man was bestowed the highest and best that God had to bestow ; thus also, at the same time, was every approach to Pantheism avoided. “The nature of God,” says he, “is eternal truth, righteousness, wisdom ; eternal life, peace, joy, and gladness ; and whatever can be called *good*. Whoso becometh partaker of the divine nature, receives all that :—he possesses eternal life and eternal peace, joy and gladness ; and is simple, pure, righteous, and almighty against the devil, sin, and death. Wherefore it is as possible to make God cease to be eternal life and eternal truth, as it is possible to take these things from you. If anything be done to you, it must also be done to Him.”

In the Kirchenpostille for the Sunday after Christmas Day, he says,—“When Cain hears that, he blesses himself with hands and feet, and exclaims with the pretence of great humility, ‘Nay, God preserve me from such horrible heresy and presumption ! How can I, a poor sinner, be so proud and say, I am the child of God ? No, no ; I will humble myself, and acknowledge myself to be a poor sinner.’ Take no heed to all that, and guard against such, as against the greatest enemies of the Christian faith and of thine own blessedness. We too know perfectly well that we are poor sinners ; but here we are not to busy ourselves with what we are and do. We speak not of our nature, but of the grace of God. If it seem to thee a great thing to be a child of God ; good, friend ! but treat it not as a light thing that God’s Son should have come, should have been born of a woman, and should have been subject to the law, in order that thou mightest be such a child.”

In the Kirchenpostille for Easter Day, he says,—“Yea, man is alarmed, and indeed, by himself, must be alarmed, at the thought of presuming to take such honour and glory to himself. But what are we then to do ? That is surely enough, and too much, which I have already done in opposition to Him, in that I have made myself a vile sinner. Shall I then, in addition, make Him also a liar and deceiver, by denying and blaspheming this comfortable message ? That, God forbid ! If I am not worthy of it, still I stand in need of it. And even if this were not so, God is worthy that I should give Him honour,

and hold him to be a true God. But if I do not believe, I do Him the greatest dishonour; and I transgress the first commandment, in that I treat God as a liar and no God."

His remarks on this subject in the "Festpostille von der Taufe Christi" are specially instructive. The word, "Thou art My beloved Son," was not spoken for Christ's sake; for even without it He would have been a Son, and would have known that He was a Son; but for our sake, who have indeed the word, but not yet the substance. Look up now and hearken! The word teaches us to know Christ, in the knowledge of whom stands our whole salvation. How so? The word declares that He was God's Son, and pleased His Father well. By that simple word, God causes all the hearts of the world to exult and be glad, and fills all creatures with pure, divine sweetness and comfort. How so? Because, if I know and am certain that the Man Christ is the Son of God, and well-pleasing to the Father, I am also certain that all that Christ says and does, all in the work and word of His dear Son, and must be most well-pleasing in the sight of God. Now, He does, and suffers, and speaks everything for my advantage and good. How could God unbosom or present Himself in a more lovely and sweet way than when He says, I am heartily well pleased that My Son Christ speaks so lovingly with you, is so sincerely concerned for you, and suffers, and dies, and does everything possible with such great care for you? Can you imagine a human heart not bursting for very joy into a hundred thousand pieces, if it do but rightly feel what it is for God to be so well pleased with Christ, when He thus serves us? For, feeling that, we look into the abyss of the Father's heart, yea, into the unfathomable and eternal goodness and love which God cherishes towards us now, and has cherished from all eternity. But we are too cold and hard; and the flesh hangs too heavily on our neck: otherwise, we should without doubt see from such a word, that heaven and earth are full of the fire of divine love, full of life and righteousness, full of honour and praise; and that, in comparison therewith, hell, with its fire, and death, and sin, are nothing but a painted unreality.

So, then, thou seest that God, by these words, draws Christ to Himself and Himself into Christ; and again, that with the same words He pours out Himself and Christ, His dear Son,

upon us, and infuses Himself into us, and draws us into Himself, so that He becomes entirely *humanified* (*vermensch*), and we become entirely deified. How so? As follows: When God declares that He is well pleased with that which Christ is and does, the words lead thee to find God's good pleasure, and His whole heart, in Christ and all His works and words; and again, thou art led to see Christ in the heart and good pleasure of God: so that both are united and blended in the deepest and loftiest manner. Further, because Christ, the beloved and pleasant Son, who was regarded with such good pleasure, and dwelt in the heart of God, with all His words and deeds, is thine, and serves thee therewith, thou also surely partakest in the same good pleasure, and dwellest as deeply in the heart of God as did He; and God's good pleasure and heart again rest as truly on thee as they did on Christ. Consequently, thou and God, and God's beloved Son, are entirely in thee, and thou art entirely in Him; and ye are all one together, God, Christ, and thou. To the same intent are many sayings in the Gospel of John; as, for example, John xii. xiv. xvii.

He wills that we be where He is. Where is He? In the good pleasure of God; in the abyss of the divine heart. There also are we, if we know and love Christ. Yea, there are we, as I think, surely enough.

Man, says he elsewhere, must become more than man if he is to become pious. A man aided by grace, is more than a man: yea, the grace of God makes him godlike and partaker of God; wherefore also, the Scriptures designate him God, and the Son of God (see the Festpostille on St Peter's and St Paul's Day). Is not that above measure great? Besides also, He has said it in the Scriptures (John x. 34). That is the work of the priesthood of Christ. His name becomes our name; we are baptized into His name, so that out of His name and ours there is formed one name. For this reason we are called, God's people, God's servants, God's inheritance, God's kingdom, God's temple.

Luther regards faith not merely as something formal, or as a mere attribute, but as a substantial and, so to speak, divine thing, because and so far as it cleaves to God and God is in it. In faith, divine being becomes human being, after the human has opened itself to the divine. Faith is in the state of the *Unio mystica*, of union with God; and yet it is, at the same

time, man's true existence, the truth of humanity. For man is so created, that he cannot satisfy his own essential nature and idea unless he enters into union with that which is higher than his own immediate constitution, even with the divine. This higher element does not destroy, but confirms the personality of man.

And yet he regards the *rise*, the *nature*, and the *fruits* of faith in the individual man as presenting an analogy to, or image of Christology; for in both cases divine becomes human, and human divine. Like Christ's humanity, so faith receives a "Communicatio" of divine attributes; because it appropriates Christ, who is the supreme power by which the union of the divine and human is effected.

(1.) The rise of faith.¹

When we once know that Christ is in the Father and the Father in Him, we shall afterwards advance further, and know that *we are in Him* and *He in us*. One (the knowledge of Christ in the Father, and of ourselves in Christ) goes beyond itself; the other (of Him in us) beneath itself. For we must be previously in Him, with all our nature, sin, death, and weakness; and we must know that we have been freed and delivered therefrom, and pronounced blessed before God through this same Christ. Consequently, we must soar above ourselves and out of ourselves into Him; yea, we must become incorporated with Him, and be His property, as those who are baptized into Him, and have thereupon received the holy sacrament. In this way, sin, evil conscience, death, and the devil are destroyed; so that one may say, "I know of no death nor hell. For I know of a truth, that as Christ is in the Father, even so am I in Christ. That is the first great point; through it man passes out of himself and beyond himself into Christ. After that it begins again from above downwards. Therefore, as I am in Christ, so is Christ again in me. I assume Him (*assumo eum*), I creep into Him out of sin, and so forth: He then shows Himself again in me, and says,—Go thy way; serve thy neighbour; I will be and do all in thee; what thou doest, that I shall have done; only be thou comforted, bold, undaunted because of Me, and see that thou abide in Me: so will I certainly be in thee."

¹ See Statius l. c. pp. 265 ff.

“In fine, through the word we are incorporated with Christ, so that all that He has is ours, and we can interest ourselves in Him as in our own body. Again, He also must interest Himself in all that happens to us, so that neither the world, the devil, nor any misfortune can harm or overpower us. For there is no power on earth great enough to be able to effect anything against union. But the devil’s great aim is to break this bond between us, and, by his cunning devices, to rend us from the word.” “As bodily food is transmuted into the nature of man, so that it loses its own form and becomes flesh and blood, even so, when the soul lays hold upon God’s word concerning Christ with the heart, and takes it to itself, faith does not remain inert, but permeates and transforms the man, so that he becomes incorporated with Christ, and Christ dwells in him. Now how is this transformation and incorporation brought to pass? In the first place, Faith, grounded on this message, holds not to a spiritual body, but to the natural flesh and blood; believes that it is the flesh and blood of the Son of God, given up and shed for us; and this is eating His flesh and drinking His blood. Thereupon follows that high and rich interchange, that He dwells in us, and we dwell in Him. With all His possessions He becomes mine; and with all my sins and misery I become His body. For if He abide in me, I must have all that He is and hath—eternal life, righteousness and wisdom, strength, might, and indeed all His possessions, of which there is neither end nor number; so that I can deal with them and make use of them as *mine own*. Again, if I abide in Him, it follows that, however frail I am, however I may stumble and err, no harm can befall me. For with my sins and weaknesses I am borne up by and in the eternal righteousness and strength.”

“Christ is God’s grace and compassion, righteousness, truth, wisdom, strength, consolation, and blessedness, given to us by God without any desert of ours: Christ, I say; not (as some say, using blind words) ‘causaliter’ that He gives righteousness, and Himself remains outside; for it is dead, nay more, it is never given, unless Christ Himself be also there.”

(2.) The nature of this union he further describes as follows:¹—“It makes new creatures of us, so that we now get

¹ Compare Statius l. c. p. 270; Walch viii. 306, 350, 358, 1906 f.; Kirchenpostille zum Pfingsttag.

other senses, another heart, other thoughts. In one word, the ground-work and soil of my heart is renewed; I become an entirely new plant, engrafted into the vine Christ, and I grow out of Him. For my holiness, righteousness, and purity do not issue forth from me, nor do they stand on me; but they arise alone out of, and in, Christ, in whom I am rooted, by faith. Now, therefore, I am like Him, of His kind, so that He and I are of one nature and substance; and I bear fruits, in and through Him, which are not mine, but belong to the Vine."

"Concerning faith one ought to teach aright, to wit, as follows:—Thou, through faith, art joined and united with Christ, so that thou and He have become as one person; henceforth ye cannot be divorced nor separated from each other, but thou shalt always cling to Christ: nay more, on the one hand, thou mayest with all joy and comfort exclaim, I am Christ,—not indeed personally, but Christ's righteousness, victory, life, and all that He has is mine own; and, on the other hand, Christ may say, I am this poor sinner,—that is, all His sins and death are My sins and My death, inasmuch as through faith He clings to Me and I cling to Him. For this reason St Paul saith,—We are members of Christ's body, of His flesh, and of His bone. Wherefore, if thou, in this matter, shouldest separate thy person and Christ's person from each other, thou art already under the law and livest not in Christ."

"When He saith,—I and the Father will make our abode in him, it follows from the grace and love of God that the heart of man becomes a throne and seat of His exalted majesty, which must be better and nobler than heaven and earth (1 Cor. iii.; 2 Cor. vi.). Behold, then, how great a thing is a man who is a Christian; he is a true wonderman on earth, one who is of more worth, in God's sight, than heaven and earth; in whom God is all in all; who has all power and does all things in God: but at the same time remains completely hidden from, and unknown to, the world."

(3.) The fruits of this union.

Whoso abideth in love abideth in God, and doeth solely such works as God Himself doeth. He is no longer a mere man; and is better than sun and moon, heaven and earth. For God Himself is in him, and doeth such things as no man nor creature can do.

This is the beautiful promise regarding the transcendent glory of Christians. God bows down so far to them, and comes so near to them, that nowhere, save in them and through their word and works, mouth and hand, will He manifest Himself or allow Himself to be seen and heard. Out of Christ and the Christian is formed one body; so that this body can bring forth true fruit,—not Adam's fruits, nor its own, but Christ's. The mouth and tongue, by which he treats and confesses the word of God, are not his own, but the mouth and tongue of Christ: the hand with which he works and serves his neighbour is the hand of Christ, the Christian's Lord. Here it is to be observed that God, who alone has made everything, who also governs everything Himself, and who alone knows what is to come, has notwithstanding taken to Himself both angels and men, that He may govern by their means, and that we may work with Him and He with us. For although He could govern without us, it is His will to govern through us.

No marvel, then, that Luther should discover other resemblances also between Christ and His people.¹ Between the birth of Christ and the birth of faith, he finds an essential similarity; for by faith Christ is born in us, or, in other words, we are incorporated with Him, we become His body. For "Christ did not receive the gifts solely into and for Himself, but that He might pour them forth into men; as, in fact, it happened at the Pentecost, and has frequently happened since that day." Christ is the Son; through Him believers become children of God, participators in the divine nature, so that they through Him are of His kind, are of one nature and substance with Him. For, as Luther countless times repeats, what Christ is and has, has been made the believer's own, in that Christ took upon Himself that which is ours.

Christ's birth, wonderful though it may be, "is distributed by means of the word. This is the way and manner to be made pure from our wretched Adam-birth." We also, then, take part in Christ's power and royalty. A Christian man has all things in his power. God doeth what he wills, in that he doeth what God wills. He has the true wisdom; for he looks into the open heart of the Father. How then shall we regard

¹ In Statius, pp. 257–259, 308 ff. 327. Walch, T. v. p. 996; x. 1363. Kirchenpostille zum Christtag and C. Trinit.

it as impossible that the man Christ Jesus should have all things in His power? or that He was in heaven, even whilst on earth? Were not even the Apostles both on earth and in heaven? And Christians too, so far as they lay hold on the unutterable, eternal treasures—so far as they possess them by faith,—have not they their substance and walk in heaven?

But it is no less true that believers also are crucified—that they die and are mixed with Christ. “It is not at all consistent that we, who are baptized and are Christians, should be minded to continue in our old sinful nature. For it was crucified with Christ, that is, the judgment of condemnation and death was pronounced and executed on it. Christians have already died twice,—once spiritually, to sin; the second time, in relation to bodily death also, to which they, as it were, died in Christ; for “the death which still remains, is for them but as a painted death.” “They live also another life, in virtue of the resurrection of Christ, through which, by faith, they have overcome sin and death, and have obtained eternal righteousness and life. If, then, we attain to such things through baptism, surely the consequence must be, that we shall no longer live to the sin which stirs in our flesh and blood so long as we live this present life, but shall ever kill the same, so that it shall have no power nor life in us: if we desire to be found in the state and life of Christ, who died Himself to sin, who destroyed and buried it in His death and burial, and who gained life and victory over sin and death by His resurrection, and bestows it on us in baptism.”

“We must believe that we also are included in the ‘Resurrexit;’ that our resurrection and life have already begun in Christ as certainly as though they were already completed: only that they still remain hidden. We must confess and say, when we ourselves come to die,—The best part of the resurrection has taken place already: Christ, the Head of the whole of Christendom, has gone through death, and has risen from the dead. Furthermore, the main part of me also, to wit, my soul, has passed through death, and is with Christ in the heavenly life.”¹

Finally, the likeness of believers to Christ extends itself even to the point of their giving up and employing for their fellow-

¹ Hauspostille am Osterabend. xiii. 1090.

men, out of love, that new personality of theirs which has been born of God.¹ This Luther declares to be the sign of the presence of the child Christ within: if we undertake for each other, and take upon ourselves, and clothe ourselves with the flesh of our neighbour, doing unto him as God has done to us in Christ. That also is a spiritual birth and a spiritual incarnation; for in this manner we ourselves are born of and amongst each other. The Scriptures designate our neighbour our flesh; for it is God's will that I undertake for him, just as though he were mine own flesh and blood, mine own body. Christ assumed our flesh, which is full of sin, and felt all our misery and woe: He acted before God His Father, as though He Himself had committed the sin which we all have committed, and as though He had deserved all that which we have deserved (Phil. ii.)."

"Nature makes of one flesh many, of one body many bodies; the Holy Spirit makes one flesh and body out of many bodies. As far as nature divides flesh and blood from each other; so near, yea, much nearer, does the Spirit bring them to each other. Therefore must I serve my neighbour as though I were doing it to myself. When I evince such a disposition in works, it is a certain sign that the birth of Christ has a power and place in me; and the more such works of Christian love are multiplied, the more does Christ grow in us. Thus, then, do we know that Christ is ours, and that He has become one with us by faith, in order to weave and blend us men together, so that we may all become one flesh and body, even as He is one body and flesh with us. We see this by the bodily marriage, in regard to which God said, 'Let the two become one flesh' (Gen. ii.; Eph. v.). When we all become one body, we are also united with Christ by a spiritual marriage, that is, we all become His brides; and He will appoint us at the last day to judge the whole world along with Himself."²

By means of faith, therefore, in Luther's view, both "the humanification of God" (*Vermenschung Gottes*) and "the deification of man" (*Vergöttung des Menschen*) are continued. So strongly, indeed, does he insist thereon, that his entire doctrine of faith must be confessed to be marked by Christological features. Yet he never forgets to give promi-

¹ xi. 2708 ff.

² Festpostille in der Frühchristmesse.

nence to the difference between Christ and us, to wit, that we become by grace that which Christ is by nature. He further reminds us also of another thing, which, as Luther hoped that a time would arrive when the action of the old Adam, the influence of our first birth, would no longer be felt, is of equal importance; to wit, that whatever we have, we have alone in fellowship with and through Christ. He was by no means of opinion, however, that in this fellowship with the Head we are impersonal, or that the divine nature and its treasures are not in us, are not to be used as our own. At the same time, he rightly maintained, that "these things do not grow out of our own garden, or flow from our own fountain," although they are our food and drink, and so become ours, and transform us. How much less must Luther (this we may judge even beforehand) have regarded the humanity of Christ as a mere selfless impersonal organ! He, above all others, was under no necessity whatever of abbreviating the human aspect of the Person of Christ, as compared with the divine; attributing, as he did, to human nature in general, so thorough and essential a susceptibility to, and need of God. The passages adduced from his writings are, at the same time, remarkably fitted to show, that a Christology which should merely lay stress on the distinction of the natures, and retain little or nothing of the vital relation between the human and the divine, must a priori have worn, to his faith, a foreign and inimical aspect. Such a Christology must have wounded and repelled the mystical element in his faith. But, in this connection, we must also take a glance at an inconsistency in the later terminology of the Lutheran Church, by which Christology was curtailed, as compared with the doctrine of faith, in opposition to the mind and spirit of Luther. In face of the New Testament, and of Luther's doctrine concerning faith, Lutheran writers felt for a considerable period neither able nor willing to deny that we become by faith partakers of the divine nature, and that, too, in such a way, that the contents of the divine nature are bestowed on the believer, and are made his own, and that they form an essential constituent of the new, the *true* humanity. The doctrine of the "Unio mystica" proves this to have been the case. On the other hand, remarkably enough,¹ in connec-

¹ See below.

tion with the doctrine of the Person of Christ, this usage, which, as Luther knew perfectly well, was both a "new" and a higher usage, was departed from. Only too many of the later theologians of the Lutheran Church, undoubtedly out of a false regard for their opponents, maintained that merely the attributes, and not the nature of God, were communicated to the humanity of Christ. On this point also Luther's view was a far more accurate one. As we have seen above, he designates God's attributes His nature; and, what is especially striking, he affirms the intellectual and moral attributes of God to constitute primarily His nature or essence. Now, as these attributes are not only communicable, but delight to communicate themselves, it was possible for Luther to speak, as he does, of the unity of the divine and human in faith.

It was not, however, anthropology alone that Luther transformed, by the action of that faith in redemption which he cherished himself and inculcated on others; he also rendered important services to Christology. In his writings, especially in the earlier ones, there may be found ideas of the profoundest and richest character bearing on Christology; by no means all of which were included in that doctrinal system which subsequently received the sanction of the Church.

It is, therefore, both worth the trouble, and necessary, to examine the difference between these germs of thought, thrown off as they were through the free and unrestrained action of Luther's deep soul and speculative mind, on a Christological intuition characterized at once by infinite fulness, by unity, and by determinateness, and the doctrinal formulæ subsequently adopted.

The treatise first and most justly claiming our attention in this connection, is that entitled "Von Christo als dem Worte" ("Of Christ as the Word"), published during the year 1575.¹ In this treatise he does not take for his point of departure the doctrine of two natures, or even of an essential antagonism of the natures.² On the contrary, his efforts are directed to

¹ Walch xii. 2144 ff.; specially pp. 2158-2167. The Latin version in Löschner's "Vollstd. Reform. Akten" i. 231 ff. Compare further the "Christtagspredigt vom Wort in Gott" of the year 1521; xi. 216: his remarks on John i. 1-14, vii. 1390.

² Compare also xi. 2730 ff. (Kirchenpostille).

setting clearly forth the very intimate union existing between deity and humanity. In virtue of this union we may say of the Word, not merely that He *has* flesh, but even that He *is* flesh. On the other hand, like as the Word of God became flesh, even so must the flesh also of a certainty be made God. For the Word became flesh, in order that the flesh might be made the Word. God also became man, that man might be made God. For this reason does power become weak, so that weakness may be made strong. But can the two be conjoined, deity and humanity? He answers, appealing to Aristotle,—Even as substance and form are conjoined. The former strives after, and is filled with a yearning for, the latter (the humanity after the deity). The material is, indeed, something, in so far as it has a subsistence; but in so far as it is stirred by yearnings after its object, without that object, it is a mere capacity, nay more, it is nothing; and does not become something until it has attained its object. That object, therefore, is its true being, its “Actus,” apart from which it would be nothing.¹

But he seeks also to show that the form or the deity was stirred by a tendency (*intentio*) towards humanity, similar to that which stirs in substance relatively to form. God must not be conceived as mere Being; God is rather eternal productiveness. That which is produced is God’s Word: in the Word God multiplies Himself. All creatures,—the so-called inanimate, things which have life, those endowed with sensation, the intelligent and rational,—all alike have the power of moving themselves, of manifesting and awakening themselves, and of, as it were, producing a word from within, which they had not been before. In growth, blossoming, and fruit-bearing, things which have life go forth as it were out of themselves, they give something from themselves, and they attain to an existence which they had not previously possessed;—they increase and multiply themselves in themselves, and yet, instead of abating from themselves, continue identically the same. Such also is the course of things in God. He continues, in an unutterable, inexplicable manner, identically the same, and yet He multiplies Himself, in that He knows Himself, in that He discourses, understands, feels, gives forth, and works. Nay more, if He did not remain the same, *He* could not multiply Himself; but would simply and solely

¹ Pp. 2166 f.

be that other thing which He had become. The same thought he expresses more distinctly, as follows:—In God is eternal motion, eternal thought. The eternal motion, the eternal thought, in God, is the Word which He speaks with Himself, and gives utterance to in His heart—His counsel, wisdom, judgment, and thought. Man also has an inward word which is more perfect than the external word; for the external word is not always able to move the heart, as is the inner. Were it possible to transport the inner word into the hearts of others, it would move them as it moves ourselves. Now, as this inner word of man abides within man, and yet is able to be corporeally revealed, so also the inner word of God abides in God, and is God (even when it assumes an outward form). Were it not God, it might be let loose and separated from God and commingled with other things; but so not. (The external is the external of an inward, and the inward remains even whilst it is made visible.) But it is not suffered to go forth otherwise than in union with the flesh or with humanity, which is the *visible* word or work of God, wherein He displays what sort of a mind and thoughts Christ has.

Between the inward and the outward word there appears to be merely the following distinction—that the outward word is the inward in motion. Christ's visible flesh or humanity is, as it were, the voice in relation to the inward word. This latter clothes itself in the voice, in order that, although merely one word, it may be distributed amongst many, and fill many ears. So also Christ, the Word spoken by the mouth of the Most High, is clothed with a voice, that is, with visible flesh, is scattered amongst many, and fills their ears through the hearing of the preachers of faith. Thus, through preaching, Christ descends upon all peoples, even as rain descends on the earth. In that the inner Word of God assumed an outward form, it passed out of itself into a motion, and by assuming that which pertains to us, became what it had not been before, in order that it might bestow on us what pertained to it, if we receive, and by faith cling to, the Word. In consequence of this union with the Word through faith, it can be said of us, not merely that we have the Word, but even that we are the Word; even as Christ not merely has flesh, but *is* flesh. For "whoso is joined to the Lord is one spirit with Him;" and so is every one that is born

of the Spirit. That which is born of the Spirit *is* spirit (1 Cor. iii. 16, 17; John iii. 8, 6); and the Apostle says, that we are in Him the righteousness which stands before God. Now, just as we are designated one Spirit, Righteousness, Truth, Sanctification, and the Kingdom, even so are we called the Word, Wisdom, Power. For when we leave and humble ourselves, retain nothing of our own mind, but deny it completely, and accept the Word, we unquestionably become that which we accept; and if we cling to this Word, and are taken possession of by it, we ourselves are the whole Word, not, indeed, “actu” during this present time, nor “substantialiter;” but, so far as our yearning is in itself a mere potentiality, nay more, is a nothing without its object (see above), the object is our *being* and our “actus.”

Luther’s conception of the matter, therefore, is as follows:—The Word of God and humanity are, it is true, a duality, in so far as each can be conceived to subsist independently of the other, and as neither leaves or loses itself through *conversion* into the other—for such a conversion never takes place. But the deity is the subject of a motion out of itself, which, without involving the loss of itself, desiderates humanity as its goal or object (objectum): humanity no less is the subject of a like yearning after God or the Word. In the one case, humanity is the “forma” which God, as the “materia,” lovingly seeks: accordingly, God not merely has flesh or humanity, but becomes and is man. In the other case, humanity is the “materia,” which longs for the deity as its goal, even as matter desires and strives after its form; and accordingly man becomes God. Both, humanity and deity, remain what they were, and yet they become what they were not; but each, agreeably to its inner yearning, becomes that which relatively to each is the other, so that the result in both cases is nothing else than the God-manhood. Naturally the movement is conceived to originate with the deity, not with the humanity.

Even in this exposition it is satisfactory to observe with what distinctness he bases his reasonings on the word of Scripture, on the historical appearance of Christ. He evidently makes faith in Christ our righteousness his starting-point; and faith itself he regards not merely as the appropriation of the forgiveness of sin, but, more comprehensively, as the beginning of the “Unio mystica.” Whatever remarks one may have to

make regarding the exposition in a scientific point of view,¹ the ideas to which utterance is given are unquestionably important. He endeavoured to set the doctrine of the Trinity in motion, in flux, and to establish an inner continuity between the immanent and the transeunt Trinity, by distinguishing between the inner and the outer word: he also perceived the inner connection between the Word of God in the flesh, and the Word in the Scriptures.² Not less clearly does he point out the close connection between Christology and faith, in that he represents faith as the means by which that marriage of the divine and the human is continued, which he held to have been absolutely accomplished in Christ. In the word, faith lays hold on the principle of this union, which, though it progresses in time, first attains perfection in the future world. At the same time, the idea of the impersonality of the humanity, whether in Christ or in believers, is now no longer held, as it was by the Mystics. For although humanity is in one respect compared to the voice, which is the outward garb of the inner word,—a comparison

¹ On a subsequent occasion (T. x. 1377) he discusses the scholastic attempt to set forth the human nature as the form of the divine (its content); or, *vice versâ*, the divine nature as the formative principle of the human. Neither of the two was satisfactory: even the images of heated iron and so forth, employed at an earlier period, halt (Thes. 43, 44). He himself, as we have shown, tried to combine the two views, and thus to secure to each of the natures an independent significance without interfering with their inner tendency towards union.

² Of a similar character is the doctrine of Andreas Osiander regarding the Word (compare Heberle). Even at this point, Luther's tendency is clearly discernible, to establish such an organic unity between the outward and the inward, that with, in, and under the former we may and should possess the latter; and that in the outward the inward may realize a further *moment* of itself, which it desiderates. This further moment may be merely being for others (*das Sein für Andere*) (§ 13), or manifestation in the form of actuality; but it must not be swallowed up in the visible manifestation; on the contrary, the visible must be rather (at all events for the earthly life of Christ) a veil for the inner. In § 10 he says,—“We hope in the future to gaze into this Word, when God shall open His heart; nay more, when He shall not merely permit His Word to proceed forth from Him, but shall rather lead us into His heart, so that we may see the goodness of the Lord in the land of the living, in that we see pure truth and wisdom. For meanwhile He shows us His hands and feet, eyes, ears, and side; but then, in company with all the blessed, we shall look into his heart. This Word will give to all a glorious prospect and joy.” (P. 2154.) Consequently the veil of the Word, but not therefore His humanity, will be taken away.

which in itself might lead to a mere theophany,—Luther does not regard it as a mere means. On the contrary, in his view, deity desiderates humanity as its object or goal, even as humanity desiderates deity; the existence of the latter, therefore, is assured and affirmed in God Himself. Repeatedly, too, does he raise his voice against the false conception of mediation which prevailed during the Middle Ages. Neither does God cease to be what He was,—that is, His love does not put that which He was not, but desires to become, in the place of that which He is in Himself; nor, on the other hand, does humanity cease to be what it is, in order that in the place thereof may be put that which it was not. To such a physical process of conversion in relation to God or humanity, he, even at this stage, manifested most distinctly his aversion (§ 18). One thing, however, it must be allowed, is not yet clear, namely,—whether he considered the humanity of Christ to be an end of a merely secondary character, an end for us, or as an end and good in itself, of an abiding character.

He saw clearly enough, however, in what direction an answer was to be sought. But he takes special pleasure in setting forth how the eternal humanity of Christ has been exalted, and how in Christ humanity sits on the throne of God; and remarks that Bernhard spoke after the manner of faith when he expressed it as his judgment, that the human race had thus been raised above the angels. Whilst Lucifer was a good angel, he saw *in the very countenance* of God, that He had from eternity resolved to become a man in time, and to assume, not the nature of angels, but the nature of men: and this stirred up his envy and caused his fall.¹ Consequently, even when sin had as yet no existence, it was the purpose and good pleasure of God to bestow this honour and dignity on humanity. Hence also He designates Christ the beginning, the middle, and end of all creatures.² God did not take delight in the work of incarnation because He expected to gain from it something for Himself, but because He was thus able to reveal His love,—in other words, because His love then became an actuality; for the glory of love consists in giving, not in receiving. God is not content

¹ Walch vii. 1498, 1502, 1544-1555, in the year 1537; i. 35 f.; ii. 584 f.

² vii. 1424. Compare Note 1, page 79.

with the mere honour of being the Creator of all creatures—an honour which even Jews and Turks allow Him ;—that is the old wisdom. No ! God desires also that what He is inwardly should be known. He has poured out His divine nature, and announced to us in the Gospel that He has a Son. Through Him He has imaged Himself forth, and given us to know Himself in His essence and will. Nor will He permit this His Son to disappear until the first creation, heaven and earth, also passes away. To know God in His Son, and to confess Him as a Saviour—that is the new wisdom.¹ *His honour is His love*, which seeks the poor and the lowly, in order to make them rich ; and the more they are lost in sin, the more He seeks them.

With this fundamental thought—a thought which Luther never quitted—we must take our start,—the thought, namely, that deity and humanity meet in Christ : the former, in the fullness of its love, lightly esteeming its own physical pre-eminence, and highly esteeming, and in the humility of love appropriating to itself, that which is lowly ; the latter (humanity), the lowly, not contrary to its nature, but agreeably to its *true* nature, desiderating that perfect union with the Word of God, by which the Word becomes its own.² During this the earliest period of his theological activity, he was evidently not content to represent the divine and human in Christ as one merely in virtue of the unity of the Ego, leaving them in other respects separate and distinct. The new and grand feature in him, was his effort to effect a real, vital union between the two aspects ; so that the divine might be at the same time human, and the human divine. This tendency of his enfolded within it the germ of a higher conception both of God and man.

To Luther's mind, therefore, it was by no means a satisfac-

¹ In the year 1542, vii. 1826–1843.

² Schenkel, in his “Wesen des Protestantismus” (i. 322), says,—that “Luther, by main force, pronounces the natures one, notwithstanding they are directly opposed to each other ; leaves the antagonism unconciliated ; and gives us simply a sum in addition, but not an unity.” Schenkel, however, in making these remarks, overlooked the treatise of the year 1515, and the still later theological treatise contained in vol. x. 1372. That his representation is inaccurate, may be seen from what has been advanced above : we shall make it still more evident a little further on in this work. Ebrard goes still further with his—surely not quite seriously meant—discovery, that Luther's doctrine was Nestorian.

tory course, first to set forth the reality and completeness of the humanity of Christ, then the reality and completeness of His deity, and finally, with great labour, to draw lines of connection between the two,—lines which, hitherto, had so frequently converged in a mere empty Ego-centre. From the very beginning his aim was, to look upon everything in Christ as at once divine and human. The distinction of the “natures” he presupposed, and felt no inclination or interest whatever in dissipating the distinction. On the contrary, he believed that the deity would be casting away its honour, which consists in love, were it to withdraw the human aspect, even though under the pretence of perfecting the humanity; and that it is just as impossible for human nature to lose its need of, and susceptibility for, the Word.¹ He did, however, insist that each should know the other to be its own—that each should not merely have, but *be*, the other; for it was his conviction that neither of them could realize the true idea of itself, until it should become, until it should actually be, the other;—the deity by its condescending love, the humanity by its divinely filled susceptibility.

It is therefore characteristic of Luther, that even at a later period, in speaking of the Person of Christ, he should have always said, not, “the person of the Son united within itself the two natures;” but, “the divine and the human *natures* were so united with each other, that Christ was but one single *person*.”² The “Unio” he regarded principally (*principiell*) as an “Unio” of the natures, the result of which is the “Unio personalis;” and no end seemed to him to have been gained unless the natures are united. At the same time, he does not in any way deny that the person of the Son was in the divine nature; nay more, he

¹ See his Commentary on Genesis i. 154, § 36. “When it is said that man was created in the image of the invisible God, it is secretly signified to us, that God intended to reveal Himself to the world in the man Christ.” Compare p. 111, § 189. However high his conception of Adam prior to the fall, he no more held that Adam’s loftiness rendered the incarnation unnecessary, than that Adam’s fall rendered the incarnation impossible. xiii. 2578,—“The devil approximated closely unto us, but not so closely as to appropriate our nature.” “The woe that befel us in consequence of the fall, is not so great as the good that accrues to us through Christ.”

² For example, B. x. 1372. Compare Luther’s “Grosses Bekenntniss vom Abendmahl” xx. 1118 ff. § 142; xii. 1457; iii. 1115; ii. 581; xiii. 2580, § 6, 7.

lays stress thereon when touching on the scholastic question,—Whether the Father and the Holy Spirit must not also be held to have become man, if the divine nature became man? Notwithstanding all objections, however, he persists in maintaining that, not the personality of the Son without His nature became man; but, that the whole Son, in whom dwelt the entire deity after His manner, assumed humanity.

To the reality of the humanity of Christ he must have attached importance, if for no other reason, for the reason, that otherwise *that* love of God, which he had seen and felt, would lose its truth and reality. Unless Christ is the perfect and complete Son of man, the divine love has not attained that which it justly desiderated; and unless humanity is the Son of God, its susceptibility is not fully satisfied. It cannot, therefore, be said that Luther was interested solely in asserting the concrete presence of God, in opposition to the theologians of the Middle Ages, who treated Him as an abstraction of the invisible and future world. (Note 5.) Equally unjust would it be to say, that the sole difference between the Reformed and Lutheran doctrine is embodied in the question,—Is the substance of the God-man to be sought in the human or in the divine; and which of the two, therefore, is to be regarded as a mere accident of the other?¹ On the contrary, the basis of Luther's Christology is as correct as possible; for his final and real aim was to show, that whilst the natures were equiponderant, they were at the same time united most closely together. His insight into the love of God had taught him that worth attaches to humanity in the sight of God; that, estimated in the light of love, it was an honour, instead of a dishonour, to the Son of God to be a man; and, finally, that the love of God is the power to which the divine nature is subjected.² The two assertions just referred to would land us in the same conclusion,—the conclusion, namely, that Luther, who set forth the idea of the true personality of man with such life and vigour (at all events implicitly) in his doctrine of faith, neglected this altogether in his doctrine of the Person of Christ; and, on the contrary, adhered to the ancient monophysitic notion of the predominance of the divine nature, with its latent dualistic

¹ Baur l. c. iii. 408 ff.

² All this recedes to the background in the system of Zwingli.

principle of the mutual exclusiveness of the divine and human natures.

How far this is the case, may be judged even from what has been already advanced. It is true, he not seldom expresses himself to the effect, that the divine and human natures are different in substance, that they are diametrically opposed to each other, that "reason" consequently must regard their union as an impossibility (ii. 582). But he also says,—to faith nothing is too difficult. It presses forward into a sphere, in which the incarnation is the rational. Specially instructive in this connection is the "*Theologische Abhandlung*" (x. 1372 f.). All words, says he there, receive in Christ a new significance, although they still retain the old. According to the *old speech*, and in common life, creature signifies something which is infinitely distinguished from the Most High Deity. According to the *new speech*, it denotes a thing which is closely united, after a completely unutterable manner, with the Deity in one, indivisible person.

In this new speech, says he elsewhere, we must learn to *utter the new wisdom as in new tongues* (x. 1402, 39). But those who, in the old sense of the schools, say that Christ is a creature, and infinitely different from the Deity, are not to be considered Christians; and those who reproach me, says he (as Schwenkfeld did), with looking upon Christ as a creature, in that old sense, "fight against their own fancies." In Luther's view, it was not merely the old humanity—humanity as actually represented in us—that appeared in Christ, but a *new humanity*, which is also the *true humanity*. In accordance with this new humanity, those who have learned the new wisdom ought to form their idea of humanity in general. In Christ, humanity attained to the possession of that which pertains to the perfection, yea, even to the completeness of its own proper idea. Humanity apart from Him is, in truth, infinitely different from God: it lies in sin and misery; it is separated from God, and is as nothing without God. If, then, the generic idea of man be derived, in agreement with common logic, from actual, natural men, unquestionably the divine and human must be allowed to be foreign to, and mutually exclusive of, each other. Even so, if we start with the conception of God arrived at by reason, amongst Jews and Turks, it is irrational and illogical to

teach that the divine Majesty can and must become man.¹ But the "new wisdom" casts down these conceptions of God and man, and teaches that the creature attained to perfection in Christ, in that it then became God and the revelation of God, in that God then became man. With this new and true conception of man,—a conception which, it is true, does not hold good of him in his natural and primary form, but having been first realized in Christ by means of a divine history, is through Him then realized in us,—it is perfectly in harmony that divine predicates should be applied to him; nay more, that conception requires us to make such an application. On the other hand, the new and true conception of God, so far from forbidding, compels us, if we desire to pursue a rational course, to say that it is the will of God, not merely to have a man, but also to *be* man. Only as we start with these new conceptions,—conceptions which give to the same old thing new positive determinations, and in that very way constitute it a new thing,—does Luther deem it possible to recognise and understand the union of deity and humanity (T. x. p. 1374, 24). (And although humanity, apart from the Son of God, is a mere creature, such a description cannot be applied to the new humanity manifested in the Son of God. For to this new humanity pertains, that it become also the Son of God by grace, of which grace even the old nature was susceptible.² Is not this the very same thing which we are taught by Paul, when he says, that with the first Adam the creation of man was not fully completed, and that therefore God's gracious thoughts regarding man were not fully exhausted in the Adamitic humanity. Hence, when Luther applies to the humanity of Christ predicates which do not pertain to it, according to the usual, and, as far as it goes, true, conception thereof, nay more, which never can pertain to the natural humanity as such, we have no right at once to draw the conclusion, that he allows the humanity of Christ to disappear

¹ xi. 274 ff.; x. 1324, § 30, 31. Faith introduces us to the school of divine wisdom.

² i. 152, 154,—“To say that there is no distinction, as touching the natural life, between man, who was created in the image of God, and an irrational beast, is an *oppositum in adjecto*. But it is thus secretly signified to us, that God intended to reveal Himself in the man Christ.” Consequently the imperfection, yea, the contrast of the beginning, leads to the expectation of a second Adam, and that even prior to the fall.

in the deity, or that he gives the divine nature such a predominance over the human as reduces the latter to a mere accident. The question really is,—Does Luther attribute too high things to the humanity of Christ, and through Him to our humanity, when he teaches that it is introduced, not immediately, but through the mediation of a divine history, into the sphere of divine being; even as God is introduced into the sphere of the human, by the fact that His Son not merely has, or is the vehicle of, a man, but is, and continues to be, man?¹ And again,—Does he draw down deity so deeply into humanity that it loses itself, even though but perhaps for a time, in the incarnation?² These can only be decided by bringing together the individual features of his image of Christ,—a task to which we will now address ourselves.

I. In the first place, let us observe how he treats all the human features of Christ as pertinent to, and the property of, the Son of God; and endeavours thus to establish that the Son of God not merely had and was the vehicle of a man, but *was* man. With the greatest freshness and fulness, he expressed himself on this subject in his numerous sermons on the birth of Christ, and that long before his controversy with the Swiss theologians.³ For example, in the “Kirchenpostille” for Christmas Day, he says,—“We ought to let Christ be a natural man, precisely such as we are, and not make a difference between His nature and ours, save in the matter of sin and grace.” He is not disposed, therefore, to take a Docetical view of the humanity of Christ, though he undoubtedly believed human nature, in its purity and truth, to be manifested in Christ. So far is he from finding anything mutually incompatible in the conceptions of a holy human nature and of the divine, that he

¹ x. 1377, 45, 46. “Of all who have discoursed of these matters, none have spoken more unskillfully and absurdly than the modern ones; and yet they think they ought to be highly esteemed, as though they had delivered themselves most accurately, and had exactly hit the mark. These same moderns pretend that the divine nature, or, as they term it, the ‘suppositum divinum,’ was the vehicle and bearer of the human nature.”

² Evidence against which may be found as early as the year 1515. T. xii. 2164. He reprobates every kind or degree of conversion of God or man—(ἐξιστάναί).

³ xi. 171, 176 (about the year 1521). xii. 1458 f., 1461 f., in the year 1522. Compare xiii. 140 ff. of the year 1533; 214–219 of the year 1532.

adds,—“We could not otherwise draw Christ so deeply into nature and flesh; it is more comforting to us.¹ Wherefore, what is not contrary to grace, no man should deny to his own or his mother’s nature. How could God have shown greater goodness to us than in entering thus deeply into flesh and blood?” We see thus that no degree of condescension on the part of the divine nature, however great, startles him, provided only it remain free from sin; and that the distinction between grace and nature in its immediate form is not pelagianistically abolished. It is further evident, therefore, that he had no intention of calling in question the distinction between the Adamitic humanity, and humanity in the form which it assumed in consequence of its union with the divine nature.

The Papists, says he elsewhere (xiii. 215), have come to regard Christ solely as a rigid judge, who demands good works, and therefore inspires all around with horrors of death: in other words, Christ, in their view, has again receded to a distance, and has become mere deity. To preach this, is to preach hell and horrors. His proper title is rather, “Great Joy;” for even the very angels must envy us, seeing that Christ assumed our nature, not theirs (xiii. 144 f.). We ought to learn to picture to our hearts, under how great misery our dear Lord Jesus was born into this world, in order that we may be moved to praise and thank God for so excellent a benefit; in that He has honoured us poor, miserable, nay, even damned men, so greatly as to constitute us one flesh and blood with the Son of God, as Himself to become our brother, yea, even our flesh and blood. For between His flesh and our flesh there is no difference at all, save that His flesh is without sin. Everything else was as natural in Him as in other men: He endured hunger, thirst, cold. In a word, all natural imperfections which have descended on us, because of sin, He bore and endured like ourselves. That is, verily, deep humiliation and condescension: He might indeed have arranged to become such a man as He is now in heaven; for even now He shares our flesh and blood, though He does not do what we do. So might He have acted from the very beginning; but it was not His will, because He desired to show us the love He bears towards us, in order that

¹ The German runs as follows:—“Wer könnten Christum nicht so lief in die Natur und Fleisch ziehen, es ist nus noch tröstlicher.”

we might be able to rejoice, and comfort ourselves, and boast in Him. He became a man such as we are; He humbled Himself, had an actual youth, and played like other children; He grew in years, wisdom, and grace before God and men.¹ Although, as the Lord of the law, He was holy in Himself, He subjected Himself to the law (that is, to commands imposed upon Him from without; as, for example, the commands of His parents, and of the Old Testament), which was in no respect obligatory upon Him: indeed, no one could claim His incarnation as a debt.² Hence, also, He allowed Himself to be baptized; for He must needs take upon Himself whatever was imposed upon us to do, in order that we might become righteous through Him who conquered the law through the law. This was not necessary on His own account; He did it for us;³ even as His incarnation was not needed on His own account, but on ours (xiii. 283): for Him it was necessary only so far as His love saw its honour therein, and so far as it thus revealed itself.⁴

But as the divine nature made everything human its own, with the exception of sin, so that, in witnessing the birth of the child Jesus, we are to believe ourselves witnessing the second birth of the Son of God, His birth into time: even so, with regard to the sufferings of Christ, we are permitted to say, that they were, at the same time, verily the sufferings of the Son of God, that He had made them His own. It would have been but a sorry redemption, or rather, it would have been no redemption at all; it would have availed us little against sin and death, the devil and hell, if the man Christ alone, and not also the Son of God, united with Him in one person, had been crucified and had died. It is true the humanity alone suffered; for the divine nature can neither suffer nor die: but the humanity alone did not *redeem* us; the deity, that is, the Son

¹ vii. 1498 ff.

² xiii. 283 f., 288 f., 494 f., 340-345, 355-361.

³ xiii. 340 ff.

⁴ "Dass die Worte Christi," u. s. w., § 131 ff., T. xx. 1019 f.—"The honour of our God consists in His humbling Himself in the deepest manner possible for our sake; in His entering into the flesh, into the bread, in our mouth, and heart, and bosom. Moreover, He suffers on our account, allowing Himself to be maltreated both on the cross and on the altar." § 135. "It is a miserable honour, and no divine honour, to allow ourselves to be honoured and served by others." § 132.

of God, redeemed us. Furthermore, God did not remain outside of the Person of Christ; nor is the deity to be separated from the humanity. Now, God having made humanity His own, nay more, having Himself become man, the sufferings of His humanity are His sufferings also. Hence, when Christ was crucified, it was not merely the man, but the Lord of glory also, that was crucified in Him:—not the Son of God apart by Himself, but God united with humanity; and not God according to His deity, but God according to the *human nature* which He had assumed.¹ His entire life on earth was a suffering, and not merely its last period;² though in the last period His sufferings rose to an infinite height. For He tasted the eternal anger of the righteous God against our sin; His passion was a visible and tangible declaration of the divine righteousness; such a declaration was especially the anguish of soul He endured in Gethsemane, and which Luther holds to have been much heavier than the sufferings of the day.³ His trembling and dismay reveal to us the truth and reality of His humanity: but that He bore up against and overcame such anguish, shows us that He was God. For human nature, yea, even the nature of angels, would have been far too weak to have stood in the place of us all, to have taken upon itself our sin, and to have borne the wrath of God. But although the Father allowed Him to feel the full weight of the judgment, and to experience what it is to be deserted by Him; although He withheld His consolation, so that the Son in consequence felt the fear and horror of a troubled conscience whilst the eternal anger of God was passing over Him; still He was not utterly and completely deserted (iv. 1640 ff.). Had He been utterly deserted, He would no longer have been the Righteous One in the midst of His sufferings. We, when we are deserted by God, are not sensible of our own sin; and that is precisely the worst form of sin. He, on the contrary, was sensible of sin in the midst of the desertion which He experienced; He felt the sin of the world as though it were His own. Because the law did not relax its claims and threatenings in relation to Him, and because it was His will to subject Himself to its accusations, and to experience the anger of God—therefore did He

¹ iii. 1115–1118; vii. 1848; xxii. 414 ff.

² vi. 1093 f.

³ xiii. 716, 717, 886 f.; xi. 1794; iv. 1639 f., 1740.

continue to be the Righteous One, and to that extent was not really deserted by God. Hence, the desertion experienced by Him was felt to be the punishment justly due to those whose place He took in sufferings, which, whilst sufferings, were also the most vigorous action.¹

II. In the second place, Luther believed that the result of the incarnation was, not merely that the Son of God regarded humanity as pertaining to Him, and therefore from the very commencement participated in all human experiences; but also, that to humanity was appropriated that which pertains to God, nay more, the Son of God Himself:—in fact, the end and aim of the Son's condescending assumption of the human, was that the human might be able to assume the divine. He became man, in order that this man might become God. Through Him, humanity in this particular person was exalted to the throne and glory of God. Luther esteemed Jesus to be the one absolutely glorious person, the ornament and glory of the world; to him, Jesus was no mere instrument employed by God for our benefit, no mere theophany; on the contrary, the loving thoughts of God which constitute humanity their end, first attained in Him their goal, a goal possessed of absolute and intrinsic worth. In point of love, it is true, this person existed on our behalf, for love was

¹ To this connection belongs especially the exposition of the 22d Psalm of the year 1521; iv. 1638 ff. As an *historical* estimate we cannot regard it, when Weisse (see his "Die Christologie Luthers und die Christologische Aufgabe der evangelischen Theologie," Leipzig 1852, pp. 32 ff., 152 ff.) maintains that the very kernel of Luther's doctrine of the Atonement is the idea, that Christ fought out, as a matter of fact, in the depths of His own spirit, the battle with the devil and his companions, Sin, Death, the Law; and that He never alludes to a substitutionary satisfaction presented to the divine righteousness. It is quite true that Luther's theory is not identical with that of Anselm: the idea of the law plays an important rôle in Luther's system. At the same time, Luther did not identify the law with the devil; still less did Luther's doctrine belong to the same class as those older theories which represented the atonement as an overreaching or overpowering of the devil. Particular passages of this kind in his writings are to be taken figuratively, as even Weisse himself elsewhere allows. The devil is merely viewed as the instrument of God's justice; and the propitiation of that righteousness is, in the last instance, the main object. This propitiation is the satisfaction offered by Christ to the law, that is, to righteousness (not merely to the "honor dei"). On the other, it is also quite true that Luther saw in Christ, not merely an atonement, the forgiveness of sin, but also the gift of the new life.

the very centre of its glory; at the same time, this love is true human love; the devotion of the Son of man to humanity was His own free deed, although such human love was only possible in that it was also divine-human. To exalt this humanity, and to confer upon it abiding glory, was the will of God, and the purpose of the Son of God who glorified it by His assumption. These things being duly considered, we must maintain, notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary arising in other directions, that Luther's Christology is fundamentally opposed to Docetism, and, as to its main features, intimately harmonizes with his doctrine of the human personality renewed by faith. His Christology was satisfied neither with a mystical extinction of humanity in God, whether as regards the nature or the personality; nor with a reduction of Jesus to the position of a mere instrument of the deity. The subject of his sermons at Christmas, Easter, and on Ascension Day, was that in Christ human nature had been ennobled and raised to honour, that humanity had overcome death, and been exalted to the government of the world, to the omnipotence of the Father.¹ Worshipfully he tarries by the side of the manger, and with the arms of a childlike faith embraces the child Jesus, adoring it as the pure gift of God, because in it were already contained the saving virtues, which should be afterwards unfolded.² Mary was in his eyes the mother of God; not as though she had given birth to Jesus according to His deity (xvi. 2721), but according to His humanity; even in the child he believed that union to have taken place which constituted Jesus the child of noblest descent, the divine-human child. Especially, however, did the exalted Lord who had ascended up to heaven, uniting within Himself deity and glorified humanity, appear to him to be the heart and the

¹ vii. 1502, 1546-1555. The *God-man* is the incarnate God, vi. 1074. The figure or form of the humanity is the form of the Son, through the medium of which the person of the Son, as a person distinct from the Father and the Holy Ghost, has been manifested, iii. 2844 f., v. 338 ff. A collection of sections relating to this subject may be found in Walch x. 1432 ff.

² Schenkel does not give a faithful account of Luther's views when he represents him as teaching that "Mary suckled, cradled, and made porridge and soup for God." For the connection in which these words occur (xvi. 2724), shows his meaning clearly enough to have been, that Mary did such things for Jesus as to His humanity. Compare viii. 166 ff; specially § 269.

sun of the world, the eye full of soul, which stands in a vital connection of love and power with all points of the periphery. To the Church He is the faithful and loving Bridegroom, the Head, who is as it were the "sensorium commune" for everything that concerns His people, and, whilst standing at their right hand with His almighty power, is conscious of and feels their sufferings as though they were His own. At such joyous festivals (as Christmas, for example), he did not ask,—What is still lacking to the perfection of the child Jesus? but saw in the seed the full-ripe fruit, and felt that victory and perfection were already germinantly there, after a divine fashion, although they needed to be first historically realized. (Note 6.)

III. So long as we regard the matter solely in a general way, and take for granted the inner connection and affinity of the two natures, it cannot appear other than thoroughly natural that the Son of God should possess, be conscious of, and retain the human as veritably His own. So also, when we conceive the "new humanity" in a state of perfection and exaltation, it can occasion but little difficulty to regard divine Sonship as its own, as that which pertains to the full idea of this individual man: even as it was never repugnant to the divine nature, "whose glory is love," to possess the human as its own. The case is different, however, when we pass from the general to the concrete, and seek directly to apply that which holds true of the idea of the perfect God-man, to that same God-man at the various stages, through which He had to pass in order that the perfect idea might be fully realized.

But how can we reconcile growth (*Werden*) in particular (without which the humanity of Christ would not have been really and truly a humanity), and the humiliation to the form of a servant, with the divine-human *Unio*, which must either be, or not be, an actual fact, which cannot be brought to pass by means of a gradual composition?

If we follow in the footsteps of the early teachers of the Church, since the fifth century, and lay the main stress on the divine aspect, without assuming it to have limited itself either in itself, or even in its relation to humanity, then humanity must necessarily be conceived as deified from the very beginning, and as a participator in all the operations which arise out of the idea of the *Unio*. But if the divine attributes are held

to have been appropriated to the humanity from the commencement, how can it at the same time have really retained all its human characteristics? nay more, how could the Logos have done that to which Luther attached such great importance, namely, take upon Himself humanity in its state of abasement? That which is absorbed, cannot any longer be assumed. And yet the doctrine of the exclusion of a growth of the humanity, and of its deification in and by the very act of incarnation—even in relation to the soul of Christ, its knowledge and its virtue—had become pretty general;—merely in relation to the body of Christ, was anything like actual growth allowed. But that was, in one form, a denial of the truth of the humanity, in its most important feature.

The vigour and determination with which Luther, on the contrary, insists on the reality of the humanity of Christ, even in the matter of growth, are worthy of note. This would not awaken so much admiration, had he not set himself the task of asserting that the man Jesus was God. For if it absolutely transcended human nature to possess divinity as its own, we need not be surprised to find that that which cannot in any respect be co-ordinated with the divine nature, cannot be co-ordinated therewith in the matter of growth. That he does occasionally, in unguarded moments, recur to traditional representations of the earthly humanity of Christ, which do not leave room for a veritable human development, we do not intend to deny. Many things of the kind might be adduced, showing that Luther did not yet distinctly understand the full force and application of the new element which he had adopted. Still, it is fairer to recognise those ideas as most properly his own, which he himself produced, and which differ most from the traditional ones. (Note 7.)

Then he earnestly and distinctly repudiates all those mythical elements which the legends of the Church had introduced into the life of the child Jesus (xi. 388), and declares that he would rather see it lying unweaned at its mother's breast, or innocently playing like other children, than have it talking when a suckling, or working miracles when a boy.¹ On innumerable occasions he

¹ Luther always held Mary in high esteem. He repudiated the opinion that she gave birth to other children after her first Son; and believed that she had been delivered and purified from original sin by the Holy Ghost

lays it down as a first and fundamental principle, that nothing whatever may be detracted from the truth and completeness of Christ's humanity. But what is of most consequence, is that he has actually verified this fundamental principle in connection with the main features of the history of Christ.

Not merely as to the physical, but also as to the spiritual aspect of Christ's humanity, does he maintain that He underwent an actual development—with the difference in favour of Jesus, that His development took a pure start. He took upon Himself mortal flesh, freed from impurity, but not freed from the punishment of sin (mortality). He was in all respects like other children, with the single exception of sin. That He would one day become a great man, He showed in His twelfth year—at the age when other boys also begin to indicate what they will be (vii. 1498 f., 1556–1560; xiii. 361, § 15). Though he decidedly represents the life of Jesus as at once divine and human from the very commencement, he is equally sincere in teaching that He increased, as in years, so also in wisdom and favour with God and men. His humanity was not omniscient, but was under the necessity of learning, though perhaps not from men (xi. 387 ff.). “We must take Luke's words regarding the humanity of Christ in their simplest and plainest sense. Although He was at all times full of the Spirit and of grace, the Spirit did not always move Him alike; but now awakened Him to this, and then to that, as the circumstances of the case required. Thus, then, although the Spirit did dwell in Him from the very beginning; but, as His body grew, and His reason grew in a natural way like that of other men, so did the Spirit pene- (xx. 2245, 2617); that she gave birth to Jesus without pain and without hurt to her body; and that, as she had been a virgin before, so she continued a virgin during and after the birth, notwithstanding that she voluntarily submitted to the law of purification (ix. 1632; xi. 169; x. 1343). Yet he takes occasion repeatedly to observe, that the only thing of importance is the purity of the birth of Jesus, and that everything else affecting Mary is dogmatically quite unimportant (see, for example, xx. 2239 ff.). He also repudiates the notion, that Christ received for His humanity a pure material derived from Adam and preserved for Him. Indeed, he maintains, on the contrary (ii. 1717 ff.), that Christ took upon Him the fallen mortal nature of man, that nature which was under the necessity of dying; though it was purified by the incarnation. The roots of the idea of a purification of Mary from original sin were thus cut away; and such a purification limited to that which was to be conceived by Mary.

trate into and pervade Him ever more fully, and moved Him the longer the more. It is, therefore, no pretence when Luke says,—‘He became strong in the Spirit;’ but precisely as the words teach, taken in their most obvious sense, so has it actually been. It is a truth that, the older He grew, the greater He grew; the greater, the more rational; the more rational, the stronger in Spirit and the fuller of wisdom before God, in Himself, and before the people: these words need no gloss. Such a view too is attended with no danger, and is Christian; whether it contradict the articles of faith invented by them or not, is of no consequence.”¹

Further, although Jesus continued invariably obedient, He was, notwithstanding, compelled to learn obedience. The temptations of Christ, he regarded as veritable historical conflicts, not as illusions; as real assaults which He had to withstand. This, in connection with his doctrine of the freedom of the will, shows doubly what great importance Luther attached to the assertion of the full truth of the humanity of Christ. The traditional expedient of saying that Christ merely played our part, that He performed epideictical acts, and so forth,—in a word, everything that favoured the idea of a merely illusory struggle,—Luther refused to employ.

¹ xi. 389, 390. From the “Kirchenpostille.” To this connection belong especially the words used by him in the “Hauspostille,” T. xiii.,—“Like any other holy natural man, the humanity of Christ did not at all times think, speak, will, remark all things; though some try to make an almighty man out of Him, unwisely mixing up the two natures and their work together. He did not at all times see, hear, and feel all things; and so also He did not at all times consider all things with His heart, but merely as God led Him and *presented* things to Him. Full of grace and wisdom He was, and able to judge upon and teach all that came before Him; because the deity, which sees and knows all things, was personally united with and present in Him.” One can scarcely understand how Weisse (see his “Die Christologie Luthers,” 1852, p. 182), in face of this very passage, can persist in maintaining that Luther regarded the humanity of Jesus as the mere means of the manifestation of the person of the Logos, and taught most clearly that humanity was selfless or anhypostatical. On the contrary, Luther above all others considered the incarnation to be an union of the natures, the *result* of which is the person; whereas the traditional doctrine was that of the impersonality of the human nature; and yet Weisse can assert that Luther distinctly taught the traditional view, though he adduces no passage in support of his position. The only passage which he does adduce (ii. 581 ff.), proves the contrary. See below, page 99.

The temptations of Christ in the wilderness consisted in the devil's assailing Him first with hunger, and then endeavouring to seduce Him into presumptuousness and pride. "Here we must regard Christ as *a man*, who had the deity hidden in His humanity. On the cross, He was a true and thorough man, wailing and crying for help and deliverance; and so here also, He stands in weakness as a real man" (xiii. 547; xv. 1677-1685). On Hebrews ii. 7 he remarks,—“The Hebrew text says, ‘Thou madest Him a little while to lack God;’ that is, Thou didst leave Him during three days of His suffering, as though there were neither God nor angel near Him. Not of course for His own, but for our persons’ sake, did He consent to subject Himself to these needs, assaults, and distresses; but in order that He might be able to undergo them, He must be deserted by God, and be tormented in His soul even as we or the damned are tormented, though without sin and guilt. That, in such circumstances, His humanity was not separated from the deity, but was merely deprived of the help of God, is true, but it explains nothing: it is also true, that God removes away from no man, in so far as He is omnipresent. But Christ endured a true conflict, true assaults; it was no mere play; for Christ’s was a true and upright nature. When left by God, Christ was far from His salvation and life. And because the pains brought upon Him by His substitutionary office were beyond the power of human nature to endure, His innocent, weak nature was forced to groan and cry out, to fear and to flee. He felt our sin, our blasphemy of God, our curse, and, as the Head of all the saints, had an intenser experience of divine desertion than they (iv. 1635-1649). In this connection, however, one of Luther’s Passion Sermons on the Conflict endured by Jesus in Gethsemane is specially worthy of quotation (see xiii. 782 f.):—“Our dear Lord Christ here puts Himself for our sake into the position of a poor sinful man; and the divine nature withholds the consolation and assurance with which it generally, in rich measure, inspired Christ. Opportunity was afforded to the tempter, the devil, to approach nearer to Him and deal Him severer blows than ever before. For this reason, Christ speaks now like a man who is in the midst of a battle,¹ and who

¹ iv. 785,—“There was He abased (Matthew xxvi. 37), and made like a wretched, forsaken man in the presence of *God*, of Himself, and of the

wrestles with death; and He seeks consolation from His disciples, to whom He had previously given consolation. He trembled and was bowed down, and His heart was full of sadness. Furthermore, His nature was thoroughly pure and unmixed, and therefore felt the anguish of death more truly and strongly than any of us. All the anguish which this man endured, was endured on our account." At the same time, Luther does not forget again to remind us that Christ would have been incapable of bearing up under such sufferings, had He been a mere man: and what we have previously advanced shows no less clearly that he believed the deity to participate in these sufferings, on the ground that humanity had been appropriated by, and continued to belong to, the Son of God.¹

Luther therefore insists most decidedly upon the recognition of a real ethical process in the humanity of Christ; the absence of which, he justly considers, would detract from the merit of His acts and sufferings. Had the almighty power of the Son of God streamed into the humanity from the very beginning, and equalized its wisdom, virtue, and power with the divine, what would have become of conflicts, how could salvation have been *earned*? The process of reconciliation and atonement would be reduced to a mere seeming. Only by thus recognising the reality of the humanity and of its growth, is it possible for a determinate and fruitful distinction to be established between the state of humiliation and a state of exaltation. And to those scientific theologians who have clung most faithfully to Luther, belongs especially the credit of having developed the doctrine of the twofold state of Christ.²

people: human nature was then left to itself, v. 331, § 74. He felt in His heart, precisely as though He were deserted by God. And, indeed, He was really deserted by God. Not as though the deity were separated from the humanity; for in the Person of Christ, the Son of God and the Son of Mary, they were so united, as that they shall no more be separated to all eternity. But the deity had secluded and concealed itself. The humanity was left alone, and the devil had free access to Christ: the deity secluded itself, and left the humanity to fight the battle alone." This is then connected with Phil. ii. 6, 7, § 75,—“Man and the Son of man stands there: He bears the sin of the world, and is not inspired with divine consolation and strength.”

¹ vi. 1101–1108; xxii. 414 ff.

² It is true that, in their development of the doctrine, they applied it onesidedly to the assumption of the servant's form, and less distinctly to the growth of Christ.

But as Luther, on the other hand, adhered to the conviction that God was truly in Jesus from the very beginning, how did he reconcile therewith, the growth of Christ, and His conflicts, of which that in Gethsemane was but the chief? How does he secure a vital, divine-human unity, veritably the subject of real growth?

Does he assume that the God-man emptied Himself, in the sense in which this was taught by later theologians? According to them, namely, Christ, even as to His humanity, really had all knowledge, all power, all moral perfection from the very beginning, and merely waived the entire or partial use—at all events, in public—of these His superior endowments. Is he therefore favourable to the views of later *dogmaticians*, who consider the growth of Jesus to have been the result of a divine-*human* self-abasement? Or is he favourable to the views of those modern theologians, who regard it as the result of the self-abasement and self-emptying of the Logos? Neither of the two. 1. He maintains most decidedly that the Son of God did not cease to be what He was, by becoming what He had not previously been. Such a doctrine of the conversion of God savoured to him of Heathenism.¹ He did not believe that deity abased itself in the sense of undergoing a loss, whether by the incarnation in itself, or by the mode of the incarnation, that is, in the servant's form:—not through the humanification in itself, for even the exalted Christ continues eternally man, and, in Luther's view, humanity was capable of being joined in perfect unity with the Son of God. Merely mediately does he refer the abasement to the Son of God, in so far as He waived His claim to outward honour, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, took upon Himself the form of a servant, who endured suffering and humiliation. 2. Luther's whole spirit had more affinity with the second view—that the growth of Christ, from His conception to His crucifixion, was the result of an act of divine-*human* self-abasement. For the words of Phil. ii. 6 ff., as is well known, are referred by him not to the deity, but to the

¹ xii. 631 f. "Auslegung der letzten Worte Davids," passim. Passages like xxii. 414, iii. 1115–1118, vii. 1843, are of no importance, when considered in connection with the assurance (repeated by him times without number) that the Son of God remained what He was. The remarks which follow in the text sufficiently explain them.

humanity (Note 8); and his example has been followed by Lutheran dogmaticians. Such a reference implies, of course, that the humanity of Christ, being endowed with a fulness of divine powers, was under no necessity of bearing the form of a servant, but that, on the contrary, it willingly dispensed with the show of dignity, emptied itself, and laid, on its own behalf, none of the claims which its inner superiority entitled it to lay.

But in the passages which relate to the official life of Christ, Luther never once says that He had, as to His humanity, absolute possession of divine majesty and powers from the very beginning. Such a statement would be in glaring contradiction with the passages just discussed, which attribute a gradual growth to the man Jesus, and speak of the divine gradually entering into Him: still more incompatible would it have been with the belief, that the humanity secretly made use of the divine attributes. Further, Luther distinguishes very determinately between the incarnation itself, and the assumption of the servant's form: nor does he look to the latter for the explanation of the former (to which pertains the growth), inasmuch as the latter is transitory, whereas the former abides. The servile form assumed by Christ was but an accident superadded to the incarnation. It originated, indeed, in the same love that moved the Logos to become incarnate; but only on the basis of an incarnation already accomplished did the God-man, in the exercise of His inward divine freedom, empty Himself, subjecting Himself to suffering, and assuming the form of a servant.¹ On the

¹ Christ, as God-man, was and continued, even during His appearance in the form of a servant, inwardly in the form of God, in piety, righteousness, wisdom, and power, although, so far as He did and willed to wear the servile form, relatively to others He made no use of His majesty and divinity. So far Luther goes: but he does not say that His humanity entirely possessed divine attributes, even inwardly, prior to its perfection; he merely represents Him as assuming the servile form worn by us, for our benefit, and not as though it were a matter of course that He should do so. Not because of any necessity, but because He had the full assurance of His equality with God, was He moved by love to serve us, and to empty Himself, instead of appearing in the majesty of a God:—even as a wise man, in possession of wisdom, and wearing the look of wisdom, lays aside his wisdom, in order to serve fools (xii. 623–633). In His humanity, Christ possessed the divine nature together with the divine *μορφή*; He possessed them as His own, and not as something stolen. His divinity was the thing

contrary, to derive the divine-human growth from a divine-human act of self-abasement, would reduce inner growth to a mere seeming, in so far as it would necessarily imply that the man Jesus, even as a man, had been filled with the absolute fullness of God from the very beginning.

When, then, Luther repudiated any mere semblance of growth brought about by an act of self-abasement on the part of the God-man;¹ and when, on the other hand, he refused to purchase an actual growth of the divine-human vital unity at the price of a depotentiation or self-emptying of the Logos; the only method by which he could secure the desired growth of the vital unity was that actually adopted by him—namely, to represent the divine as entering into the humanity, not in its entire actuality all at once, but ever more and more according to the measure of human susceptibility.² Consequently, notwithstanding the indissoluble Unio established from the very beginning between the natures, in the depths of the divine-human substance, he assumes that the Logos so limited Himself, relatively to the instreaming of the “actu” divine into the humanity undergoing the process of development, as to leave the humanity opportunity for true and actual growth; that is, he assumes that the Logos so far rested and was inactive in Jesus as to leave room for human conflicts and temptations. The divine-human potency, wherein consisted the essence of Christ, and which constituted His continuous vital unity, may have existed in Jesus from the very commencement; but still the God-manness had not, at the beginning, attained its full actuality. To the realization or development of this potency, it was necessary that its moments should undergo a relative segregation, and that the human should stand forth in relative independence;³ though the invariable end and aim thereof was the furtherance of the

most certain to Him; and He *took upon* Himself the form of a servant. *We* are not in the form of God, but in the form, nay more, in the very essential nature, of a servant: but we desire to appropriate the form of God by robbery.

¹ Compare, besides, xii. 622 ff., 2268; iv. 784 (year 1521); v. 331, 1314; vii. 1558; x. 1345, 2153; xi. 278.

² xi. 389 ff.; see above, Note 42.

³ This Luther means, when he represents Christ at decisive epochs of His life, above all as a “pure man,” without therefore conceiving the essential bond of the Unio to be rent.

process by which the divine and human were being united. Notwithstanding the original union of the factors, the actual God-manhood was accordingly the subject of a process, of growth: though a reality as to principle, in the sphere of the actual the interweaving of the divine and human still remained an incompleted task. Consequently, prior to the accomplishment of this task, ere the susceptibility of the humanity was fully ripened, there existed a relative separation between the Logos, who never gives up His actual substantial being, and man, whose actuality cannot yet keep pace, or coincide, with that of the Logos. By means of such a relative dissolubility of the factors prior to their absolute interpenetration—a dissolubility willed by the Logos, who restricts His influence, and, out of tender regard to the preservation of the reality and of the free development of the humanity, avoids everything of a magical or physically overpowering character—full opportunity was given for the free play of the human powers, and for a real process, by which the factors could attain to an ethical interpenetration, during the course of the earthly life of Jesus. But assuming this relative dissolubility, we cannot, of course, call in question the relative separation of the Logos as *actual* (that is, of the omniscient, almighty, omnipresent Logos) on the one side, from the humanity undergoing development, on the other side.¹ Luther did, it is true, at all events for a time, call this in question;² but it was merely a backward movement towards the point of view of the earlier Christology, which left no room for actual growth. To this regression no great importance must be attached, for the simple reason, that in the passages in which he gives utterance to his own Christological intuitions, he strongly maintains that the Logos and man were at the beginning relatively separated from each other, as far as the sphere of actuality was concerned.³

¹ Compare xiii. 544, 547, § 15, 782-787; iv. 1637-1647, especially § 26, where he speaks of the very high and great mobility of the innocent nature of Jesus; and § 15, where he speaks of the impossibility of Jesus having been most blessed and most damned during the Passion at one and the same time. v. 327, 321,—The deity, although indissolubly united with Him, secluded itself, and left the humanity alone in its conflict. And, so far as His humanity consented to this suffering, it may be regarded as forming part of the self-abasement to the form of a servant (Phil. ii.).

² During the sacramental controversy; compare above, p. 552, p. 565.

³ See above, pp. 553 ff. This is not meant to imply that his doctrine of

We have previously remarked that Luther evinced a decided preference for the description of the incarnation as the union of the two natures to one person. This peculiarity is in striking agreement with the conclusion just arrived at, that the Unio of the natures was a realized fact from the very beginning,¹ and that—not despite, but through it—room was left for the process and growth of the divine-human life, until it should result in the full actual existence of the divine-human *person*;—though, be it observed, Luther himself did not fully carry out and take advantage of what he thus laid down in principle. The *personality* of man cannot, strictly speaking, be born with him: viewed as an actuality, and not merely principally, it falls within the sphere of the actual, and is subject to the laws thereof; that is, it must be the result of a process. The child Jesus, if it were a real child, must have been at first unaccountable, and destitute of personal self-consciousness; consequently, though it may be termed a divine-human individual, or, even further, a divine-human subject, it could not yet be termed a divine-human *person*. To the realization of that divine-human person, which consists in the equiponderance of the divine and the human, a process of actual interpenetration was indispensably necessary.

Ubiquity was not intimately connected with his views on the subject of Christology, relatively to which the living and perfect union of the divine and human is so very important. But, unless the idea of the growth of Christ were again to be dropped, the reality of ubiquity must be reserved for the period of glorification, and its roots be found in the perfect realization of the Unio. Instead thereof, Luther, by way of establishing the ubiquity, went back, not to the idea of the Unio, but to its first momentum, and to the Act itself; and for a long time he treated this beginning of the Unio as though it were identical with the full actual realization of its idea. That he did so, arose from his not having presented his Christological ideas in a logical, connected form. The issue of this procedure was a “*Logos non extra carnem, nonnisi in carne*,” even at the very beginning; and connected therewith a series of most monstrous representations—as we shall afterwards find. No marvel, then, that at a subsequent period Luther himself felt no proper confidence in this method.

¹ Compare, besides the above passages, ii. 581 ff.; vi. 276, § 202, 1074 f. (where the term “union of the natures” is unhesitatingly used as synonymous with “personal union”); vii. 1839 f.; xiii. 152, 1138; viii. 2130, § 271. Other related formulæ are the following:—The two natures were so combined as to produce one person; or,—The one Christ consists of two natures; or,—Jesus is the man who is one thing or person with God; xvi. 2729.

The Logos undoubtedly was personal; and not merely His nature, but also His personal will, established from the very beginning the union between the natures; but so long as the humanity continued irresponsible, the personality of the Logos could not be its distinctive Ego, for the simple reason, that it had not, or was not yet, the actuality of the Ego. Consequently, that in-forming of the divine personality in the human nature, the issue of which should be, that the man Jesus would be, and know himself to be, at the same time the Son of God, was at the commencement a task to be accomplished. If we adhere solely to the formula—the hypostasis of the Son assumed human nature, by that act we give the predominance to the divine aspect, and reduce the humanity to impersonality: whereas Luther's idea was, that, on the one hand, both the divine nature and the divine personality became, in their actuality, the property of the humanity; and, on the other hand, that the human, in every form in which it actualizes and manifests itself, became the property of the deity.¹

Lastly, all those incongruous and discerptive elements which the old doctrine of the two natures introduced into Christology were set aside, as far as Luther was concerned, by the higher conception he had formed both of the human and of the divine; in short, by the principles involved in the distinction between the "old and the new speech," to which we previously drew attention. To represent the union as consisting in the mere communion of attributes, whilst the essences, the substances of the two natures, remained apart, did not satisfy his mind. On the contrary, he deemed the attributes to constitute the essence of the natures; and his great aim was to unite the two na-

¹ That he did not conceive the human nature to be impersonal, may be most strikingly seen in connection with such events of the career of Christ as the Passion, the Temptation, where Luther remarks,—“Here Christ stood as a true and genuine man.” There the humanity was not regarded by him as a mere “instrument or tool in the hand of the deity.” The Christology of Eutyches he deemed to be discerptive, because it did not concede to the humanity the capability of possessing the divine as its own. The fault of Nestorius, says he, was not, as the Popes invent, that he posited two persons,—for he never acknowledged more than one,—but that he effected no actual union between the natures: xvi. 2719 ff. The Council condemned far too little in the system of Nestorius; in the Papacy there are certainly many Nestorians: x. 2730, 2736.

tures.¹ Nor does he identify the natures; for otherwise, how could he have supposed that the union was a thing requiring first to be accomplished? Viewed in their true light (that is, defined according to the "new speech"), the human and the divine did not appear to Luther to exclude each other, but to seek each other, in their very essence; so that in this sense, their union may be one of substance, essence (viii. 166, § 266). The relative dissolubility of the factors in Christ comes to a close, giving way to that interpenetration of the divine and human, to whose complete realization the resurrection and glorification put the finishing stroke. This complete interpenetration of the factors Luther again regarded also as the completion of the humanity in itself, and not merely as its perfect revelation to others;² though, at the same time, it cannot be denied that the prime and central source of the life of his faith, was his intuition of Christ in His entirety and oneness, and that he had but very imperfectly dialectically worked and thought out the aspect of growth. The consequence thereof is, that that vital unity of the divine and human which preceded their conjoint growth, is not sufficiently discriminated from that vital unity which should be the result of the process, and which Luther had particularly in view. Hence also the absolute completion of the God-man is involuntarily dated back by him to the beginning of His temporal life,—a procedure which gave rise to confusion, contradictions, ambiguities, and which must necessarily have checked the development of the pregnant Christological germs infolded in Luther's fundamental view of the Person of Christ.³

But although we must allow that Luther did not bestow equal attention on all the aspects of his peculiar Christology, and that, in particular, the Scripture passages which relate to

¹ See above. Further, xvi. 2729,—“Whoso denieth the idiomata or attributes of a nature, denieth the nature itself.” In xvii. 519, he speaks against the scholastic distinction between substance and accident; compare Weisse l. c. p. 181.

² v. 338 ff. “From eternity Christ was Lord of all creatures, ere He became man; but, having become man, and having been for a little while deserted by God, though at the same time crowned with glory and honour, He was *made* Lord in time, according to His humanity, through the revelation and glorification after His resurrection and ascension:” vi. 1078.

³ Of the numerous passages adducible in proof of this remark, let it suffice at present to mention xx. 1013, § 122.

the growth of Christ were treated less carefully; still, how many germs of a more vital and scriptural Christology are contained in what has been advanced! It is true, there lacks a firm rational impress; the basis of a well-defined doctrine of God and man, regenerated by the principle of the Reformation, is wanting; and we miss an accurate and thorough acquaintance with the general laws of human existence and human development. At the same time, the occasional discussions (and they are merely occasional) of, now this, and then that point, rested, as we have seen, on a fundamental intuition of a pregnant and profound character, the contents of which have not as yet, by any means, been exhausted by the later Christology of the Lutheran Church. We shall not err if we say, that the two lobes of the heart of the Christology which hovered before his mind, were, on the one hand, the susceptibility of the human nature to the divine, due to the gracious love of God, and on the other hand, that the divine nature and its substance, owing to the power exercised over it by love, not only presented no hindrance to an union of natures in the Person of Christ, but was able to possess, and to be conscious of, all that is purely human as its own.¹

In the dialectic development of Christology, which he undertook during the last eight years of his life, he evinces, it is true, a more accurate knowledge of the history of the dogma; but he also corrupts his own original view, by a somewhat too nervous and anxious adherence to the traditional scholastic for-

¹ The accurate and acute glance which Luther took at the history of Christology, deserves mention. He did not, as it would appear, occupy his mind with the subject till towards the end of the first thirty years of the sixteenth century; but his critical estimate of the history of the Councils of the fifth century, specially that of Chalcedon, is grand. His judgment of Eutyches and Nestorius, and of the unfruitfulness of the Council of Chalcedon, is distinguished by sobriety and care. He saw that Nestorius and Eutyches both acknowledged, indeed, two natures and one person, but that both also denied the real vital union of the natures, each in a different way. Nestorius esteemed the divine nature to be too lofty for union with, and therefore kept it far from, the human; Eutyches, on the other hand, considered the human nature incapable of receiving the divine as its own, excluded it from participation therein, and thus put a slight on it (though pretending to exalt it by means of absorption), xvi. 2715-2746. The fundamental fault common to these two extremes was thus indicated.

mulæ.¹ He then, namely, not seldom applied the scholastic formula of the "*Communicatio Idiomatum*" to Christology, in a different sense, it is true, from that in which it was used by scholastic theologians; but his own idea was necessarily obscured by being clothed in a garb foreign to it. This formula was partly to blame, that the proper task, to wit, the union of the natures, was left untouched; that attention was directed to the mere communication of the attributes; and that thus a return was made to a more superficial treatment of Christology. Still easier was it, from this position, to fall back into the doctrine of the impersonality of the humanity, in that personality was not usually regarded as an attribute. Nay more, the very subject of controversy with the Christologians of the Reformed Church threatened to disappear from view; for, in a multitude of the passages cited below, Luther's sole aim, so far as he ranged himself under the formula of the "*Communicatio Idiomatum*," seems to have been to show, that the two natures, which otherwise stood apart from each other, so laid down their attributes in the person, considered as the Ego, that the attributes of both pertained to the one Ego, and a number of peculiar figures of speech are applicable.² We must at once add, however, that Luther did not treat even the word "*Idioma*" as a mere synonym of "*Eigenschaft*" (attribute, quality). He includes under the term "*Idioma*" all that adheres to a nature, all that pertains to its essence, in such a sense that the nature cannot be conceived apart therefrom.³ For this reason, he showed no leanings whatever to the doctrine of the impersonality of the human nature (vi. 1077). Finally, also, he was far from conceiving that the "*idiomata*" of the two natures were deposited in the person as a third something, whilst the natures

¹ Compare the Exposition of John xiv.-xvi., in the year 1538, T. viii. 166; the Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, in the year 1539 (the edition revised by himself), viii. 2130 ff. "*Von den Concilien und Kirchen*," in the year 1539, T. xvi. 2715 ff., 2724 ff.; vi. 1075, in the year 1544.

² The formula, "*Communicatio Idiomatum*," was employed, therefore, as a kind of Formula of Concord, especially by Melancthon and his school, until the Würtembergers made the attempt to rescue the strict and proper Lutheran idea. This they did, it is true, merely by giving the formula a new cut.

³ xvi. 2724; viii. 166. See Note 2, page 101.

themselves still continued apart. The sense he tries to put on the formula,—a sense, it is true, different from its scholastic one,—is the following:—that the natures themselves, in their actuality, were so united, that the deity possessed humanity as a proper determination of its own being, and the humanity was omnipotent. In one word, he used the formula to denote a real mutual communication, not merely of attributes, but, with the attributes, of the substance of the natures.¹ For example, the application to the humanity of predicates which strictly and originally pertained to the deity alone, he considers to be justified, not on the ground that the two natures are in the one Ego, but that they are conjoined by the *Unio*; for the word “Man” now includes the deity also, in that it has become “another and a new word,” with a new signification.²

It is therefore certain that Luther never changed his fundamental intuitive view of the Person of Christ,—the view he had taken long before the controversy respecting the Sacraments; and even when he gave in his adhesion to the traditional formula of the “*Communicatio Idiomatum*,” which had grown out of theological and religious principles entirely different from his own, he did not himself fall back into the doctrine which prevailed prior to the Reformation. It was his followers who did this; for, having been led back out of the broad domain of the new intuitions, which called for the formation of a new language, into the narrow limits of a formula which preserved merely a fragment of that which Luther meant, they gradually lost sight of the real problem in its totality, depth, and simplicity.

Luther's thoughts on the subject of Christology breathe throughout a religious spirit, and are not mere idle, scholastic inquiries. This may be seen by the circumstance that, even as his doctrine of faith is intimately allied with Christology, so his views of Christology lead him back in the most natural way

¹ xvi. 2728. In the passage, vi. 1076, 1077, the “communication of attributes,” which he always represents as mutual, is evidently equivalent, in his eyes, to “union of the natures.” By person he understands, not a third something already existing in addition to the natures, but the result of the union of the Son of Mary and the Son of God. The same remark holds good of xiii. 152.

² viii 2131.

to faith. Everything in Christ was done for our advantage. Not that he regarded Christ as a mere means; he also held Him to be the absolutely "Glorious Person." But neither the Son of God nor Christ sought His own advantage: it was free love that found its glory in condescending to, and becoming even a substitute for, us. Hence also, in his view, the Person of Christ was nothing so isolated that, through faith in Him, the birth of God in man, and the birth of man from God, could not be continued in us. Like as in Him the divine nature, by its participation in the human, so worked on this humanity, as that it was exalted to God's throne; so, also, is His incarnation fitted and intended to raise our humanity, by faith, to a participation in the divine nature. "Behold," says he, "thus did Christ take to Himself from us our birth, and insert it into His birth and give us His own, in order that by it we may become pure and new, as though it were our own. Every Christian, therefore, may exult and boast in the birth of Christ, just as though he himself had been physically born of Mary like Christ. Whoso doth not believe, or doubteth this, is no Christian. This is the sense of Isaiah ix. 6: 'Unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given.' Us, us, to us it is born, to us it is given. Therefore, see thou that thy delight in the Gospels be derived not solely from the history in itself; for it exists not long; but make thou His birth thine own; exchange with Christ, so that thou mayest get quit of thy birth and appropriate His. This takes place when thou believest. Then wilt thou of a certainty lie in the womb of the Virgin Mary, and be her dear child."¹ The act of the incarnation of God in Christ corresponds to our act of faith; for the aim of Christ in His love, and our aim in our faith, is one, to wit, each desires to cleave to the other, to become one with the other, to forget that which is his own, and to make that his own which belongs to the other, in order by love to give, and by faith to receive.

¹ xi. 175 f., 228-233. With regard to the Platonic Ideal World, according to which all things live in God, he adds,—“That the heathen also knew, that we live and move and have our being in Him, and are of His kind; nor is this to be denied. But the idea that all creatures live in God, may make subtle talkers, is also dark and difficult; but it tells us nothing of grace—it makes no man rich in grace; and therefore the Scriptures express themselves regarding it as a subtlety.

Love and faith, therefore, he thus reduced to one fundamental function, to wit, my desire to exist in another as in that which is my own, in order that the other may exist in me as in his own (xii. 623-633; v. 1314). How in us the self-forgetfulness of appropriating faith is followed by the self-forgetfulness of self-renunciatory, bounteous love, after the manner of the love of Christ, we have previously shown (p. 526 f.).

In conclusion, it must still be remarked that his doctrine of the Word was, from the very commencement, intimately connected with his fundamental view regarding the Person of Christ. He held it to be certain that God as Love can and will reveal Himself as that which He actually is, and that He does also veritably thus reveal Himself in the Word: whereas the Mystics regarded Him as still veiled in mystery even whilst revealing Himself, and thus reduced revelation to a mere sign. So must we estimate, in the first instance, the Word of God, the *Son*; and no less also Christ. Through Christ, says he times without number, we look into the heart of the Father. Christ does not merely denote God, or a thought of God; He is God Himself in the form of a mundane actuality, or in the form of a man.¹ But Christ Himself is brought to us also by His word. Even our words are an image and counterpart of our heart: through the medium of words the sentiments of the heart itself become known, as though the heart were in the words. But our words retain always somewhat of the character of mere significant tokens; for human words are never the vehicles of the essential nature of the heart. God's eternal Word, on the contrary, is like Himself; the deity is entirely in it; and whoso has the Word, has the entire deity: it is not merely an image or token, but contains also the entire essence, and is as fully God as He of whom it is the image or Word. Now this Word, which is God, became flesh and dwelt amongst us. The humanity would have been of no use had not the deity dwelt within it, and thus come nigh and made Himself apprehensible to man; but again, God neither can nor will be found, save through and in this humanity which He has set up for a certain sign, and by which He will gather to Himself all His children out of the world. The eternal Word, in whom was all life, is in Christ, the

¹ xi. 220, of the year 1521. See above in connection with year 1515, pp. 535 f.

Son of God in humanity. Whoso believeth this, becomes enlightened by this light, nay more, receives life.¹ From this point of view, according to which, in divine things, the external is, relatively to man, the very revealed thing itself in its mundane actuality, Luther never departed, through all his writings, from the earliest to the latest; in his doctrine of the Holy Scriptures and of the Sacraments, the impress of this fundamental idea is constantly traceable. (Note 9.)

Luther's great superiority, even in a Christological respect, to the noblest representatives of Mysticism anterior to the Reformation, must have become sufficiently evident from what has been advanced. A still higher position does he occupy, as compared with Roman Catholic contemporaries, such as Bishop Berthold and Theophrastus Paracelsus. (Note 10.)

Among the more eminent men connected with the Reformation, Andreas Osiander undoubtedly evinced most affinity with Luther's fundamental Christological idea; and of those who declined to mix themselves up with the movements of the Church, the much misunderstood C. Schwenckfeld. Osiander had at an early period fixed the main features of his Christology; and his mystical view of faith, of the vital fellowship between believers and Christ, of the Word of God, and of the relation of that Word to human nature, bears a much closer resemblance to Luther's than to that of Melancthon and his other opponents. Notwithstanding the many points of affinity between the systems of A. Osiander and Schwenckfeld, there is a decided difference between them: the difference consists specially in this, that the Christology of the former manifestly lays main stress on the divine nature of Christ, that of the latter on His human nature; whereas in Luther's fundamental intuition both aspects held, as nearly as possible, an equally significant, that is, an equally integrant position.²

¹ xi. 241 f.

² The resemblance between Luther's and Osiander's type of doctrine comes out especially in connection with the Word of God. Osiander's view thereof reminds us of the earliest period of Luther's theological activity. It is traceable further in the Christological character of his Mysticism, and in his conjunction of the eternal divine image and of perfect humanity in one intuition. In all these respects, he bears at the same time the closest resemblance to Brentz and the Church of Württemberg: for this reason, he was best understood in Württemberg, and much more favourably judged there,

The central feature of Osiander's system is his doctrine of justification. Justification he held to be, not merely remission of punishment, but also the extinction of guilt, the restoration and full realization of the divine image, that is, of the original idea which God had of man: the necessary consequence of putting so extensive a meaning on the term "*Justificatio*," was that it reacted on his Christology.

Osiander, as an able, accomplished, and courageous confessor of the Gospel, was invited to be present at the most important negotiations,—at Marburg, Augsburg, Schmalkalden. He was thoroughly of Luther's view, especially on the question of the Sacraments. He differed from Luther, with his mystical point of view, especially in the greater boldness and wider range of his speculations.¹ Whilst Melanchthon contented himself with treating Luther's doctrine of faith in a more popular, empirical, and practical form, Osiander early evinced an inclination to penetrate to its deepest roots, and speculatively to reconstruct the evangelical system. In pursuance of this design, he naturally formed a terminology of his own, and thus exposed himself to much misinterpretation. Osiander's opposition to Melanchthon's method and system did not arise solely from jealousy of the high esteem in which that theologian was held; but from

than in North Germany. Thomasius, therefore, is guilty of inaccuracy when he represents the Church of Würtemberg, without further explanation, as equally opposed with the other churches to Osiander; see his otherwise painstaking and meritorious work, "*Historia et progressio dogmatis de obedientia Christi activa*," 1846, P. I. pp. 22 f.

¹ Compare Baur's "*Disq. in A. Osiandri de justif. doct.*," 1831; and the same author's "*Lehre von der Versöhnung*," pp. 316-344; "*Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes*" iii. 247-252;—Wilken; "*A. Osiander's Leben, Lehre und Schriften*," 1844. Among older works, compare Hartknoch's "*Preuss. Kirchenhistorie*," pp. 309 ff.; J. G. Walch's "*Religionsstreitigkeiten der evang. luther. Kirche*," Thl. 4, pp. 137 ff., where also the older literature of this subject is given. See also Planck's "*Geschichte des protest. Lehrbegriffs*," Bd. iii.—Of Osiander himself, the following works deserve especial mention:—"Confessio A. Osiandri de unico Mediatore Jesu Christo et justificatione fidei," Regiom. 1551; "*Epistola A. Osiandri, in qua confutantur*," etc. 1549. Then his work,—"*An filius dei fuerit incarnandus, si peccatum non introivisset in mundum? Item de imagine Dei quid sit? Ex certis et evidentibus S.S. testimoniis et non ex philosophicis et humanæ rationis cogitationibus deprompta explicatio*." Monteregio Pruss. 1550. Compare Schlüsselb. Catal. hæret. L. vi. 48 ff.

his accurate perception that Melanchthon's formulas embodied too little of the vital element of Mysticism, and that, on the contrary, the rational divine substance of Christianity was rather dissipated by the sharp definitions and calculations of Melanchthon's understanding.

In his doctrine of faith, Melanchthon always laid special stress on the laying hold of the merit of Christ, understanding by that merit His expiatory sufferings for us. For this reason, he not only gave little consideration to the active, alongside of the passive obedience of Christ, but in general directed his gaze rather to the work of Christ, than to the inner source and living unity of the works, in His person. Faith is to behold and lay hold upon the work which Christ wrought, not needing to undertake it on His own behalf. To A. Osiander this appeared more frosty than ice; and he justly felt that he was acting more in Luther's spirit when he set forth the Person of Christ in its totality—which, with the Father and with the Son, takes up its abode in the heart—as the object of faith. Melanchthon and his school, as indeed his other opponents, the letter-worshipping Lutherans, appeared to him to undervalue the present living Christ, in comparison with the empirical historical Christ or His works performed fifteen hundred years ago. But such a mistake is only possible where justification by faith has been reduced to a mere external work. It is true, that if justification consists solely in ransom (*redemptio*), that is, in the remission of the *punishment*, we can truly say that we are justified through faith in the historical fact of the merit of Christ, in that He paid the ransom-money for us, even as a slave, ransomed for money from the Turks, not merely becomes free from slavery himself, but also makes free all the children whom he may beget, and who otherwise would have been slaves. According to the Scriptures, however, justification signifies far more than that, to wit, the being made good and righteous again; and this was the higher purpose of the appearance of Christ. The propitiation of Christ was but the introduction thereto, or that by which He earned the right to make us righteous.

In order to establish the necessity of a more intimate connection with Christ than that which consists in the mere faith in His historical merits, Osiander goes back to the idea of man, and seeks to effect a transformation of the doctrine of the divine

image in harmony with the principle of faith. In his view, man was created by God, not merely unto obedience and good works, as though it were possible for him, through them alone, to be righteous before God (which would be putting too high a value on good works—such a value as is usually put on them in the Romish Church), but to *be* righteous and good in his nature. Not good works make a man good, but a righteous man does good works. Whether we are well-pleasing to God or not, depends on our being, on the principle of good in us. There is only one good which can stand before God; and that is the goodness which is originally and essentially in Himself. There are not two different species of righteousness or of the good, but one alone; and that is His essential righteousness. Were this righteousness of His not self-communicative, He alone would continue righteous. But the revelation of the law shows that it is His will to see a righteousness outside of Himself also. The law does not say that there exists now, or ever did exist, a path to blessedness through our own good works; but the fundamental requirement of God is, that we allow ourselves to be filled with divine life and essence, with the essential righteousness of God which was embodied in Christ. For this reason, the divine image could not be perfectly realized even in Adam. But as man was created from the beginning, in this pregnant sense, exigent of God, the counsel of God from the beginning, at the very creation of man, was to communicate Himself to humanity in the only possible way, to wit, through the mediation of the incarnate Son of God. For in our present state, we could not lay hold on God and His essential righteousness unless He became like and came near to us. Consequently, the idea of the God-man was eternally in God. It was necessary that He should set before us essential righteousness in an intelligible form, that He should be the realization of the image of God, in order that we also, through Him, may become perfect, and by participating in Him participate in the divine nature. According to this representation, then, Christ, as the indispensable organ of our perfection and of divine grace, would have appeared if no one had sinned; although sin undoubtedly brought with it the further necessity that Christ, by His passive and active obedience, should offer satisfaction for our deliverance. This obedience, however, would not have been in itself abso-

lutely pleasing to God, if it had not been the fruit of an essential righteousness in Christ. For even the human nature of Christ by itself would have been empty; without God, it would have been as a dry vine-stock, and would have availed us nothing.

But Osiander could not rest content with the view of the necessity of the God-man as a mere means for our benefit. As essential righteousness, and its actual realization in the world, must be a good in itself; and as the God-man was the appropriate organ, solely in virtue of the essential righteousness which He first personally realized and exhibited in the world; it follows at once, that in his view, the appearance of Christ must have been also an end in itself and a good in itself. Nay more, he regards Christ as the centre and culmination of the good of the world. The idea of the God-man is the organic centre, in which, and through which, the universe attains its perfection. Hence he says,—God would not have created at all, had He not purposed to become man; and He would have become one flesh with the Church, His bride, even apart from sin. The archetype according to which, and unto which, Adam was created, was not the naked deity, nor even the Son of God in Himself, but the Son as to be incarnated, as the God-man. But so far was this archetype, unto which all things were created, from being a mere idea, that the eternal Word actually appeared to the patriarchs in an image (*simulacrum*), in all the dimensions of His future form. Nay more, when he says, in speaking of the eternal purpose of incarnation,—There is nothing in God which is not God Himself; he appears to put into God that which he regarded as the essential feature of humanity, in such a way, that not merely the idea of humanity, but the humanity itself, was eternally, if even merely potentially, present in God, in that it was God as to its essence, and was destined to be God in actuality. (Note 11.)

This outward actuality through which He is approachable to us, continues to exist for us in the preaching of the outward word. The outward word is not empty sound, but the manifestation of the "*Verbum internum*:" the latter comes along with the former, and enkindles the light also in susceptible hearts. It is true, the Christ who is veiled under the external word, as an inner word, can only be recognised by the spiritual eye: if

we lay hold on and believe the inner word, that Word which is true God and true man abides in us. But our ability to lay hold on Him in the outward word we owe to His human nature, which was a temple in which dwelt the entire fulness of God. We are the members of Christ as to His humanity: through His humanity we receive the light and life of the Word, and thereby all the members of His mystical body, the Church, are enlightened. The holy Eucharist also shows, that if we are united with His human nature, we shall be made partakers of His divine nature. Thus the entire human nature of Christ serves the purpose of bringing down the deity, which became one person with it, into us, even as the entire vine constitutes the branches one nature with it, and enables them to bring forth fruit. For in the vine also there are two natures, of which one is wood, which abides even though the vine itself should wither, the other is completely hidden, bears fruit, produces grapes. Now, as the vine could not be of a grape-bearing nature if it were not wood of the wood of the vine-stock; even so we cannot become partakers of the divine nature unless we are so incorporated with Him by faith and baptism, as to become flesh, blood, and bone of His flesh, blood, and bone.

This doctrine of justification by the indwelling of the essential righteousness, or by the reception of the divine nature through faith, he put in opposition to the external and merely legal imputation of the merit of Christ. Christ's work for us he endeavoured to retain his hold upon in the inwardness and unity of His person: at the same time, however, avoiding the Romish error of conjoining the forgiveness of sin and sanctification, fixedly and principally, in faith. We cannot fairly say that in his system no place was left for the doctrine of imputation. Apart from the relation of the satisfaction of Christ to our punishments, his system required such a satisfaction, in so far as he did not deny the continuance of sin in believers, and yet conceived their reconciliation to be perfect.¹ He further continued to recognise a kind of imputation, in so far as he did not consider faith to justify, as virtue or as a subjective meritorious state (as Augustine did), but the object of

¹ That is, unless he had left room for an antinomian view of the insignificance of sins committed afterwards in comparison with the essential righteousness of faith: and his own positive declarations forbid us supposing this.

faith, Christ, who in His grace allows Himself to be reckoned part of man, both by the believer and by God. But he does not recognise imputation in the sense that Christ is merely *reckoned* as pertaining to man;—he goes on further to maintain that He makes Himself, His divine nature, the veritable property of faith; so that God does not see something which does not really exist, when He looks upon man as actually righteous in Christ.¹

Osiander must be allowed to be right in asserting that the Person of Christ, in its unity and totality, is the proper redemptive object to be laid hold of by faith, and not merely His performances or merits, not merely, as it were, His collective obedience, whether the obedience be regarded both as active and as passive or not. But he himself continued to look, not so much to the Person of Christ, as to His “*divina natura*” or “*essentia*.” What Christ did and performed, is to him a subordinate matter. In his view, the value of Christ, that which properly constituted Him Redeemer, even without His work, consisted in His *being*, more definitely, in His essential “*justitia*,” that is, deity.² The righteousness of Christ was ever the same, because it was rooted in His *being*. Accordingly, notwithstanding his energetic recognition of the ethical roots of religion, he failed to perceive, that to “*justitia essentialis*,” if we form an ethical conception of it, and do not represent it as a mere natural nobility, it is essential that it express itself in action;—indeed, it has the concrete existence, by which it is recognised and laid hold upon, solely in such practical manifestations.³ Had he recognised this, it could have occasioned him no difficulty to assert for the humanity of Christ a further essential significance,—the significance, namely, of having earned salvation, that is, deliverance from guilt, and not merely

¹ It would be unjust, says he, to regard a man as righteous who has nothing righteous in him. But the believer has righteousness in and by himself as a branch of Christ, or in that he has Christ in himself.

² This appeared to him to follow from the consideration that Christ is righteous, not because He fulfilled the law, but because He was already righteous before. He says also expressly,—It depends neither on “*actio*” nor on “*passio*,” but on the “*essentialis justitia*” which God is.

³ His opponents regarded “*Christi obedientia activa et passiva*” pre-dominantly, as the proper saving object of faith: he, on the contrary, the “*justitia essentialis*.” Both put asunder things that belong to each other.

from evils. Of still greater importance in a Christological respect, is it that, in consequence of his indifference to righteousness in act, in comparison with righteousness as a life, as an unchanging state, he was quite unable to allow that the human nature of Christ really grew in moral power and righteousness. This was rightly perceived and blamed by his Lutheran opponents. The essential worth of the humanity, therefore, he regarded as consisting, not in the fact, that it grew in ethical power, or, as Luther taught, that the divine qualities also became its own, but strictly and solely in the "*divina natura*;" consequently, the humanity itself was merely the manifestation or form of that constantly identical magnitude, the "*Verbum Dei*." In his system, therefore, a false predominance is still assigned to the "*divina natura*;" and the human nature is represented as impersonal. Moreover, the only way in which he was able to realize that unity of the divine and human at which he aimed in common with Luther, was by substituting or making the divine the representative of the human, after the manner of the Germanic Mystics, instead of following Luther's example, and representing the divine as having actually become human. The same lack necessarily then made its appearance in his description of faith and of "*Justificatio*." Osiander does not hold the concrete God-man to be our righteousness, but rather merely His "*divina essentia*," of which the humanity was the vehicle. (Note 12.) Further, despite the zeal with which he takes the field against a merely "*imputativa justitia*," he never succeeds in showing that man himself, and in himself, is holy and righteous through the communication of Christ: on the contrary, he confines himself so completely to the substitutionary life of Christ in us, that he is as far as his opponents, who made the "*imputatio forensis*" the all in all of salvation, from allowing the existence of a new and free personality, distinct from Christ. He may be right enough, when he characterizes it as frosty and cold, to speak merely of powers which the Holy Spirit pours out, or when the operations of the Holy Spirit are alone spoken about, instead of the essential presence of Christ and the Holy Spirit; but he himself makes the substitutionary life of Christ in us, which should be viewed as a fruitful, creative principle, again poor, in that, for the sake of always retaining the possession and enjoyment of the totality, he refuses to permit the

principle to be the principle of a new personality in the Holy Spirit. Calvin, therefore, who otherwise formed a high and just estimate of the ethical tendency displayed in Osiander's premises, was not wrong when he charged him with, in various ways, commingling the divine and human, with pantheism.¹ Osiander is right, indeed, in denying that the ransoming of men and their freedom from punishment were the final aim of the incarnation ; but, instead of regarding the atonement as forming the subjective and objective point of transition to sanctification and to the full realization of the image of God in us, he rends asunder the outward and the inward spiritual part of the work of Christ. For the punishment which we merited, Christ, according to him, offered satisfaction once for all on behalf of all ; and having been offered, this past history works in a purely objective manner, and of itself, the ransom of us all. At this point, therefore, he adheres to the abstract juridical point of view (the point of view, as it were, of private right), in order quite as suddenly to substitute the "Unio mystica" by faith for that "justitia essentialis" which he looked upon as the most important matter.

¹ The system of Calvin, and approximatively also, that of Melancthon, did not allow that the divine in Christ really became human ; but for an opposite reason. In their view, the essence of the "finitum" and "infinite" is such, that a real self-communication of the divine to the human nature is impracticable ; and the Holy Spirit is introduced by way of bridging over the gulf between the divine nature of the Son and the humanity. See below.

SECTION II.

U. ZWINGLI AND LUTHER.

THE unity which at first existed between the German and Swiss reformatory movements, notwithstanding the independence of their respective points of departure, consisted not merely in their common opposition to the pagan and Judaistic elements of Roman Catholicism,—not merely in the doctrine of the non-meritoriousness of works, which both carried out to absolute predestinarianism,—but also in the importance they attached to the doctrine of the forgiveness of sins by grace;—in one word, their unity consisted in the common doctrine, that we are justified by faith alone.¹

In Zwingli's view, however, faithfully to hold fast this principle, forbade the teaching of any doctrine of the holy Eucharist which could detract from the glory of faith, by representing it as insufficient for salvation. And he considered faith to be degraded, and to be represented as capable merely of an imperfect appropriation of salvation, when the holy Eucharist is held to confer anything necessary to salvation other than what faith had already laid hold of, in laying hold of Christ and His merits; or when the act of faith alone is denied to be the perfectly sufficient subjective means of appropriating salvation, and there is demanded, in addition, a corporeal feeding on the body of Christ, through the elements of the holy Supper.² The confidence reposed in the presence of the body of Christ in the

¹ Compare Zwingli's Letter to Alber, Nov. 1524, in Pfaff's "*Acta et Scripta publ. Eccl. Würt.*," 1719. Page 15, "*Sola enim fide justificamur.*"

² In the aforementioned letter he repeatedly makes special allusion to this; for example, page 14,—"*Fides ergo opus (Dei) est quod beat, non corpus corporaliter edere. Nam si corpus comesum bearet, duæ rationes aut viæ essent, quibus bearemur.*"—Page 15,—"*Whether, according to the Scriptures, ea fides beet, qua credas Christum hic corporaliter edi, or the Word of the cross taken up in viscera pectoris nostri?*"

holy Supper, appeared to him to draw men away from the only way of salvation, and at the same time to open the door to Romish superstition and idolatry; because the presence of the body of Christ in the sacrament leads to the notion, that He is chained as by a magic formula to the elements, and that it is the duty of the Christian to worship in the elements the present Christ (see p. 16). All must depend on the inward, on faith in the work of Christ: this is the work of grace; but we never celebrate the Eucharist rightly till we have faith, and in having faith have Christ. Consequently, in the holy Eucharist we have not, in the first instance, to do with a receiving of grace, but merely with the exhibition of our faith; in a feast of commemoration, with praise and thanksgiving; and by partaking in common of bread and wine, those symbols of the death of Christ, we, as it were, make a common confession and oath,—we vow ourselves to be Christ's, and feel ourselves to be grown together to one whole, to one body (pp. 20, 21). For this reason, in John vi., Christ speaks not merely of our duty to eat His body and drink His blood, that is, to feed by faith on His life-giving death, but also calls upon us to work for the food which abides eternally, that is, to gain the faith through which we shall possess eternal life. But so long as the notion is entertained, that we receive the body and blood of Christ in the holy Eucharist, the gaze of men is turned away from all this, and is attracted to the outward, and faith is disturbed. Faith, then, is fixed on that which is of no use, the flesh, and leaves the main matter unheeded, to wit, the merits of Christ, and fellowship with the deity of Christ. The deity of Christ Zwingli naturally conceives to be omnipresent; present, therefore, also in the holy Eucharist. Through it alone is Christ a source of health and life to us; for although He was under the necessity of suffering and dying as to His human nature, yet unless He who died had been also the Son of God, Christ could not have been a source of life and health to the entire world.¹ If we

¹ “Commentar. de vera et falsa religione,” 1525. “Epistola ad Albe-
rum,” pp. 13 f.—Christ is not corporeally in us. Page 14:—“Quatenus
Christus mundum vivificat, hinc est quod Deus Deique filius est, non qua-
tenus caro est.” Page 22:—Faith does not need corporeally to feed on the
body of Christ; and indeed no man ever really believed in such a corporeal
eating of Christ's body. That would be *Creophagy* (κρέας, φαγεῖν), page 23.

possess Him as to His deity, we possess also the fruit of His humanity in which He suffered, but not the reverse. The deity of Christ, then, and not His humanity, is, in the view of Zwingli, the creative principle of salvation: the humanity is not a part of the blessing of salvation, but the means by which redemption was historically effected. At the present time it has no further significance; not even as a vehicle of the inward. Now, seeing that "the flesh avails nothing," but rather draws faith away from the spiritual to the outward, why should it be there at all? It avails very much "caesa," but not "esa;" for the former is for faith. By making the holy Eucharist a matter of faith, we enable all men, however remote from each other, to eat it at one and the same time.¹ The controversy took a still more directly Christological turn, when the body of Christ was not merely affirmed to be absent, on the ground that its presence would serve no purpose, but when the one party maintained its presence to be an impossibility, whilst the other party asserted it to be both possible and necessary.² This took place in the course of the discussions between Ecolampadius and the Suabians. Not because God absolutely could not communicate to the creature the power of being in different places, or everywhere, at the same time, or as though His honour would suffer by such a communication, was

He declares his adherence to the view of Carlstadt, if not to the grounds on which it was based.

¹ Zwingli's Answer to Johan. Bugenhagen's Letter of October 1525.

² Ecolampad., in his "Liber de genuina verborum Dom. expositione," 1525 (see the "Acta et Scripta publ. eccl. Wirt.," p. 51), raised the objection, that the view of his opponents would lead to a miracle greater than the creation and the incarnation. We should have to assume, namely, that there were two bodies in one place, and that one body was in two and several places at the same time; or we must even assume that Christ had several bodies (see Walch xx. 784). For this reason we ought to say (see "Acta et Scripta, etc.," p. 146),—"Non alibi quam in cœlo corpore fate-mur Christum." To assert that Christ was on earth, would be to do away with the "veritatem corporis Christi." The Suabian Syngramma, on the contrary, says (see Walch xx. 35, 36),—Christ, His body and blood, are present in the Eucharist, through the *power* and *word* of God; and yet He remains at the right hand of the Father: nor does it follow from this, that Christ either suffers, descends, or is humbled afresh (§§ 38, 39); nor does He undergo any "impanatio" or "laceratio" with the teeth (§§ 41, 54). All this do the Suabians also reject (Brentz at their head).

it impossible, said Æcolampadius. But it would be contrary to the true character of bodies, as created by God, in that all bodies are circumscribed.¹ The adherents of the Syngamma charged Æcolampadius with being shy of miracles,—a charge which they could not substantiate. But their own view left many things in the dark. They did not even decidedly say whether they deemed Christ's body to be bestowed in its glorified form, or in the form of humiliation.² Their thought was the following:—God is in His word, and gives Himself to us in the word: that which is eternal, and above space, thus enters really into the sensible, visible world. Our words also are not mere signs of the things in the soul, but bring these very things to and before us (Pfaff l. c. p. 182.). Christ's words enclose Christ in themselves, and bring Him with His blessings to us; even so the words of consecration employed at the Eucharist. The only difference is, that these latter words, according to their import, bring Christ into the elements, which themselves remained unchanged, and, as it were, constitute them, along with the word, the vehicle of Christ (“*Verbum visibile*,” according to the *Apol. C. A.*). In like manner the word brought saving virtue into the brazen serpent. If, then, Christ be at all in His word, and if He be distributed through the medium thereof, His body also is in His word; and this same word brings Him also into the elements, so that He is spiritually appropriated in the word by faith, even as the elements are corporeally appropriated.³ The mode of the union of Christ with the bread (and the word) is a mystery; but it is in analogy with the union of the natures in Christ Himself. Whoso dissolves the former, threatens also the latter (l. c. 158–160, 173 f.). It is true, that flesh without spirit and faith is of no use, nay more, that it does injury; but to faith it is of great use: for through the bread we touch by faith the veritable body of Christ, “like as Magdalene touched the feet of the Son

¹ *Ibidem*, p. 146. With the spirits (consequently also with the soul of Christ) it is a different matter: they are not bound to any place. He speaks solely of the body of Christ, and cries out,—“*Sursum corda*.”

² Walch xx. 784, § 81.

³ Brentz, therefore (1527, in Pfaff, p. 38), distinguishes between the “*offerre*” and the “*accipere*;” between an outward acceptance, for example, of the word, with which may be conjoined an inner “*repellere*,” and the spiritual acceptance of faith. So also M. Alber. Pp. 35 f.

of God, who in Himself is not tangible, when she touched the feet of Christ." They thus inclined to the idea, that Christ assumes the elements of the holy Eucharist in a manner similar to that in which He assumed humanity in Mary. Of the doctrine of the ubiquity of the body, there is nothing as yet in the Syngramma: indeed, it rather teaches the contrary (compare p. 173).¹

One cannot say that this prelude to the controversy led to a clear understanding of the true nature of the antagonism; and indeed the view taken by the Swiss theologians was not yet consolidated, either exegetically or dogmatically. Œcolampadius was still inclined to regard the Lord's Supper as a means of grace and a gift (Pfaff's *Acta*, etc., p. 146), of which Christ's body constituted the substance, although locally absent (Walch xx. 784, § 81): whereas Zwingli was content to look upon it as a feast of commemoration, of thanksgiving, and of the confession of the faith and love of the Church as the body of Christ. The fundamental difference, which even at a later period had not yet come clearly to light, consisted in this,—that the Swiss theologians before Calvin, even when they allowed the Eucharist to be a gift, regarded it not as the ever renewed act, by which their exalted living Lord brought them into mystical communion with Himself in the entirety of His person, but merely as an "excitare, admonere, consolari," as a means by which the past but eternally valid *work* of salvation is made present to believers. The piety of the Swiss was satisfied with the enjoyment of the impersonal gift of the forgiveness of sin earned by Christ when on earth, or of the Holy Spirit who is bestowed by the omnipresent Son of God: the Lutherans, on the contrary, regarded the receiving of the body of Christ (and with the body they believed themselves to receive His person) as the pledge and seal of the reception of the forgiveness of sin and so forth.

From the year 1526 onwards, Luther himself appeared on the scene of conflict, particularly through the treatises entitled

¹ The acceptance of the Syngramma by Luther, shows how very different his judgment of Calvin's doctrine must have been from his judgment of Zwingli's. For on some very important points there is the greatest resemblance between the Syngramma and the teachings of Calvin. At a later period, the Reformed Church declared its willingness to accept the Syngramma. Compare l. c. pp. 159-162, 176.

“Sermon vom Sacrament des Leibes und Blutes Christi wider die Schwärmer” (“Discourse of the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ against the Visionaries”), 1526, xx. 915–950 ; and “Dass diese Worte, Das ist mein Leib, noch feste stehen” (“That the words, ‘This is My body,’ still stand fast”), 1527, pp. 950–1118.

During this controversy, Luther’s entire interest was concentrated on the assertion of the living and intensive presence of the whole Christ, of the person of the God-man. According to the Romish doctrine,¹ the Eucharist or Mass was merely the real and magical re-enactment, revival of the historical sacrifice of Christ : the Swiss theologians did away with the magical element, it is true, but, like those of the Romish Church, fixed their faith solely on the past, historical Christ, whose beneficent work they held to be ever present. In Luther’s view, on the contrary, the Eucharist is not merely a thing, a something past, which is meant, either subjectively or objectively, to be made present ; but the exalted, glorified Lord Himself, as He now lives in heaven, wills to be present through the holy Eucharist, for and in believers. The Exalted One brings in His train all the blessings which He earned for us during His historical life ; and on the events and performances of that life we must reverently meditate, in order that we may become aware of all the treasures which are eternally present for us in the Exalted One, and which are given along with Himself in the holy Eucharist. This is the religious kernel of Luther’s doctrine. (Note 13.)

Herein consists the great step in advance which the dogma of the Eucharist made under Luther’s influence. He thus brought under discussion the question, whether God alone, or the God-man, is the centre of Christian piety. If the latter be the case, He cannot be absent from the feast which is the culmination of the Christian religion ; and the union of the divine and the human, which, being absolutely realized, is therefore a productive force in Him, must, if anywhere, be manifested and continued in the Eucharist through Him and the living presence of His entire person, and that, not by the conversion of Him into the elements or of the elements into Him, but through our being transformed into ever more vital members of His body. (Note 14.)

¹ See above, Volume I. pp. 271 ff. (Div. II.).

In the sermon mentioned above, Luther endeavours in the first place to show that it is not absurd to suppose that the body and blood of Christ are present in the Eucharist. The soul, although one and indivisible, is notwithstanding in the entire body; so that if but one small member suffers, the entire soul is affected. Why, then, cannot Christ be in all places in the sacrament, even as the soul is at one and the same time in all the members? A word is a creature, weak and transitory, and yet an entire land can be governed by it. A weak voice penetrates at the same time into a thousand ears, and every ear receives not a portion of the voice, but the whole. If the word can be so widely distributed, is it not still more possible for the body of Christ to be thus distributed? How much more noble a thing is a glorified body than the natural voice! Furthermore, I preach the Gospel of Christ, and by my bodily voice I bring Christ into thine heart, in order that thou mayest form Him in thee. If thine heart lays hold on and clings to the word, what hast thou in thine heart? Thou must needs answer, —I have the veritable Christ who sits at the right hand of the Father. How that comes to pass, thou art unable to tell; but thine heart feels that He is certainly there, by the experience of faith; and every one who believes, gets entire possession of Him in His heart. He cannot be divided into pieces, and yet He is entirely distributed among all believers; so that one heart gets nothing less, and a thousand hearts get nothing more, than the one indivisible Christ. There, then, you have a *daily miracle*; —a miracle, too, *as great as the one performed in the sacrament*. A single grain brings forth much fruit, and forms each grain again after its own kind. Why should He not be able to be apprehended by many at the same time? Cannot one eye be directed to a thousand grains at the same time, and again a thousand eyes be directed to one corn?¹ Further on, he employs also the following images,—man's little eye embraces in one glance half the heaven with the sun; and again the sun appears entirely in each of its rays (Gr. Bek. § 288). If thou walkest round a pond when the sun shines on it, thou seest the sun in the water; and as thou movest, thou seest ever afresh and entirely, one and the same image of the sun in different places. And if a form stands before a mirror, the image thereof is in

¹ Walch xx. 919–922.

the mirror; and even though the mirror be broken into a thousand pieces, each single piece will still reflect the same entire and undivided image.¹ Nature itself therefore shows us, if we will only properly reflect on its miracles, that one and the same thing may be in many. That it is His will to be there *realiter*, is evident from the word "is."

But Christ is the more fully able to do whatever He will, in that, as to His humanity, He is set over all creatures, fills all things, is Lord over all things, and everywhere present (Eph. i. 20, iv. 7 f.). That He sits at the right hand of God, does not separate us from Him; but denotes that He is above all creatures, in them and outside of them. If thou believest that He sits at the right hand of God and rules, thine heart is in heaven—not in seeming, and in a dream, but veritably. He needs not to ascend and descend from heaven through the air; He needs not be drawn down into the bread; but He is around us and in us in all places, has all things before His eyes, is nearer to us than any one creature to another.² These remarks would seem to imply that Christ's glorified body is under the *necessity* of being everywhere, and that Christ can therefore will to be everywhere laid hold on:—nay more, that He is already totally in every man. This conclusion Luther seeks to avoid by representing the true having and grasping as rather dependent on the word of promise;³ which might mean, that though Christ is

¹ At a later period, in his "Grosses Bekenntniss vom heiligen Abendmahl" (xx. p. 1265, § 290, pp. 1198 ff., § 160 ff., xx. 1013).

² xx. 922-925, § 17-22. Still more strongly, xx. 1000-1009, "that the words of Christ, 'This is My body,' still hold good." Here he remarks,—Christ's body is at the right hand of God; the right hand of God, however, is not any particular place, but everywhere, as God's nature is everywhere. Further, pp. 1007-1009,—God was entirely in Christ, personally, essentially, in the womb of the Virgin and on the cross, and in all other places; for where the deity is at all, there it is personally. But He also dwells bodily in Christ, so that one person is both man and God. Christ is God: "They have crucified the Lord of Glory." Nay more, we read in John iii. 13, that the body of Christ was at the same time both in heaven and on earth (p. 1013). At this point he had already lost sight of the difference between the earthly and the glorified body.

³ P. 926, year 1526. "Although He is everywhere present in all creatures, and I might find Him in stones, in fire, in water, or even in a piece of cord, for that He is certainly there, it is not His will that I should seek Him there apart from the word. Ubiquitous is He, but not for thee to

present everywhere alike, He can only be laid hold of when He gives Himself; and He has promised to give Himself in the sacrament. Or, which comes to pretty nearly the same thing, Christ Himself is not everywhere present alike, but everywhere just as He wills to be: in the sacrament, He is present in the fulness of His grace, according to the promise. In each case, however, His presence is not owing to a necessary physical ubiquity, but solely to His will in instituting the sacrament:—if such be His will, the unbelieving do not receive His body; and thus its omnipresence is made of no avail. He then proceeds to say, instead of building on the omnipresence of Christ as a physical necessity to which He is subjected,—*There is a distinction between His presence and thine apprehension. He is free and unbound wheresoever He is, as the rays of the sun which strike thee without thy being able to lay hold on them, but which thou art able to interrupt. Even so is Christ able to strip off His outward self, so that thou shalt receive only the shell, and shalt not lay hold of the kernel.* (See above, Note 3, p. 119, Note 1, p. 120.) It is one thing for Him to be present in Himself; another thing for Him to be present to thee. For thee He is present, when He gives His word in addition, and thus binds Himself to thee for thy good, and directs thee to a place, to His humanity. Then thou certainly findest the right hand of God (xx. 1015).

To this Zwingli replied,¹—Luther's similes are not appropriate; for I myself am far from denying that the deity of

gropes after Him everywhere: where the word is, there do thou seek Him, and thou shalt lay proper hold on Him; otherwise thou dost tempt God and act idolatrously." P. 931,—“Through the word He seeks to show us clearly where and how we may apprehend Him.” The word to which he here refers, is the promise that He will communicate His body and blood in the holy Supper, to the end that I may be assured that my sins are forgiven, that I shall be freed from death and hell, that I shall have eternal life, and that I am a child of God and an heir of heaven. (P. 936; compare xx. 1015.)

¹ “*Pia et amica ad præstantissimi vivi M. Lutheri sermonem pro substantialis corporis et sanguinis Christi in sacramento adsertione contra suermeros, apologia et responsio,*” 1527. Translated into German in Walch xx. 1386 ff. Further, in reply to Luther's work (1527), “That the words, This is My body, still hold good” (xx. 950 ff.), Zwingli wrote (1527) his,—“*Dass diese Worte, ‘das ist mein Leib,’ ewiglich den alten einigen Sinn haben werden*” (xx. 1407 ff.).

Christ and the fruits of His sufferings reach everywhere ; *but the question is, whether His body is ubiquitous.* He ascended in the body to heaven, and therefore cannot any longer be on earth. For even after the resurrection, His body was not in several places at the same time. The angel said,—“ He is arisen : He is not here.” He Himself said,—“ I leave the world ;” “ it is good for you that I go away.” Otherwise Christ would have remained ever in hell, as to His human nature, even as He is in heaven (xx. 1490, § 108), if His humanity had been diffused as widely as the deity.¹ He would have been in the grave and out of the grave at one and the same time ; in the womb of Mary and out of it, in heaven. In that case He must have continued in the grave, even after He had risen again. Such a Christ would be a mere invention. At this result must Luther necessarily arrive, because he does not distinguish the two natures of Christ as he ought (xx. 1489). At this point Zwingli passes to the exposition of his own Christology.² God has joined the two natures together, but in such a manner that each nature continues possessed of its own peculiar attributes ; for as man is compounded of two opposed substances (§ 116), soul and body, even so Christ also is one, constituted of two natures. As to His divine nature, He has power over all things ; as to His human nature, He was subject to Cæsar, He did not know everything, He had no doctrine of His own, and all His miracles sprang solely from His divine power. But if we speak of the entire Christ, an

¹ Moreover, Luther's supposition serves no purpose ; for the physical eating of His body does not strengthen faith, does not bring the forgiveness of sin. For not on the recipient of the sacrament is the Gospel conferred, but on the believer ; and Christ's body is not corporeally brought into the sacrament by the act of consecration. Zwingli here seized hold of the advantage of forcing Luther into a discussion of the ubiquity of the body of Christ, which was easier to controvert ; on which, however, Luther had not hitherto, strictly speaking, based his doctrine, and according to which, he had not interpreted the words of institution. On the words of Christ themselves he had hitherto taken his stand ; out of them he had derived his doctrine of the Real Presence. Zwingli, however, perceived that his opponent's reasonings were influenced by another conception of Christ ; and attacking this conception, he harped particularly on what Luther had let fall regarding the omnipresence of Christ. There is no promise relating to that.

² “ Dass diese Worte u. s. w. ewiglich den alten einigen Sinn u. s. w.” l. c. pp. 1492 ff., § 113 ff.

ἀλλοιωσις takes place, inasmuch as we mention the one nature and mean the other, or name that which they both are and understand the one only.¹ So is John i. 14 to be interpreted; the divine nature is set for the human. The words, "The Word became flesh," in that God is perfect and cannot become anything more than He already is, must needs be understood to mean only, "Man is become God." But again, as the human nature cannot be converted into the divine, but continues possessed of its own essence, this latter expression can only signify, "Man is taken into the unity of the person of the Son of God."² Accordingly, the saying, "The Word became man," simply and solely signifies, "God's Son assumed human nature." If we do not allow such a figure of speech, John i. 14 would lead us to conclude that the Word had been converted into a man.

But it is further impossible in itself for the humanity of Christ to be infinite like His deity. For then we should have two infinities, and the one would be the limit and extinction of the other. The infinite is essentially one. And if Christ was in heaven, as to His humanity, even whilst He was on earth, He must have also suffered in heaven. But if His body, which according to Luther was in heaven, was there free from suffering, and yet the very selfsame body, He cannot really have suffered on earth.³ The deity, in its infinitude, cannot be so enclosed within humanity, that "out of Christ there is absolutely no God nor deity." Luther, it is true, only encloses the deity in the humanity, in order then to extend the humanity which embraces the entire deity, till it is as wide and infinite as the deity (xx. 1503). But all bodies are limited and circumscribed; and this quality they retain. Christ's humanity was a finite, circumscribed personality, and such it continued to be: infinite, it could not be. God is everywhere, and the elect are with Him; yet they are not ubiquitous. None the less is the humanity of Christ with God in unity of the person, what we shall not be. "Even as the queen alone is the king's true

¹ Ibidem, p. 1495, for example,—Christ suffers, that is, human nature suffers.

² Ibidem, pp. 1496 f. "The word is ab adoptionibus transsumpta" (Bugenhausen also spoke of an "adoptio" of Christ).

³ L. c. 1498 ff. p. 1507: Be on thy guard, Luther, be on thy guard! Marcion is coming into thy garden.

consort and queen, and even though other maidens have joy with her, they are not queens." The queen herself also lives in the majesty of the king, but has not his power and majesty.¹

In consequence of this reply, Luther made a tentative effort, in his (larger) "*Bekenntniss vom Abendmahl*" ("Confession concerning the Eucharist"), published 1528, to prove the presence of Christ in the holy Supper more clearly than before, not merely from the words of institution, but especially also from the doctrine of the Person of Christ; that is, from an ubiquity of the body of Christ, possessed by it in virtue of the "*Unio personalis*." The more connected view given of his Christology in this connection (unfortunately in a very passionate tone), is based indeed on the fundamental ideas to which attention has been previously called, but is made subsidiary to, and is evidently throughout arranged for the support of, another dogma. The original, free, and extensive horizon was thus narrowed to a small circle; the natural growth of the dogma received an artificial direction; and the exaltation also was referred to the present world.²

He blames Zwingli for representing the infinitude of God in a coarse, sensuous light. Zwingli speaks, says he, as though God could be circumscribed by a body. He conceives God as an extended being, filling the world and stretching out beyond it. Judged after this corporeal manner, the ubiquity of Christ must unquestionably reduce Him to a mere ghost. God, however, is not such an extended being of whom we may predicate length and breadth; but a supernatural, unsearchable being, who is completely and entirely in every grain of sand, and yet at the same time is in, above, and outside of all creatures; there is, therefore, no need of His being enclosed.³ Luther consequently demanded that a more dynamical conception should

¹ P. 1520: The Son of God is the King; humanity is His bride. The simile of marriage is meant therefore to denote the *Unio*.

² Walch xx. 1118-1386. Now, for the first time, it was urged,—So certain as is the *Unio*, even so certain is the Ubiquity, and that from the very beginning, like the *Unio*.

³ P. 1192, § 146; 1202, § 170. He goes on to say,—There is nothing so small, that God is not less; there is nothing so great, that God is not still greater. One body is of much too great compass for the deity, and many thousand deities might be contained in it. But again it is much too narrow to contain a deity.

be formed of the omnipresence of God. It does not lie in the power of anything to exclude God from itself; it depends entirely on His will, whether and how He is present in anything. —With regard to the humanity of Christ also, Zwingli has formed a purely local, sensuous, coarse conception of its presence. Of such a presence, however, he (Luther) had not spoken; but of a presence independent of space. It is not necessary for every man to be shut up within a limited space (as Œcolampadius himself allows with respect to the spirits); so that Christ's humanity would be separated by such a space from that part of the deity which transcended it. For, in the first place, so sensuous a conception must not be formed of the presence of God (as we have just shown); and, in the second place, the bodies even of the saints are not shut up in the manner of which Zwingli speaks. He reproaches Luther with wishing to chain and shut up Christ within the humanity and the sacrament; whereas it is really Zwingli who chains the humanity of Christ and cuts it off from us, by shutting it up in heaven as in a particular place (§ 302). But heaven is not a particular place; wherever God is, heaven is; and not Christ alone was able to be in heaven whilst He was on earth, but we also are able, nay more, it is our duty. If now we, who are on earth, can at the same time be in heaven, why cannot He, who is in heaven, be at the same time on earth?¹ It is true, we are only spiritually now in heaven: but even when we are corporeally in heaven, as we hope one day to be, heaven will not chain us, unless it be the will of God; we shall have the power to be in other things, and places, without hindrance; even as Christ went through closed doors.² Now Christ is not

¹ L. c. § 180. At this point Luther and Calvin meet. We can even now be spiritually in heaven where Christ is, § 301, 304–306. See above, p. 613.

² After the example of the Scholastics, specially of Occam, he terms this “*præsentia*,” the “*definitiva*,” which is already far higher than the “*præsentia localis circumscriptiva*” (compare p. 1186, § 135). If a thing be “*definitiva*” in a place, it is there, without being able to be measured according to the space of the place; even so can Christ be in the sacrament. The obscure word, “*definitiva*,” seems to refer to the determination of the will to be present in a place. Luther styles it also the incomprehensible spiritual mode, § 155. He maintains also that Christ could have had both the local visible presence and the “*definitiva*,” such was the case, for example, at the first celebration of the Eucharist. § 137.

merely like other saints,—He is God and man; and His two natures cannot be separated by any power out of Himself—not even by space. Even supposing that God filled infinite space locally, His humanity could not anywhere be separated from Him, nor He from it; for otherwise the two natures would at this point, which would set a limit to the humanity, be separated—the humanity from the extra-human deity; whereas, wherever Christ is, there also He must be as man, for He is one, undivided person.¹ But not even His deity is *locally* omnipresent;² consequently, we cannot assert the same thing of His humanity. In this supernatural and divine mode (*repletiva*), however, He must be able to be present even as to His humanity.³ At this conclusion he arrives, because otherwise Christ would be divided. Nay more, the unity of His person cannot subsist, unless all that falls to the lot of the humanity be given to the deity, and all that falls to the lot of the deity, to the humanity. It is true, the deity does not suffer; but yet the entire person of which the passible humanity is a part suffers: even so is the entire person omnipresent.⁴ By the *ἀλλοίωσις*, realities are converted into mere figures of speech, the transference of predicates from one nature to the other is reduced to a mere name; and thus the unity of the Person of Christ is dissolved. For if we hold to the fact of the unity, then, as the person did all and suffered all,—though at one time through the medium of one nature, at another time through the medium of the other nature,—all that is predicable of the person must be predicable of the two natures. (Note 15.) It is right to say, The king's son is sick, even though his foot alone is affected; or that Solomon was wise, although his mind alone was wise. To the *entire* person pertains that which pertains to one part. Luther is prepared to admit the figure of synecdoche, in accordance with which, for

¹ L. c. p. 1190, § 142 ff.

² L. c. § 180, 288.

³ L. c. § 142 ff. After this third, divine, secret manner are all creatures, in his view, “repletive” much more permeable and nearly present, than after the other manner. Then do the other creatures not merely not touch, measure, comprehend Him, but they are present before Him, and He measures and comprehends them. For thou must remember to remove this nature of Christ, according to which He is one person with God, as far from creatures, as God is removed from them; and again thou must put Him as near to, and as deeply in, all creatures as God is.

⁴ L. c. § 115–133, p. 1175 ff.

example, the whole is put for the part ("Christ is dead," that is, as to His humanity); the older teachers of the Church allowed the same thing.¹ He admits this, however, with the modification, that in virtue of the unity of the person, whatever pertains to the whole, or to any part, pertains really to every part. For all the parts are together in the person; the person does everything, and all works and all sufferings pertain to the person (compare §§ 354 and 127).

The union of deity and humanity in Christ is more close and intimate than the union of body and soul: no creature can dissolve it; nowhere can the Son be, where the man also is not (§ 172). Again, inasmuch as Christ's humanity alone is so connected with God as to constitute one person with the deity, it must be higher than, above, and outside of, all other creatures, and under God alone. It must be present where God is present; for although it cannot be essentially, it is personally, God (§ 174). The infinitude of the humanity does not follow from its ubiquity; for the world is not infinite. In another respect, indeed, Luther was compelled to allow the humanity to be infinite, because the deity is infinite. But in no case did he understand the infinitude of God, or of the humanity, in an extensive, local sense.²

In this respect, his remarks concerning the "*Prædicatio identica*" belong peculiarly to the present connection.³ They teach in the schools, says he, that "*prædicatio identica de diversis naturis*" is not admissible; that is, two different natures cannot be said to be one (for example, that the bread is the body of Christ). For this reason Wycliffe affirmed, "Bread is there, but not Body;" and the Scholastics said, "Body is there, but not Bread:" whilst at the same time they themselves decline to apply the principle to the Person of Christ. The true course, however, is to retain both, bread and body, humanity and deity;

¹ Zwingli's second species of *ἀλλοίωσις* is strictly speaking a synecdoche, only applied more exclusively to the nominal "*communicatio idiomatum*."

² To this connection belongs also § 288, p. 1264:—Zwingli pretends that Christ's body must be as great as heaven and earth.—We say, No, to it; God Himself is not so great and broad, although He is omnipresent. Compare also Pfaff's *Acta*, pp. 203 f., where Brentz relates how Luther at Marburg, in 1529, said, among other things,—In fact, the world itself is not in any place, and yet it is corporeal.

³ L. c. § 336-357, pp. 1287 ff.

and, notwithstanding all objections, to apply the "*prædicatio identica*,"—for example, "This man is God, God is man." Logic teaches correctly that bread and body, man and God, are two distinct natures; but "*Grammatica*" is also right when it nevertheless employs the "*prædicatio identica*" regarding both. There is a greater difference between man and God, they are further removed from and more opposed to each other, than bread and body, and yet they are styled one being, and the one is designated by the name of the other. Nor is the ground thereof the essential identity of the natures; for, in truth, as to nature, God and man are distinct, although as to the person they have become one being (§ 344). And when two distinct beings are combined in one, grammar embraces both under one term, when it has in view the unity of the two beings. And, in very deed, two distinct natures, thus brought together, do acquire one new nature: through their conjunction they become a completely new being, and lose their distinction so far as this new one nature is concerned (§ 353 f., 357).

This "*Prædicatio identica*," which it was supposed necessary to refer to everything, to doing and suffering, to attributes and natures, and which, whilst not excluding the distinction of the natures, was rightly meant to describe the two as one being, was Luther's characteristic "*Terminus technicus*" at this stadium, the employment of which was his own deed, and most intimately connected with his fundamental Christological idea. The expression "*Communicatio idiomatum*" had not up to this time been made use of by him; but a meaning, wider than the expression contains, may be found in his writings at this period. Still, in this connection, where he treated Christology rather in passing, Luther either put in the background, or even gave up, many of the richer germs, to which we have previously drawn attention. In particular, he no longer considers the inner essence of the natures, and their relation to each other, with the view of setting clearly forth that intimate union at which he aimed; but he argues from the personal unity, which he was able to take for granted, to the validity of utterances regarding the real union of the natures also. In doing so, however, he treats the person, not as the indifferent Ego-point, but as the real unity of the two natures, as the result of a real, actual union, from which the "*prædicationes identicæ*" are then analytically de-

ducible.¹ Relatively to the matter of omnipresence, Luther here, in a certain respect, adopts the notion that ubiquity was *physically* necessary to the humanity of Christ; for he regards the presence of the body of Christ in the sacrament as based in the personal union, by virtue of which it is impossible for the deity henceforth to be where the humanity is not; and as the deity is omnipresent, the humanity also, he supposes, must be omnipresent along with it.—But, as he expressly declares, he speaks in this way merely tentatively; and he endeavours to meet the charge of dissipating the humanity by distinguishing different kinds of presence, and by claiming for the will of the God-man the power of determining to be present, now in one way, and then in another. In virtue of the divine mode, which he conceives to be permanent, to be involved in God-manhood itself, he views Christ, pneumatically also as to His humanity, as the centre of the universe, to whom all things are present, who has all things immediately before Himself, and is able to permeate and operate through them, as the soul is present everywhere in the body. Luther never gave up this fundamental thought; although, it is true, he never afterwards resorted to the idea of the ubiquity of Christ, for the purpose of proving His real presence in the sacrament—neither in the Wittenberg Formula of Concord, nor even in his “Kurzes Bekenntniss vom heiligen Abendmahl,” 1544 (Walch xx. 2195 ff.). It testifies also of genuine Church tact, that nothing relating to this matter was incorporated by him either in his Catechisms, or the “Confessio Augustana,” or the Smalkaldic Articles.

Finally, a word with regard to the circumstance, that this entire discussion was mainly concentrated on the body of Christ. When, on the one hand, Luther was so anxious to establish the

¹ It is also to be regretted that, during this controversy, the line of demarcation drawn by him between the state of humiliation and that of exaltation became ever more indistinct; and that, from the identity of the body of Christ in both states, he almost deduced their perfect sameness. But in this connection compare also xx., p. 1268, § 297, where he speaks of the subtle nature of the body of Christ, which passed through the closed door, and maintains that by virtue of the same subtlety it is present in the sacrament. But that, in order to preserve the reality of the growth of Christ, a limit must be put on the “*prædicationes identicæ*,” as he himself elsewhere allowed, he here quite overlooks.

real presence of the body of Christ, and not at all merely of His deity, with us and in the holy Eucharist; and when, on the other hand, the Swiss theologians insisted so strongly on the reality of the humanity of Christ; nay more, when they opposed Luther, principally because they feared that the truth of Christ's humanity would be done away with by his doctrine of the Real Presence; a wise design worked in both cases,—the design, namely, of correcting the Docetism into which the Christology of the Middle Ages had fallen back, and by which, in fact, the flesh of Christ had been treated as a useless thing. We find here a re-enactment of the spectacle of the first period, when it was necessary above all that the reality of the body of Christ should be established; but it is re-enacted on a higher stage. The primary question, namely, now is,—What is Christ's relation to believers? Has His real humanity, has His flesh, any significance relatively to the religious life of individual persons? Luther felt that we should lose the union of God and man, of spirit and nature, which was realized in Christ, if in Him there had not also been accomplished the glorification of nature, its spiritualization without injury to its reality; if Christ were not the archetype and the principle of the glorification of the world (for example, vol. xx. 1055). With the same desire to assert the truth of the humanity, the Reformed theologians directed their attention mainly to the empirical historical image of Christ. It is therefore no cause for contempt that the period of the Reformation occupied itself so predominantly with the question of the nature of Christ in its Christological inquiries: on the contrary, we may trace therein the working of the healthy impulse to take firm hold again on Christianity on its realistic side, feeling well that Christianity itself is given up, if either the one or the other of the aspects of Christ's person is sacrificed.)

If any proof were needed of this fact, it might be found in the prominence given by almost all the chief parties, during the age of the Reformation, to investigations regarding the body of Christ.

Luther himself did not further develop those richer germs which he had laid down at the commencement; nay more, from the end of the first thirty years of the sixteenth century, he began even to clothe the new element of which he had been the

representative, in the traditional forms ; though, be it remembered, he persisted in asserting that the true sense of the Church's doctrine is a real "communicatio idiomatum." To Melanchthon, on the contrary, it became ever more clear, that both the dogma of the Person of Christ and of the Trinity were destined to be the subject of great movements, and that the traditional scholastic doctrine of the duality of the natures could not permanently satisfy the Christian mind. (Note 16.)

In the later editions of his *Loci*, especially in that of the year 1543, Melanchthon treated both the doctrine of the Trinity and that of the Person of Christ.¹ He employs for the Trinity the image of human consciousness and thought. Our thought sketches an image, but it is transitory : the image, on the contrary, which God's thought sketches, is imperishable, hypostatical. This reasoning was specially directed against Servetus, who maintained that the Logos became personal for the first time in Christ. His Christology embodies fewer distinctive features. The Logos united the natures in a personal Unio in Christ, in order that He might dwell personally in Christ. This he holds to have been denoted by the term *σωματικῶς*, used in Col. ii. 9 ; for, to the ancients, *σώματα* signified persons. The sufferings of Christ, in agreement with the apt expression of Irenæus, must be conceived as a *resting* on the part of the Logos, that is, the Logos, in obedience, refrained from the employment of His powers. Similar also is his explanation of Phil. ii. 7 f. In consideration of the servant's form, if not in consideration of His assumption of human nature, the Logos took up the position of one *ἡσυχάζων*. Of the two formulas, "The Word became flesh," and "The Word assumed human nature," the latter best corresponds to his representation of the matter. He persists, indeed, in maintaining that we must worship Christ, and that His work must not be referred solely to His human nature : he maintains that there was a "communicatio idiomatum," on the ground of which we can say, "God was born, crucified ; this man was God." But he allows a real transference of predicates to have taken place to the personality alone, not to the natures (that is, in concreto, not in abstracto).²

¹ Compare his "*Loci Communes*," Lips. 1550, with the preface of 1543, pp. 15-40.

² Pp. 35, 36.

He also makes no mention of the attributes of omnipotence, ubiquity, and so forth;¹ and maintains the truth of the humanity of Christ, even to the extent of allowing the existence of an innocent contrariety between the flesh and the spirit, in His sufferings. For the rest, he lays chief stress on the substitutionary sufferings of Christ, by which He bore away from us, in obedience and without murmuring, the terrors of the righteous anger of God.²

By way of conclusion to the present section, let us cast another glance at the types of Christology represented at this stadium of the history of the Church respectively by the Lutheran and Swiss theologians. The most remarkable feature is, that Zwingli (with his adherents, Leo, Judä, Ecolampadius, and others), who in other respects was a much more severe critic of traditional views than Luther, takes up a contrary position relatively to the dogma of the Person of Christ. Questions which, as we have seen, busied Luther's mind, combining as it did depth of feeling and speculation, had no direct interest for Zwingli's clear, practical, common-sense, and logical understanding. The dogmas of the Trinity and of Christology he never discussed from an independent, personal interest in them.

Luther he reproaches with innovations; and, in support of his own doctrine of the Person of Christ, appeals to the Fathers, nay, even to the papal doctors. He rightly denies that the traditional doctrine of the Church permits us to view the union of the natures as Luther viewed it; for, on the contrary, says he, the ancients teach merely an *ἀλλοίωσις* in discourse, that is, that in consideration of the unity of the person, the predicates of the one nature are figuratively transferred to the other—assertions which are correct relatively to the post-Chalcedonian period, but not relatively to Cyrill, Athanasius, and others. "We abide rigidly by the old doctrine," says he. A further development did not appear to Zwingli to be necessary: he needed a deeper conviction of the dualism which prevailed during the Middle Ages, and of the falsity of the exclusiveness

¹ What he terms "idiomata," pp. 35, 36, are "opera" or states.

² Pp. 39, 40. Whether in the view of Melanchthon Christ held an essential relation to us, or merely one conditioned by sin,—this question is referred to in Note 61, Div. II. Vol. I.

which characterized the conceptions of God and man relatively to each other, ere he could fully recognise the element which was justifiable in the Christological tendency of Luther. In this respect, therefore, Zwingli, though apparently more strongly antagonistic to, had really greater affinity with, Roman Catholicism than Luther, and was unable to understand the new element stirring in his contemporary.

At the same time, it would not be just to represent the Reformed doctrine as a mere repetition of the old dogma of Chalcedon. Merely to stand still is so contrary to nature, that it is impossible even when it is desired. The very exclusion of a possibility which had hitherto remained open, is a modification of the point of view in which it was previously involved; and, in this respect, the Reformed doctrine is a counterpart to what we find in the case of Cyrill. In addition to this, it is further to be borne in mind, that the act of exclusion referred to was dictated by a very determinate moral and religious motive, which became constantly a matter of more distinct consciousness. Reverence for the holy God, and His absolutely incomparable nature, assumed in the Reformed system the form of a sharp, anti-pagan distinction between the divine and the creature dependent on it; though, at the same time, an existence was ensured to the creature over against the overpowering might of the divine, by representing it as unconditionally pledged to obedience to the will of God.¹ In this manner, Zwingli, and at a later period Calvin, coincided with the fundamental feature of the Reformation, which was shared also by the Lutheran theologians; to wit, the unwillingness to sacrifice the human nature of Christ in any sense to the divine, and the desire to retain it in its full reality and truth. The motive,

¹ Zwingli does, it is true, lay down the position,—The essence and power of God are everywhere: the essence of God is the essence of all things (Walch xx. 1489; and similarly in his work entitled "Von der ewigen Fürscheidung." Compare Luther xi. 228 ff.). But even he lays such stress on the metaphysical predicate of infinitude, that the essence of the creature as such, seems to consist in its finitude; and thus, after the manner of the Romish Church, a foundation was laid for an irreconcilable dualism. His tendency, further, was to carry through a fixed, immoveable distinction of the divine from the human, in opposition to the pagan elements contained in the theology of the Middle Ages. Calvin, however, develops the distinction still more consequently.

however, in each case was a different one. The Lutheran Church was concerned that Christ should be recognised as the highest revelation of the divine love, for which humanity, and that in its absolute truth, was both end and means of representation. For it was the love of the Son of God that made humanity its own, even its sufferings, and bestowed the divine on humanity; in order that humanity might be ennobled and set forth in its true, that is, perfect form, and the love of God in its reality. Zwingli, on the contrary, laid stress on the actuality of the humanity of Christ principally out of regard to His death and redemptive obedience, and as a means for His glory. But to reckon the divine as necessary to the truth, that is, to the perfection of the humanity; or the appropriation of the human as necessary to the completeness of divine love, appeared to him as it were unjust, incompatible with the fundamental relation between creature and Creator, with the honour of God and with the reverence due to Him. It is not right either to confine the Creator, the Logos, within the limits of finite human nature, or to expand the humanity of Christ to the dimensions of the divine. The Logos is constantly both outside of and in the flesh: the Almighty Deity cannot be chained with its nature to one point of the world, not even to that with which He is personally united. Again, the humanity of Christ would no longer have been humanity, had it had for its own the predicates of the divine infinitude. For in that case its finite predicates would be done away with; in other words, its creatural nature lost. Its fundamental determination, finitude, which distinguishes it from God, being taken away, it itself would be annihilated. (Note 17.)

For the demonstration of the possibility of two so infinitely different natures becoming one person, Zwingli did nothing;¹ he leaves the gulf fixed by the Council of Chalcedon precisely as it was. Nor can we see how he could still attach a present, and not merely an historical, significance to the humanity of Christ, relatively to Christian piety. In order to do that, he ought to

¹ Calvin was the first to render service in this direction. The formula employed even by Zwingli, that the Almighty Son was the vehicle and bearer of man, declares nothing particular concerning Christ; and if it mean that the humanity subsisted solely in the Logos, as the personal power above it, it is reduced to a mere instrument, it is impersonal.

have represented the humanity of Christ as more highly endowed.¹ He merely guards the premises for an earthly human life. Luther was above all concerned about the vital unity of God and man in Christ. He was concerned to establish not merely the reality of His humanity in general,—an humanity not to be confounded with God; but also that the true humanity, that is, an humanity perfectly susceptible for God, was an actuality; and further, the reality of the true love of God, that is, of that love whose will it was to become man. To him, therefore, the one nature is the goal of the other. In their union, each attains to the other; and consequently the “new speech” must be substituted in the place of the old conceptions and words. The humanity of Christ is not merely the general empirical humanity—although it is this also—but new humanity, because God belongs to it. He therefore requires a reformation also of the old idea of humanity. Such also is the case with the conception of deity: for the Son of God abides eternally man; He not merely bore or had a man, but humanity was a determination of His being;—it became such, indeed, through the medium of His act of love; but love belongs to His essence. Notwithstanding the permanent difference of the two natures, each has an aspect, on the ground of which the other may be reckoned to form part of itself,—to wit, when a true and full conception is formed of them; and, in this sense, Luther maintained that in the new theology, the “*Prædicatio identica*” must be the shibboleth in regard to the two natures, which, considered by themselves, are opposed to each other.

It cannot be denied that, in the Christology of Luther, the idea of the God-manhood is laid down in a far purer and more powerful form than in that of Zwingli. This *idea*, however, which involves at once the appropriation of everything human by the deity, and of everything divine by the humanity, Luther represented—that is, subsequently to the discussion on the Eucharist—as passing into actuality, not mediately, but immediately, not gradually, but all at once;—in a word, as identical with the act of “*Unio* ;” whereas, otherwise, he had wished to leave a place for growth and development. On this supposition, the state of exaltation must have been as it were constantly simultaneous

¹ In this respect also, Calvin improved upon him, as is clear from his doctrine of the Supper.

with that of humiliation; or, in other words, the former never suffered the latter to be a reality. However earnestly Luther was desirous, especially out of regard to the Passion, of asserting the actuality of the servile form, not merely in single, isolated instances, but constantly on earth; it was impossible that that desire should be met, so long as human growth was at the very outset cut off, or even absorbed, by a view of the act of "Unio," which made it in itself identical with the absolute idea of the God-manhood, especially if it be supposed necessary that this "Unio" (that is, therefore, this identity) should indissolubly, unalterably pervade the entire course of the temporal life of Christ. On such a groundwork, it would be impossible to form a connected image of this earthly life. Nay more, we can already at this point see that, as even beforehand room was left merely for the semblance of abasement and growth in the historical life of Christ, unless this position were renounced, the Lutheran Church must be drawn away from that wherein its life rooted,—to wit, from the contemplation of the Passion of Christ,—to regard everything Christological under the point of view of Majesty, and thus to approximate in a dangerous manner again to the Middle Age representation of Christ.

During the process of temporal growth—if such a growth be recognised—only those momenta which were included in the unity of the eternal idea of the God-man might be dialectically exhibited. The inner articulation of this idea, however, required a more comprehensive knowledge of the divine and human natures than had been attained at the Reformation. The service was great which Luther rendered, in opposition to Zwingli and the Romish Church, relatively to the specifically Christian conception of humanity and deity, and to their mutual connection, for the theology of the "new speech" and ideas. Far less clear and defined, however, is the view he took of the general laws of human life and development, so far as they are a subject of philosophical knowledge. The same remark may be made regarding the conception of God. That this defect could not be without influence on the view taken of the Christian, is clear to every one who considers the inward relation between the first and the second creation. The idea of man involves not only that his nature is destined for God (still less a merely immediate unity with God), but also his relative independence, at all events as a

point of transition in the attainment of true ethical unity : this, however, was not as yet understood at the period of the Reformation. It is grounded in the universal idea of man, that unity with God must also be brought about by the ethical will, and that only thus can it be a genuinely human union : this also is the ultimate reason why the idea of the God-man cannot attain to absolute realization by a single act, but merely by means of a process of growth. But this relative independence, which, as a transition point, is indispensable to the truth of the humanity, was overlooked by both the Evangelical Confessions at the time of the Reformation—a circumstance which is intimately connected with the absolute predestinarianism which both taught at the beginning.

SECTION III.

CHRISTOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS, OF THE TYPE OF THE PERIOD OF THE REFORMATION, OUTSIDE OF THE CHURCH.

NOTHING can more clearly show what was, and must be, the essential aim of the reformatory movement during the sixteenth century in relation to Christology, than the character of the parties outside the pale of the Church. Only by assuming that the Christian "Sensus Communis" of that age had universally pronounced judgment (and that independently of external historical connection) on the defects of the traditional doctrine, can we satisfactorily account for the fact, that all the parties which cried out for Reform, whatever might be the differences in their reformatory power, and whether the view they took of Christianity was predominantly religious or predominantly religio-ethical, or predominantly intellectual and moral, aimed, on the one hand, at the union of the natures instead of the prevailing *διχοτόμησις*, and on the other hand, at raising the humanity of Christ to its true significance. The Reformed Church alone limited its efforts to the latter point; in relation to the former, on the contrary, concerning which we cannot say that the period of the Reformation offered sufficient premises for a satisfactory conclusion, like the Romish Church, it worked as a wholesomely retarding factor.

The delineation of these parties will be no less adapted to explain, nay more, to reconcile us to, the circumstance that the reformatory principle itself did not more completely transform the old Christology, and that, on the contrary, as we shall find, the Lutheran Church aimed more and more fully at clothing its view of the Person of Christ in the old forms, and so rigidly preserved the continuity of the development, that the doctrine which it received as authoritative was simply the completion and close of the old, on the inherited basis. The more, too, as the topstone thus laid to the ancient edifice, beyond which no fur-

ther progress was possible, was in more than one respect the prophetic commencement of a new development.

Of the parties whom we shall have hereafter to notice,—to wit, the *Schwenckfeldians*, the *Anabaptists*, and the *Antitrinitarians*,—the first-mentioned were an exaggeration of the Lutheran idea of the divine majesty of the one undivided God-man, with which they took their start; the result of the exaggeration being, however, that they involuntarily fell into, or even outdid, that glaring antagonism between God and the world, spirit and nature, which was characteristic of the Reformed Church. The *Anabaptists* started with the Reformed antithesis between God and the world, spirit and nature; but, through exaggerating it, they were led out beyond the fundamental idea of the Reformed Church, and consequently approximated to, nay more, outdid the Lutheran idea of the perfect unity of the Person of Christ. Both thus occupied a middle position between the two Confessions. By their continued existence, they reminded both of problems not yet solved; compelling them, however, to take up an exclusive position primarily towards the parties themselves, and then, by consequence, still more completely towards each other; for neither *Schwenckfeldians* nor *Anabaptists* could be deemed happy efforts at the union of the two evangelical churches, although they regarded themselves as such. Finally, still more than the two other parties, the *Antitrinitarians* (who, after many attempts, first acquired a fixed form in Socinianism), gradually reducing their tone, sought to gain a firm footing on the empirical soil of nature and history, and thus entered into the most marked antagonism to the element of abruptness, and the supernatural corporeality of Christ, taught by *Schwenckfeld* and the *Anabaptists*. However low their Christological principles may in other respects be, they represent a *natural* momentum, which justly claims consideration, and without whose full recognition, as we saw at the close of the previous section, it was impossible that Christology should advance to a higher and more fitting form. They were the representatives of the conviction, that no conception can be formed of human nature unless its development be allowed to possess a relative independence and freedom, if the human-ethical character is to be preserved; and that such relative independence, far from being something foreign or contradictory to God, is marked by resemblance to Him.

It is to its assertion of these two features of the humanity of Christ, which, although merely natural, are indispensable to a true doctrine thereof, and not merely to the unbelief which it embodied, that Socinianism owed the powerful influence it has successively exerted on the two evangelical Confessions, as the so-called rationalistic mode of thought clearly enough proves. Nor does the idea of the divine government of the Church need correcting, on the ground of its having suffered this meagre theory to exercise for a time so mighty an influence. If Schwenckfeld and the Anabaptists may be regarded as existing principally for the purpose of warning each of the two Confessions against appropriating, in a Christological respect, that which was defective in the other, and rather to strengthen itself in that which it had itself received as its own dowry, the Socinians point unconsciously to a distant future, to those *natural premises*, in which both Confessions were to find an important point of union which they lacked, and without which free Christological progress would be an impossibility.

CHAPTER FIRST.

SCHWENCKFELD.

THIS remarkable man, though at first allied with the Swiss Reformers, and even with the Anabaptists, through his doctrine of the Word and the Sacraments, and therefore estranged from the Saxon Reformers, was far more akin to the Lutherans in regard to the doctrine of the Person of Christ, and of union with Him by faith. This first became gradually clear to him through a dispute with Vadian and Bullinger; for which reason, he was compelled to break up old connections without finding confidence in the new ones which he endeavoured to make (Epist. i. 726). Although sincerely pious and humble, he found himself repelled by the Reformers on both sides. The fault, however, lay in the peculiar character of his system, in which the most heterogeneous elements were blended. And we ought the less to be surprised to find that the age of the Reformation failed to perceive the connection between his ideas, and rather

looked upon his system as a capricious contession of the most fantastical idiosyncrasies, as it is only very recently that the efforts made to understand him have been rewarded with any success.¹

In order to understand him, we must take our start with the conviction that nothing of the nature of a *thing*—no impersonal grace, no work, no office, no merit of the Redeemer—satisfied his pious soul, but alone the *person* of Christ in its glory.² He, in His divine unity and entirety, stood before Schwenckfeld as the highly-born, illustrious man, Jesus the Nazarene, who is at the same time God and regnant King of Grace. This indivisible unity of the person which, being exalted above all creatures, was divine in the human, and human also in the divine, as presented to him by his religious experience, formed unconsciously to himself, from the very beginning, the inmost impulse of his activity. As in the case of Luther and A. Osiander, therefore, so also in the case of Schwenckfeld, the exalted Christ, His glory and majesty, and mystical union with Him, constituted the centre of his inner life. A. Osiander's doctrine, however, did not satisfy him. For the "*justitia essentialis*" demanded by him, he considered to be first given in and with the unity and entirety of Christ, and not with the divine nature by itself. Osiander's theory did not appear to him to attribute its true significance to the body or humanity of Christ, but to represent it merely as the instrument by which He suffered, the vehicle through which we are enabled to lay hold on His divine nature,

¹ Compare the beautiful work, "*Geschichte der protestantischen Sekten im Zeitalter der Reformation*," by Erbkam, 1848, pp. 357–475. But G. L. Hahn, in particular, in his *Commentatio* on "*Schwenckfeldii sententia de Christi persona et opere*," Bresl. 1847, has the merit of having first cleared up several difficult points in the Christology of Schwenckfeld. The older theologians who occupied themselves with him,—as, for example, Wigand, "*De Schwenckfeldismo*," 1586,—confined their attention, like the polemical writers (in whose works he forms a standing article), more to single principles laid down by him, which, in the abrupt position they occupy, seem absurd enough. Still it cannot be maintained that he always occupied the same ground, or that there are not irreconcilable contradictions in his system.

² Compare the first part of the "*Christliche und orthodoxische Bücher und Schriften des edlen theueren von Gott hochbegnadeten und gottseligen Mannes, Caspar Schwenckfeldts v. Hans Ossing*," 1563; and further his "*Epistolarum* i. ii."

not as an integral part of the blessing of redemption itself. He teaches, indeed, that by faith, and through the sacrament of the Supper, Christ dwells in us after the flesh and blood ; but still, as it is His divine nature alone that is supposed to justify, His humanity remains without significance. He says, it is true, that what Christ did for us 1500 years ago cannot be our righteousness ; but he does not properly weigh the nature of faith, which makes everything present, both the future and the past.¹ Osiander has no knowledge of the unity of Christ ; he divides the natures : to this he is led by the seductive school-doctrine of the “*communicatio idiomatum*.”

For this reason also, he felt himself compelled to raise his voice decidedly against the doctrine of the Swiss teachers. They sever Christ, says he, they deny His entirety ; but this diminishes His glory and desolates His kingdom. We must not take the view of the matter, as though each of the two natures of the Person of Christ stood alone by itself, without being united with the other. So soon as one nature is separated from the other, in the contemplation of His sufferings or glory, and one is viewed without the other “*seorsim*,” that is, disjunctively (so as, for example, that the human alone suffers, whilst the divinity remains without participation, inactive ; or, that the deity alone dwelt in glory, and in some way the Word without the man), that which is taken by itself is no longer merely a nature, but, because it works and suffers by and for itself, and disjoined from the other, becomes a person ; in this way we arrive at two persons and two sons. On the contrary, Christ suffered for us entirely and unitedly in both natures ; and entirely as to both natures makes us righteous and blessed.²

¹ “*Vom Wort Gottes, dass kein ander Wort Gottes sei, eigentlich zu reden, denn der Sohn Gottes, Jesus Christus.*” Fol. 124, 129, 130.

² Compare in particular Schwenckfeld’s *Conf. Thl. II.*, pp. 139 ff., 152 (in opposition to Vadian’s “*Antilogia*” and the “*Cirkelbüchle*”) :—Vadian teaches, Christ was “*totus creatura sicut et totus creator*,” was on earth “*creatura servilis* ;” the two natures are represented by him as “*longe diversissimæ*” (compare p. 153) ; according to him also, Christ has still two unequal wills, and will one day be subjected to the Father (1 Cor. xv.). He writes as though, as to His humanity, He no longer discharged His office, observed a Sabbath, and no longer governs, but the Word alone, on whose account alone Christ is to be worshipped. Schwenckfeld, on the contrary, maintains that the flesh of Christ has received divine glory, power, and

One would suppose that he must needs agree with Luther, who also aimed, not at a mere "*Unio personalis*," in the sense of Zwingli, but also at an union of the natures; as is evident, in particular, from his doctrine of the state of exaltation. For, as far as Luther was from supposing deity and humanity to be in nature one outside of Christ (or, as Luther terms it, "*in abstracto*"); so far was he from representing the natures as touching, or being connected with, each other merely in the Ego, and in other respects remaining outside of each other. Even if Melancthon contented himself with such an union, Luther aimed at an union, not merely "*in concreto personarum*," but also "*in concreto naturarum*." The humanity which was in Christ, and the divinity, as it was in the Son of God, entered into an union, so to speak, apart from the "*Unio*" at the personal centre, or in the Ego.¹ Still Schwenckfeld was not satisfied even with Luther. He did not consider the two natures intimately enough united by the doctrine of the "*Communicatio idiomatum*" adopted by Luther subsequently to 1538; because the essence of the two, even then, still form an impassable wall of separation between them. The "*Communicatio idiomatum*" is merely a more refined discription of Christ; and it is not clear how a nature essentially different from God can have divine attributes.²

substance; nay more, that it became God, not merely through communications "*ex Verbi sodalitis, sed etiam propria et naturali a deo Patre gloria*," which Jesus, "*conceptione ex Sp. S. generatione et renovatione, maxime vero per Primogenitarum ex mortuis clarificatione et unctione plenissima accepit*."

¹ Hence, in the dispute which subsequently arose between the "*Abstracts*" and the "*Concretes*," especially in the form which it took in Königsberg, by the "*Abstracts*," we must understand those who remained faithful to Luther's opinion; although Luther was accustomed to term the "*Unio*" an "*Unio in concreto*." It would have been more accurate to designate the "*Abstracts*," "*Concretes*," in regard to the natures even apart (*abstrahendo*) from the person (see below).

² *Epistolar.* ii. 644 f.; *Christliche orthodox.* BB. i. 307 ff. (see *Confession*); *Apologia* u. s. w., Bl. 63. He shows how Luther also at first taught a deification of humanity; likewise Melancthon and Brentz; and complains that the Lutherans now blame him for that which they themselves taught at first, and that they had fallen into the sophistical doctrine of the "*Communicatio idiomatum*;" that they now call Christ a creature as to His humanity, which, according to Vadian's "*Antilogia*" against Schwenckfeld, Frecht of Ulm carried (independently of Luther), with the

One might therefore suppose him to have been inclined to the pantheistic views diffused from Italy, which aimed at establishing the unity of the Person of Christ by representing human nature in general, and therefore specially in Christ, as of the like essence with God, nay more, as divine. From these, however, his pious Christian soul was still more averse. He characterizes the notion as a blasphemy against God, as a confusion of nature and grace, as Pelagian. Schwenckfeld, indeed, recognised clearly enough that the essential indwelling of God forms part of the full idea of man; but he did not deem this idea to be immediately realized, not even in Adam prior to the fall; still less could he regard it as having reality in men as they are at present. On the contrary, he had so strict a conception of original sin, that he even regarded the substance of man as evil, and styled Flacius Illyricus a Pelagian, because he merely held man to be so far corrupt, that he can be helped by a creature, by preaching or by the Holy Scriptures, instead of by the Creator alone.¹ From this view of the first Adamic nature, on the one hand, and positively from that fundamental intuition of the unity and entirety of Christ, in a glory exalted above everything finite and creatural, on the other hand, resulted the following attempt to arrive at a still more intimate unity of the natures than Luther had arrived at; without, however, falling into a pantheistic identification of the divine and human.²

Christ had indeed, he unweariedly repeats, a truly human flesh, and retains it: from Eutychianism he felt himself to be

Smalcaldic theologians, in opposition to him; that Bugenhagen and Cocceius are already tending towards the notion of an adoptive Son, because they are no longer willing, as Luther was at first, to confess the natural Son of God in the entire Christ. Compare i. 91; further, "Collatio Ph. Melanthonis et C. Schwenckfeld."—"Seb. Cocceii Discovered Errors."

¹ "Hypothesis das ist kurzer Begriff und Inhalt von den alten Irrthum-ben" (against N. Gallus and Flacius).

² Against Seb. Franck see Epistolar. i. 178 ff., 289-295. Against Servetus compare C. Schwenckfeld's "Kurtze gründliche Verantwortung," Bl. 16, 17, "Vom Ursprung des Fleisches Christi." His own doctrine, which at first had not as yet carried out the distinction of the two states, is specially set forth in his Confession iii. Parts are contained in the "Christliche Orthodox. BB." i. 91-319. (Compare "Ein schöner Send-brief," pp. 510 ff.; the "Summarium von zweierlei Staud," u. s. w.) He repeats himself, however, in all his works.

free. But it is arbitrary, nay more, incorrect, to designate that body alone human, which is of the like origin and nature with ours. The regenerated is also a man, nay more, he first is a true man. Whereas, in the first Adam, the creation of man was only commenced typically, the outline, as it were, sketched; in the regenerated, on the contrary, there is the germ of a divine substance, a glorified body, even as of essential sanctification.¹ Both these things a regenerated man possesses, not in virtue of his being created, but in virtue of his being begotten by God. A distinction must be drawn between creation and generation. Creation is an expression of the divine power, not a communication of the divine essence; whatever is a creature, God has outside of Himself, and it is outside of God, and is therefore foreign and contradictory to Him.² Generation, on the contrary, although taking place in time and not in eternity like the generation of the Son, is a revelation of the divine love and grace, a communication of the divine essence; the generated is of God, and that not merely according to the Spirit, but in the unity and centre of His essence. Christ could not have received His body from this creatural world, from the Adamitic nature. In that case, if not stained with sin, He must necessarily, as a creature, have been outside of God and His essence; and God could neither have entered into that absolute union with Him which belongs to the Christian faith, nor could there have been in Him the power to plant the seed of the pneumatico-somatic

¹ Von der Sünd und Gnad, Adam und Christo, Christliche orthodox. BB. i. 460. Vom Ursprung des Fleisches Christi xi. The Holy Scriptures distinguish two sorts of flesh in man: firstly, the flesh of sin, which we all have from Adam, and in which sin, according to Schwenckfeld, dwells not merely as an accident; and a flesh which, though like the first mentioned, is a flesh of promise, grace, righteousness. The former is created, is transmitted in a natural way; the latter has its origin in God, and is notwithstanding human.

² "Vom ewigen Wesen Gottes," see "Christliche Orthodox." BB. i. 551, 560. "All creatures have out of the creation (ex nihilo) an essence from God, outside of God and His own essence, but which does not subsist without God, but is maintained by God. That is the presence of the energy, power, and might of God." The presence of grace is the presence of the Holy Spirit, life, essence, and kingdom of God. Epistol. i. 634:—Creatures are created to stand outside of the divine essence; the believer comes into that in which God also naturally and essentially dwells. *Creaturæ sunt omnes extra deum creatorem, i.e., non participant naturam creatoris.*"

(geistleiblich) nature out of God ; in other words, to plant the true man in us. He regards it therefore as certain, that Christ, who must be that by nature which the regenerated are by grace, was begotten of God even as to His humanity, and as to both natures was “*Dei filius naturalis*.” For this reason, he refuses to suffer Christ to be called a creature, even as to His humanity.¹ To represent Christ as a creature in one aspect of His being, seemed to him a total destruction of the unity of the image of the Redeemer.²

By adopting this solution of the problem, we should suppose that he must all the more certainly fall into the Christology taught by the Anabaptists even prior to Menno, who severed the connection between Christ and the Adamitic humanity by their doctrine of His heavenly flesh ; and, indeed, a dualistic motive operated in the case of both.³ But he protests most decidedly against the doctrine of Melchior Hoffmann and others,⁴ because they did not hold Mary to be the actual mother of Christ, and were only able to acknowledge the appearance of suffering in such a heavenly body. So also against Corvinus.⁵

But how does he connect the two things together, that Christ's body was out of the essence of God, and yet out of Mary also, yea, out of her substance ? By his doctrine of the pneumatico-somatical (geistlich leiblich) significance of faith. (Note 18.) By faith Mary was born of God, and had a substance out of God, which was not created, nor outside of God, but was begotten and of divine essence. Out of this substance of Mary now,—not, however, merely out of her Adamitic nature

¹ Confess., pp. 306 ff ; and infinitely frequently *passim*.

² He regarded Adam prior to the fall as in a state of grace and purity, but as a creature without participation in the essence of God or in Sonship. It appeared to him, therefore, both a blasphemy and an “absurdum” that God's Son should constitute one person with a creature. Compare “*Collatio Phil. Melancthonis*,” etc.

³ Epistolar. ii. 163.

⁴ On Melch. Hoffmann, see, for example, “*Christliche Orthodox*.” BB. i. 426 ; Epistolar. ii. 163 ; i. 100, 291 f., 404 f., 606 f.

⁵ On Corvinus compare Epistolar. i., pp. 580–630, 78th Sendbrief. He assumed that the Word “became flesh,” converted itself into humanity, and that there was, therefore, one nature only in Christ, and not, as Schwenckfeld persistently maintained, two natures. Mary gave birth to the incarnate Word, but did not conceive it in the sense of contributing to it anything from her substance.

(which can only fall a prey to death),—Christ was conceived and born. On this ground it is said of Him, “He was conceived of the Holy Ghost.”

With this noble divine substance out of Mary, it was possible for the Son of God to enter into that perfect union, so that the exalted Lord could be deified in His entirety, nay more, be translated into the Trinity. And yet, even in this case, Christ is always man “the humanity is never destroyed.” The regenerated also is a man, although begotten of the essence of God: to participate in divine nature, is not opposed to the idea of humanity; on the contrary, according to God’s eternal idea of humanity, it would be opposed to that idea, if human nature were to advance no further than the first Adam,—if it were not to attain to its goal, first in Christ, and through Him in us.¹ If, he goes on to say, this also belongs to the essence of man, that when once the race exists, all that bears the name of man must in some way or other be derived from the existent race, this condition is also met, in that Christ descended from the faith of Mary, and thus from the Holy Spirit. Nor did Christ lack the essential features of every man, body and soul. Finally, he takes particular pains to show that Christ underwent a true growth, notwithstanding that, from the commencement, the humanity and divinity were so intimately united that everything was indivisibly common to both. (Note 19.) At this point, it might be supposed that he would be necessitated, for the sake of the “*Unio personæ*” and “*naturarum*,” to attribute ubiquity, omnipotence, omniscience, and so forth, to the humanity of Christ, and thus to overthrow the truth of His human development. He escapes from the difficulty, however, by drawing a deeper distinction between the two states of Christ. (Note 20.) He takes a view of the “*Exinanitio*” of the Son of God, which enables him to allow that the perfect unity of the deity and humanity actually grew. The Son of God did not bring the divine nature, which was His in common with the Father and Holy Spirit, at once into the humanity; for, though He retained it in heaven “before God,” He did not soon make use of it, and therefore, as a matter of fact, His personality alone, in the first instance, became man (Epist. i. 181). The divine nature which the Word had from the Father, was not indeed separated

¹ Confess. Theil iii., pp. 225 ff.

from the nature which He had from His mother; the Word brought the former from heaven, and the flesh was in heaven. But the flesh itself did not yet possess it actually; and the Word was not at first conjoined in all its actuality with the flesh; otherwise the humanity of Christ would have been a mere appearance. Otherwise it would have been impossible for the divine nature of the Son and the humanity of Christ, which had first to grow, to have been coincident and formed a divine-human vital unity with each other during the period of the Saviour's earthly development. But the one Christ, in undergoing His development, grew ever more and more into the divine nature of the Son; the divine nature became His own, even though only in the way of reception: on the other hand, at the close of the process, the Son, who, during the course of the holy life of Christ, gradually, and ever more completely, without the possibility of falling (although Schwenckfeld elsewhere lays stress on freedom in opposition to predestinarianism), reassumed His original divinity, thus lost His "exinanitio," and glorified humanity by exalting it to the right hand of the Father. Still it remains eternally humanity; for it rests in the deity, and the deity is taken up into it. (Note 21.) But it was the humanity alone that grew, not the Word (Epist. i. 724). The Word governed the world even when Jesus was forsaken on the cross: the "exinanitio" (the non-use of His majesty) related, therefore, solely to the existence He had in Jesus (Epistol. i. 181).

The above exposition will show that Schwenckfeld's Christology by no means merits the neglect with which it has been for a long period treated. Equally unjust is it to describe it as Eutychian. The principle of the Reformation, in its anthropological and soteriological aspects, stirs powerfully in his system. His fundamental tendency exhibits a Lutheran physiognomy; and, indeed, Luther did not blame him for refusing to designate the humanity of Christ a mere creature, or for laying too great stress on the unity of His person. Luther, with his deep insight, blames in his principles, on the contrary, that they compel him to divide the one Christ into two; for he saw clearly the consequences of the dualism into which Schwenckfeld evaded. With all that he says about the flesh of Christ, his system conceals within itself an element of hostility to nature; and this

hostility, as is well known, strongly influenced his doctrine of the Word of God and the Sacraments. And, although he assumed the existence of a connection between Christ and the Adamitic nature, his premises required him to posit so complete a distinction between the two states of Christ, that the earthly element in Christ was annihilated when He attained to perfection, and the identity of Him who was abased with Him who was exalted, was lost. Hence Luther reproaches him with having a double Christ.¹

CHAPTER SECOND.

THE ANABAPTISTS.

MENNO SIMONIS (he died in the year 1561) advanced a step further, in order to secure the divine-human unity of Christ.² To the adoption of this course he was led by the strict view he took of the evil which entered our nature through Adam. Christ cannot have assumed, and made His own, our guilty, curse-laden, sinful nature; otherwise He could not have redeemed us. He must have a pure spotless humanity, and not the corrupt nature of Adam, in order that He might become the second Adam, able to die for the sins of all, and to beget again into a pure humanity all who believe in Him. One must be of another genus, which, though it is true, primarily possessed alone by Him, had the power to make the sons of the first Adam sons of the second. But this pure humanity of the

¹ In the "Kleines Bekenntniss vom heiligen Abendmahl," and elsewhere.

² Compare Opera Menno Simonis, "Ofte groot Sommarie," etc., 1646, Fol. 157 f., 589-602 (against Gellius Faber in Emden, 1552); "Een klare onwiderspreeckelycke Bekenntnisse ende Aenwysinghe—dat de geheele Christus Jesus, Godt ende Mensche, Mensche ende Gott, Gods eengeboren ende eerstgeboren eyuen Sone is niet ghedeylt noch ghestuckt, maer een cenig ongedheylt Persoon, Soon ende Christus, Godts Woort in der Tydt Vleesch geworden," Door M. S. (Menno Simonis), Emden, pp. 657-724 f. ("A clear and unanswerable confession and demonstration that the entire Jesus Christ, God and man, man and God, God's only-begotten and first-born one Son, is not divided nor in pieces, but is one undivided person, Son and Christ, God's word in time, incarnate," by M. S.)

second Adam was only possible, on the condition that *God became man*. It is not enough to say, The eternal Word assumed a man. That would lead to two sons, two persons; the words, "The Logos became flesh," would then be perverted and emptied of their meaning. Had the eternal Word assumed an humanity, which was, as it were, already in existence, it must have been the sinful humanity of Adam. As this cannot be affirmed, His pure humanity must have had a higher origin; it must have sprung from the eternal Word Himself, and indeed so that the Word Himself was the humanity which came into existence through the Word. This, however, is inconceivable, save on the supposition that the eternal Word of God Himself, the Creator of the world, out of love to humanity, gave up His glory and dignity, and became little for our sake. (Note 22.) The Son of God transformed Himself into the elements of a man, into a human germ, which was deposited in the womb of the Virgin, prepared by the Holy Ghost (the conception), and appointed to undergo a truly human development, through which He should regain the dignity He had laid aside. Such a supposition does not contradict the divine unchangeableness, for both the Father and the will and decree of God remained immoveable, even though the eternal Son made Himself passible, and converted Himself into an actual man (Fol. 691 ff.). Besides, the Logos did not give up His own substance when He assumed the servile form of man: on the contrary, what was effected was, that this man acquired a truly holy, yea, divine, nature; for the nature of the Son of God became his, and a complete unity of the person (and of the natures) was established (Fol. 694).

The Scriptures never say, The Word assumed a man, or, two persons and sons of different sorts and natures became one person and one son; but, The Word *became* flesh, and Christ Himself was the Son of God. This was not opposed to the original order of God, that a man should be brought into existence immediately by God; the first Adam is the proof thereof. It would, however, be opposed to the order of God (Gen. i. 27), if a man of our kind were to be born otherwise than from a father and a mother. The father gives the seed; where that is not the case, the man is not one of our kind. The learned, therefore, with their mode of representing the birth from the Virgin, fail entirely to attain the end at which they aim; they assume

a false miracle, which is contrary to the order of God. What do they accomplish thereby? If Christ were a real child of Adam, a guilty, curse-laden, sin-burdened nature must be attributed to Him, and He could not redeem us. And as respects the Son of God, who is represented to have assumed a child of Adam, on the view referred to, the Son Himself would not then have entered into the flesh; He would merely have employed the man derived from Mary as an instrument by which He might suffer for us. But if it were intended that He Himself should suffer, and not another in His stead, He must needs enter into flesh Himself; otherwise He could not have suffered. This is too clear for any one to doubt it (Fol. 695, 589-600). Those who hold the opposed view have a divided Christ, one half from heaven, the other from the earth. It leads to two persons; for all they are able to say is the absurdity, that although every man is a person, and Christ was a man, still Christ alone was not a person. They teach really that there were two sons in Christ: the Son of God, motherless and impassible; and the Son of man, fatherless but passible. According to their representation, it was not the first-born and only-begotten very Son of God who suffered death for us, but the fatherless son of Mary, derived from the sinful and death-deserving flesh of Adam. Moreover, a created being could not be worshipped without falling into idolatry. It is true, Christ assumed the seed of Abraham, that is, He bestowed grace on believers; but had the Word assumed a man created in Mary out of her flesh, contrary to the entire order of nature, He, Christ (as a man), could not have claimed God as His true and veritable Father, nor would Mary have been His (the Son of God) true mother. He can only have been the Son of both on the supposition that He, the eternal Son, made Himself little, and that Mary miraculously conceived and bore Him through the Holy Ghost.¹ For the rest, Menno did not assume an eternal or pre-existent humanity

¹ Whether or no Menno denied that Christ derived anything from the womb of Mary, even after the conception, is clearly decided by Fol. 596 f., where he represents Him as growing out of the flesh of Mary. But the germ itself implanted at the beginning was of divine substance, though in the human form. This form, as a self-constituted one, was for a time the form of the Son of God, vigorous enough to ward off everything impure, which first entered His nature through the sin of Adam.

(Fol. 717); nor did he recognise any other human soul in Christ than the abased Son Himself. He speaks always of the pure and holy flesh of Christ alone, even as he considers our need of redemption to lie solely in the sinful flesh we have inherited. At the same time, it is not to be denied that his intention was to retain an *eternal* God-manhood *a parte post*, notwithstanding that the humanity actually taught by him is nothing more than a self-abasement of the Son, which will cease with His exaltation. In this respect, his doctrine bears a strong resemblance to the patripassian theories of the first centuries, with the difference that Menno treats, not the deity in general, but solely the Word, theopaschitically. (Note 23.)

Similar doctrines to those of Menno were taught also by other Anabaptists, especially by Melchior Hoffmann.¹ In the Anabaptist articles of John of Leyden, the twelfth runs as follows:—Christ did not derive His human nature from Mary.² Similarly also taught the English and Dutch Baptists; partially, too, their Confessions of Faith.³ Later adherents of

¹ See above, pp. 630 f. Compare M. Göbel's "Geschichte des christlichen Lebens" i. 180. Göbel (p. 198) denies Menno all originality in the matter of doctrine, and maintains in particular that he had borrowed his Christology from the other Anabaptists; but he brings no proof for the latter statement, and in the former probably goes too far. Menno, with his pious soul, sought the God who suffered on his behalf; and this was not the manner of the other Anabaptists. At the same time, it was a result of the strong antagonism posited by Anabaptists, in general, between God and the world, and by Menno, in particular, between nature and grace, that the latter was unable to allow Mary any measure of the share of a mother in the substance of Christ, nay more, that he scarcely permitted her to be Christ's nurse or nourisher.

² Walch l. c. i. 702. Compare Cornelius's "Berichte der Augenzeugen über das Münsterische Wiedertäuferreich," Münster, 1853, pp. 445–451. (The Apology of Münster, in which Christ is confessed to have died for sin, but is also taught, that all who receive the word of God, they also give birth to Christ and are mothers of Christ, p. 451.) One of the Anabaptist Confessions of Faith also, which appeared at Horn in 1618, teaches (Art. 14, 15) similarly to Menno,—that the flesh or corpse of Christ was not from Mary, nor from a creatural substance, but alone from the Word of life, which descended from heaven, in nature far removed from sin. Later writers, as Schyn, "Hist. Christianorum, qui—Mennonitæ vocantur," c. 7, art. 8, speak ambiguously: compare Walch l. c. pp. 721 f.

³ Some of them became at a later period Socinians. Compare Walch pp. 721 f.

the party gave it up, or at all events put it into the background.

Menno was separated also by his doctrine of Christ from men who, in other respects, were closely related to him;—for example, from Johann von Lasky and Martin Myconius. The latter had an interview with Menno in Wismar, the former in Emden. They did not agree; but a correspondence arose between them.¹

Lasky says, he sees clearly enough that Menno regards Christ as God and as man; but God cannot be mutable and mortal, and he who has not human flesh is not a man. Menno recognises that the Word was spirit; how then could it change its existence, and pass over into flesh? His exinanition (Phil. ii. 7) brought Him not merely external resemblance to men, the form of a servant, but *μορφῇ* must be taken in both cases in the same sense; consequently, *μορφῇ δούλου* as certainly denotes “speciem ipsam, characterem,” as *μορφῇ Θεοῦ* denotes the real substance of God. A veritable man, therefore, was assumed by Him who was in the form of God. But in saying that He assumed the servile form, we by no means allow that He also took upon Himself the bondage of our flesh under sin. Lasky regarded the “exinanitio” as the “splendoris divini voluntaria dissimulatio, nostræque servitutis in carne nostra assimilatio.” Had He assumed “per prioris formæ desertionem nostram formam,” and completely laid down the “forma Dei,” how could He have said that He was in heaven whilst He was living with us on earth? The same thing is proved by His miracles and transfiguration. But he sustains himself, in particular, on Heb. ii. 14, as in opposition to Menno on John i. 14. Lasky’s work contains nothing distinctive; but it is interesting to remark how the two passages of Scripture, which are favourable to the “assumptio” and to the “incarnatio,” are made the starting-point of two opposed doctrines, both of which are equally unsatisfactory. For Lasky’s “dissimulatio” and “assimulatio,” so far from establishing the truth of the humanity, threaten rather to reduce the “Incarnatio” to a mere

¹ See the above-mentioned works of Menno, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, “Defensio veræ semperque in ecclesia receptæ doctrinæ de Christi domini incarnatione adv. Mennonem Simonis Anabaptistarum doctorem per Joann. a Lasco Poloniæ Baronem,” etc. Bonnæ, 1545.

ἀλλοίωσις. Menno felt very distinctly that he stood nearer to Luther.¹

CHAPTER THIRD.

THE ANTITRINITARIANS.

WHEN Melanchthon, in the first edition of his "Loci," passed over the doctrine of the Trinity and of the two natures of Christ in silence, it was by no means from an intention to assail, though it did show indifference towards, the spinose and scholastic form in which they had been handed down. Pervaded as that work in its first form unquestionably was by the conviction, that it contained the substance of the Christian faith in a purer state than that in which it had heretofore been presented, Melanchthon and Luther cannot have regarded the traditional form of the doctrine of the Trinity and Incarnation as the foundation of the Christian faith; but, inasmuch as we know that they clung firmly to those doctrines, must have believed that whatever in them was necessary to salvation was implicitly contained in that which they had set forth as the central feature of the Gospel. Ground was thus broken for a revision and regeneration of these doctrines in accordance with the principle of the Reformation. But, although Melanchthon was unable, at a later period, to escape the feeling of this need (see pp. 134 f.), he contented himself with the simplification of those dogmas, without attempting any further development. Nor was this meant to be the vocation of the Reformers: they were intended to leave the objective dogmas untouched, lest, if the reformation of everything were undertaken at once, the movement should overflow its proper limits and banks. It was necessary rather that, in the consolidation of the one grand principle of the

¹ L. c. Fol. 591. He adduces Luther's words,—“Guard, guard against the *Alloesi*; it is the devil's mask. It arranges at last such a Christ, as that I should not care to be a Christian after Him, to wit, that Christ neither is nor does anything more with His sufferings than another saint. For as soon as I believe that the human nature alone suffered for us, such a Christ is to me a wretched saviour—he himself would need a Saviour.”

Reformation, a regulative and a clear goal should be given to the efforts that had been initiated. The dead and rigid character of the traditional doctrines was scarcely perceived by those whose joy, because of the wealth of their new religious life, caused them in general to regard obscurities in the sphere of scientific knowledge as a slight thing. It was the more easy for them, in this case, to submit to the authority of ecclesiastical tradition, as it insured, if even in a not quite satisfactory form, the full divine dignity of Christ, which was the indispensable condition of His atonement and justification, and was guaranteed by the faith in redemption.¹

The Antitrinitarians took up a totally different point of view. Deprived of the distinctive moral-religious principle which lay at the basis of the Reformation, and turned towards the intellectual or moral, they treated the movement onesidedly, as one of enlightenment, of liberation from superstition of every kind; and on the ground of their approval of the negative consequences of the principle of the Reformation, as considered from the point of view of humanism and culture, notwithstanding their lack of the inner hold and moderation characteristic of the same principle, regarded themselves as the true completers of the Reformation; whereas, in reality and principally considered, with their religious, half-magical, half-Pelagian, fundamental views, they had not advanced beyond Romanism;—in fact, the subjectivity which, in the evangelical faith, observes proper limits, whilst at the same time enjoying true freedom, was directed against those aspects of the system of the Church which were repellent to the understanding, and appeared practically unfruitful.

¹ Even Calvin, about the time of the dispute with Caroli, asserted the necessity of a developing revision of the doctrine of the Trinity. On this ground, he declined pledging himself to the Athanasian Creed, and wished to cast aside the terms "persona," "Trinitas," as scholastic expressions. At the same time, he was so far from being inclined towards the Antitrinitarians, that he wished to carry out the doctrine of the Trinity still more completely. He saw clearly that, in the traditional form of the doctrine, the Son had not full deity, because aseity (aseitas) was reserved to the Father alone, who thus received a preponderance over the Son, and was identified with the Monas or the divine essence. The Antitrinitarians, with whom he had to struggle, usually directed their attacks on this weak point of the dogma, and deduced therefrom their antitrinitarian conclusions.

More carefully considered, several lines of Antitrinitarianism may be discriminated. *Firstly*, the Anabaptist line, which preponderated during the first period, till towards 1540. To this belong Hetzer and Denk, as well as David Joris and Campanus. *Secondly*, the theosophic natural philosophy of Servetus and his school. *Thirdly*, the Socinian line, which at last was the only one that remained. All were Christologically agreed in striving towards, or positively teaching, the unity, instead of the duality, of the natures. There were, however, three modes of arriving at this unity;—either by docetically denying the truth of the humanity, and really leaving only the divine nature, as did the Anabaptists: or, by leaving only the human nature and denying the divine, as was done most clearly by the Socinians; or by taking the middle course, of assuming pantheistically an immediate unity of the divine and human,—a position which proved itself untenable,—as did Servetus.

I. The Antitrinitarian Anabaptists, whilst differing from Menno in some points, agreed with him, and opposed Servetus and his school, in taking up a completely antagonistic relation towards nature and corporeality; for, whilst Servetus deified, they, in their spiritualism, either despised or denied, nature. Their spiritualism, however, had not the ethical and religious vigour of Menno's, but was more theoretical and pantheistic.

Denk (died in 1528), and L. Hetzer (died 1529), who owed his opinions to him, rejected the external word and sacraments, and without doubt attached no importance to the historical, outward Christ. On the contrary, the inner word was all to them; and they supposed it to stand in an essential relation to all men.¹ This word is produced out of the essence of God, who is the primal source of the creatures through the Spirit, that is, His power. The Word is potentially the collective sum of the human souls, which, being gradually born into time, are all saved by their free will and good works.²

¹ Which reminds us of the Quakers.

² Denk's doctrine ends in an emanatistic or pantheistic subordinationism, which, logically carried out, leaves not room for the pre-existence of the hypostasis of the Word. Adam Pastoris (also called Rud. Martini), therefore, consistently went on to deny the identity of essence, and to assert that His equality to the Father consisted solely in harmony of will, in order to be able to assert for Christ a pre-existent hypostasis; in other words, he went on to Arianism.

David Joris (Georg, about 1536, died in 1556) does away still more distinctly with the hypostasis of the Son or Word: "the true Word of God is God Himself." He passes on from subordination to a kind of Sabellianism, which reminds us of the Pseudo-Clementines; and seeks to secure a determinate place for Christ by means of his theory of the ages of the world, and of the advancing revelations of God. "The one divine essence bears many names, under one true nature of Christ, on our behalf." The many names of the one God, who, as revealing Himself, is termed Christ, are so many utterances, effluxes of God, who in Himself is not divisible, but has arranged for Himself divers tabernacles or dwelling-places in certain human persons, through whom the days of the world or the periods are designated. These periods are stages corresponding to the body, the soul, the spirit; or to the ages of childhood, youth, manhood; or to faith, love, and hope. Himself he regarded as the highest stage; and appears to style Himself now David, and then Elias. Men are saved by inward suffering and dying after the example of Jesus. Then the birth of Christ, who is the heart and nature of God, is continued; believers are the mother of Christ, in that they give birth to Him. He enters into them and assumes humanity, in that they enter into Him, into the Christ after the Spirit, by penitence and faith. The last kingdom is not to be prepared by the carnal, corpse-like Christ, but by Christ after the Spirit; it comes with David Joris.¹

The rigid antagonism to nature and corporeality took already a milder form in the case of Campanus. His system formed the transition point to a naturalism, if even in the first instance, under a mystical form.

Campanus supposed himself able to reconcile a duality of divine persons with the unity, and to establish it by the relation between the two sexes. Not man, says he, but man married, is the image of God; in marriage there are two persons and one man in one being. So are Father and Son one being. And, as Eve was formed out of Adam, so the Son was begotten, made, created out of the Father's essence and nature. In this way the subordination of the Son is established, without pre-

¹ The fleshly, antinomistic termination of this spiritualism, and its impious assumption of divinity, see in Trechsel l. c. pp. 53 ff.

judice to the unity of essence. He styles Him ambassador, servant, steward of God.¹

When Anabaptism, as laid down by such representatives as the men above referred to, freed itself from the impure mysticism, the fragments of which might be discovered in their systems, it gave itself up Christologically to a kind of pantheistic Ebionism, like that set forth by Seb. Frank, Theob. Thamer, and others. By their depreciation of the historical Christ, they prepared the way for the doctrine of the universal Christ; the boundary line separating nature and grace was erased in favour of the idea of the universal divinity of humanity.

Intimations, also, of the rise even of a Judaistic Ebionism are discoverable in the writings of Claudius of Savoy, who held Christ to be merely a man supernaturally generated by the Holy Ghost.

II. Like Schwenckfeld, Servetus² zealously attacked the traditional form of the doctrine of the two natures; indeed, going further than Schwenckfeld, he altogether rejects and styles it the dogma of Antichrist. Like Schwenckfeld, he speaks of the flesh of Christ, of His body and His soul, as consubstantial with God, but in a sense which admits of only an ill-defined boundary line between nature and grace; for, according to his theosophic philosophy of nature, everything is of divine substance.

In the last exposition of his system, which is most of all tinged with Neo-Platonism, he teaches that God is the indivisible

¹ To represent God as the unity of the sexes, is a fundamental principle of certain old natural philosophical systems. We do not know whether Campanus followed it out further. Without doubt, the Son, as the principle of revelation, is, in his view, united at the same time with finitude and matter, but pre-existent as a divine person, ditheistically. Campanus no longer hypostatizes the Holy Spirit. His words are—"Wider alle Welt nach den Aposteln," 1530; "Restitution und Besserung göttlicher heil. Schrift," 1532. Seb. Frank welcomed in him a kindred spirit.

² De Trinit. erroribus, L. vii. 1531; Dialogorum de Trinit. L. ii. 1532. These two treatises having been rewritten, were comprised in the collection of his writings which he published under the title, "Christianismi Restitutio," MDLIII., and which contains 5 Books and 2 Dial. de Trin. div. Schlüsselburg's Catalog. Hæret. L. xi. Compare Heberle's "M. Servets Trinitätslehre und Christologie" in the Tüb. Zeitschrift for 1840, 2; Baur l. c. iii. 54-103; and particularly Trechsel's "Die protestantischen Antitrinitarier" i. 61-150, 1839.

unity, absolutely incognisable in itself, but stirred with an essential tendency to self-revelation. He is present also in His revelations, but always only as to one aspect of His being, "multimode dispositionibus quibusdam," that is, in self-determinations to revelations, of which there are two fundamental forms, the objective, in which God is set forth, and the subjective, in which God is inwardly communicated;—Word and Spirit. The entire subject-matter of His revelation is originally concentrated in an ideal picture of the world, in the Word, from whom everything, according to its own kind and order, is ideally derived, as from a root. But this "Word," or picture of the world, must not be confounded with the hypostatical Logos of the Church; seeing that it is not personal, and does not coexist eternally alongside of God, but is God's act, which is able to make itself and God visible, a lucific form shining in God as a thought of God.

Further, the Church's idea of the Logos lays claim to being already a reality, nay more, a complete and absolute reality; whereas, according to Servetus, the Word first attains full reality in the actual world. Hence the ideal Word, which was the vehicle of the seed of all things, first became a reality and a real *person* (not merely an appearance) in the veritable, actual world.¹ This might lead to the idea of an universal humanification or personification of God; but Servetus endeavours notwithstanding to remain in harmony with the Christian revelation, and to preserve for Christ a thoroughly unique position.

In that ideal image of the world, namely, everything is contained which now exists or ever will exist; in such a manner, however, that the first archetype in the archetypal world is Jesus Christ (His archetype). He is the middle, the beginning, and the goal of the archetypes, whose realization began with the creation. But the archetype of Christ is the idea of Him as one becoming a reality: the purpose of incarnation was eternal, and did not depend on sin. The content of this eternal idea of Christ is the countenance of true humanity, whose realization is the objective manifestation of the countenance of God. Nay

¹ Although Servetus himself uses the word "*persona*" in a Sabellian manner for rôle; and therefore applies it also to the Old Testament shadows of the Christian revelation, in which God Himself, who is the essence, was for the first time manifested.

more, "the flesh of Christ" contained the entire deity of the Father substantially in itself. The content of the "Word" in general was, in his view, on the one hand, the idea of the Father: the Father thinks Himself, as it were, as to His essence, or necessarily; but, on the other hand, this idea or this thought has for its subject-matter the world, which is consequently nothing but the self-realization of God;—a self-realization effected, it is true, according to Servetus, by the divine will.¹

But how could that archetype of Christ, in which the Father's entire essence was ideally contained, become a real man, with flesh, blood, soul? This question he seeks to answer by means of his doctrine of the supernatural birth of Christ. In order to understand this doctrine, we must take into consideration, that he held God to be, although apart from His self-revelation, incognisable and simple, at the same time an infinite womb of forms and forces, to which He gives mundane actuality in agreement with that image of the world, the Word, which comprises within itself as truly the natural (light) as the spiritual, and out of which the Holy Spirit proceeds; in whom again natural (breath) and spiritual are united, but under the type of communication (*dispositio communicationis*): nature and spirit (being and thought) have, therefore, their original unity in God. Out of His essence (through the medium of His will) both proceed: they can therefore never be entirely rent from each other, but are the same divine essence, under different "*modis*." Nature was created out of the light from God, which shone in the Word; by various changes of the formative lucific force, water, air, fire, came into existence, which give form to matter, to chaos, whilst that which inwardly gives life and spirit to the world is the soul of the world, the "*dispositio*" of God as Spirit, mediated by the Word.

Now, as the nature and Spirit of God, in general, are mani-

¹ We see, that by means of the insertion of the eternal Word, which he represents as at once the thought of God and of the world, he aimed, on the one hand, at asserting an eternal divine self-knowledge, independent of the actual world, and, on the other hand, to lay an ideal foundation for the world in the eternal essence of God; it is merely the actuality of the world, to which matter belongs, that he declines importing, as such, into God Himself.

fested in the actuality of the world, under the conditions of time and space (without themselves becoming temporal), in accordance with the order and substance of that ideal image of the world; after the same manner was accomplished the wonderful birth of Him, in whom "the Word," in its fulness and entirety, or "the countenance of the Father," the dynamic entirety of the substance of God, and not merely a portion, was destined to enter into mundane actuality: God implanted His nature and Spirit in the form of a germ, and without prejudice to the divine intensity, in Mary, to the end that Christ might be brought into existence. A light, watery, ætherial cloud, out of the substance of God, which he also designates heavenly dew, overshadowed the Virgin, and uniting itself with the earthly material (the seed and blood) of Mary, as the fourth of the elements, became the body of the Lord, which consequently was of divine nature and substance, although also human. Even so did the soul of the world become a human soul in Him.¹ After this manner a man was formed, who, as to His substance, both corporeal and spiritual, was God; but Servetus neither left a place for, nor felt the need of the ecclesiastical doctrine of a duality of natures.² This man also, apart from an eternal, real hypostasis of the Word, is the natural

¹ De Trin. div. i. p. 9. "Verbum dei instar nubis obumbravit virgini. Egit in ea, ut ros genituræ, instar imbris terram germinare facientis." L. iv. p. 159:—"Sicut paternum nostrum semen est aqueam, aëreo et igneo spiritu plenum: ita in Christo nubes illa oraculi Dei (that is, Verbi) velut aquea aërea et ignea, fuit ros naturalis genituræ Christi, nihil in se terrenum continens." This he also expresses as follows:—"Deitas egit viceseminis." Now although the three elements referred to (which through the Holy Ghost, with earth out of Mary, formed the body of Christ) were not, like the seed of a man, mixed in themselves with earth, but were the "exemplar substantiale" of these same elements, yea, of the substance of God, still they were created. Compare Heberle l. c. p. 23.—"The soul of Christ breathed into Him by God, contained the entire soul of the world, yea, the deity (dynamically) in itself." Dial. i. p. 231; ii. 263-268.

² He refuses, however, to allow that God is a man; objecting that it would be unworthy of God: de Trin. i. 14. God abides in His eternity: this, however, is to be conceived, so that He eternally gives utterance to the Word of incarnation, which is in due time to appear in a visible, real form. Wherefore merely, "the Word became flesh." It is no longer merely what it was before; nor again has it lost anything, but it became flesh by the exaltation of the flesh of Christ, by its becoming Flesh-Word" (Caro-Verbum). Pp. 201, 202, 206 f.

Son of God : the eternal Word, which pre-existed merely as an idea and potency in God, attained in Him a personal existence by means of its human limitation, and everything (even the sufferings) must be referred to Christ as God, as truly as to Him as man. In like manner, also, His being a creature, which does not conflict with His deity. Fully perfected, however, He was not from the very commencement ; but although as to substance God, in whom at the same time humanity was eternally preformed, the potency must needs first be developed and actualized,—a process which he describes as the communication of a new spirit. Servetus was thus enabled to concede an human development, which was first concluded at the resurrection, and whose product was the Holy Spirit, who proceeds alone from Him, and has likewise a body of a pneumatico-somatic kind. (Note 24.)

Inasmuch as Servetus thus held Christ to be actually the divine substance, appearing in human limitation and actuality, as conceived in the eternal idea of the world, and therefore grounded in the essence of God, whose nature it is to tend towards such a limited, organized existence, as towards a fuller reality, Christ undoubtedly occupies, in his view, a very lofty position. Further, a speculative element is contained in his conceiving the eternal generation of the “ Word ” as the image of the world, not to be completed once for all, but partly as eternally happening, partly as a process, which can only attain the full objective reality required by its idea, in revelation or in temporal birth. For the latter point, however, his grounds are unsatisfactory. Firstly, because this our sensuous actuality does not bring a more perfect reality—taking the word in the metaphysical sense. For he himself believes that it will disappear again after the resurrection. Further, because he does not recognise love as the motive of this progress from the eternal generation (of the image of the world) to the real incarnation of God,—otherwise he must have taught that love was the origin of the image of the world itself,—but merely a will, which is determined by the divine thought ; or, to trace the matter still further back, by the non-ethical divine essence. The result whereof was, that he ought consistently to have represented the world as for God, the mere realization of the thought of Himself, His self-actualization. This pantheistic tendency of)

the entire system corrupts also his doctrine of the Person of Christ.¹ For if all things are of divine nature and substance, then, of course, Christ also is divine. But why then those ingenious arrangements for a supernatural birth to which he resorts? He held the soul to be derived from God, and to be of His substance, even though primarily in the form of a germ: the divine image is constituted by the divinity which is implanted (*insita*) in the soul and body of man. For Christ, there remains the distinction, that He alone was sinless, and full of God; whereas "*deitas*" in others first becomes free through the new birth, which is accomplished in them when the creatural is cast aside, and the divine form is left alone in its purity. The distinction of Christ consists further in the circumstance, that He mediates this new birth, and that too not merely as an historical person. For His glorified body and His blood nourish and assimilate us corporeally to His divine glory; and so also does His spirit glorify us, which we inspire with the air, which is His breath. But he endeavours, in particular, to secure for Christ a special dignity, by representing the divine essence as first disclosed to our view in Him. Prior to Him, there existed only types of its manifestation. The word, indeed, of which He was the inmost kernel and substance, was spoken from eternity, and was not inoperative; but in order that its glory might shine all the more brightly, it gave at first merely presages of its entrance into the actual world. So in conscience; so in the law; so in the ceremonies; which were appointed through His speaking, or in the angels who played His rôle (*Michael* above all). Then the Word assumed a visible shape in the cloud, and for the prophets in the visions which they saw. Finally, it descended into Christ. Whereas previously God had shown Himself merely, as it were, through mist and cloud, or through the bars of a window, now He was not merely present, but gave us to behold Him in His glory. But as this view by itself leads to the representation of salvation as a partly intellectual and partly physical process; so also does he conceive every man to be justified, whether Jew or heathen, who lives well, "*recto naturæ motu*," and thus renders himself worthy of the grace which proceeds

¹ *Omnes creaturæ*" are, in his view, "*ex Dei substantia. Omnia sunt Deorum plena.*" Compare p. 187.

forth from the "Verbum," who was eternally destined to become man.

In his first work Servetus had laid down a lower view of Christ; he had treated Him merely as a man, who had been constituted Son of God by divine grace. This he afterwards characterized as childish (even as early as 1532, in his Dialogues); for his pantheistic principles, conjoined with the assumption of "*varii modi et subordinationes in Deo*," enabled him to assign to Christ a higher position, without the necessity of resorting to a doctrine of two natures (L. v. pp. 181, 182; L. i. p. 15). At first he endeavoured to hold fast the idea that God is *merely* the immoveable Monas. But even his first doctrine of the divine "*dispositiones*" clashed therewith; for if God were merely such a Monas, these "*dispositiones*" could not be anything more than different reflections of one and the same God, having their ground in the differences of the world, which reflects God; whereas he regarded them as forms under which God willed to manifest Himself, and in which He was present. The stronger the influence of Neo-Platonic elements on him, especially of the Neo-Platonic doctrine of a pre-existent ideal world in God, the more distinctly did he go on to assume two eternal "*dispositiones*" in God, to wit, the Word and Spirit, in which the divine essence thinks eternal conceptions, which are not merely ideal, but, though not primarily possessed of mundane actuality, stand eternally ready to be archetypes for the world, and shine as lucific forms. It is true, even on this supposition, the subsistence ascribed to them in the divine sphere is but a precarious one; not till they become mundane actualities do they acquire full reality; they spring, further, from the will of God, and therefore bear to a certain extent the character of creatures. On the other hand, they carry in them the substance of God—God revealing Himself, and are therefore divine. But because he no longer purposed to represent the movement as one going on absolutely outside of God, Servetus was compelled to modify his doctrine of the absolute immutability of God, by distinguishing between an immoveable, hidden element, and a moveable and communicable (Word and Spirit) element,—which latter is, notwithstanding, divine. Was, then, that immoveable, divine element a mere void abyss of infinite being? and did personality pertain alone

to the Word and Spirit? Or did there remain in that primal divine element also, a place for an hypostasis? Servetus already decidedly inclined to accept the former alternative. The second would have led him back towards the doctrine of the Church. His aim was so to secure the momentum of finitude in the "dispositiones" of God, with their, it is true, precarious hypostasis, that the infinite deity might still subsist for itself apart from them. This primal divine element, however, being destitute of inherent distinctions, constantly assumes again in his system the position of the *Monas*, never that of the Father who is co-ordinated with the Word and Spirit; and the more he approaches an hypostatization of the Word and Spirit, the more certainly does the *Monas* become impersonal. For Arianism he refuses to accept.

The followers of Servetus,¹ Gribaldo and Val. Gentile, gave to this its further logical development. They endeavoured to improve his system by teaching still more distinctly than even he did at a later period, that the Word and Spirit had a real pre-existence in God, although they were subordinated. Their nature is divine, they derive it from the Father, the "essentiator." He is the primal source of all deity; they are light of light, as the Church also teaches. But they draw therefrom the conclusion that the Father alone is "*sensu eminenti*" God, because He alone is "*a se*." Word and Spirit, says Gribaldo, are essentiated by the Father, the "essentiator," who posits them as "particular persons." Both he and Val. Gentile considered the distinction posited between the persons by the doctrine of the Church to be Sabellian. A deeper view must be taken of the distinction; it did not, however, owe its existence to the actuality of the world, but was already from eternity in pre-existence. Son and Spirit must be conceived as individuals. If the Father, says Gentile, is the source of all deity, He must be assumed to be identical with the divine essence. Only on this supposition can we attribute to Him a distinctive character. He is not an individual, but the originator of individuals. The Son is the expressed image of that substance of the Father, the

¹ Compare Trechsel l. c. ii. 277-355, specially on Gribaldo, pp. 283 ff.; on Gentile, pp. 319, 321 f., 333, 336 ff. Similarly also thought G. Blandrata and Alciati; see Trechsel ii. 303 ff., 310. Heberle, Tüb. Zeitschrift, 1840, 4. "Ueber Georg Blandrata (Schüler Gribaldos)."

natural Son of the Father and very God, because He has the same essence as the Father.¹ The Father is *αὐτόθεος*, the Son is *δευτερόθεος* (also *ἐτερόθεος*), subordinate, although also an eternal Spirit and God. To this second God Gentile assigned the momentum of finitude. The Son collects the entire deity in Himself (dynamically), but as "circumscripta;" which he maintained ought not to be regarded as a limit or negation of the divine powers, but merely as their personal concentration. This circumscribed Logos became man, not by the assumption of a second nature; but He altered His form, and thus took upon Himself flesh, *made Himself* a mortal man, and suffered in the strict sense,—for indeed flesh and blood were His own. Only in so far as he designates the distinctive features of the Father, the Son and the Spirit, their essence, does Gentile speak also of three divine beings; and in regard to *this* essence the three are so different, that the word "Trinity" is to him a mere abstract formula of unity for the three. He did not intend in this way to exclude the eternal generation and deity of the Son (the same thing holds good also of the Spirit); they are of divine substance; but the Son is another God than the Father, as it were God in altereity, in circumscription, and therefore a Person, that is, "substantia individua intelligens, incommunicabilis;" whereas the Father is not a person in this sense, but is substance, without measure and communicable. The three, therefore, are not one in point of number. At the same time, he supposes himself far removed from Tritheism, because he holds the Father alone to be the original God. Gentile therefore was already on the point of passing over from Sabellianism to Arianism, notwithstanding the divinity of the substance of the Son and Spirit; and through their decided subordination, he opened out the prospect of a still more consequent Unitarianism,

¹ On the other hand he says,—"*Patrem esse ipsam uncam essentiam.*" The two things are reconciled again by the distinction of a communicable and an incommunicable essence of God, which lies at the basis. Aseity is the essence of the Father alone. But He is able to communicate of His nature. Our opponents say,—Aseity, or to have one's being in and of one's self, pertains to the essence of God, which is common to the three persons: consequently the Son also is "a se" as to His essence; as to His person, He is from the Father. But even on this supposition aseity would belong to the person of the Father alone, and not to the Son and the Spirit.

to wit, that of Socinus.¹ The finitude emphasized by Gentile and Servetus, and which they aimed, after an Arian fashion, at introducing into the sphere of the divine itself, was removed by the new Unitarianism, agreeably to the character of modern times, out of the world of eternal pre-existence into that of time; and its doctrine of redemption, having become estranged from the grand principle of the Reformation, was unable to offer any resistance to the process of banishing the divine from the present order of things.

The phantasy of Servetus, winged by the newly-revived Neo-Platonism, surrounded the universe and humanity with an ideal divine brightness, and regarded Christ in particular as the concentration of the rays of the glory of God.² But how different is this form of Pantheism from that which we found allied with Neo-Platonism at an earlier period of the Church's history! Then the goal of yearning was to sink into divine contemplation, into the divine indeterminate substance; now the human, the principle of subjectivity, comes to the foreground. The human seeks to assure itself of its own worth, in that it aims to see itself *grounding* (*gründend*) and hidden in God Himself. But in that the subject now posits humanity as immediately endowed with divine nature, and, on the other hand, more and more ignores sin, it soon becomes clear that that ideal view of the world is essentially false, and has neither hold nor vital vigour. Separating itself from the real process by which grace glorifies spirit and nature, it pales and fades only too quickly. The lofty words concerning "divine nature" continue empty titles and names, which only in imagination constitute an exaltation of position, and nought is left for the sobered and calmly reflecting mind, when forsaken by the living breath of religion and the divine life, but the bare, naked human:

¹ Bernhard Ochino, in his attacks on the doctrine of the Atonement, a forerunner of the Socinians, occupied already, as to his Christology and doctrine of the Trinity, the point of view of Arminianism, and, professedly out of practical considerations, fell into indifference towards, nay, even began a polemic against, more precise doctrinal determinations, though he at the same time wished to preserve a triplicity of a subordinationist character in God. Trechsel ii. 241 ff.

² Neo-Platonism exerted an influence on the Christology of others also in the age of the Reformation. We may refer, for example, to Marsilius Ficinus, Reuchlin, Picus of Mirandola.

from being of divine race, man is reduced again to the old γένος φιλόν, and Christ to the ἄνθρωπος φιλός of the Ebionites. Our fathers drew too slight a distinction, it is true, between that higher form of Ebionism which is possible on a pantheistic basis, and that sober prosaic form which springs from deistic principles; but we cannot blame them for regarding the two as essentially the same thing. The transition from Pantheism to Deism is in all cases very easy, because a dualism lies concealed in the conceptions of the infinite and the finite, which Pantheism unavoidably adopts. This also was historically demonstrated in the age of the Reformation. When the clear minds of the Socinians began to lay hold on and work up those lofty pantheistic ideas, the only thing that remained as a precipitate was a revived and partly improved form of Ebionism, which, because it sunk back to stages long overcome and left behind by the Church, lacked the vital energy which expresses itself in the formation of ecclesiastical communities; although we by no means intend to deny that Socinianism has occupied a highly important position in the history of the development of dogmas.

STADIUM SECOND.

FROM THE DEATH OF LUTHER TO THE FORMULA
CONCORDIÆ.

LUTHER himself, as we have seen, did not develop his deep and full Christological intuitions in a connected, doctrinal form. His controversy with the Swiss, on the contrary, had led him, as we have shown, to the adoption of single divergent principles, which aided in reducing Christology to the rank of a follower in the train of another doctrine, instead of conceding it an independent life and sphere of its own. The danger arising to Christology from this dependence on the doctrine of the Supper, since the controversy with the Swiss, consisted in this, —that because the holy Eucharist had to do with the glorified Christ, He was made too exclusively the object of contemplation, and the image of the historical Christ paled in the brightness of the “status majesticus.” Luther had at first asserted the redemptive significance of the passion and true humiliation of the Lord, no less than of His resurrection and ascension; he had maintained with equal vigour the appropriation of the lowly human by the divine, and the appropriation of the divine by the human, though at the same time recognising that these momenta must be successive, because, if simultaneous, they paralyze or even undo each other. In consequence, however, of the Swiss controversy, his entire Christology was more and more dominated by the picture of the exalted Christ; and in heavy punishment thereof, the ethical receded to the background, and the non-ethical predicates of majesty, might, and glory acquired the predominance. Unless taking a reverse course, we should regard the legacy of the ethical factor, which otherwise manifested itself in so many connections in the Lutheran Church, as the ultimate ground of the acceptance of, and contentment with, a Christology whose distinctive characteristic was to represent the Person of Jesus as complete from the very beginning. But

from the moment the Lutheran Church thus narrowed its prospects, and allowed the Christological impulses by which it was originally stirred to languish, the Reformed Christology acquired a right over against that now designated Lutheran, which could not have been previously conceded it.

Things did not, however, take this turn all at once. An essential cause thereof was the danger which threatened the distinctive features of Luther's Christological views with complete destruction in his own Church, shortly after his death. Even the champions of peace between the evangelical parties put their Christology in a position of dependence on the doctrine of the Eucharist, which almost involved the entire loss of the grand features of Luther's doctrine.

Melanchthon (like Calvin) had not bestowed much thought on Christology, not even at the time when he still firmly clung to the Lutheran doctrine of the Supper (about 1529). Inasmuch as, soon after the Concordia of Wittenberg, in the year 1536, even Luther, as we have narrated above, approximated substantially nearer to the Swiss in the matter of Christology, not only by conceding the right of discriminating the two natures more decidedly than he had previously done, but also by accepting, if even in a different sense, the scholastic "*Communicatio idiomatum*" instead of the earlier "*prædicationes identicæ*" (see pp. 130 ff.); inasmuch as, further, he sharply opposed Schwenckfeld in his "Short Confession concerning the Holy Eucharist," and further followed out the same principle of distinctions in unity also in his late work on the "Last Words of David;" inasmuch as, finally, whilst separating himself as distinctly as possible, in his "*Kleines Bekenntniß*" (Short Confession), from the Zwinglians, he passed over in silence the doctrine of Ubiquity, by which he had formerly sustained his position,¹ without even now putting his fundamental Christological intention, which he had never renounced,² in a

¹ His retreating and taking his stand on the words of the institution, and his renouncing all attempts to give his view a doctrinal basis, may have been due, in particular, to Schwenckfeld, of whom the Short Confession says so much. For his case showed that it was possible to attribute infinitude in every way to the humanity of Christ, and yet precisely therewith to recommend the doctrine of an enjoyment of Christ in the Eucharist, such as Faith also has.

² See above, page 104.

more definite shape ;¹ there was the less to hinder Melanchthon, whose present doctrine of the Supper stood nearer to the Calvinistic, from letting fall not only Luther's doctrine of Ubiquity, which he had never really appropriated, but also Luther's fundamental Christological views, with which, at all events at an earlier period, it is very possible he may have sympathized. The decisive point was his connecting the "*Communicatio idiomatum*"² with that old mode of speech which Luther himself still followed, and his giving it again the significance it actually had in the hands of the Scholastics, though never with Luther. It is reported that from the year 1550 onwards, Melanchthon drew a very clear distinction between a "*Communicatio idiomatum physica et realis*" and a "*Communicatio dialectica*," and maintained that the latter alone was recognised by, and customary in, the Church. This view was accepted also by the entire Wittenberg Faculty, and, in consequence, became for a time predominant in the Lutheran Church.

As about the same time the Reformed Church was brought very considerably nearer to the Lutheran by the victory of the Calvinistic doctrine of the Eucharist, nay more, had put itself on Luther's side as regards the decisive point of the substantial enjoyment of Christ in the Supper, a peace seemed about to be realized,—one, however, which would, at all events for the time, have deprived Christology of every momentum of the progress peculiarly characteristic of Luther. But things were destined to take another course.

The victory gained by the second, Calvinistic form of the Reformed doctrine and constitution over the first, and its richer religious and theological substance, gave the Reformed Church a new and grand impulse, after the establishment of concord between Zürich and Geneva. In view of the well-known friendly relations between Calvin and Luther, the Lutherans would have been able to regard the above-mentioned victory with unmixed satisfaction, had not Calvin, in the "*Consensus*

¹ The only treatise in which an attempt of the kind might be found, to wit, the Last Words of David, 2 Sam. vii., is vague and popular in character, and was therefore cited at a later period with preference by the Crypto-Calvinists.

² Though Luther at the same time expressed his desire for a "new speech." See above.

Tigurinus,"¹ although he faithfully carried out therein his main thoughts, for the sake of peace, allowed many matters to pass, which both in a formal and polemical point of view not merely wounded the Lutherans, but inspired them with a suspicion which long remained inextinguishable, and had a decided influence on the "Formula Concordiæ,"—the suspicion, namely, that his possible superiority to Zwingli consisted solely in beautiful, disguising words, without real substance;—in other words, the suspicion that Calvin had fallen away from his earlier point of view, which had affinity with Luther's, and had passed over into the camp of Zürich.²

It was reserved for Joachim Westphal in Hamburg, with his passionate haste, in the year 1552, first to raise the cry, whose premonitory whisperings had been working only too long, that the doctrine of Calvin and Zwingli were strictly speaking identical:³ men like Timann, Gallus, Tilemann, Hesshus, Er. Alber, Schnepf, and Paul von Eitzen, joined in the cry (since 1555).⁴ Vexation also at the power acquired by Calvinism, even on German soil, did its part. The ever bitterer controversy against Calvin and his friends, Joh. v. Lasky, P. Martyr, Beza, Hardenberg in Bremen, filled all ears for nearly ten years, from 1552 to 1561; and the fruit of the Swiss approximation to the Lutheran form of doctrine, through the pacific work of Calvin in the "Consensus Tigurinus," was to be a deeper schism between the German Evangelicals and the Swiss, primarily on account of the doctrine of the Supper.

Nor did the Christological question remain entirely unaffected by this controversy. Amongst the afore-mentioned champions in the controversy, there was not one who had at all thoroughly appropriated the kernel of Luther's view, or aided, to any noteworthy extent, in its further development.⁵

¹ Compare Consensus Tigurinus, Art. xxiv.

² Compare Julius Muller's "Das göttliche Recht der Union," pp. 328 ff. Henry, in his "Leben Calvins," ii. 459 ff., shows how unwarranted was this suspicion of apostasy or change in opinion in Calvin. Planck v. 2, p. 22, compare with pp. 60 f., contradicts himself.

³ Compare Planck v. 2, pp. 86 f., 98.

⁴ Ibidem, pp. 69–73.

⁵ Hesshus, like Westphal (Planck v. 2, 87), occupied in fact an uncertain position relatively to Christology; and the former became at a subsequent period a zealous opponent of the Würtembergers. Westphal did not

Instead of sustaining themselves on Luther's earlier doctrine of the ubiquity of the flesh of Christ, they followed at first his later example, and appealed to the "is" of the institution. Deeper Christological investigations of a doctrinal kind were avoided by an appeal to the omnipotence of God and the promise of Christ; and accordingly, Melanchthon's doctrine of a merely dialectic "*Communicatio idiomatum*" was able the more unhinderedly, and without opposition worth mentioning, to gain pretty universal sway.

It was reserved for the theologians of Würtemberg to prevent the fundamental Christological views of Luther, which elsewhere had partly died out, and were partly not understood, from being completely buried through the retreat on the "is;" theirs is the merit of having rescued at all events a germ thereof, and made it the common property of the Lutheran Church. The principal service in connection therewith, was undoubtedly rendered by the venerable Joh. Brentz, Luther's friend and Würtemberg's Reformer; who, especially after Melanchthon's death, stood in the first ranks of the Lutheran Church, and through whom the hegemony in the development of doctrine was for a time transferred to Würtemberg. (Note 25.)

Brentz saw that by merely appealing to the words of institution, the entire doctrine of the Supper was made to hang on the fine point of the "is," concerning whose interpretation there were so many different opinions, that agreement seemed impossible, unless they were above all agreed as to the nature of the Person of Christ. For a proper image thereof must furnish a standard, as for other points, so also for the doctrine of the Eucharist.

At a Synod held in Stuttgart, on the 19th of December 1559, the theologians of Würtemberg definitely pronounced it as their judgment, that the doctrine of the ascension of Christ, and His sitting at the right hand of God, instead of withdrawing from us (as their opponents maintained) the true presence of His body and blood, rather strengthen and confirm

carry out his Christological principles: his main argument for the presence of Christ continued to be the "is." Joach. Mörlin and Wigand were also opposed to them on this point:—compare R. Hospinian's "*Concordia discors*," ed. Genev. 1678, pp. 22 ff. For the rest, Westphal succeeded notwithstanding in inducing many to subscribe his doctrine of the Supper.

it; inasmuch as Christ is omnipresent not simply as to His deity, but the man also fills everything in an heavenly, unsearchable manner, because of the majesty and glory which He possesses, as seated at the right hand of God.¹ The article concerning the majesty of Christ ought therefore to be carefully and scripturally explained. For this declaration of the Württemberg prelates (Prälaten), the way was prepared also by the negotiations with Schwenckfeld,² and the sympathy which he there found. In a series of treatises, of which the "majesty of Christ" constituted the central feature, Brentz began thereupon loudly and publicly to defend, more carefully to demonstrate and develop, at all events that aspect of the Lutheran idea according to which divine becomes human.³ At his side stood all the more important theologians of Württemberg, the Faculty of Tübingen, with the Chancellor and Probst Jacob Schmidlin called Andreæ at their head; further, Bidenbach; later also, Lucas Osiander, and the philosopher Schegck, who enjoyed a considerable reputation. (Note 26.)

From the bearing which this tendency of the Church of Württemberg had on the final settlement of the Lutheran Christology in the Formula Concordiæ, we must devote to it somewhat longer attention.

Brentz himself rendered by far the most important services. He entered the lists as much against the Melanchthonic

¹ Compare Pfaff's "Acta," pp. 336, 341. In the Confess. Wirtemb. of 1551 this is not mentioned. It is combinable with Calvin.

² Pfaff, pp. 227-229. At the colloquy with Schwenckfeld at Tübingen in 1535, which referred also to "the creature in the man Christ," not merely were the Württemberg Councillors manifestly more on Schwenckfeld's side than on that of the Upper Suabian theologians, Frecht, A. Blaurer, but Schwenckfeld was able to say that—"if he refuse to call Christ a creature, and to raise up any inequality in Him, and thus discern Him, he does not teach as Luther taught. Why then do they not call him and Erh. Schnepff and Brentz also to account?" Here, therefore, the difference between the Upper Suabian, more Reformed, and the Württemberg theologians, relatively to Christology, for the first time came clearly to light.

³ Compare Joh. Brentii Opp. 1590, T. viii., pp. 831-1108; "De personali Unione duarum naturarum in Christo," 1561; De libello H. Bullingeri," etc., 1561; "De majestate Dom. n. Jesu Christi et de vera presentia," etc., 1562. Against Bullinger's "Fundamentum firmum," etc., he wrote further his "Recognitio prophet. et apost. doctrinæ de vera majestate Domini," etc., pp. 976 ff.

form of the Christology of the Wittenbergers, after the death of its author (in 1560), as against the Swiss. In an acute critical review of the various Christological theories, which reminds one of Theodore of Mopsuestia's discussions on the omnipresence of the Logos (see Div. II. Vol. 1, pp. 41 ff.), he first shows strikingly the impossibility of retaining a place for the specific dignity of Christ, if, like the Swiss, they should continue, with the Scholastics, paying regard solely to the divine aspect of His person and its connection with the humanity, and supposing the latter to be substantially nothing different from that of men in general. Merely to say,—God was in Christ, is to say nothing pertinent; because God is present everywhere. If we appeal to God's indwelling in Him, it may be replied,—God dwells in all the saints.¹ Even if we should say,—But God was in Christ with His entire fulness and energy; one may still answer,—You ought rather to teach that as far concerns God by Himself; He is everywhere equal to Himself,—wherever He is, He is in His entirety. Some indeed give as Christ's specific characteristic, that God dwelt *personally* in Him. But God and the Logos are *personally* present, wherever they are present; and even the indissoluble union of the person of the Logos with the man does not pertain to Christ alone, but also to all who are perfected. Consequently, nothing at all special is said, when we say that the hypostasis of the Logos was united with the man Christ (*unio hypostatica*); the specific characteristic of Christ is not at all touched by this formula.

Like Luther, he does not bestow a single word on the notion to which some resorted, that other men have their own hypostasis, whereas the humanity of Christ was “distinguished by impersonality:”—doubtless with the feeling that that would be no exaltation, but conversion into a mere dead instrument or organ of the deity.

Whilst, however, he thus perceived that the predominance given to the divine nature, which was at the same time supposed to be alone possessed of personality, and the attribution of activity to it alone,—in other words, that the hitherto prevailing views were the destruction and not the establishment of Christology; and whilst he treated the stress laid on the “*Unio*

¹ *Recognitio de Incarnat.*, pp. 982 f., 992.

personalis," with the notion of thus insuring the dignity of the God-man, as empty talk; he maintains the more distinctly that the pre-eminence of the God-man consisted, not merely in the circumstance of the Logos being present in Christ with His entire fulness, and that personally,—for, regarded in Himself, He is thus present everywhere,—but in the fact, that humanity attained in Him to an unique existence, not merely experiencing and being subjected to, but receiving, the action of the Logos, and in union with Him reaching an actuality, by which it became a participator in, and equal to, the majesty of the Son of God. What was needed, therefore, was, instead of laying the real stress on the "Unio personalis," or the union of the *hypostasis* of the Son with the humanity, to have regard rather to the *union of the two natures*, whose perfect effectuation alone is the realization of the incarnation of God. Not the fellowship of the person of the Son with a man, but the union of the natures in this case connected therewith, and whose *result* is the divine-human personality, adequately expresses the Christological thought cherished by the Church. From this we see clearly, that, in Brentz's view, the main point was the humanity of Christ, its exaltation, glorification, perfection unto absolute glory through the deity: in connection with which, it is worthy of remark, that whereas Luther, especially at the outset, had asserted both that God appropriated the human, and that humanity appropriated the divine, the whole stress was now laid on the Theosis (*θέωσις*) of the man. Brentz refers, indeed, also to the "Communicatio idiomatum," but it is rather for the purpose of repudiating the merely "verbalis communicatio," than of establishing by it the "Unio naturarum." Strictly speaking, he does not even base the "Communicatio idiomatum" on the "Unio hypostatica;" but his characteristic expression is,—The two natures or substances united themselves in such a manner as to constitute one single and indivisible hypostasis; and as each of the so very different natures retains its own idioms or attributes, these latter enter into so inward an union, that what is an attribute of the one nature becomes also an attribute of the other.¹

¹ "De person. Unione," p. 841:—Etsi enim naturæ seu substantiæ sunt inter se diversissimæ et habent sua quæque diversa idiomata et proprietates, tamen et ipsæ substantiæ tanta unione conjunguntur, ut fiant una et inse-

As, in this view, there is in all men, on account of the omnipresence of God, a duality of natures, a human and a divine nature; and as the divine nature is personal in all, if nothing more were to be predicated of Christ, He would be a mere man like ourselves. The Logos would then be outside of Christ, as well as in Him. But if He be personal also outside of Christ, we should have two persons instead of the one God-man. Only on the supposition that the Logos is not personal outside of the flesh of Christ, can the incarnation and the unique position of Christ then be preserved (Note 27): quite as difficult would it be also, if He stood with His "natura" outside the "humana natura." The Logos, it is true, has absolute power, to wit, over Himself and all things (pp. 991, 994; this Brentz regards as the fundamental attribute from which he endeavours to derive the rest); He is the ruler of all things, to which He is near and not far removed; and this His majesty He cannot have given up;—indeed, Brentz protests most strongly against every species of conversion (T. viii., pp. 991–994). From this, however, all that follows is, that if He did not intend to remain either personally or with His nature outside of Christ, but purposed to become man, He must needs exalt the humanity into His own majesty. Therein, in fact, consists the incarnation, that the man Christ not merely never existed or worked without the Logos, but also that the Logos never existed or worked without the man, whom He had assumed; and as this was only possible through the elevation of the humanity to equal dignity with the Logos, the incarnation consists precisely in this elevation,—the one is identical with the other.¹ Our opponents say, indeed,—Limitation belongs to the essence of the body; the pouring out of the divine majesty and attributes (which he at the same time describes as the nature of God, p. 916) into humanity is opposed to their idea. They aim at shutting out *parabilis hypostasis,—et proprietates earum tanta familiaritate substantiis communicantur, ut quæ est unius naturæ proprietates eam altera sibi communem faciat.* The "humana natura, humanitas Christi," is "vivificatrix, adoranda, implet omnia, habet majestatem non ex se et sua natura, sed ex natura divinitatis." He says further, p. 839,—"God makes the *passio* His own, undergoes it as a person, is not otherwise affected thereby than as if it befell Himself." "Patitur impassibiliter," p. 903. This aspect he treated more and more slightly at a later period.

¹ Pp. 923, 1018, 1041. The incarnation is itself an "Ascensio."

Christ from our earth, even through His ascension; in that they conceive heaven to be a particular place, with many divisions, in which one can sit, and stand, and walk.¹ In this way, the very men who, in connection with the Supper, insist on the purely spiritual, fall into an unspiritual, coarsely sensuous view, and form an unworthy conception even of the omnipresence of God. Heaven is nothing but the element of the divine itself; the right hand of God, to which the humanity of Christ is exalted, is nothing but the divine majesty and freedom. Time and space, with the separations attendant thereon, belong solely to this earthly order of things:² for God there is nothing infinite; even He Himself is not infinite to Himself; He is bounded to Himself, embraced by Himself; He can measure His own wisdom; He has power over Himself. And that which He *is*, He can communicate, so that others may *have* what He *is*. Before God a thousand years are as one day; nay more, He can make them an hour or a minute. Why, then, should He not be able to constitute a thousand spaces for Himself one space, so that what we men term being in a thousand places at one and the same time, is for Him nothing more than being in one place, or even not being in space at all, so far as it involves limitation (p. 946)? This freedom of God above space and time, which Brentz conceived partly as elevation above, non-subjection to, and partly as power over it,³ in virtue of which He is able to be in many and in all places at one and the same time, is also communicable, is a portion of the perfection of humanity (pp. 907, 914 f.). The expression "ubiquity" did not please him: proceeding from his opponents, he deemed it to involve false secondary ideas of being stretched out and diffused *in* space;⁴ whereas he was concerned about an elevation above space and time, about the freedom of the humanity of Christ (compare p. 893). At the same time, he expressed himself ready rather to adopt the expression than to infringe on the majesty of the humanity of Christ (p. 996). Now, so far as that freedom above space is from standing in contradiction with the essence of human nature, seeing that, even if space were to cease to exist (p. 1000), humanity would remain; even so little are we justified in regarding the full and equal partici-

¹ Pp. 887, 907, 996, 999, 1030.² Pp. 933, 951, 1000 f.³ Pp. 1010, 893, 907, 914.⁴ Pp. 991, 996, 887.

pation of human nature in the majesty of the Son of God as incompatible with the idea of humanity. Not everything earthly-human is also essentially human. It is not essential to man to be bound by space and time; it is not essential to him that his participation in God should be limited; still less that he should participate merely in *gifts* of God; but human nature, which our opponents term merely "*finita*," is, not indeed *per se*, but still according to God's free will,¹ "*infinite capax*": it is capable, through God, of *having* that which God *is*.² Never, indeed, can it become deity (*divinitas*) in itself; but deity may so pour itself into it as that it shall *have* deity; and because it has it, as it were in fulfilment of its own receptivity, it also is to be worshipped, and not merely the name of God, but the very thing itself belongs to it. And as the humanity was susceptible of the deity, so the communication of the divine essence was no loss to God Himself. Even in nature there is a self-communication of God, still more in the saints (p. 1006); for God is all being (*alles Sein*). It is objected, indeed, that God's omnipresence, omnipotence, and so forth, belong to His essence, and cannot therefore be communicated without commingling God and man; in God there is no "*accidens*" which can be distinguished from His "*essentia*."³ But, even though God should communicate His entire fulness (His essence in the wider sense), He would not thus lose Himself, nor that which constitutes His specific essence; He is and remains the communicator, who has this fulness of His essence "*a se*" and "*per se*" (pp. 836, 1001): humanity has it also, although it receives it "*ab alio*." This receiving is its abiding essence, even as the proper essence of God is giving; consequently, for example, the power over His own omnipotence, which manifests itself in giving. If, then, the nature or fulness of God stands in His own power, and this power over His nature is His eternal essence; then this fulness or nature (*proprietas, actus*), although not an "*accidens*," does not belong to the "*essentia*" of God in the same sense as His "*ascitas*."

The communication of this fulness to Christ is raised also above the merely accidental, by that which he says regarding the eternal goal of the world.⁴ The humanity of Christ remains,

¹ Pp. 905, 921, 922.

² Pp. 987, 992, 998-1000.

³ Pp. 836, 870, 1001, 1006.

⁴ See below. Pp. 836, 1006. According to Brentz, the Son also, and

notwithstanding, a creature, asserts Brentz against Schwenckfeld.¹ There appertain to it body and soul, which abide eternally; but above all, its essence always consists in its owing its being to another. At the same time, it unquestionably *received* the majesty which appertains to the essence of God;² for which reason Christ bore the title of Creator, even as to His humanity, and had Himself the power of giving life. This filling with divine fulness (Col. ii. 9), so far from destroying either the idea or actuality of human nature, is much rather its perfection (pp. 987 f.). According to the philosophy of Zwingli, there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite (pp. 902, 990); but in the philosophy of God, finite humanity also may become infinite. So far is this loftiness from being something foreign to the divine idea of humanity, that regard was had from the very beginning to the attainment by human nature of this dignity in Christ: Christ is the goal of the world. In the secret and unsearchable counsel of the triune God, it was from eternity decreed that the Son of God should become the Son of man, for whose sake the angels, and the world, and the human race were created, and to whom was transferred all divine majesty.³ Such an exaltation of humanity is comforting and glorious in itself (see, for example, p. 963). To cleave firmly to it, is important also for the sake of the holy Supper.⁴ That superiority to space and majesty with which

not the Father alone, has aseity; the world, however, has a divinity in Christ, communicated through the Son.

¹ Pp. 995, 836, 916, 986.

² "In Deo nullum est inhærens, nullum accidens. Quicquid est in ipso, essentia est, imo nihil est in ipso, sed ipse est totum Esse.—At enim, si ob hanc causam est incommunicabilis proprietas, quod sit essentia Dei, nihil certe quod est in Deo erit communicabile—nec bonitas, nec sapientia, nec iustitia, nec felicitas Dei."

³ Pp. 984, 994, 1006:—"Condidit Deus omnia ad participatum suæ bonitatis, et imprimis hominem condidit ad participatum suæ sapientiæ, justitiæ et felicitatis, et quem ita condidit, eum etiam fecit horum bonorum capacem quantum voluit. At voluit quidem ut alii homines qui credant in Christum—fierent—κοινωνοί, consortes divinæ naturæ, juxta suam quisque mensuram; ipsum autem hominem Christum, *propter quem omnia alia condita sunt*, voluit esse *χωρητικὸν καὶ κοινωνὸν* omnium suorum bonorum sine ulla mensura," etc.

⁴ Taking his start from the circumstance, that the word of God is not merely a sign of something absent, but includes the substance itself within

the humanity of Christ is endowed, demonstrate the reality of His presence, as with all things over which He rules, so also with the sacrament, and that too independently of the consecration; for the consecration is not to be supposed to make Him present as by magic. Thus, too, is it proved that He can give Himself to be partaken of by us, where we proceed in accordance with His appointment.

It cannot be denied that Brentz had thus laid hold of the central thought of Christology with rare clearness, and that he, more truly than any of his contemporaries, represented the Christological view of Luther. Among the ancients, Cyrill naturally occupied a very high place in his esteem; with the earlier Fathers he appears unfortunately to have been little acquainted. On the contrary, he betrays very distinctly the feeling, that this was not the traditional Christology;¹ and even with the Council of Chalcedon he could only reconcile himself on the condition that the human nature should not be held to be merely borne by the divine nature, or even by the divine person (pp. 898, 984), but that the *natures* should never be separated from each other. The distinction between the natures he endeavours, in a genuinely speculative manner, so to view, that their unity may be confirmed instead of being destroyed (p. 984); which he succeeds in doing by recognising their inner connection, precisely in that wherein they differ. The divine "natura" wills to communicate itself; the human is "capax" for the divine essence. Further, according to his original conception of Christology, the humanity of Christ was not merely a temple or organ of the deity; but this man, who not merely adumbrated, as in our case, but perfectly expressed the deity (absolutissime perficitur, non adumbratur, p. 994), is the end and goal of the world. Such importance, indeed, did he attach to his reality, that he deemed everything to depend on itself (as Luther also taught), Brentz had laid down in his Syngamma the view, that Christ, who is behind or above space and time, comes forth in the word, which brings Him really with itself, revealing Himself to us; but in the holy Eucharist the words of institution introduce Him also into the elements, and constitute them a word and saving sign. The magical representation of the effects of the consecration which might have connected itself with these words, he himself at a later period controverted with zeal and judgment.

¹ Pp. 898, 931, 941, 954, 984, 993.

having in the Son of man the actuality of that for which humanity, according to God's idea of it, was destined and susceptible.¹ When, therefore, he elsewhere lays down principles which do away with the humanity, it is contrary to his own inmost intention. But let us direct our attention to the details, premising only the following consideration. The majesty of God, although in his view, not merely an attribute, but at the same time also an inseparable portion of the divine essence,² the Son of man received for His own. This he reconciles with the unchangeableness of God by distinguishing in Christ a twofold deity,—the deity which the Son of God possesses *in* Himself, and in virtue of His aseity has *from* Himself; and that which is communicated to the humanity (communicans and communicata, p. 929). But no less also are two elements to be distinguished in the humanity of Christ (p. 932):—on the one hand, it is essentially different from God and His majesty, possessing nothing divine from and by itself, and subjected to all the laws of earthly existence and growth; on the other hand, it participates truly in divine majesty, and consequently in divine nature;—it continues, notwithstanding, in identity with itself, because it is susceptible to the divine nature; consequently, its distinction from, unites it with, instead of separating it from, the divine nature.

The Christological image which floated before the mind of Brentz was taken from Christ in His state of exaltation, in His "majesty," when the idea of the absolute God-man had found perfect realization. But how does the earthly life of Christ stand related hereto? Was the idea of incarnation then not yet fully realized on earth? And if this cannot, without further inquiry, be maintained, what is the relation between the state of humiliation and that of exaltation?

Brentz starts with the principle, that the incarnation itself consists not in the humanity being entirely appropriated by the Logos, but in the Logos being assumed and received in His entirety by the humanity, so that, subsequently to the incarna-

¹ Herein also does he resemble Luther, who refused to allow the humanity to be dissipated, and merely maintained that in Christ it is to be seen in its truth, as contrasted with the empirical actuality in the race of Adam.

² See above, and p. 987.

tion, the Logos had no longer an existence outside of this man. This was only possible, on condition that the humanity, which in itself, indeed, was finite, was endowed by the omnipotence of the Logos, with infinite susceptibility, and the susceptibility filled with the divine fulness.

To deny to the humanity this possession, this exaltation into deity,—an exaltation which was a reality from the moment of the incarnation,—would, in the view of Brentz, be equivalent to denying the incarnation of the Logos Himself (pp. 986, 1026). This possession of divine majesty on the part of the humanity, was also incapable of increase in time; it was simply the reverse aspect of the act of incarnation, which, in his view, must either be a complete actuality or not, and cannot gradually come to pass.

From this, however, follows a series of consequences. The humanity of Christ was truly exalted to heaven, and placed at the right hand of God (which is involved in its participation in divine majesty), not first after the resurrection, but from the very commencement of its existence; and that outward transaction on the Mount of Olives (*ascensio visibilis*) would have been impossible apart from the precedent inner ascension (p. 923):—it was not the manifestation of an exaltation of humanity which had then for the first time taken place, but merely a symbolical representation for the disciples, of that which was already a fact (*exaltationis invisibilis*). Ascension and sitting at the right hand of God express one and the same thing. Nay more, inasmuch as the God-man was first constituted by this “*exaltatio in divinum majestatem*,” freedom from the conditions of space and time is to be regarded as *habitual* (*habitus*) to Him from the very commencement. From this point we must start in any consideration of the Person of Christ (*primus gradus*, p. 928); and His subjecting Himself to particular conditions of space and time, be it now in the case of the Eucharist, or be it during His sojourn on earth, is rather to be regarded as exceptional, as a self-restriction of His humanity (*alter gradus*, pp. 893, 929), which He undertook or undertakes for our benefit (*œconomiae, dispensationis causa*). The words of Phil. ii. respecting the self-abasement, he refers, with Luther, not to the deity; but also not to the time of Christ’s sojourn on earth, as Luther did:—he refers them, on the contrary, to the very first moment of

Christ's earthly existence, which already formed part of His low estate : in other words, he refers them to the self-abasement of the humanity, which, from the very beginning, was possessed of divine majesty (pp. 922-925). This self-abasement from birth to death was, on the one hand, a not-revealing of the inner majesty of the humanity, and, on the other hand (p. 1041), an assumption of finitude, limitation—a submission to be shut in by the body of Mary, to suffering—in short, to all that which the Father's will deemed necessary, and which pertained to the earthly form of humanity ; but, being merely accidental to its real essence, was overcome, and passed away after the resurrection. With the resurrection and the end of the “*exinanitio*,” began the *third* stage of His existence (p. 928), when the divine majesty of His humanity, which previously had been rather a mere potency and possession, entered into its full actuality, and only occasionally, contrary to its “*habitus*” and “*œconomix causa*,” appeared in a place.

Brentz, however, expresses himself vacillatingly and indistinctly on the question, whether, in the state of exinanition, the humanity of Christ still made secret use of its divine majesty, under the cover of the flesh (*sub obtectione carnis*), as the Logos, or not. An affirmative answer was, strictly speaking, required by his principle, that the man assumed by God was at the very commencement true God, and that since the incarnation the Logos must have *everything* in common with this man, consequently also His own actuality, and not possess an actuality for Himself, denied to the man (pp. 834-836). From which it then followed (as Jac. Andreae also in a coarse way deduced), that the humanity of Christ filled the world whilst it was in the womb of Mary ; that it was already with Lazarus at the very time when it appeared to have begun its journey ; that when it appeared to Mary in the garden, it was still in the grave and everywhere else ; nay more, to carry the matter out consistently, that, whilst hungering, it was raised above all needs, agreeably to the actuality of its majesty, and was already invulnerable, whilst undergoing suffering.¹ These collisions are of so glaring a character, that either the actuality of His earthly human nature is converted into mere seeming, and the human is swallowed up by the divine ; for example, the human affections, growth, suffer-

¹ Pp. 906, 924, 928, 986, 838.

ings: or, if such opposites are to subsist at one and the same time, they must be distributed between different "supposita" and a twofold humanity, in an entirely different sense from that referred to above, must be assumed in Christ,—to wit, an eternal humanity like ours, and one that generally remained internal.¹ Then, however, a bond of unity between the two would fail: nay more, the very idea of God-manhood would be again undermined, if, as is acknowledged, it must be laid down as a principle, that the humanity of Christ and nothing else, consequently also the external earthly humanity, was from the beginning transferred into the divine majesty.

No wonder, therefore, that Brentz not seldom takes the opposite direction, and in order to avoid reducing the self-abasement to mere seeming, subjects the actuality of glorification to limitation for the period of humiliation, if he does not almost do away with it, at all events for its beginning.² Then he says,—Christ had a true natural body; nevertheless it was not God's will that this natural man should *always* remain bound by natural laws; even on earth Christ displayed this freedom. In evidence thereof, are rightly adduced His walking on the sea, His fasting, His passing through closed doors. Others adduce also His birth from the Virgin whilst her womb was closed; but to this he did not himself hold fast. Generally, however, He was in one definite place. So also, although possessing that which exalted Him above all imperfections, He grew truly, did not know everything, and was not ubiquitous.³ But as necessary as this reality of the "exinanitio" is to the truth of the humanity, so far is it from harmonizing with the position that, from the time of the incarnation onwards, the unchangeable Logos has everything in common with the man, and does nothing apart from, or outside of, Him. The question may also be fairly asked,—whether the inactive, but still full and complete possession of the divine majesty, can be reconciled with the growing actuality and acquirement thereof, in one and the same humanity? In God himself, according to the usual assumption,

¹ There would thus be a coincidence between him and the frequent, especially Anabaptist, representations of a double humanity of Christ.

² Pp. 838, 924, 1001, 1002, 1006, 1016, 990:—"Auctoritate et natura, Christ had all from the very beginning."

³ Pp. 926-928, 1001 f.

there are also passive attributes,—as infinitude, immeasurableness, eternity; now, if these are transferred to the humanity, the will of self-abasement, in case it refers solely to the actuality, could not refer to them as passive. They would, therefore, have an existence simultaneously with, and alongside of, the finitude and locality of the humanity of Christ, and would dissipate it into mere seeming. Accordingly, some deny altogether the communication of *these* attributes to humanity; others allow it only indirectly, mediately, along with other attributes (as, for example, along with eternal, boundless omnipotence). How, further, the humanity of Christ could have the divine omniscience in actual possession, and yet be able to refrain for itself from the actual use thereof, is inconceivable; inasmuch as omniscience is by no means the mere possibility of knowing everything. With such a possibility, a human process of learning might be combined, but not the simultaneous possession of omniscience, by the human nature of Christ.

If, further, the “*exinanitio*” was an act of the humanity of Christ, which began with His very conception and birth from Mary, by whose body He was enclosed, then the subject which abased itself, to wit, the humanity, must itself have preceded the exinanition in time, even though it were but for a moment. In order that it might be able to empty itself, the humanity of Christ must have existed, at all events for a moment, outside of, and prior to, the exinanition; and yet, on the other hand, the God-man is supposed to have spent the first moment of His existence in humiliation. The idea of incarnation and that of humiliation are not, it is true, identical; the former can be a fact independently of the latter, nay more, must be so, if the idea of the incarnation is identical with the full participation of humanity in the majesty of God. This distinction is in itself good, nay more, necessary, for the sake of the eternity of the humanity, after its humiliation and resurrection. It is also a corner-stone of the view shared by Brentz, that the incarnation has not its sole ground in the sin which required that Christ should appear in the form of a servant. But if the incarnation, which Brentz supposed to be possible apart from humiliation, is to be conceived as a *fact* that preceded the humiliation, and not merely as an eternal idea or potency in God; whilst, notwithstanding, the historical humanity of Christ actually had a lowly

beginning; then, in order to carry out the idea of the self-abasement of the humanity, consistency would require us to go back to a supra-temporal, supra-historical (*überzeitlich, übergeschichtlich*) incarnation of the Son of God, which was free from humiliation:—the historical incarnation, however, is thus reduced from its very basis to a Docetical seeming.

Andreae furthered the doctrine of Brentz in scarcely any other than a formal respect.¹ Like him, he starts, not with the “*Unio hypostatica*,” but with the union of the natures to a person, identifying therewith the “*communicatio idiomatum*” (for an “*Unio hypostatica*” without “*communicatio idiomatum*” seemed to him to be Nestorianism). This “*communicatio*” he held to take place, not merely to the person (concrete), but also to the natures (abstracte);—in such a manner, indeed, that the deity receives no weakness from the human nature. His main text is also the words of Col. ii. 9, concerning the fulness (nature) of the deity in Christ. There are, however, but slight traces in him of a religious spirit. One point alone of his system deserves closer remark.

Brentz had understood the “*natura*” of the Logos, which became the portion of the man, in the sense of the fulness of the divine essence. Andreae, however, says,—As God is simple in essence, everywhere present in His entirety, and equal to Himself, we can only speak of a difference of the being of God, as of a difference in His workings. Now in Christ we have an infinite working or effect of God, which he describes as an infinite outpouring.² We may clearly discern in this expression, which reminds us of the Antiocheians, the effort to keep God and the creature determinately apart; for which he had the greater cause, as the distinction drawn by him between the two resolved itself, in the last instance, into the distinction between eternal and non-eternal being. Nevertheless he tried again to represent these workings of God as a *being* of God in

¹ Compare his Concluding Discourses and the afore-mentioned writings.

² One might suppose that he aimed, in this way, at avoiding the idea of the communication of the passive attributes of God. So far from this, however, he, like Schegck, held God to be in essence “*actus purus*.” The conversion of the deity of Christ into a divine effect (compare the *ἐνέργεια δραστηνὴ* of Marcellus) might have drawn after it very serious consequences, if it had not at the same time been conceived as a self-outpouring of deity.

the creature ;—a being, however, carefully to be distinguished from His being in Himself, over against which the creature stands, as something external ; whereas He is in the creatures through His operations. This distinction reminds us of Schwenckfeld (see page 629), whom Andreæ had studied ; according to him, the being of God *in* the creature, is not a being in it merely as to love, but, above all, as to power, which he maintained to be the essence of God.¹ He too, therefore, held that the essence of God was actually in Christ. But he endeavoured, even more than Brentz, to distinguish this divineness, so far as it was the property of the humanity of Christ, from God Himself. The deity communicated and given, and the deity of the Son Himself, were not one and the same deity, *considered sub specie diversa* ; but the communicated deity is another, although equal, majesty ; it is, as it were, an effulgence, a form of God (*μορφή Θεοῦ*, Phil. ii. ; an *εἰκασία* of God ; whereas the Logos Himself is *εἰκὼν*), which can never be the essence of the humanity in the sense in which it is the essence of God, although it is, notwithstanding, constituted the property of the humanity.² Similarly also, he says, regarding the body of Christ, that it had a double mode of being : in addition to its natural qualities, it received new ones ; in one aspect, it was of the like nature with ours ; in another, not. (Note 28.)

With Brentz, Andreæ assumed not merely that the Son of God poured out His omnipotence, omniscience, His complete wisdom and righteousness, His omnipresence, blessedness,—but also that He did nothing apart from the man, even as the Father does nothing without the Son, and the soul nothing without the body : through the human nature the Word swayed all things in heaven and on earth. It is wrong, therefore, to speak of Christ doing anything in this or that nature, seeing that everything, on the contrary, is divine-human, even as the soul in this life displays all its power through the body. As to His *essence*, God is not otherwise in Christ than in other creatures ; but whereas He does not work everything in others, but one thing in this, and another thing in that, the entire working of the

¹ Schlussreden, Thes. 30 ff.

² This matter is discussed in detail by Dan. Hoffmann in his "Jac. Andreæ Dogmata de Persona Christi," etc., 1859 ; specially in Antith. vii. viii. xxx. ; and shows that Andreæ contradicts the "Confessio Saxonica."

deity was poured out into Christ. In order to gain scriptural proofs of this equality of the humanity of Christ with the deity, in power, glory, and majesty, not in nature and essence (Schlussreden, Thes. 26), he, even more than Brentz, adopted the plan of referring passages to the humanity, which are usually regarded as the strongest proofs for the divinity of Christ.

The school of Württemberg soon obtained a considerable number of followers. For example, the physician Schegck, in Tübingen (see Note 29),—a man of philosophical culture, who had previously been mixed up with the antitrinitarian controversies of that day,—took their part in the matter of Christology, but proved not to be a very useful or reliable ally. Some of the northern Germans, also, gradually inclined to the side of the Württembergers. So, besides Andreas Musculus, Ægidius Hunnius, still a young man, and Joh. Wigand, for a time Tilemann Hesshus. The latter, as the Bishop of Samland, entered into the controversy “*de abstracto et concreto*” with some of his clergy, and with Wigand, Bishop of Pomesan, in the year 1574, which, after lasting several years, ended in his deposition. (Note 30.)

This Christology of the Suabians, however, met also with much opposition, not merely from the Reformed theologians (Note 31), but also from the Roman Catholic Church and the school of Melanchthon.

The opposition on the part of the Catholics was first raised by the Jesuits, who most quickly, and not without reason, discerned in the Lutheran Christology a principle foreign to them, and pregnant with danger to the traditional form of the Romish doctrine. The Jesuits in Ingolstadt and Mainz (Note 32) sought to defend the dualistic point of view adopted by the Fathers of Chalcedon, and by the Sixth Council held against the Monotheletes, and maintained the impersonality of the human nature; in fact, they asserted its incapability to receive divine attributes by communication still more strongly than the Council of Chalcedon itself had done. They perceived a source of new dangers to their Christology in the circumstance, that the Suabians refused to recognise, in the idea of the “*Unio hypostatica*,” the specific characteristic of the God-man, and maintained that an union of God and man must start with the

natures, and not with the personality. Their position, on the contrary, was, that a real, and not merely a grammatical "*Communicatio idiomatum*," must be allowed to have taken place in the *person* of Christ; as regards the natures, however, not even a verbal communication. To the one person everything must be ascribed, as Leo taught; the natures are wonderfully united with each other, not in and through themselves, but through the personality. Participation in the divine "*idiomata*" is an impossibility, without confusion of the natures; but still they coexisted, and were mysteriously united in the person. In every respect, as to its attributes, and not merely as to its substance, the human nature was "*minor divinitate*." Notwithstanding, by way of distinguishing it from others, it received through the Holy Ghost that which a "*natura finita sortiri aut capere potest*" (Disp. i. 40); it remained, however, at the same time, as far as possible removed from the infinite dignity of God, and was subject to the Father (41, 42). Whoso does not accept this, and attributes to the humanity of Christ like power and like regiment with the divine nature, teaches Monophysitism, or, at all events, Monotheletism (43, 44). With this *Andreas* is chargeable. He defines the "*personalis unio*" as "*communicatio plenitudinis omnis deitatis*," speaks of an "*æqualitas majestatis gloriæ et potentiæ* (of the humanity) *cum Verbo*," of an "*effusio realis divinitatis in humanitatem*," and recognises this alone as an "*Unio personalis*." Whereas Councils and Fathers teach, that the humanity, after the hypostatical union (with which the beginning is to be made), retained its qualities untouched, and remained distinct, which would be an impossibility, if it at the same time had the opposed divine predicates; for the latter must needs be the extinction of the former (Disp. ii. 6). Moreover, that alone is "*proprietas*," which serves for the distinction of a being; if another likewise possesses the same thing, it ceases to be the "*proprietas*" of the first. The "*proprietas*" of God are therefore incommunicable, like those of man.

Natures are denoted by means of their "*proprietas*;" if the properties are made common, the natures also are common and commingled, and are no longer particular natures. If we make the power of the humanity equal to that of the deity, the activity (*operatio*) must needs also become one (D. 2, Th. 8).

Will and understanding belong to the natural attributes of God: if these be poured out, we must assume that there is one will and understanding common to both, and should thus fall into Monotheletism, which has been repudiated by the Church, and against which *Andreas*, surely not without reason, never raises his voice. In that case, the humanity also would be too intimately united with the Trinity, that is, not merely through the personality, as the early Church taught (?), but also through the natures. If the humanity also is almighty, we have a double omnipotence; but on that supposition the humanity of Christ can neither have been subjected to His parents, nor serve as a mediator. The Monothelete Paulus also applied the words, "in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," in the same way; but it is not allowable to refer a passage to the nature which speaks of the person. *Andreas* himself also ascribes the human sufferings, not to the divine nature, but to the person alone; what right has he then to pursue an opposite course with the predicates of the divine nature, which he represents as really participated in by the humanity? For the person, there is a real communication of the "*idiomata*" of the natures, flowing out of the hypostatic union of the two: otherwise merely great distinctions are conferred on human nature; and these distinctions always continue human attributes,—not natural ones, indeed, but bestowed by grace. If, on the contrary, the humanity receives the majesty of God as its own, it receives also the essence of God as its own; for the majesty of God is His essence (*Disp.* ii. 38). What is of one "*operatio et virtus*," must also, according to *Cyrill*, be of one species (*speciei unius*). But the "*proprium*" of the one cannot be communicated to another; least of all can the attributes of the infinite God be communicated to finite human nature. If it has become almighty, it must also be creative, and can no longer be a creature. *Andreas*, it is true, wishes to attribute that which belongs to God "*per essentiam*," to man merely "*per accidens*;" but on such a supposition, the "*Unio*" itself becomes an accident: nay more, that which in God is essence, becomes accident in man.

But *Andreas* is not merely chargeable with the monophysitic and monotheletic error of commingling the natures, their activities and attributes; he does *too little* also to secure their

union. For his "*Communicatio idiomatum*" does not reach as far as the "*Unio hypostatica*." Even though the attributes of the two natures were communicated, we should not therefore have one person: the Council of Ephesus justly rejected those as Nestorians, who represented the two natures as united merely *ἐνπροσηλώ*, and not hypostatically. If, notwithstanding, Andreae is of opinion that the communication of majesty, or the fellowship thereof, surely establishes the unity of the person, he forgets that on this supposition he loses the Trinity; for the persons of the Trinity have such fellowship, and would therefore be, according to him, one person. No less would these principles lead to the exclusion of the body of Christ,—indeed, in general, of this not yet glorified humanity from the sphere of that which is hypostatically assumed. For the humanity had not true and full possession of the majesty till after the resurrection: if, then, there was no hypostatical union till there was a communication of the majesty, the humanity of Christ was first hypostatically united with the Son of God after its sufferings, and perhaps merited the union by its sufferings. The body of Christ, separated as it was during the three days after His death from the soul, and given up to death, further, in itself incapable of divine majesty, could not then have been any longer united with the Logos; for, according to Andreae, this union consisted solely in the communication of the majesty—a communication which did not then take place, nor indeed at all on earth. The Church, on the contrary, which does not, like Andreae, convert the hypostatical union into the "*Communicatio majestatis*," has in that "*Unio*" a far deeper bond between the Logos and the body, both in itself and after the death of Christ.

This disputation the Wittenberg theologians caused to be reprinted in the year 1571, with a commendatory preface, instead of raising doubts about such an alliance. But they had already before published several declarations against the Christology of the Suabians. (Note 33.)

The Wittenbergers, appealing to Christian antiquity, especially to Leo and the Council of Chalcedon; to the signification of the "*Communicatio idiomatum*" customary with the Scholastics; to Melancthon's tradition, whose school dominated in the Electorate of Saxony; to Luther's doctrinal writings, which must be carefully distinguished from his controversial treatises, and

amongst them, in particular, to his latest Christological investigations ; but chiefly of all to the "Corpus doctrinæ Philippicum," which since 1560 had become a kind of symbolical authority ; expressed their resolve to abide by the traditional Christology, which represented the specific feature of the incarnation of God and of the Person of Christ to consist solely in the fact, that the human nature was borne (*sustentatur*) by the divine person, and in a truly human, gradual development, was adorned with all kinds of lofty gifts of God, which exalt it above all other creatures. These "*dona*," however, are still merely "*dona finita*," an elevation of the "*natura finita*;" they do not involve any transport out of its finite essence, and, as the gifts of human nature, ought not to be confounded with the attributes of the divine essence. Reprehensible is it to describe the personal union as an outpouring and essential communication of all divine attributes, power and workings, of the majesty and person of the Son of God into the humanity.¹ It leads back to old heresies ; for with the distinction of attributes, falls also that of the natures and the wills : in that case, the humanity of Christ would differ "*toto genere*" from ours. But as the truth of the humanity is endangered, so also the truth of His deity : the strongest testimonies to the latter are applied to prove the deification of His humanity, which then becomes as it were a second created God, behind whom the eternal Son of God remains inactive. Already do some teach that the humanity of Christ by itself is to be addressed as Jehovah. God and the creature are confounded together : if the eternal Son be held to have been shut up in the body of Jesus, we must necessarily form an unworthy conception of His deity, we must make it finite. Inasmuch, further, as the divine essence or the attributes are common to the three persons of the Godhead, a

¹ *Proposit. Thes.* 29-31. Compare "Grundvest Xrij. Andreæ wrote to the effect, that if the Wittenbergers would not alter their "*propositiones*," he should be compelled to regard them as nothing better than Alkorianic and Mohammedan, and that in a short time all Saxony (that is, Lower Saxony and Thuringia) should be aroused, and writings be published *en masse* against the university and its teachers. Bidenbach in Stuttgart, in conjunction with Andreæ, wrote to and endeavoured to form a league with the Flacians in Jena and Weimar ; whilst Andreæ worked through Julius, Duke of Brunswick, who induced several princes to convene synods in opposition to the Wittenbergers.

doctrine which speaks of a physical communication of essence, instead of a personal union of the Son, must attribute the incarnation to the Trinity instead of to the Son. A "*Communicatio idiomatum*" like that of the Flacians, which is termed "*realis*," but is actually "*physica et essentialis*," strictly viewed, destroys itself, leaves no place for fellowship, and leads to identification. The sole effect of such exaggeration is to open the door to those who in Transylvania, Hungary, and Poland, as the followers of Servetus, refuse to hear anything of a duality of natures or of a "*Communicatio idiomatum*." These also entertain the false notion of the transferableness of attributes to another being; they thus exalt the humanity of Christ, though at the same time they let fall the deity of the Son in Him, which is reduced to inactivity; nay more, the Trinity also. This is especially favoured by the Nestorian doctrine of *Andreae*, that the distinctive features of Christ consisted in the special operation of God in His humanity, or in the circumstance that God ruled the world solely through the man Jesus.¹ Many begin already to say,—As far as concerns the Son of God, His essence and His person, He is everywhere alike, and no one, not even Christ, has in this respect an advantage over others. His distinction consists solely in His having all the gifts of God, whereas other saints have merely some gifts. This is a dangerous equalization: the God-man is then converted into a divine, or into the most divine *man*. The outpouring of gifts does not constitute a person;—gifts are bestowed on a person; consequently the "*Unio personalis*" is not arrived at in this way. If the communication of all gifts constituted a person, so also would the communication of some gifts, and we should have many God-men instead of one. Equally impossible is it that a personal union with God should be the result of humanity's being made the organ of many, or all, the divine operations. Nestorius also designated the hu-

¹ In point of fact, this meeting between *Andreae* and Socinus is well worthy of note. Compare Kkk to Lllij. Servetus also laid it down as a fundamental principle, that the fulness of the deity might be so communicated to a man as that he should become God. So also in 1569, Franz Davidis and Blandrata designated the mere man Son of God, because, through the anointment, he was equal to the Father "*divinitatis plenitudine, omnipotentia, etc.*," although the Father alone retains "*monarchicæ dignitatis prærogativa*."

manity an organ, and, like these, represented the incarnation as consisting in a communication of activity, dignity, attributes, instead of in the "*Unio hypostatica*." But as, on the other hand, the same teachers teach what was not taught by the Nestorians,—that the humanity received into and for itself the attributes which constitute the essence of God,—they so far coincide with the Monophysites and Schwenckfeld, notwithstanding all that is said of two natures and their remaining unmixed in essence. Nay more, if the humanity received all divine majesty at the very moment of its personal union, Christ cannot have been truly visible, cannot have undergone true human hunger, thirst, trouble, suffering, death. If we say that this majesty was concealed prior to His resurrection, then, either the weakness of Christ being swallowed up by the inner majesty, must have been a mere external seeming put on for the sake of men, or His humanity must at one and the same time have been encompassed with weakness and adorned with divine power and gladness, suffering and unsuffering, mortal and immortal; nay more, His body must have been dead in the grave and alive at one and the same moment. His body would then have been in and outside of Mary at the same time; whilst hanging on the cross, it must have been in heaven. The birth, the sufferings, the death, the ascension of Christ, are thus reduced to a juggler's play, and the Marcionitic or Manichæan heresy is revived.

But even if we suppose (with Schwenckfeld) that the complete "*Communicatio idiomatum*" first took place after the resurrection, the continuance of His humanity, the reality of His ascension and second coming as a man, would be endangered by the ubiquity.

No less do our opponents arrive at a double deity, an original and an originated one, an eternal and a communicated, temporal one,—one who is such in substance, and one who is such "*per accidens*." But this would be nothing more nor less than a revival, for the present age, of the Samosatenic and Arian thought.

A very peculiar third position was taken in these controversies regarding the Eucharist and the Person of Christ, by Martin Chemnitz of Brunswick, who, with Andreae, was the most important agent in bringing about the "*Formula Concordiæ*," which was intended to settle the disputes. He was the

recognised spokesman of Lower Saxony, a man of comprehensive patristic learning, of clear logical, though not, properly speaking, doctrinally productive, mind; at the same time moderate, circumspect, and of a dignified character. Trained in the school of Melanchthon, he continued to respect that great teacher, and, like N. Selnekker and Chytræus, preserved in general his type of doctrine, with the difference that, with the churches of Lower Saxony, he adhered rigidly to Luther's doctrine of the Supper, and in agreement with this point of view, which lay nearest his heart, regulated his theological and ecclesiastical sympathies.

This is the explanation of the position which he assumed relatively to the Christology of the Suabians. His peace-loving spirit was opposed to an increase of points of controversy; his common-sense and originally Melanchthonic point of view did not harmonize with the Suabian Christology. His aim, therefore, was to base the Lutheran doctrine of the Supper exclusively on the words of institution. A foreign, discordant element was introduced, it is true, by his explanation of these words, into the main texture of his Christology. This escaped his attention simply from the circumstance, that owing to the non-speculative character of his mind, he did not feel the need of casting his doctrinal system in one mould, but was content if he could only, with greater or less skill, conjoin given utterances regarding the Person of Christ, the truth of which he started with assuming.

In his principal work, concerning the two natures of Christ and their hypostatical union,¹ he maintained, in direct antagonism to the Suabians, that the inquiry ought to start with the principle that the two natures form one *ὑφιστάμενον*, and that therefrom must first be deduced a "Communicatio idiomatum." For this "Communicatio" he laid down a triple form; a division generally adopted by succeeding theologians. The first "genus," or, as he says, the first "gradus," is attributing to the divine-human *person* in its entirety that which appertains to each of the natures. The second mode, which is the reverse of the preceding one, is when to one of the *natures* (for the sake of the "Unio personalis") that is nominally ascribed which appertains solely to the person or to *one* of the natures. The third, which,

¹ See M. Chemnitius "De duabus naturis in Christo, de hypostatica earum unione, de Communicatione idiomatum," etc., 1570.

properly speaking, is the only subject of dispute,—the “*genus auchematicum*,”—refers to the *real* fellowship of the natures. Not only, however, does he not express approval of the Suabian Christology; he also, without mentioning its representatives, controverts every aspect of it in detail, so that there is no alternative but to say,—Christologically he takes up almost completely the point of view occupied prior to the Reformation; and, judging from his numerous citations, he regarded this as an undoubted merit. He controverts, in the most vigorous manner, a “*physica, naturalis communicatio*,” or “*transfusio idiomatum* ;” and no less earnestly does he deny the “*capacitas*” of a “*natura finita*” for the “*infinite*,” if it signify more than that the divine can dwell and work in man. He gives prominence to the circumscription of the humanity of Christ, to its presence in one place, as something appertinent to its idea, and therefore eternal; and denies altogether that the divine predicates can in any sense become the own predicates of the humanity by communication.¹ He maintains so strongly that each of the natures must always retain the predicates essential to it, that he not merely reckons to the humanity creatural reception and dependence on the divine nature, but considers also that what the humanity receives for its own is in all cases much less than what the divine nature has or is; for with him also it is a principle, that the attributes of God are His essence. His view becomes most clear when we compare it, as he himself does, on the one hand, with the scholastic doctrine (especially cherished by the Reformed theologians) of the gifts of grace which were bestowed on Christ, and, on the other hand, with Brentz. He concedes to the Reformed that the humanity of Christ was adorned with distinguished human gifts; only he connects them more intimately with the “*Verbum*,” the Reformed with the Holy Ghost. And whereas the Würtembergers said,—These “*dona*” by which the human nature of Christ was “*habitu*” heightened, yea, perfected in itself, must not merely be regarded as “*dona finita*,” but the human nature, because of its “*capacitas*” for the “*divina natura*,” receives in them something infinite, a truly divine element, which, though infinite and divine, neither transcends its susceptibility nor lies out beyond its idea: Chem-

¹ “*Formaliter*” or “*habitualiter*” the divine never becomes the property of the human nature,—is a proposition which he repeats continually.

nitz, on the contrary, agreed entirely with the Reformed and the Wittenbergers in the position, that whatever can become "habitualiter" and "formaliter proprium" to human nature, must needs be finite, and finite alone. On the other hand, however, he repudiated the notion of the humanity being merely borne (sustentata) by the Logos, or only enjoying His assistance and influence.

His own view is the following:—Although the humanity of Christ remains necessarily limited, His body retains eternally its organization and symmetry, and never becomes infinite. Although humanity can never in any case have infinitude "secundum se subjective, formaliter, inhærenter," the divine majesty is notwithstanding communicated to it, *above* and *against* its nature, by the indissoluble "Unio" of the Logos. It is robbed of its own personality (for which reason he terms it a "massa"), but the hypostasis of the Logos becomes also hypostasis for the human nature which He takes up into Himself (c. 6, pp. 31–35). One would suppose that he must needs attribute to humanity susceptibility for the infinite, inasmuch as the "persona" of the Logos, which he supposes to unite itself with it, is also infinite. For unless, at all events, the "persona" of the Logos becomes the property of the human nature, and if the person of the Word merely has and bears a concrete human nature, then humanity is a mere *ὄργανον*, and all that deity has attained is a theophany. With this matter, however, he does not more closely occupy himself; on the contrary, he says without hesitation,—Christ is not to be regarded as "homo deificatus," but as "Deus incarnatus" (p. 34). Nay more, he expressly gives in his adherence to that mystical doctrine of the Middle Ages, according to which the incarnation was a kind of transport of the human personality out of itself, and its swallowing up in God.¹ Still he held this "Unio" with the human

¹ He quotes approvingly J. Gerson's *De Consolat. Theol. L. i.*:—"Sicut humana natura in Christo—propria subsistentia *dimissa* innititur hypostasi filii Dei, in qua ita sustentatur, ut in nihilum redigeretur, nisi a filio Dei ita gestaretur; ita unica salus est generis humani, si nos ipsos abnegamus et Christo inserti, ipsi toti innitimur ut inveniamur in ipso—ut efficiamur justitia in Deo, ut dicere jam possimus: Vivo jam non ego sed vivit in me Christus." The same thing is evident from his supposing it allowable to adduce the "obsessio Diaboli" as an analogous counterpart to the "Unio" of the Logos with human nature. P. 30 b.

nature to be indissoluble, so that the Logos works both in and with it, as well as through it. Nay more, He communicates to it a multitude of the most glorious excellences,—not merely “*dona finita*,” which might be regarded as the heightening of its own capacities, and for which it possesses susceptibility, in its present state, but also veritably infinite gifts, which, strictly speaking, are *above* and *against* its nature. These “*dona*,” as, for example, the gift of “*multipræsentia*,” Chemnitz supposes, notwithstanding, to be conferred on the humanity, at all events temporarily, and without affecting the permanent limitation of the human essence; and, consequently, not merely where the humanity is, is the Logos who is united with it, but also vice versâ, the humanity, alongside of its quality of limitation, has power of being for the moment wherever the Logos is, when the the Logos wills it, for example, in the Eucharist in several places at one and the same time. With this hypostatical ubiquity, or, more correctly, “*multipræsentia*,” he then connects propositions in which worship and the government of the world are ascribed also to the humanity of Christ since its exaltation.

But how does he reconcile the two principles,—on the one hand, that humanity by itself has susceptibility for finite gifts alone, and therefore can never possess divine gifts as its own; on the other hand, that through the “*Unio*,” an actual communication took place of divine gifts? Communication is not effected unless there is also reception; and there can be no reception without susceptibility. He resorts for help to the image of heated iron and the doctrine of *περιχώρησις*. Although, says he, the substances of fire and iron remain distinct, and the fire never becomes the property of the iron,—inasmuch as it is by nature cold and black, retains these qualities even when heated, though as it were reduced to inactivity, and may soon display them again,—still it is not the fire alone that shines, but the iron also,—not, indeed, through its own quality, but through that of another body. So also did the humanity of Christ participate in the majesty of the Logos, and, fired by, work jointly with, Him.¹—This image, however, did not help the matter. For if the iron burns and shines, it has susceptibility for both: to burn and shine, is not above and contrary to its nature. He had therefore no right to maintain, with the Swiss, in opposition

¹ P. 33, c. 6. P. 113 a, c. 23.

to the Suabians, that humanity cannot receive the divine for its own. So far from this, both justly combine against him to maintain that it is unallowable to teach the real communication to human nature, of something, for which it lacks the proper susceptibility. If we wish to make to ourselves clear how Chemnitz can have supposed the divine to be communicated to the humanity, and yet have denied that it became its "proprium," no more relevant analogy can be adduced than that of the "donum superadditum" of the Romish Church, which having been driven out of anthropology, now sought a last hold in Christology.¹ For as the "donum superadditum" is not supposed to become the "proprietas" of the nature and being of man, and yet is to be his adornment; or, as the Ego of the Mystic rises by ecstasy or ravishment into a higher being, which notwithstanding never becomes a permanent and proper possession of human personality, that is, of the true personality, but constantly remains merely *reckoned* to belong to man; even so, according to Chemnitz, the elevation or transference of the human into the Logos, and its participation in His divine substance, will never belong to the Son of man "habitualiter." The ultimate ground of this doctrine, is his taking, like the Swiss, humanity in its *empirical* form for his starting-point, instead of, like Luther, its true idea; according to which, it does not arrive at its own perfection until it is united with the Logos.² He deserves praise, however, for teaching that the humanity participated in the divine to the extent described, solely in virtue of the continuous indwelling and will of the Logos, and for refusing to advance onwards to a double deity, out of regard to the reality of this participation.

From this it is clear that there is an hiatus between the first and second part of the treatise of Chemnitz, the presence of

¹ This view, applied to soteriology, would necessitate the supposition that the righteousness and sanctity of Christ continue eternally merely imputed, and that a new personality, a new man, is never brought to pass.

² As compared with Luther, Chemnitz adheres so completely to the "old speech," that he conceives Christ to be the mere sum of the two natures, which the will of the Logos has indissolubly united into one hypostasis, the Logos *having*, but not strictly speaking *being had*, by the man. In his highest Christological utterances, the Son of man is nothing more than a God-moved organ:—a representation to which even the Wittenbergers objected.

which was perceived also at an early period by sharper-sighted Reformed theologians like Danæus, who, be it remarked, took a far more correct view of it than the Wittenbergers. With the first part, the Reformed could be tolerably content; but there he does not advance beyond the idea, that the entire humanity of Christ was fired through by the Logos. In the second part, on the contrary, where he endeavoured to establish the possibility of the Real Presence in the Supper, he gave in his adherence to the Suabian doctrine regarding the majesty of Christ with propositions which he lays down, at all events, for exceptional cases (as, for example, multipresence for the Eucharist), but which are scarcely consistent, unless he makes those momentary ‘*dona infinita*,’ “*dona habitualia*.” He approximates also to the Würtembergers, in that he deems these gifts not to be contrary to nature, or to transcend the idea of humanity. As it is, however, he takes up a half-way position, which necessitates his casting aside the kernel of Luther’s, for the sake of his own, Christology: alongside thereof, however, he retains a remnant of Luther’s view for use in extraordinary cases; as though the Logos had been able to become man in two different ways. He thus apparently escapes many difficulties; but in reality participates in the defects both of the Reformed and Suabian theory.

In another aspect, Chemnitz was more nearly related to the Wittenbergers and the Swiss, and was far superior to the Suabians. He demands an humanity which, without detriment to the “Unio,” was from the very beginning an actuality and the subject of growth. Starting with ignorance, it developed itself to completeness. The Logos did not overpower it by His actuality, but by self-restraint, quietude, non-influencing, permitted it really to grow, both as to soul and body. He worked in fellowship with the humanity so far as its power was developed—no further. The Logos did not give up His all-embracing actuality, but it was not absorbed in the growing humanity; His activity stretched out far beyond His humanity. Still, in virtue of the incipient “Unio,” He was always God-man, and His humanity was never without the Logos, who formed with it one *ὑφιστάμενον*. The Logos belonged so fully to the man, that He had no existence apart from His union with him (c. 4, 33). Chemnitz therefore gave real

significance and force to the distinction between "Exinanitio" and "Exaltatio."

As we have remarked, Chemnitz was superior to the Suabians, in that he had no need of resorting to the notion of a double divine element in Christ,—a communicated divine (which became the property of the human nature through the incarnation, even though merely in the way of "donum"), and the communicating divine of the Logos. The price, however, at which he acquires this superiority is, that a communication of the divine—not of higher, created gifts—to humanity does not really take place. It is moved, determined, by the divine as a living, not dead organ: it also embraces the divine, so far as a finite nature can do so; but it is merely clothed with, laid hold on, by the divine, it does not itself lay hold on and use the divine as its own; consequently, it never gets so far as to act in power of the divine which is present with, and appropriated to, it. His standing expression is,—The Word of God, the Son, acts "in, cum, per humanam naturam." It is true, Chemnitz endeavours to conceal from himself that this is the true state of the matter. He endeavours to modify the externality of the position thus assigned to the Logos, by deriving the superiority of this man, not from without, not merely from the Holy Spirit, but by representing the "*Communicatio idiomatum*" as proceeding forth from the person of the Logos. Even on this view, however, the divine still stands in a foreign relation to human nature, and by no means appears as something necessary to the realization of its own perfection. It is, therefore, not attributable to accident that Chemnitz, notwithstanding all his reading in the Fathers, pays no attention to the passages which characterize the idea of the divine-human life as belonging to the divine image. He abides by the simple, practical position, that the incarnation took place on account of sin; he does not regard it as a fulfilment of the "*capacitas*," that is, as the completion of human nature in Christ, which cannot in vain have been fitted for such a communication: on the contrary, he denies this "*capacitas*" of human nature, and represents the incarnation as a something not merely hyperphysical, but also paraphysical, taking place because of sin. The consequence whereof is, that he falls short even of the idea of incarnation, and at the point where the union ought to appear most clearly, instead of

representing human nature as completed agreeably to its divine idea, represents it as ravished out of its own essence, without, however, securing for it a firm footing in the higher element. In this respect also, the Suabians stood nearer both to A. Osiander and Luther. Their objection, that the Logos, in virtue of His omnipresence, is personally present in all men,—that consequently no distinction, nothing specific, remains for Christ, unless His humanity really and for itself participated in the divine predicates,—was either entirely overlooked by Chemnitz or deemed not worth examination. He himself, on the contrary, persisted chiefly in maintaining that the personal, hypostatical union of the Logos with Jesus, from which followed a real “Communicatio idiomatum,” was His sole distinction, without reflecting, at all events in this connection, that no incarnation has taken place at all, if the Logos, who is personally everywhere present, merely united Himself with this “*massa humana*,” but the “*massa*” had not received the infinite personality of the Logos as its own.

Nevertheless, how many elements were contained in the Lower Saxon and Suabian Christologies, by the aid of which each might have been freed from important defects! Of the Christology of Chemnitz this is self-evident. Its conclusion (the *majestas divina hominis Christi*) demands another foundation, more akin to that of the Suabian Christology. For he abides by the worn-out principle, that the “Unio” was accomplished in the *person* alone, instead of both in the person and the natures; and still continues to attribute mutual exclusiveness to the natures. For this reason, like the Reformed theologians, he falls into the contradiction of conceiving the human *nature*, on the one hand, to be very independent, that is, to be inwardly and abidingly separated from the parallel divine nature; and, on the other hand, as selfless, as the mere determined organ of the Logos, who did not permit the humanity to advance to human personality in the God-man. The Suabians, on the contrary, taking fuller hold of the idea of God-manhood, considered everything to have been, as it were, at once completed with the act of “Unio;” accordingly, they left no room for a true, historical growth of the God-manhood, and in their efforts to secure a *true* humanity, that is, an humanity corresponding to the divine idea, lose its actuality. Against this

unintentional Docetism the only help lay in Chemnitz's doctrine of the "Exinanitio," by which he had aimed at preventing the completed image of Christ being confusingly transferred to His earthly history. Prior to the controversy with the Swiss, as we have seen, Luther had combined the two elements, the absolute idea of God-manhood and its growth, in an immediate, if not in a dialectically complete, form. After that controversy he allowed Christ, as historically growing, to recede to the background, as compared with the glorified and exalted Christ. This neglected aspect Melancthon took up and carried further out; but, letting fall the *idea* of God-manhood to which Luther had given a place, he, and the Wittenbergers after him, took the reverse course of drawing the picture of Christ from Christ in His empirical, limited form, subjected to the conditions of space, in other words, from Christ in His state of humiliation.—There-upon again arose, in the Suabians, representatives of Luther's idea of God-manhood; but more glaringly than ever Luther did, they made the beginning or the principle of the realization of the idea the end, constituting the act of incarnation the ascension. In Chemnitz, who still defended the other aspect of the original Christology of Luther (to wit, the growth of Christ, etc.), and at the same time, even though chargeable with great inconsistencies, stood nearer to that fundamental idea which, as the goal, must also determine the path to the goal, than Melancthon and the Wittenbergers, the Suabians had one who should have been a warning to them to be on their guard.

The inner conciliation of these two points of view, with which the German Reformation had been inoculated by its fathers, would have been the birth-hour of a new, higher Christology, analogous in form to the Lutheran doctrine of justification:—nay more, it would have led also to the substantial reconciliation of the Reformed and Lutheran Christology, as indirectly to that of the Reformed and Lutheran doctrine of the Supper.

To such a result, however, it would have been necessary for the two points of view, the Suabian and the Lower Saxon, to engage in a long struggle with each other. Instead whereof, by premature concessions, an unity was improvised which was destitute of inner reality. The Christological antagonism between the Suabians and the Low Germans, with Chemnitz at

their head, was put into the background, and concealed by palliatives, in order that the opponents of the Lutheran doctrine of the Supper, or those who were deemed its opponents, might be met with the fact of a realized concord; whereas, logically, the doctrine of the Supper depended for being brought to a satisfactory completion on Christology.

STADIUM THIRD.

SYMBOLICAL CLOSE OF THE REFORMATORY MOVEMENT.

SECTION I.

THE FORMULA OF CONCORD.

AFTER long and wearisome negotiations, the Suabians and Lower Saxons first came to an agreement;¹ in the course of several other conventions, other countries also gave in their adherence, and the Book of Concord finally assumed the form in which we now have it.

This work did not, it is true, bring about peace in the Lutheran Church; it merely became the symbol of a majority of the Lutherans of Germany, who never conscientiously could, nor seriously desired to, deny the Lutheran character to those Churches which declined to accept it. Still it brought a course of development to so significant a termination, the most eminent theologians of the time took so important a part in it, and it gave symbolical shape to so many weighty thoughts of the Reformation, that it deserves a more careful examination. Its doctrine is as follows.²

Eutychianism, indeed, and every "Confusio naturarum" is to be rejected; but equally so Nestorianism also. Now, to the latter belongs in particular the opinion which speaks solely of an unity of the person, and leaves the natures merely standing outwardly alongside of each other (*ut duo asseres conglutinos*). What is necessary, is to view them also in each other, because, if they remain outside of each other, not even the unity of the person can be maintained: and, on the other hand, if the unity of the person be really conceived to be a vital one, it must

¹ Compare "Formula Concordiæ inter Suevicas et Saxonicas Ecclesias," in Pfaff l. c. p. 381. "Von der Person Christi," pp. 397-409.

² Epitome viii. 605-612. Solida Decl. viii. 761-788.

also show itself active.¹ This cannot take place by the one nature being converted into the other, or even only by its merely losing its essential qualities ; but the natures must be conceived communicatory and susceptible of receiving communications—the personal unity (*ἑνωσις*) must manifest itself in fellowship of life (*κοινωνία*, *communio*, *communicatio naturarum*, p. 766). It is not enough, therefore, to represent the divine and the human nature as merely so united in the person (pp. 775, 56) that neither communicates to the other anything that is peculiar to itself ; that the one receives from the other, in consideration of the common personality, merely “*titulum sine re*,” God being called man, and man being called God, without the divine nature having anything in common with the humanity, or the human nature with God ; and that, for the rest, each nature works in its own way. On the contrary, the divine nature makes the humanity, with its weakness and sufferings, its own (*proprium*, p. 608, 14), although the divine nature in and by itself cannot suffer ; and the divine prerogatives, which are summed up in the majesty of God, are realiter communicated to the human nature.² This is not to be conceived as a physical outpouring, nor as a self-duplication of God into a communicating and a communicated ;³ but one and the same majesty which the Son of God has, became the possession of the humanity after its manner. The deity continues the vehicle of the divine predicates ; the humanity, the vehicle of the human (p. 777, 62) : and these predicates do not pass out of their subjects ; but by the hypostatical union, and by it alone, they are brought so very close to each other, that the one receives that which has and retains its essential and original place in the other. Thus also do soul and body form a living unity, without prejudice to the abiding distinctions between them. Through this highest and unutterable union was to be brought about that in Christ God should be man, and man God, which could not have been the case had the natures remained merely external and foreign to each other, without truly and actually communicating anything.⁴ Without

¹ P. 766, 20, 22 ; 769, 32.

² Pp. 773 ff. ; 762, 4.

³ P. 763, 4 ; 606, 6 ; 765, 19.

⁴ That the person of the Logos also communicates itself to the humanity, and the latter, therefore, is personal, is taught, p. 763, 10 :—“*ita naturas unitas esse sentimus ut unicam tantum personam constituent, in qua simul*

such communication of divine attributes to human nature, it is hinted, page 607, 11, to worship the Son of Mary would be idolatry. But for it, the Son of God could only be with us on earth in the Word, in the sacraments, and in our needs, as to His deity (p. 786, 87); His humanity could have nothing to do with His presence with us. But if the humanity of Jesus should no longer be able to concern us, precisely what is most comfortable would be taken from us. His naked deity must be to us as a devouring fire; whereas the thought, that He who is God is also man, comforts us; and the fact that in Him, who is man, our nature is exalted to the right hand of God, is our blessedness. On the other hand also, without the participation of the divine nature in human attributes, Christ would have suffered for us merely as to His human nature; whereas we believe that the Son of God became man, in order to be able to suffer, and, by the weight of His deity, lent the sufferings of His humanity their infinite value. And in this their belief in a real communication of attributes, they did not allow themselves to be disturbed by the objection, that humanity is essentially finite, circumscribed, creatural, and therefore susceptible alone of creature, finite gifts and excellences, which are communicated to it through the Holy Ghost, and different only in degree from the gifts conferred by the Holy Spirit on others. To this objection they boldly opposed the proposition,—human nature, or Christ as to His humanity, was capax of receiving omnipotence and the other divine “proprietarytes:”¹ those who denied this are expressly rejected. At the same time, the essence of the two natures remained unaltered; their distinctions were not obliterated; the humanity continued subordinate to God. Each retained its essential qualities; and if it received, as its own, in addition, the essential qualities of the other nature, it did not receive them as they were in the other nature—it received them by communication, and did not possess them as essential (p. 777, 61). As an image of this unity, in which the distinctions are preserved, they especially employed glowing iron, which glows without being consumed, and, on its part, does not exclude the glow.

personaliter ambæ—unitæ sint et subsistant.” It is true, says Æg. Hunnius on a subsequent occasion, the personality as such is incommunicable to another person, but not to another nature.

¹ P. 611, 34; 774, 52 f.; 775, 781, 611.

The homoousia of Christ with humanity was treated by the "Formula Concordiæ" as irrefragable and fixed; but with the principle of the "*capacitas humanæ naturæ*" for the divine, which in Christ attained fulfilment, it laid the foundation-stone of a new anthropology in the spirit of the Reformation, and began the further development of that which Luther desired, when he referred to the "new speech" and the new humanity (780, 69). Concerning the humanity of Christ as thus conceived, the Son of God is further said to do everything, in and with and through it, in virtue of the personal union (732, 74; 784, 81).

It is self-evident that not a few of Luther's original fundamental Christological thoughts were concealed from the Lutheran Church by what has just been expounded. On this occasion, the Suabians and Lower Saxons laid aside faults peculiar to them, and borrowed good elements from each other.¹ Far less satisfactory, however, is the "Formula Concordiæ" in its concrete development of these fundamental thoughts in important points; in consequence whereof, the Concord must be pronounced a fruit prematurely plucked.

In the first place, both parties displayed a false spirit of compliancy towards each other, and did not stedfastly enough maintain the better knowledge which they possessed. For the sake of concord, they in part let fall important points; in part, adopted error; and in part, too hastily contented themselves with half, ambiguous concessions: whereof the result was an ephemeral appearance of unanimity, unworthy of such a work. Chemnitz in particular, instead of guarding his doctrine of a true "*status exinanitionis*," and insisting that the Son of God only gave the humanity really to participate in His majesty so

¹ Chemnitz recognised that "*capacitas*" of human nature more completely than before; thus rose above the idea of humanity as a mere passive organ of the deity; and was able accordingly to give in his adherence to the position, that in Christ not merely was God man, but this man was also God—that humanity can really have divine, uncreated qualities or gifts. The Suabians, on the other hand, let fall their doctrine of a double divinity of the Son (779, 60), of a "*physica transfusio*" (777, 62, 63), or "*exæquatio*" (768, 28) of the essential attributes; and recognised the distinction in unity more distinctly than before. They allowed that, as to His humanity, Christ was under God (777, 61); that finitude, circumscription, pertain essentially to it (763, 19); nay more, that even now, Christ is localized somewhere or other (p. 611, 33).

far as it was compatible with a true human growth, renounced his doctrine of the "retractio" or ἡσυχάζειν of the Logos in relation to the humanity. He consented, on the contrary, to the position, that human nature possessed divine majesty and all the qualities of the divine nature, not merely first after the resurrection, but from the first moment of its existence, in virtue of the "Unio personalis" (764, 13). He consented further to the doctrine, that even the very conception of Christ was an exaltation to the right hand of God (Ascension, 608, 15), and that the ascension which took place at a later period was nothing but the laying aside of the "forma servilis" (767, 26); that the person itself had consequently been complete and perfect from the very beginning, even though concealed. His earlier doctrine of a quiescence of the Logos in relation to the humanity, he now converted into the doctrine of a quiescence and veiling of the humanity, which from the very commencement was complete, and in possession of the highest, for example, knowledge (p. 779, 65).¹ He conceded to the Suabians an "omnipræsentia generalis" of the humanity of Christ (608, 16); nay more, what involved the weightiest results, he allowed them, so to speak, at the last moment, to take back with one stroke, by using Luther's authority, all the concessions which they had apparently made in favour of his doctrine of the hypothetical omnipresence, or rather multipresence of Christ; for they succeeded in obtaining the verbatim insertion into the Formula of Concord, of a number of the strongest passages from writings published by Luther at the time of the controversy,—passages which most decidedly defend the "omnipræsentia absoluta," and derive it from the "Unio hypostatica," on the ground of which the Son of God could not be anywhere where the humanity also was not. Now, as the humanity took its rise with the "Unio hypostatica," this principle involved the ubiquity of Christ even during the state of exinanition (pp. 784 ff.). But the Suabians also allowed themselves to be dragged away to several concessions detrimental to the general cause.² Relatively

¹ He consented even to the position, that this majesty of which the humanity was in possession, displayed itself already in the womb of His mother through the miracle by which Christ was born without the womb of Mary being opened. P. 767, 24.

² For example, the position that the divine attributes are not merely

to a number of important points, an actual agreement had not been arrived at; but it was determined to secure concord at any price: the false method was therefore adopted of meeting concessions with counter concessions, and of framing formulas which both parties believed themselves able to accept, though each in a different sense. The result of this course of procedure was a half-and-half thing which, by its conjunction of heterogeneous fragments from different Christological systems, not merely reminds one of the image of the two boards used by the Formula of Concord, but contains also actual contradictions.

Such contradictions are especially observable in connection with the "Status Exinanitionis." Chemnitz sacrificed his manner of representation, because (p. 608, 16) a true progress (*proficere*) was conceded by the Suabians.¹ Nay more, he allowed that the exaltation was nothing more than the laying aside of the servile form; that, consequently, everything was complete in Him from the womb of His mother; and that the state of humiliation consisted solely in the concealment and *secret* possession of divine majesty. This naturally involved attributing to the humanity secret omniscience whilst it was engaged in learning, secret omnipresence whilst it went from one place to another, secret omnipotence whilst it was shut up in the womb.² Similarly, as far as concerns ubiquity, Chemnitz wished to concede merely an hypothetical ubiquity, and succeeded in securing the repeated insertion of the words,—With His humanity, Christ is able, according to His free pleasure, to be present wherever He wills,³ even in several places at the same time; but he failed in securing the repudiation of the

"supra," but also "contra naturam humanam," and that it never had them "in se" even after the "Unio" (p. 762, 4; 773, 50; 775, 54; 606, 7, 8); all which contradicts their doctrine of the "*capacitas humanæ naturæ*."

¹ P. 608, 16. "*Jam omnia novit*;" which for him included in itself the proposition,—in the "*Exinanitio non omnia novit*." P. 767, 26, also, the Suabians allow a true "*Exaltatio*" after the resurrection; nay more, they allowed that He was then first "*ad plenam possessionem et usurpationem erectus*," 774, 51.

² P. 782, 75. The Agnoetes are repudiated without further ceremony. The "*Exinanitio*" was partially a non-use, or even concealment (*secret use?*), of the divine majesty, possessed by the humanity.

³ P. 766, 24; 778, 64; 779, 66; 781, 71. What is absolutely necessary, it would seem impossible to attribute to the free will.

opinion that ubiquity is involved as absolute and necessary in the "*Unio personalis*." On the contrary, the "*Formula Concordiæ*" teaches an actual "*omnipræsentia generalis Christi*" (p. 608, 16); and Chemnitz consented to basing Christ's freedom from the conditions of space (which he asserted) on the "*Unio personalis*," from which inevitably followed rather the necessary presence of the humanity, wherever the Logos is.¹ For the "*Unio personalis*," it is said, cannot be conceived without the "*Communicatio idiomatum*;" and the "*Communicatio*" involves the possession of the majesty (which embraces all divine prerogatives) by the humanity. Chemnitz was, therefore, driven completely out of the field, and the absolute ubiquity was established by the extracts from Luther, to which he did not venture to offer opposition.² No marvel, then, that controversy arose between the framers of the Concord shortly after its publication.³ The Suabians maintained that their doctrine of ubiquity had been recognised as the doctrine of the Church; the Lower Germans denied it. The Apology of Erfurt did not produce much effect; Chemnitz himself subscribed the "*Formula Concordiæ*," with the supplementary clause, that he took it in the sense of the Lower Saxon Confession (consequently without the doctrine of absolute ubiquity). His joy in the work cooled considerably as soon as it was completed, especially as it at once became the occasion of hot disputes both within and without the Lutheran Church (Planck l. c. 690); even its principal patron, Duke Julius, gave it up, and forbade its introduction into his territories.

From what has been advanced, it would appear that with the welding together of the systems of the Suabians and Chemnitz is connected the circumstance, that the "*Formula Concordiæ*" does on the one hand too much, and on the other hand too little, for the unity of the Person of Christ.

I. Inasmuch as through the "*Unio*," and from the very first

¹ The omnipresence of the Logos is conceived as a necessary being every where, as a filling of all things; p. 763, 9; 768, 28; 780, 68; 606, 7.

² Chemnitz had allowed himself to be deceived by the formulæ (see Note 3, p. 214) "*potuit*," "*liberrime*," and so forth, which the Suabians allowed to stand, because what one is and *must* be by physical necessity, is certainly also possible.

³ Planck l. c., B. x. 757 ff., 678 f., 795-799.

moment of its effectuation, a communication is supposed to have been made, which included in itself the entire divine majesty, a process of deification so absolutely instantaneous can scarcely be distinguished from a monophysitic identification or conversion; and it makes no difference whether the divine prerogatives are represented to be actually used or merely possessed. For, even in the latter case, they must have been, from the very beginning, fully and completely attributes of human nature; the essence of which, demanding as it does a gradual development, is thus violated. On this supposition the human will of Christ entered merely apparently into a struggle; its sanctity and obedience were complete and finished from the beginning. Further, what idea can we form of an omniscience which is a mere quiescent possession? for omniscience, if it exist at all, cannot but be used; we cannot refrain from its use nor bring to pass, that we do not know something which we know.¹ Besides all this, the alternate use and non-use of the divine attributes, which are represented as in the full possession of the humanity, gives an unsteady, arbitrary, phantastic character to the life of Jesus. Finally, the "Formula Concordiæ" refuses altogether to acknowledge that the divine nature refrained from the use of its divine attributes, whilst the human nature rested (acted?) in any particular case.² Notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary, then, it arrives finally at the result that, during the earthly life of Christ, the total life of the Logos was not yet common with the life of Jesus, whereas it intended to deduce the contrary from the "Unio personalis" at the cost of the humanity. Nay, further, if merely the person of the Logos were from the beginning entirely and completely the person of this man, inasmuch as the Logos knew everything, the learning of the humanity must have been a mere show.

II. But the "Formula Concordiæ" does also too little for the unity. The main efforts of the Suabians had been directed to the establishment of the union of the natures; and in pursuing this aim, they had undoubtedly approximated towards Monophysitism,—against which Chemnitz justly protested. Now, however, they gave in their adherence to the derivation of the

¹ The negation of such knowledge would be in itself the position of the same knowledge.

² P. 612, xx. 773, 49; 781, 71.

"communicatio idiomatum" or the "communio naturarum" from the "Unio hypostatica," instead of continuing to maintain that the latter was the result of the former. In the praiseworthy effort to preserve the distinction of the natures, they fell into evident vacillation in relation to the main point, the communication. With a view to forefending Monophysitism, it was said, the human nature received the attributes, not as essential, as pertaining to its own being; but they remain eternally proper to the divine nature alone. We cannot see, therefore, that the human nature really had anything appropriated to it, in the power of which *it* can act—a consideration which becomes specially suspicious, if the "persona" also is not really to belong to the humanity, but remains purely matter of the Logos. For then the humanity is nothing more than an organ to be determined. Soon after, however, when the object was to set forth the closeness of the vital union between God and man, the strongest terms are used to declare that everything is common to both; that the humanity was really exalted to the right hand of God; that it had received all divine predicates as its own; nay more, that an union of the natures (*ένωσις, κοινωνία*) had been brought to pass by the "Communicatio idiomatum." With this connected itself also vacillation with regard to what was essential to the two natures. For Monophysitism is assailed in a tone implying that the "Communicatio idiomatum" was not deemed to involve a communication of the essential elements of the two natures, or their substance: whilst, on the other hand, when the object is to show how much the "Communicatio idiomatum" does for the unity, the "Formula" warns us against supposing that the essential features of the two natures remain foreign to each other and incommunicable.¹ So far from that, the communication of the

¹ The objection so frequently raised, that the Lutheran doctrine in the "Formula Concordiæ" severs the attributes from the substances, and treats the former as communicable, the latter not, whereas the attributes are but the natures in life and motion, is, therefore, only partially true—true, namely, as regards propositions directed against Monophysitism. For, as regards the new and principal feature in the efforts of the authors of the "Formula Concordiæ," they could by no means have had any interest in conceiving the attributes to be so separated from the substances, that a new gulf should be opened, in place of the one that had been bridged over.

attributes spoken of is regarded as an union of that which is essential to the two natures.

This hesitation as to whether the humanity had really received the divine for its own or not; further, as to whether humanity and deity were really united as to that which in both is essential and not merely accidental—an hesitation which threw doubt again on whatever gain had previously been effected—could only be escaped in one way, without falling into Monophysitism, to wit, by *recognising that by which God and humanity are essentially and eternally distinguished from each other, as, at the same time, the point through which both are essentially related and belong to each other.* A beginning, if only an imperfect one, of such a course was made by the Suabians. In accordance with the divine idea of humanity, the realization of which is presented in Christ, it was necessary to conceive it as lacking completeness and truth, save as it is united with God by that which in one aspect discriminates it eternally from Him; in other words, it must be conceived as mere susceptibility, that is, for God Himself: and so also, to conceive that which eternally distinguishes God from humanity, even in Christ, to wit, that He is essential and creative love, as at the same time that which unites Him with humanity, according to His own true idea, to wit, love. By this means, Chemnitz's "*contra naturam*," which the Suabians had inconsistently allowed themselves to be persuaded into adopting, would have been set aside, as also the constantly recurring and just charge of venturing, in the "*Communicatio idiomatum*," to make that which is reckoned to the essence of God (His entire majesty) an accident of man;—which did not after all, really, in any way inwardly benefit humanity, seeing that it continued to be nothing more than a kind of "*donum superadditum*." This new, higher conception of God and humanity, according to which they stand in inward and essential relation to each other, and point the one to the other; which teaches that, precisely through that which discriminates them, they are inwardly connected with each other, and as it were yearn for each other, in condescending and ascending love: this was the object of Luther's desires. On the other hand, however, it must be allowed, that even if the process had not been prematurely decided and fixed by the "*Formula Concordiæ*," it is very much to be doubted whether

a continuation of the controversy between the Low and Higher German Christologies could then have led to any satisfactory results. Thereto were necessary new, further presuppositions, which both parties still lacked;—for example, to mention one only,—they lacked clear insight into the elements which constitute the true idea of man; the knowledge of the ethical ground-work and of the ethical laws of the growth of man; the perception that such ethical growth does not stand in connection with the imperfections which owe their existence to sin (from which, therefore, the God-man must be freed as quickly as possible by means of the “Unio” and its accelerated operation); but forms an essential part of the revelation of the divine love and of the redemption given in Christ.¹ These preliminary questions are not merely of a specifically theological, but also of a general philosophical nature. But a philosophy imbued with the spirit of Protestantism was not then born.

¹ A parallel antagonism to that between the Suabians and the “Exinanitio” of Chemnitz, is the anthropological one,—Was Adam absolutely holy and perfect at the very beginning, or merely pure and on the straight way to holiness? The Apology leaves the two alternatives open; the “Formula Concordiæ” inclines already to the former.

SECTION II.

THE REFORMED CHRISTOLOGY.

As compared with Zwingli, Calvin occupied, in the matter of Christology also, a position more akin to that of the Lutheran Church.¹ It was a common, more intense religious interest, that connected him more intimately with the kernel of the Lutheran Christology. We stood in need of a *Mediator*, says he, who touched both God and us, in order that we might be united with God through Him. For even if man had not fallen, his rank was so low, that he could not have penetrated and risen up to God.² What then would finally have become of man, fallen into the ruin of sin, if the Son had not resolved to become incarnate for our salvation? His mission was to restore a lost world, and of children of men to make children of God and brothers to Himself. But He came also to be a *Redeemer* (Redemptor). For who, save the Life, could swallow up death? Who, save the Righteousness and Power of God, could overcome sin, and the powers of the air and the world? But for the behoof of atonement also, man, who was lost through disobedience, must bring forward an obedience, offer satisfaction to the judgment of God, and pay the penalty of sin. Accordingly, the true man, our Lord, came, assumed Adam's person and name, in order to take our place before the Father; and the community of His nature with ours, has become the pledge of our fellowship with God.³

¹ Hence the Lutheran dogmaticians of the 17th century frequently appeal to him in opposition to Reformed theologians.

² J. Calvini Instit. relig. Christ. ed. Tholuck. L. ii. c. 12-17, c. 12, 1:—"Quamvis ab omni labe integer stetisset homo, humilior tamen erat ejus conditio, quam ut sine Mediatore ad Deum penetraret."

³ L. c. § 3:—"Quum denique mortem nec solus Deus sentire, nec solus homo superare posset, humanam naturam cum divina sociavit, ut alterius imbecillitatem morti subjiceret ad expianda peccata, alterius virtute—nobis victoriam acquireret."

✓ In consequence of this religious interest in Christology, he sympathized more than many others with the Lutheran doctrine of the "Communicatio idiomatum" (L. ii. c. 14). It is true, constructive speculation, which takes God for its starting-point, was not in Calvin's way; he also lacked the intuitive faith-mysticism of Luther. It was simply the combined need of the consciousness of redemption and of the understanding that drove him constantly upwards to God, and gave him no peace till he secured for the history of redemption in time a home and refuge in the eternal decrees of God (c. 12, 1); but everything of the nature of a progressive procedure was rendered impossible to him, at the very outset, by the view he took of the divine *freedom*, which does all things for its own sake (c. 14, 2). He was stirred more by humility and submission to God, by conscientious awe before the divine mysteries, than by the desire of a child to look into the secrets of love, the heart of its Father. At the same time, he did not regard the "Communicatio idiomatum" as a mere trope. The power to forgive sins, says he, to awaken whom He wills, to communicate righteousness, sanctity, and life, appertained neither to the deity alone, nor to the humanity alone, but *to both at the same time* (c. 14, 3). But the same religious interest, and still more the keenness of his discriminating understanding, demanded not merely the strict retention of the distinction between God and man, but for that very reason also, the full recognition of the reality of the humanity and its development. For this reason, he took up a strongly antagonistic position to the Christology of which the Suabians shortly became the representatives, especially as relating to the period of "Exinanitio."¹ Further, he it was among the Reformers who laid special stress on the human soul of Christ, which shows itself, among other things, in the circumstance that, alongside of the outward bodily pains, he gave prominence to the inner aspect of the sufferings of Christ, that is, to His endurance of the punishments of hell in the invisible anguish of His soul *on the cross*, and maintained it to be a distinct and important article of faith. He finds it to have been confessed also by the Church, in the article concerning the de-

¹ Defensio sanæ et orthodoxæ doctrinæ de Sacra. Opp. viii. 658 ff., in the year 1554. The body of Christ is not "immensum," but in one place. Still more explicitly in Instit. L. iv. 17, 30.

scent of Christ into hell.¹ In the same interest, he refuted in detail the Christology of the Mennonites (ii. 13), which abolished the full reality of the humanity of Christ; especially, however, the doctrine of Servetus, who pantheistically confounded the distinction between God and man. On the other hand, he also attacked both Stancarus and Andr. Osiander (ii. 12, 4-7), who offended against his canon, that the key to the understanding of Christology is, that whatever concerns the office of Mediator can be referred neither to the deity alone nor to the humanity alone.²

On the whole, however, Calvin displayed in this dogma no special productivity. He contented himself principally with closing up bypaths to error, neither aiding in furthering the solution of the problem, nor devoting attention to the more difficult questions, nor endeavouring to discover the element of truth contained in the errors. He appears to have considered a more precise understanding of Christology impossible, and preferred abiding with scrupulous caution by the traditional type of the Council of Chalcedon, to acknowledging the difficulty of reconciling an "Unio personalis" of God and man, who is not to be a mere *ᾠραν* and temple, with the ideas that had been handed down. Nor does he seem to have felt the need of looking more deeply into the mystery into which angels desire to gaze. Andr. Osiander he could only warn off with severe words; this, however, he did not do without falling into contradiction with himself.³ And yet it was specially needful that he

¹ C. 16, 8-10. Johann Æpin in Hamburg differed from Calvin in representing the soul of Christ as propitiatorily enduring the punishments of hell in *hell itself* (as Luther also did in 1524); for proof of which he appeals to Psalm xvi. 10 and Acts ii. 24-27. Æpin also was concerned to maintain that the entire man suffered for us, as to soul and body. Compare his Comment. in Ps. xvi., of the year 1544, and his Enarratio, Ps. lxxviii. Planck v. 1, 252 ff. Flacius also shared his view. The "Formula Concordiæ" declines to decide whether the descent into hell belongs to the "Exaltatio" or to the "Exinanitio;" only Christ's victory over hell is certain. The descent of the "tota persona Christi" (with the body?) into hell is also taught. According to the Romish Catechism, Christ delivered the souls of the fathers out of the "Limbus Patrum."

² C. 14, 3, cf. Calv. Ep. ad Polonos adv. Stancarum, and his Defensio orthod. Fidei sacræ Trinit. adv. prodigiosos errores Mich. Serveti. Hispani.

³ C. 12, 1 (see above), had not he himself also said,— "We need Mediator even apart from sin?" Inasmuch, now, as he afterwards supposed

should recognise and more correctly carry out Osiander's thought. For it could not escape his acute mind, that the doctrine of predestination was fraught with most serious dangers to a Christology logically carried out, if Christ was conceived to be a mere means, and not also as an end in Himself. His Christian consciousness told him that we have to regard Christ as the real *acquirer* of our salvation, and not as a merely apparent cause of salvation,—constituting as it were the transition-point or means of revelation for God, who is in Himself eternally reconciled with sin. He busied himself earnestly with this question, and arrives finally at the answer (c. 17), that Christ was a subaltern means of salvation. The decree of salvation, however, was not otherwise formed than as to be worked out by Christ. Accordingly, he undoubtedly aimed at assigning to Him an essential position as the cause of redemption. But this he cannot strictly carry out, if Christ existed solely because of sin. Predestination and the divine omnipotence encompass Christ, in as far as He is a mere means, so immediately, that His accomplishment of redemption must, strictly speaking, be deemed the act of God Himself:—in other words, God pays Himself, and the divine-*human* causality of redemption is reduced to a mere seeming. His position in this respect would have been at once improved, had he recognised, with Osiander, that Christ stood in an essential relation both to humanity and to God, and been prepared to say,—The satisfaction is not a mere seeming; for Christ, who has an essential significance even independently of sin, and is also an end in Himself, was merely in the first instance the personal, God-given *possibility* of atonement; and the atonement, as an objective reality (without which it would be impossible for us to have the consciousness

it necessary to express disapprobation, and disapprobation alone, of Osiander, he ought logically to have gone on to reduce Christ to the position of a person whose existence and services are no longer needed, after the accomplishment of His work of Mediator; and to deprive His humanity of further significance (compare c. 14, 3). Inasmuch, further, as he maintained, in opposition to Osiander, that the *deity* of the Son is the head of angels and Adam's archetype, he clashes with what he had taught before, that the angels could not redeem, because they themselves lacked a head “per cujus nexum solide et indistracte Deo suo cohærent (c. 12, 1). Christ has, in his view, “medium gradum” as “legatus Dei,” till the time of perfection; 1 Cor. xv. (c. 14, 3).

of reconciliation), He effected not by a human merit apart from God, but by earnest wrestling and divine-human conflicts.¹

If Calvin contented himself in the matter of the doctrine of the Person of Christ with less determinate results, and, in particular, did not say precisely whether the real communication related to the person alone, or to the natures also; the Ubiquity Controversy, which began about the year 1560, must, owing to its connection with the doctrine of the Supper, have had the effect of leading the Reformed theologians to take up a more determined Christological position. This took place through the above-mentioned works of Beza, P. Martyr, H. Bullinger, and others. Their common doctrine is laid down in the two confessions almost universally recognised in the Reformed Church—the Heidelberg Catechism of Z. Ursinus and Caspar Olevian, and the “*Confessio Helvetica*” of 1566, of H. Bullinger, Beza, and others.² The latter expressly gives in its adherence to the decrees of the first four Œcumenical Councils (the Ephesian also), to the Athanasian and Apostolic Creeds, and rejects, besides the Docetists and the Ebionites, also Nestorianism, Eutychianism, Monophysitism, and Monotheletism. In the one Christ are and remain two natures or substances; because they are united in Him, we can say, that the Lord of glory was crucified. The “*Communicatio idiomatum*,” in accordance with the old usage of the Church, is to be employed for the explanation of apparently contradictory passages of Scripture (consequently not to constitute an article by itself). Christ is now exalted into the highest heavens, to the right hand of the Father.³ The Heidelberg Catechism takes up a

¹ This is plainly enough the tendency of c. 17; but he was unable to keep distinctly apart the God-given possibility and the actuality of the atonement, because he regarded Christ *merely* as a means. His causality, therefore, threatened to become Docetical, instead of veritably redemptive.

² Augusti Corpus libr. symb. qui in ecclesia Reform. auctor. publ. obtinuerunt, pp. 25–31, c. 12; Catechesis Heidelberg. Q. 29–52.

³ P. 28:—*Ad dextram Dei patris, quæ etsi et gloriæ majestatisque consortium æquale significet, accipitur tamen et pro loco certo, Joh. xiv. 2, Act. iii. 21, “Oportet Christum cælum suscipere,” etc. P. 27, the notion is rejected, “Christum secundum humanam naturam adhuc esse in hoc mundo adeoque esse ubique.”* Similarly already the “*Wahrhaftes Bekenntniss der Diener Christi zu Zürich*,” 1545. The Confess. Belg. (19) and Gall. (15) content themselves with the positive assertion of the reality and permanence of the humanity. The Scottish Confession (Art. 6–11) is

still more peculiar position. Like Calvin, it considers the work of Christ under the point of view of His threefold office, with a reference to the anointing of Christ with the Holy Ghost.¹ The curse which rested on us He was compelled to bear on the accursed tree, and hanging on the cross He endured the tortures of hell (Q. 39, 40, 44):—therein consisted His descent into hell. Although He ascended to heaven, and as to His humanity is now absent from the earth, as to His deity, majesty, grace, and Spirit, He is continually with us;² and although His humanity is not everywhere present with His deity, His two natures are not therefore severed from each other. “*Nam cum divinitas comprehendi non queat, et omni loco præsens sit, necessario consequitur, esse eam quidem extra naturam humanam, quam assumsit, sed nihilominus tamen esse in eadem, eique personaliter unitam manere*” (Q. 48). He is and remains the Head, which draws us His members to Himself (Q. 45, 49 ff.).

We see from this, that the Reformed Churches did not represent a new view of the doctrine of the Person of Christ: they occupied the old Church ground of the Council of Chalcedon, prepared to maintain it against sects of every kind. At the same time, they stood at a greater distance from that series of teachers, which acquired the predominance in the Romish Church during the Middle Ages, because they rather laid stress on the full reality of the humanity of Christ. With the Romish Church,³ however, they opposed the doctrine of ubiquity, which they feared would lead to an equalization of the natures.⁴ Of

fullest on the subject of Christology. Separation by space does not prevent fellowship with the head,—which head is not the Logos, but the God-man. Compare Art. 21 with 8.

¹ Compare Catech. Genev. l. c. pp. 470 f., which (p. 472) refers the “*unctio*” more distinctly to the birth of Christ. According to p. 476, Christ was able to endure suffering in His soul, because “*paulisper delitescere ejus divinitas, h.e. vim suam non exercebat.*”

² The Catech. Genev. says,—Christ, really absent from the earth, is present with us through the power which streams forth from His glorified person. P. 478.

³ Turrianus, Busæus, Bellarmine, and other spokesmen of the Romish Church, agree here with the Reformed theologians as the defenders of the old, correct doctrine:—praise of but an ambiguous character, if, as is allowed, progress required to be made.

⁴ The main symbols of the Reformed Church blame merely this, not the Lutheran Christology in general.

far more importance for the history of Christology than the doctrinal principles of the Reformed Churches above referred to, is the work of the Reformed theologians before and after the completion of the "Formula Concordiæ."

It is unquestionable that the Christological literature of the Reformed Church, which reached its climax about the time of the "Formula Concordiæ," was perfectly a match for the Lutheran theology, whether as to spirit, acuteness, learning, or philosophical character;—in some respects, indeed, it was superior. What impelled the Reformed theologians of this time to apply themselves with all the force of their acute minds to this dogma, was the wish to preserve that peaceful relationship of the Churches, which was still maintained by the older Lutheran confessions. For in them, Christology did not as yet form a point of controversy.¹ We must dwell for a time on the most distinguished of these men. Besides Theodore Beza and Lambert Danæus, there are the noble, moderate, and gifted Antonius Sadeel and Zach. Ursinus. (Note 34.)

They bitterly complain, above all things, of the inaccuracy of the account given of the Reformed view by the "Formula Concordiæ" (which the Erfurt Apology for the Formula was compelled also in part to acknowledge) and the Lutheran Polemicists. These attacks ran as follows:—God has nothing really in common with the humanity of Christ; the two natures communicate nothing to each other, and stand in a purely mechanical relation to each other,—which leads to a Nestorian separation into two persons. This being the case, the sufferings of Christ did not affect the divine nature; and the human nature, having no participation in divine predicates, is shut up in heaven, and has nothing whatever to do with us: the divine nature nowhere performs its works in and with the human nature; the latter has no fellowship with the divine omnipotence, no perfect knowledge of God, or of that which is, was, and is to

¹ Compare *De libro Concordiæ Admonitio Christiana*, Neostad. 1581, c. 4, 5. An attempt is there made to prove a similar thing on behalf of Calvinism, in relation to the tenth article of the Augsburg Confession of 1530. The doctrine of predestination was as good as not treated as a point of difference by the Reformed at this time (especially as the "Formula Concordiæ" accepted Luther's work, "*De servo arbitrio*"), but merely the articles "*De persona Christi*," and "*De Cœna sacra*."

come, but has merely the knowledge requisite to the judgment:—in short, they attribute to Christ, as to His humanity, nothing supernatural. In their view, the worship of Christ, as to His humanity, is idolatry, according to the principle,—“*finitum non est capax infiniti*.” In this way, the door is opened to Arianism, because such a lack of divine attributes by the humanity is only intelligible on the supposition that the humanity was personally united, not with the Son of God, but merely with a subordinate being.

They were thus in a great measure treated unjustly. In reply, it was possible for them to say,—that they conceived the humanity of Christ not merely as borne and sustained (*sustentatum*) by the Logos (which is common, indeed, to it with all creatures, in that they also, according to Luther, are never able to sustain themselves), but, like the ancient Church, as most intimately, supernaturally, uniquely, in one word, personally united with God in Christ. Through this, human nature was brought into the most real possible fellowship with God (*Deus*). It is true, it is not, and never can become God, but remains a creature, consequently finite; and could not, therefore, without contradiction, receive that which is peculiar to the divine nature (*proprietas divinas*) as peculiarities of itself. Still, the humanity of Christ had not merely fellowship with the divine person (*Deus*); but as the divine person was the personific element, this man, though not indeed human nature, was God. Inasmuch, further, as the divine attributes, or the essence of deity, cannot be separated from the person, *deity* also was given to this man, and belongs to the substance of His person. Consequently, the humanity of Christ stands also in real fellowship with all divine attributes, to wit, through the medium of the person. For this reason, there can be no word of a Nestorian separation or duplication of the personality of Christ; for the Son of God was never in any instance naked deity,—never was He separated from the humanity which He had assumed, but even during the death of Christ, was personally united with it. From this follows also the injustice of the charge of denying that the sufferings of Christ affected the deity; for, on the contrary, the sufferings were the personal sufferings of the man whose personality was constituted solely by the person of the Logos: the suffering body and the soul of Christ were the body

and soul of the Son of God ; accordingly, the Son of God also suffered, though, it is true, only as to His humanity, not as to His deity. And because the Son of God is never without the humanity He assumed, He does everything with and in human nature : not, of course, everything through it ; for to create does not pertain to the creature. Still, even in creation, the humanity of Christ participates after its own manner. It is not inactive, or, as it were, dead and chained down in heaven, but throned in glory and majesty in the midst of the saints and angels ; it is the lord of all creation, and by its unutterable greatness,—a greatness appreciable by no creature,—exalted above every conceivable human magnitude, although it is not equal to the infinite God. Christ protects, tends the Church with His divine and human spirit : in this matter the two natures meet together. The humanity of Christ, by its earnest, powerful intercession, represents its brethren with the Father ; the deity works what the humanity supplicates, and what is very well known to itself. Christ is thus Mediator, Priest, King, Head, in both natures. The sun remains in the heaven, and yet diffuses its blessings ; so also the humanity of Christ, although it is not omnipresent. By faith the members are incorporated with the head, and also united with His humanity ; for the Logos, simple, and everywhere equal to Himself, is everywhere, where He offers Himself, no other than He who is also united with humanity. Whether His humanity is present as to space, makes no difference. They also grant that the knowledge of Christ as to His humanity had no determinate measure, but transcended every measure conceivable to us. Even the elect will have a perfect knowledge ; how then could it be lacking to the humanity of Christ, which stands unlimited above them all ? The potency of knowledge in it is infinite ; it can know all that it wills to know, through the deity which is in it, or in which it is. But, of course, it does not possess omniscience as God possesses it. As man, Christ cannot know everything by one act, at one glance, but merely in a succession of several acts. To equalize the creature with God, would be its destruction, not its perfection. It would then be made manifest, that humanity is not at all in a position to glorify God by its continuance. But inasmuch as God would then be the only remaining being, and He cannot call us brethren, through

the very exaltation, we should lose the true humanity, and the comfort it brings. On earth the knowledge of Christ was a growing one, as Luther also taught : in the state of exaltation, Christ knows all that pertains to his work and regiment ; indeed, all that it is His will to know, and that, too, as to His humanity. How, then, can it be just, they conclude, to charge the Reformed doctrine with the severance of the natures, or with improper concessions to philosophy and natural reason, when it rejects the notion of an equalization of the attributes of the two natures by communication ? The attributes of God are nothing but His essence, are inseparable therefrom, for they are not an external possession ; and so also are all the “ *proprietares essentielles* ” of human nature constitutive for the human essence. If, then, instead of an intimate fellowship of the attributes of the two natures and of themselves in the unity of the person, we assume a mutual real communication of attributes, it would be equivalent to a communication, an exæquation of the essence of the two natures, and Monophysitism would be unavoidable. The opposite view, instead of doing more for the union of what is distinct than the Reformed doctrine, does less ; not merely because it represents human nature as swallowed up, instead of united, by its adjustment or equalization with the divine ; but, because even if we should regard this Eutychian termination as an unintentional consequence of the Lutheran doctrine, and look rather to the tendency most proper to and distinctive of it, it, and precisely it, necessarily involves a duplication of the divine (by consequence also of the human), in other words, the opposite of unity. We should then have an original divine, and a derived divine, transferred to and deposited in humanity. If, however, we should prefer to say,—the one divine works through the humanity, as its organ, this is no union, but Monotheletism. It was precisely the Nestorians who tried to mask the separation involved in their doctrine, and to make the “ *Unio personalis* ” indispensable (like the Lutherans), by teaching the communication of the attributes. The Reformed Churches, on the contrary, for the sake of the personal union, confess, “ *Homo Christus substantialiter et realiter est Deus, omnipotens, infinitus,* ” to wit, “ *respectu Deitatis suæ.* ” It is true, the humanity of Christ cannot pass beyond the creatural limits ; for which reason, its

gifts which are communicated to it remain created gifts, which are as far removed from the divine attributes, that is, from the essence of God, as God is distinct from the creature. The humanity of Christ receives everything of which there is any susceptibility in it—in such a manner, however, that it is exalted, not annihilated thereby. Christ (Calv. Inst. iv. 17, 30) is everywhere entire (*totus*), although not the whole of Christ is everywhere. His person, to which the humanity belongs, is to be worshipped. But to demand that the humanity be worshipped by itself, is again to sever Christ, not to speak of its being idolatry. The annihilation of its essence would be the consequence of the real communication of divine essence or divine attributes. To appeal to the divine omnipotence, which can do all things, is of no avail; for the question is not, whether God is almighty; but whether He can contradict Himself, or whether He is not rather true? His word announces a true incarnation. The question then is,—Could God do that which would convert this truth into mere seeming? Our opponents' view gives us God-manhood only in name, not in substance. It reduces the omnipotence which strives for the union of the two absolutely different natures to impotence, by maintaining that it could only effect this in one way, that the two must rather needs be confounded. The miraculous and supra-rational element consists precisely in the circumstance, that the two natures, which in themselves are absolutely separated, are united in one person by the divine omnipotence: not in the circumstance, that in order to become one, the natures are made equal. And to what purpose? If we endow the human nature with divinity, we proceed precisely as though one nature alone might and could accomplish the work of redemption.¹

But the Lutherans, they go on to say, as they are unable to confute the Reformed doctrine, so also are they unable to prove their own. They lay chief stress on the necessary connection between the "*Unio personalis*" and the real "*Communicatio idiomatum*;" supposing that a fellowship which does not consist in a communication of attributes and workings (*communicatio transitiva, transfundens*) is not a real fellowship. But the

¹ Admon. Neostad. c. 3, pp. 63 ff.; Defensio, c. 2, Blatt 61-97; Sadeel l. c. c. 4, pp. 172 ff. He discusses 13 Objectiones, the Defensio 18 calumnias; compare Admon. c. 8.

"Formula Concordiæ" contradicts itself, in so far as at one time it represents the "*Communicatio idiomatum*" as the ground of the "*Unio personalis*," and at another time treats the latter as the source of the former.¹ The two things are irreconcilable, seeing that it is impossible for a thing to be the cause of itself. Further, the Lutherans talk as though nothing specific would characterize the indwelling of God in Christ, unless God constituted the humanity omnipresent, omnipotent, etc. On the contrary, this communication of attributes, in that it originates merely a second divine being, but no "*Unio*," constitutes Christ in a certain way quantitatively different from other men endowed with divine gifts; whereas the specific distinction lies in the mysterious, unutterable, personal union of the humanity with the Logos. The Lutherans would be in the right if personal union with another nature were equivalent to the reception of its essential attributes. But in that case, the reception must be a reciprocal one. In that they themselves, therefore, deny that God receives the human attributes, nay more, that God can receive anything at all, they confess that there is no essential and necessary connection whatever between the "*Unio personalis*" and the "*Communicatio idiomatum*." Besides which, the Lutherans maintain, on the one hand, that the communication of the attributes is necessarily involved in the idea of incarnation or of an "*Unio personalis*;" and yet, on the other hand, deny that such attributes as "*immensitas*," "*æternitas*," were really communicated to the humanity."² Now if the idea of the "*Unio*" does not necessarily and logically require the communication of all the divine attributes, by what right is the real communication of some actual divine attributes traced to the "*Unio*?" Nor are the images of

¹ Compare, for example, *Formula Concordiæ*, 766, 20, 22; 767, 26; with 764, 12; 780, 70; or 768, 31. The Suabians undoubtedly partly gave way; but still some obscurity continues to hang over this point in the "*Formula Concordiæ*."

² Compare, for example, *Bechmann's Annotat. to Leonh. Hutteri Comp. Theol.* 1690, pp. 158 ff., where the expedient is resorted to of saying—Not all the divine predicates can be *predicated* of the humanity; those not, which characterize the essence of God, the infinite. Nevertheless all predicates are *communicated*. The "*Communicatio*" without "*Prædicatio*" would be a lower, mediated form of "*Communicatio*," which the Reformed also would have had no difficulty in conceding.

the glowing sword, or of the relation between body and soul, when more carefully examined, favourable to the real communication of attributes. For as it is not the iron, but the heat in the iron, that burns, and not the heat, but the iron that cuts, we see that each of the two, unmixed with the other, produces its own peculiar effect, and that the communication is simply an union, which, though not a matter of indifference for the united elements, really confers nothing on either of them, to which they were not susceptible without their essence being destroyed. The iron, for example, does not receive lightness or a tendency upwards through the fire; and the fire in the iron shines farther than the iron is heated by it. So also the divine nature in Christ. Further, the iron is in itself black and cold, and becomes bright and warm through the fire; even so is the humanity of Christ adorned by high, supernatural gifts: but as the iron cannot be at the same time hot and cold, dark and shining, so neither can opposed attributes be ascribed to the humanity of Christ at one and the same time,—as, for example, finitude and infinitude, localization and visibility, invisibility and superiority to space. But even the relation between soul and body rather furnishes evidence in favour of the Reformed doctrine. For notwithstanding the union of soul with body, it is not the foot, but the soul, that thinks; moreover, it is not the limbs, but the spirit, that possesses the power of thought. The soul, and still more the Logos, is present in its entirety, wherever it is, not one part outside of the other; which cannot be said concerning the body, nor transferred to it. For when the body ceases to have one part outside of another, in other words, when its members cease to exist in space, it itself ceases to exist as a body—it is destroyed. And as the soul, although existing, willing, thinking in and with the body, does not do everything through the body, but, without prejudice to its union with the body, can perform within itself the operations of thought, because thought and the faculty of thought do not pertain to the body, even so the Logos in Christ.¹ Then follows a detailed exhibition of the difficulties and contradictions involved in the doctrine of a real communication of attributes. (Compare Admon. Neost. c. 9, pp. 297 ff. xi.—xli.)

¹ Compare Sadeel, pp. 185 ff.; Admon. 252 ff.; Danæus, Exam. 166–246.

The divine attributes are not to be regarded as an external possession: they are all essential, for in God there is nothing accidental; nay more, they constitute the essence of God, and in their unity are simply the living God Himself, who is to be conceived as "*actus purissimus*."¹ There can be no word, therefore, of a real communication of attributes without a communication of the essence. This was conceded also by *one* section of the Lutherans;² not, however, by Chemnitz, Selnecker, Kirchner, or in general by the Lower Saxons at the time of the "*Formula Concordiæ*." Against the Würtembergers the objection was raised, that they receive two sorts of divinity, an original divinity, and one posited by the will of God. The second, however, cannot be truly divine; for it is essential to the divine not to be created. And if we assume an outpouring of the divine essence,—that is not merely opposed to the unity of God, but leads to the physical, emanatistic theories of the old heretics.³ Supposing, however, that a divinity thus transferred were really divine, the humanity of Christ would have deity in itself, and the divine nature alongside of such an human nature would be inactive, nay more, useless. This opens the door to Arianism; to the same goal also tends the method of referring the strongest passages of Scripture against Arianism to the humanity. In fact, on this supposition, Christ is reduced to an

¹ The *Defensio* goes so far as to say,—The divine attributes are distinct solely in our thoughts; nay more, in God there is no "*possessio proprietatum*" which is not also "*usus*,"—a position which might have very dangerous consequences, if it related directly to the "*omnipotentia*," and not rather to the power over the omnipotence. Compare Blatt 14a, 55 ff.; see further for the following, *Defens. c. 3*.

² The Würtembergers, especially J. Andreæ, said,—"*God is omnipotence, wisdom*," etc. Among the later Lutherans, Gisenius also, in his "*de Zwinglio-Calvanismo fugiendo*" (Giessæ, 1621), says,—The divine attributes are the divine nature. Similarly all those who, like Calov, also teach a "*Communicatio naturarum*." The prevailing opinion, therefore, that the Lutheran doctrine of the "*Communicatio idiomatum*" is connected with the notion of the separability of the divine attributes from the divine essence, is erroneous. But in that case the communication of the divine essence must also be taught; as, for example, Andreæ still does in his "*Repetitio sanæ doct. M. Lutheri de persona Christi*," Vitenb. 1580, where he says,—"*Deitatem ipsam, hypostasim, etc., communicatam esse*." Compare above, Section I. page 717, Note 27.

³ So Sadeel.

Arian middle being, for the deity He is supposed to have is not “*ex se*” and “*per se* ;” in other words, it is a created deity. If, further, the divine essence is transferred to the humanity along with the divine attributes, confusion of the natures is unavoidable, and the human nature is abolished. Opposites, to wit, human and divine essence, would then belong to it at one and the same time. The humanity would be at one and the same time circumscribed, visible, local, finite, and uncircumscribed, invisible, illocal, infinite : it would be at the same time simple and without parts, and have parts which are outside of each other. Further, if the humanity, because it is taken up into the “*Unio personalis*,” must therefore have divine attributes, the body of Christ also must be omniscient and so forth, because it is taken up into the same unity along with the soul ;—in short, nothing would be too absurd to be possible. Things may very well be united in the person which cannot be united in the natures : it is absolutely impossible for human nature to have alongside of its own essence that which is opposed to its essence ; and if it were to take up such an opposed element into itself, with the loss of its essential distinction from the divine, it would itself be annihilated. Nor does it help the matter to say,—The humanity merely *has* the divine essence, whereas it itself is human ; for it is unworthy of the divine to become an accident of humanity, when in reality the divine nature bears the human. And the distinction between the state of humiliation and that of exaltation does not help us over the contradiction, that the human essence remains what it was, and yet has at the same time a divine essence, which is opposed to its own.

No better than the assumption of two sorts of divinity, one of which is poured into the humanity, is the doctrine of the other Lutherans, who deny the essence of God to be twofold, or communicable in such a sense as to become “*proprium*” to the human nature. They say, There is only a “*communicatio*” and *περιχώρησις* of the divine attributes, which, being unseparated from the divine essence, are for the advantage of the humanity, in so far as the Son of God acts through and in it, according to the image of the soul in the body, and the fire in the iron. If their opinion really be that the human nature merely has fellowship with the divine, and that the divine predicates are not communicated and do not pertain to the hu-

manity, we have no controversy with them; in that case, the real "*Communicatio idiomatum*" would be limited to the person. But that this did not satisfy men like Chemnitz, is clear from their employment of expressions which signify that the divine was deposited in the humanity itself; especially, however, from representations regarding the body of Christ, which Chemnitz also entertained, on account of the Eucharist. What is this but to say,—The human nature had divine attributes as its property, and it had them not? It is true, they lay stress on the inviolability of the essence of the two natures, they repudiate the "*transfusio physica*," and in asserting the real communication of the attributes, are bent solely on securing the unity; but all this has only meaning on the supposition that the divine attributes are separable from the divine essence,—a supposition which plainly leads to coarse representations. The attempt to leave the divine essence out of consideration, by describing the divine attributes, so far as they are communicated to the humanity, as attributes which the humanity has not "*ex se*" and "*per se*," whereas God has them both from and through Himself, leads again to that separation of essence and attributes which, though partially justifiable in the case of mutable, perfectible man, is totally inadmissible in the case of God. Supposing this distinction were admissible, we should arrive again—that is, in the sphere of the attributes—at a twofold divinity, as it were, a higher and a lower divinity. But omnipotence, omniscience, and the like attributes, with their infinitude, do not admit of such a distinction. Every infinitude must destroy human nature, must convert the creature into the Creator; and to suppose, notwithstanding, that the limited human nature at the same time continues to exist, is not to obviate the evil, but to throw together things that are incompatible with each other, in a way that Eutyches and Schwenckfeld would never have ventured upon. For what are we to think when the body of Christ is said to be circumscribed, local, in one place, and uncircumscribed, in all places, at one and the same time?

The doctrine of the ubiquity of the body of Christ is controverted with special zeal, and unweariedly are the contradictions exposed which it involves.¹ Sadeel refers, in particular, to the circumstance, that the entire doctrine of ubiquity, nay

¹ Defens. Bl. 119b ff.; Admon. 303 ff., 155 ff., 250 ff.

more, of the real communication of attributes, is laid down for the sake of the Eucharist, whilst it fails utterly to fulfil its purpose.¹ For the possibility of a special, limited presence of the body of Christ in the Holy Supper, so far from being established, is really excluded by the idea of its actual and professedly necessary omnipresence. What the Lutherans are concerned about, is the physical enjoyment of the body of Christ, consequently about its existence in a place, in a limited shape; but if the body of Christ is at the same time everywhere (consequently, also, previously in him who partakes of it), the distinctive characteristic of the Eucharist must be injuriously affected. That which is omnipresent can experience no movement,—cannot therefore be moved into the mouth in, with, and under the elements. A further remarkable contrast is, that the Lutheran doctrine begins with the illocality of the human nature of Christ in the person; nay more, with regarding heaven, not as a place, but merely as God's right hand; and ends with localizing it in the most glaring manner, to wit, in the "os." He adds further,—If it be said the "Unio" denotes, primarily, merely a relation of the human nature to the Logos; space does not come into consideration in connection therewith; the union is illocal;—we must ask, Was, then, the body of Christ never in Mary's womb? Could He then really have had a human body, if He were not bounded by other corporeal objects? If we deny His localization, because of the illocal union, instead of positing the union of the illocal Logos with the localized body, and if we convert this latter idea into that of the ubiquity of the body, then the humanity of Christ, instead of being in Mary, must have been everywhere; after His resurrection, He was still in the grave; after His death, as to His soul He still remained united with the body, and so forth. The entire Gospel history is thus converted into a mere show; under the pretence of exalting Christ, we are robbed of that which was fullest of consolation. To say,—He was in Mary, on the cross, in the grave, and at the same time ubiquitous as to His humanity, leads to the assumption of two bodies,—the one lowly, subject to suffering; the other free from suffering, and not on the cross, unless indeed we should attribute ubiquity to the cross and the grave. If the body of Christ were ubiquitous, it would be like God, because there cannot be

¹ Sadeel l. c. pp. 170 ff.

two kinds of omnipresence: no longer would one member thereof be outside the other, but it would be everywhere present in its totality, even as the spirit is. In that case, however, it would have lost its lineaments and form, and would rather have become spirit; the determinate concrete body of Christ would be lost, would be dissipated into something general; and precisely then the Eucharist would no longer be the communion of the body of Christ. Nor does the notion of an hypothetical, instead of an absolute, omnipresence, or more precisely of a "multivolipræsentia" (Chemnitz), lead us any further. For if the body of Christ be conceived to be present in the Supper, in different parts of the earth at the same time, we must either suppose it to be multiplied (as the Church in the Middles Ages in part assumed), and recognise some sort of magic as the cause of the multiplication (which was abhorrent, above all, to the Würtembergers), or renounce the unity of the body; for a body can only be one and the same in different places at the same time, by its extending without break from the one place to the other.

Sadeel further remarks also,—How strange it is, on the one hand, to adopt for the Supper as hyperphysical and supernatural a representation of the Person of Christ as possible; and, on the other hand, to take so predominantly physical a view of the enjoyment itself, and to attach chief importance to the oral reception of the body, that scarcely any allusion is made to fellowship with the soul of Christ and with the Logos, into which we are to be implanted.

Chemnitz and his adherents, as we have shown, laid greater stress than the Suabians on the "*Unio personalis*," as the necessary source of a real "*Communicatio idiomatum*." This gives occasion to new doubts. If the necessary consequence of the "*Unio*" of the natures in the "*persona*" is the "*Communicatio idiomatum*," they ought in consistency to go on to transfer the human predicates altogether to the divine nature, and all the divine predicates—consequently also spirituality, simplicity, impassibility—to the human nature; not, however, arbitrarily to exclude the one and the other. We should then arrive at the eternity of the humanity of Christ, towards which goal, indeed, the illocality was the first step. This once acknowledged, a *κένωσις* would be entirely out of the question. For if

it be a rending of Christ, of His personal union with man, to say that, although He was constantly united with the man Jesus, the body of Christ was not everywhere present with the Logos, it is also a rending of the "Unio personalis" to say that the body of Christ was not ubiquitous during the state of humiliation, but first became ubiquitous after His exaltation. If, on the contrary, it be no rending, they ought to cease deriving the ubiquity from the "Unio personalis," seeing that they really trace it to the exaltation as its source. The same remark may be made concerning the other attributes and activities of God. From the "Unio personalis" follows either the communication of all the attributes or of none. The Lutherans themselves do not venture to adopt the former alternative; we must abide, therefore, by the latter. In order notwithstanding to establish a real communication of attributes through the "Unio personalis," some therefore fall back on the position, that the human nature merely had possession, not also the use, of the divine majesty. Herein is contained, indeed, an involuntary confession that the Person of Christ is not at once rent by those who maintain, that the humanity during the state of humiliation did not work everything with the Logos, who for His part never refrained from the use of His attributes, and therefore must have worked alone while the humanity rested. But this distinction of possession and use cannot be conceded. Is it possible to possess omniscience or omnipresence, without their being at the same time an actuality?¹ The design is, by such means to preserve the truth of the human development of Christ: all that is attained, however, is a distinction in the revelation of that which was always equally existent for others, though not for Christ's own consciousness. But the development is not to be restricted solely to the consciousness; for the favourite images of sleep and swoon during which the possession continues, and only the consciousness is lacking, cannot be applied to the Logos Himself, though they must needs be extended to Him also, if we are to derive the "Communicatio idiomatum" from the "Unio personalis."² Even the image of the soul of a child,

¹ Similarly also in relation to omnipotence, Sadeel and the Defensio maintain that the distinction between *potence* and "actus" is inadmissible.

² There can be no word of a "deliquium," but only of a "nubes," which kept back the revelation of the Logos for others and in Christ Him-

in which every faculty still slumbers, is inapplicable, partly because the child really grows (for example, physically), even as to possession, and is not from the beginning in *possession* of all knowledge and potency; and partly because the Lutherans, in order to be able to represent the humiliation as a divine-human act, must suppose, not only the possession, but even a certain use, of the divine majesty to have preceded the state of slumber; nay more, evince an inclination to allow that the humanity sporadically used the divine majesty, even during the state of humiliation, when and as Christ willed. The Reformed, however, returned continually to this point, that if the unity of the person requires such a real interchange of attributes, either the Logos must assume human attributes, such as limitation, visibility, separateness of the parts, yea, even passibility; or, if this do not take place, because it contradicts the nature of deity, for the same reason no attributes can be attributed to the humanity, which do not accord with its essence. This those desire, at all events for the earthly life of Christ, who hold rather to the *χρησις* than to the *κτησις*, and suppose that the humanity of Christ was allowed merely the use of the divine attributes *without the possession*,—the latter being, strictly speaking, reserved for the Logos, who has them “in se” and “per se.” But either the attributes are then considered in the light of things which may be let out for use to another, without being really his own possession; or else we must understand by the use referred to, that the Logos is properly the user, and that He works through the medium of, and thus holds fellowship with, the humanity. The first is an essentially absurd idea; the latter leads to the doctrine of the Reformed Churches, unless we return to the idea already referred to, that the Logos works everything through humanity as His organ. From all this they draw the conclusion, that the doctrine of the real communication of the attributes

self during the state of humiliation. Phil. ii., with the Lutherans, they referred to the incarnation (which neither Luther nor Calvin was in the habit of doing; see the latter's Inst. ii. 14, 3). The subject of the exinanition in Phil. ii. is the Logos, not, as most Lutherans suppose, the God-man; for the “conceptio,” through which the God-man first entered on existence, was not prior to the “abdicatio” (humiliation), but rise and “conceptio,” consequently also humiliation, were coincident, and the Logos entered into personal union with man in his lowliness, in virtue of an “inclinatio miserationis” (Leo M.). That signifies His humiliation.

leads to irreconcilable contradictions (indeed, the "communicatio" both of the attributes and the activities of the two natures), so soon as the natures themselves are conceived to be their receivers. These difficulties are avoided if the real communication be taken to refer solely to the person, the "Concretum," not, however, to the natures themselves (in abstracto), save through the medium of the person.

Not without a measure of self-complacency were the Reformed theologians accustomed to direct attention to the vacillation and variety of the views entertained by the Lutherans themselves on this same subject. This they regarded as a sign of uncertainty, instead of as a proof that a living, not yet completed, process was being undergone, and a deeper view being taken of the problem, contrasting therewith the, on the whole, undeniable sameness and steadiness of their own doctrine. One party, as Selnekker, Kirchner, and the Lower Saxons in general, described it as an abomination to suppose the body of Christ to be present in the foliage, the trees, and so forth, as Luther taught in the year 1526; the other party says, He is worthy of anathema who believes that the body of Christ is less ubiquitous than the deity.¹ The "Formula Concordiæ" teaches both at the same time. For, on the one hand, it cites those words of Luther, and sanctions the writings published by him between the years 1526 and 1528; on the other hand, it teaches that Christ is bodily present wherever He wills, thus making His presence dependent on an act of will; which is incompatible with the doctrine, that "ubiquitas," like all the divine attributes, pertained to the humanity, in direct and necessary consequence of the "Unio." It shows the same uncertainty also as to the question, Whether the "Unio personalis" was the active principle, or the result, of the "Communicatio idiomatum." Such things reveal to us the work of welding and concealing contra-

¹ Selnekker designates the "Ubiquitas absoluta figmentum Sathanæ" (Chemnitz, a "monstrum" and "portentum"), and yet subscribed the Bergian formula, which included Luther's words—"omnia in universum plena esse Christi etiam juxta humanam naturam;" which repeatedly says, —Whoso believeth not that where the Logos is, there also is the humanity of Christ, divideth the person; and which assumes Luther's doctrine of the three modes of existence of the body of Christ—that also according to which "Christi corpus repletive, absolute ut Deus, in omnibus creaturis sit." Compare Præf. Defens.

dictions going on amongst the Lutherans; and the Reformed are convinced that if the "Formula Concordiæ" did not stand in the way, and pledge them to contradiction, the Lutherans would come to an understanding amongst themselves in favour of our view.

Herein, however, they deceived themselves. However pertinent might be the objections advanced by the Reformed theologians; however irrefutably they demonstrated the incompleteness and assailableness of the Lutheran view,—and in point of fact, new differences soon enough arose out of the badly conciliated antagonism between the Würtembergers and the Lower Saxons,—it is still true that, differ as they might from each other, the Lutherans pursued an homogeneous tendency, which could not have been satisfied with the type of Christology set up by the doctrinal writers of the Reformed Church. The Reformed dogmaticians were quite correct in asserting that they clung to the traditional point of view, especially that of the Council of Chalcedon and that of Dyotheletism, more firmly than the Lutheran Church. It gave it still more distinct and logical form, in that, with full consciousness, it took for the basis thereof the absolute difference between the essence of God and that of man, which had been the impelling principle with those early councils. The distinction from the older doctrine is simply, that the Reformed, in all earnestness, asserted the reality of the humanity of Christ; whereas during the entire period from the year 451 onwards, onesided predominance had been given to the divine nature. One would naturally expect the Reformed to fall into the same fault, seeing that they represented the creature in general, consequently also the humanity of Christ, as the subject of absolute predestination. For this appears necessarily to lead to a slighting of the humanity. We find, however, the very contrary. In this respect, the Reformed theologians shared the general tendency of modern times, laying greater stress on the reality of the humanity of Christ (though, it is true, they did not, for the most part, consider the "liberum arbitrium" to be one of its constituent elements), and thus evincing that they had made progress, as compared with the Romish Church. How now does the antagonism of the Reformed theologians to Docetism rhyme with their doctrine of predestination? From the soil of the early and non-predesti-

narian Church, Adoptianism burst forth ever afresh with a free human Ego, so soon as the reality of the humanity began seriously to be maintained. The Reformed Churches, on the contrary, in the idea they laid down of God and man,—an idea whose most distinct expression was their doctrine of absolute predestination,—secured, on the one hand, an absolute distinction of the natures which can never be shifted or obliterated; and yet, on the other hand, the passive determinableness of humanity for the incarnation of God. Its absolute dependence on God, which belongs to its essence, must, namely, be able to take such a form that it can be personally appropriated by the Logos, and yet at the same time retain the dependent position befitting it as a creature. But although the Reformed dogmatists found in this dependence a means of securing the distinct actuality of the humanity, without falling into the Adoptian error of a double personality, the actual humanity thus arrived at was not the *true* humanity. For without controversy, a person conceived solely from the point of view of absolute dependence on God, cannot be the free Son of man full of grace and truth, but is the Christ bound down under the law. Nay more, Christ continues eternally in this state, as it has its ground, not in the humiliation, but in the eternal and essential relation between God and the creature, as viewed by the Reformed theologians. In this aspect, their Christology must have appeared to the Lutherans never to advance beyond the state of humiliation; even as, on the other hand, the Christology of the Suabians and the “Formula Concordiæ” appeared to the Reformed not really to teach a state of humiliation. From opposite reasons, neither of them was able to posit two actual states, but each remained limited either to that of humiliation or to that of exaltation. The Reformed theology, in particular, constantly returned as to a final appeal to the principle,—“*finitum non est capax infiniti*;” and was totally unable to comprehend how a reasonable or pious mind could deny its truth, inasmuch as the contrary necessarily appeared to it blasphemous and idolatrous.¹

The two Christologies are undoubtedly, therefore, marked by considerable differences. At first sight, the Reformed may appear, in fact, more approveable.

¹ For example, Danæus Exam. p. 294; Paræus Irenicum, c. 28; Admon. Neostad. 376 ff., 250 ff.; Sadeel l. c. pp. 146, 182, 183.

On the other hand, however, there is one spot of the Reformed Christology, where its apparent simplicity and clearness changes into obscurity and indefiniteness ; where it is compelled to confess the superiority of the Lutheran view ; nay more, where it is unable to free itself from the fundamental Lutheran thought, and thus loses its own compactness and position. If it did right in raising an unwearied protest against the position, that veritable divinity is appropriated also to the humanity ; if it does its endeavour to establish merely a fellowship of the divine with the human, instead of the existence of a real point, which conjoined both divinity and humanity : how is it reconcilable with its persistent assertion of the unity of the person, and its saying that the man Christ was omnipotent through the person, but nothing divine could pertain to the human nature ? Is, then, the person not of divine essence ? Or does it not pertain to the human nature ?¹ If it be not of divine essence, what is it then, seeing that it is the person of the Logos ? In contradiction with their doctrine of the simplicity of the divine essence, the Reformed Churches would then have to acknowledge a distinction between the person and the essence of the Logos ; which, though certainly not without example in earlier times, is not less doubtful in character than, nay more, runs tolerably parallel with, the distinction drawn by their opponents between incommunicable essence and communicable attributes.² At this point the Lutherans persist in maintaining, that the personality of the Logos cannot be conceived without the fulness of its attributes ; consequently, if the person pertain to the human nature, so also must the attributes. Or shall we say that the person of the Logos did not exist without its essence

¹ The Lutherans did not neglect to direct attention to this inconsistency ; see, for example, Balth. Menzer, *Exeges. Conf. Aug.* 1621, p. 78. Some deny that the humanity became personal in the Logos ; so Sadeel, p. 169. Further notice will be taken in the immediate sequel of the consequences of this supposition.

² Some of the Reformed theologians (as, for example, Danæus, *Exam.* p. 82 ; Joh. Pincier, “*De cœna domini* ;” Sohn, *Exeges. Conf. Aug.* ; and others), in order to be able to teach an appropriation of the divine person, without by consequence positing a real communicatio of the *idiomatum*, of the natures or essence, assumed that the person of the Logos, but not His nature, became man. Compare Quenstedt's *Systema*, P. III. c. 3, 143 ; Menzer l. c. p. 133. The former was in no instance “*extra humanitatem* ;” the latter might be.

and attributes, but did not really become the property of human nature?¹ What, then, was bestowed on the human nature, if not even the person was bestowed on it? For, inasmuch as the union, by means of the real "*Communicatio idiomatum*," is also denied, there is no real point of unity whatever, and the incarnation itself is reduced to a mere seeming. The humanity remaining impersonal, even during the "*Unio*," because the divine personality is not also at the same time its own, is nihilistically mutilated, and made a selfless organ of the deity; and the divine person is, as it were, merely accounted its property, without its being able to consider it in the light of a veritable possession. And if, finally, they should say, the divine nature of the Logos did not become the property of the human, because the person is nothing at all by itself; because person simply denotes the intelligible nature, viewed in its distinctness, and merely marks the limit,—a limit, however, which is abolished by the "*Unio*" of the two natures, in that, through that union, or through the conjunction to one person of that which prior to the "*Unio*" had existed in singularity and separation, that is, in double personality² (as, after the manner of the old Monophysites, Reformed theologians of the Cartesian school, such as Wittich, Braun, and others, taught);³ then the mysterious expression, "*Unio personalis*," which seems to signify so much, and really signifies nothing, is substantially given up as a point of departure, and steps are taken to return to the original Lutheran view, that the "*Unio naturarum*" was rather the first, and the "*Unio personalis*" its result. The question would then be, Wherein consists and manifests itself the union of the natures? In other words, the Reformed theologians would be facing the problem at which the Lutherans **had** been labouring from the very beginning. But if through the incarnation even only the person of the

¹ So Joh. Piscator:—"Christ is not *filius divinus per unionem personalem*, as to His humanity." Further, Wendelin, Samuel Maresius; compare Menzer l. c. p. 137; Quenstedt, p. 134. Otherwise, on the contrary, Calvin, Instit. L. ii. 14, 4. Compare Quenstedt l. c. pp. 132 ff.

² Similarly already Zanchius, De tribus Elohim; see Menzer l. c. p. 134. Even prior to the "*Unio*" the humanity was an *ὑφιστάμενον*; through the "*Unio*" it became one *ὑφιστάμενον* with the Logos.

³ Compare Pet. van Mastricht's *Gangræna Cartesiana*, Amst. 1677, Sect. II. c. 34, pp. 513 ff.

Logos becomes actually the property of the humanity, an irremediable rent is made in the Christology, whose most clearly defined expression is the absolute principle, "*finitum non est capax infiniti*;" and the question then becomes, How, without commixture and confusion, and without detriment to, nay more, in virtue of the distinction of their essence, divine and human can be connected in Christ? To the answering of this question, however, would be necessary a development of the idea of God and man, that should be equally far removed from the idea laid down by absolute Predestinarianism on the one hand, and from the magical and Pelagianizing point of view of the Middle Age Church on the other. The way must have been prepared for rising above the legal position of the mere absolute dependence of the humanity of Christ, by the consideration, that inasmuch as creatures in general, no less than Christ, are dependent on God, and He cannot therefore on this ground have held an unique position,¹ this dependence must have assumed in Him the form and character of a living susceptibility of His essence to a real union of Him with God, and of God with Him. Christ's humanity would thus be supposed to be not merely passively determinable, but to be stirred by yearnings after the reception of the divine; and the entrance of the divine into human nature could no longer be regarded as a contra-natural miracle (as it is, according to the principles of the Reformed theologians and of Chemnitz), as a mysterious contradiction, brought into existence by mere omnipotence; but as a fulfilment of the needs of Christ's human nature itself. This being the case, the divine could no longer be deemed an heterogeneous element, but that in which human nature realized its own truth, perfection, freedom, and blessedness;—consequently, the human nature had it "subjective in se."

On this view, the Reformed position, that participation in the divine attributes implies also participation in divine nature, would undoubtedly have to be conceded: indeed, such a con-

¹ Hence the opposition, for example, of Menzer (l. c. pp. 121, 134) to the Romish and Reformed doctrine, that the "*Unio*" is "*gestatio, sustentatio in $\Delta\acute{o}\gamma\omega$* " (P. Martyr, Dial. fol. 10; similarly Sadeel, Pezel, Beza). Menzer answered,—"*Sustentatio*" is the work of the entire Trinity, but does not therefore lead to "*Unio*;" for the Word sustains all things, and not Christ alone.

cession was quite in the spirit of Luther and the Würtembergers, as opposed to later confusing halfnesses. It would not be necessary, indeed, to assert the immediate and universal divinity of humanity; on the contrary, human nature, in its empirical state and general form (even apart from sin), must be distinguished from its idea; the first Adam from the second. To the essence of the latter appertains, that the divine has become in Him the property also of the human; to the essence of the former merely, that the human should be susceptible of that divine deed which constituted Christ a child, and which constitutes Adam's children children of God, raised above the bare, legal stage of obedience and dependence, to freedom in God, into the family of God.

The superiority of the fundamental thought of the Lutheran theologians (however clumsily and coarsely it may have been expressed), is especially evinced in the lofty estimate formed, notwithstanding empirical appearances, of the *idea* of man. Human nature first truly possesses itself, when by grace it possesses the divine,—when it has God, not merely as the Lord on whom it depends, but as the one who dwells in it, and stills its yearnings with Himself. It is not beyond its “*capacitas*” to be free from time, to stand with its soul in eternity, and to live with God eternal life. The corporeality of man, also, says the Lutheran, though now dark and heavy, would be falsely conceived, if its present materiality, limitedness, divisibility, and so forth, were to be regarded as its essence. That would be to form our idea from the empirical man, instead of from the thoughts of the grace of God, or from the idea. The Reformed doctrine also grants, it is true, that the body will assume spiritual qualities; this concession, however, it cannot properly make, without contradiction, if it form its conception of the body from its actual condition. It endeavours, therefore, to keep this spiritual element distinct from the proper, permanent substance of the body, characterizing it as a mere accident. The Lutheran doctrine deemed the spiritualization of the body, its freedom from the conditions of space, to be the realization of its true idea. Accordingly, we can say in general, in opposition to the Middle Ages, both Confessions were concerned to show the humanity to be real, and not merely apparent:—the Reformed Church considered the reality of the humanity to be

better guaranteed in the form which corresponds to our present earthly circumstances; the Lutheran adheres rather to the ideal, or to the idea of a glorified humanity, as compared with which, it considers the empirical form of our human life to be somewhat transitory, to be marked by a mere semblance of reality. > This is the root of the remarkable Lutheran doctrine of an *illocal* union of the Logos and humanity. The purpose thereof was by no means, as Schneckenburger supposes, to establish an "Unio" precedent to the "conceptio," with which connected itself the self-abasement, which leads to the "conceptio" of the God-man. What they intended to teach was, that the relation to Mary and her body was not the essential feature of the incarnation; nothing external can exert an originally determining influence in this connection; but the essential, fundamental element, altogether apart from time and space, lies in the relation which the illocal and eternal Logos purposed to establish (in the fulness of the times) between Himself and humanity. Humanity itself was thus made participator in illocality and eternity; even as deity became a participator, through the humanity, in time and space. What Mary gives is certainly temporal, spatial; but these are merely elements, which themselves are again relatively accidental and exchangeable; whereas the God-man could only be brought to pass by an act of the Logos, whose will it was to become man,—an act standing above these elements, whilst absorbing them into itself. A clear and logical completion of the doctrine of the superiority of this "Unio" to space and time, of the participation of the humanity in the illocality and eternity of the Logos, must have necessitated the postponement of the full realization of the "Unio" to the close of the earthly career of Christ, when He was exalted (which is the truth lying at the basis of the Reformed view), and the careful discrimination therefrom of the temporal-spatial life of the God-man. It must have distributed that which, represented as simultaneous, involves a multitude of contradictions, into two main stadia, in order that, as the Reformed Church justly demanded (Admon. Neostad. p. 301), the full, historical, veritable actuality of the earthly appearance of Christ might be acknowledged, and the reality of His humanity not be prejudiced by prematurely assuming its existence in full truth and perfection. On the other hand, however, it

would be quite as perverse to confound the historical *actuality* of the God-man with the *true form* or *idea* of His humanity, and in drawing the picture of the glorified Lord, of the true and actual God-man, to introduce traits borrowed from, and suitable alone to, humanity in its earthly form. Rather must the idea of the man who, in his personal union with God can say, "All Thine is mine" (an idea realized at the end of the process), also be the motive principle through the various earthly stages, and form an element in the consideration of the section of the life, through which its realization is mediated. This idea has undoubtedly a real, eternal being, in the "inclinatio amoris" of the Logos, who determined to become incarnate. For His will of love constituted so completely, as it were, the very heart of His loving nature, that He in His entirety, or in His entire essence, was determined by it; and with all His infinitude or omnipresence, was in no instance without this most inward and real relation to this central act of love. It is revealed to us, that the inmost thought of His condescending love was His becoming an actuality in the external world; but in order to give inwardness to that which had acquired outward reality (zu verinnerlichen das äusserlich Gewordene); in order, as personal, to heal that which is personal, and to fill that which is empty; in order to become the centre and head of a new cosmos, in which, by a wondrous union of the clearness and the mystery of love, both the inward should attain to transparent manifestation, and the outward to the deepest inwardness.

As to the Reformed Church, we need scarcely add the summary observation, that it never failed earnestly and sincerely to recognise the incarnation of the Only-begotten Himself (a point which is decisive both for Church and the fellowship of churches); and in this respect renounced, along with the Lutheran, not only Ebionism and Nestorianism, but also the Docetism of the Christology of Roman Catholicism. For this reason also, as far as concerns the more precise and complete development of the doctrine, it was able, starting as it did with the recognition of the fundamental fact in its purity, to develop out of itself the true elements of the Lutheran Christology.

SECTION III.

THE SOCINIANS.

THOUGH the Socinians were far from occupying a position at the centre of the Reformatory movement;—for they never wearied of controverting the high-priestly office of Christ, with its necessary premises;—still Christology occupies an important place in their system, and they deemed themselves called upon to extend the work of the improvement of the faith to this doctrine also. (Note 35.) The contradictions which they found in the traditional doctrine, they exposed clearly to view, and supposed themselves to have discovered again the primitive Christian doctrine. Their interest was mainly concentrated, not on the religious in the stricter sense of the term,—they totally lacked a deeper consciousness of sin and guilt,—but on the moral, of which they took a legal, though it was at the same time also a religious view, in so far as they neither approved of eudæmonism nor of purism, neither spoke of merit in relation to God, nor were indifferent to the highest good, so far as it includes also deliverance from evils; but, on the contrary, considered blessedness to consist in immortality, as the final goal of the children of God. Therein were they agreed with the Reformed theologians, that there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite; but they based this absolute difference of essence, not on the circumstance that all things are absolutely dependent on the absolute God, but inversely, in a completely Scotistic manner, on human freedom, combined with the doctrine of the natural darkness in things divine of that which is placed outside of God.¹ They also held God to be originally absolute power, “*liberum arbitrium* ;”—hence the divine law roots ultimately in the arbitrary will of God: but they said also,—God used His absolute power, partially to renounce it in favour of the world and creatures; He gave

¹ Compare the Pseudo-Clementines. See Division I. vol. i.

away a part of it. Thus, here also that aspect of the "*liberum arbitrium*" is fixed for God, in which its own absolute indeterminism is bound by the very act of freedom, in that, as the Socinians so frequently reiterate, "*factum infectum fieri nequit.*"¹ To the distinction of God from the world belongs, that the world is characterized by multiplicity and division, God (in contrast to the Trinity) is simple, distinctionless unity. God willed also the existence of spiritual beings as free, as he Himself is free; this, however, does not constitute equality, but rather essential distinctness. For the essence of God is to be the one absolute Being, the creative cause of all things: by the act of creation, however, He voluntarily renounced His absoluteness, and became actually "the highest Being." But God can never, as Sabellianism taught, communicate His essence, which even subsequently to creation continues to exist as an absolute potency.

The next conclusion drawn by the Socinians from the principle recognised by the Middle Age and the Reformed Churches, "*nulla proportio finiti est cum infinito,*" was, that there can be no word of an union of the divine and human natures in one person. They considered it to be inconsistent in the Reformed theologians to assume, in the sphere of *personality*, an union of such thoroughly disparate magnitudes, which they justly denied in the sphere of the *natures*. If such an "*Unio personalis*" took place, say the Socinians, the conclusion must undoubtedly be drawn, that the divine and human natures interchanged their "*idiomata*;" and the Lutherans, if they did not contradict the "*Unio personalis*" by teaching an "*exinanitio*," would have consistency on their side; though, it is true, the falsity of the starting-point is brought to light by absurdities, and by the blasphemous deductions, that the Most High God actually suffered, and was a man. Moreover, say they, it is in itself impossible to form an unity out of two totalities. This position they take up in opposition both to the general doctrine

¹ Hence their doctrine, that through freedom God's knowledge, and through the existence of a world outside of Him, His essential presence, is limited.

"So ist hier auch für Gott die Seite des *liberum arbitrium* fixirt, wornach dessen absoluter Indeterminismus durch den Akt der Freiheit selbst gebunden wird."

of the Church and to recent Arians.¹ Nothing which is one in itself, can have two essential forms. Now, according to the teachings of the Church and of the Arians, the Son of God had already a perfect existence prior to the incarnation; He cannot therefore have, besides, that "*forma essentialis*" which is, being a man. And if notwithstanding He has this same "*forma*," it must be as something supplementary, accidental,—something which does not belong to His essence, but was merely as a garment which He put on. But "*putting on*" and *being* are two different things. Accordingly, it is thoroughly unallowable to speak of God *being* man.² But they consider the doctrine of the Church also to clash with an essential Christian interest. Every enhancement of the Person of Christ at the expense of His humanity, is in reality a lowering, a partial denial of the highest work of God, robs us of the consolation which lies in the humanity of Christ, dims the glory and dignity to which, as we see from Christ, if He were flesh of our flesh, humanity is to be exalted. It is time, therefore, to cease inventing two natures in Christ; of which the first three Evangelists, and, properly explained, John also, know nothing. The prevalence of the notion is due rather to the Council of Nicæa, which marked an apostasy from the ancient Christian faith. If we assume a divine nature in Christ which did not, nay more, could not, become passible and finite, the humanity is still mutilated. All the passages of Scripture refer to Christ as a man. (Note 36.) Only on this supposition are passages like Mark xiii. 32 and John xiv. 28, where Christ speaks of His ignorance and of the Father being greater than He, intelligible. For with what right can those who otherwise always represent the divine nature as the Ego in Christ, and lay all stress on everything being common to the two natures, here, where Christ simply predicates ignorance and being less than the Father of His person, to refer the words to His humanity taken alone by itself? Do they then believe in a robbery, alongside of the *communicatio, idiomatum*? Or, applying their own image of body and soul, is it allowable

¹ Compare above, pp. 161–171.

² The Arian doctrine does not admit of our recognising humanity as exalted in Christ, because at the bottom it has no man. But in this case, we should be deprived of the example, promises, consolation, confidence, which all are grounded on His humanity.

to say, that man does not know because his body is ignorant? Had Christ known the day of judgment according to a second divine nature, He would not have been able simply to say, that He knew it not. But the unity of His nature must, therefore, above all be assumed, because the unity of his person must be maintained. God is a person, but so also is man; humanity does not subsist in its truth without human personality. Consequently, if Christ is not to be regarded as two persons, and the human nature like the divine is to be conceived as personal, the only alternative is, either to deny that Christ was truly a man, or to allow that He did not consist of two natures.¹ It is wrong to take offence at this. For even the doctrine of two natures, if it adhere to the position that the humanity retains its essential predicates, and is as far from becoming God as God is from becoming man, cannot bring forward, as the fruit of its pretended "*Unio personalis*," anything more than that infinitely great gifts were conferred on the humanity by the divine nature or by God. But in order to arrive at this result—a result unquestionably of great importance to Christianity, and at the same time the only one really necessary—there is no need for the hypothesis of a personal *Unio* of two natures,—an hypothesis which is pressed by invincible difficulties, especially for the period of Christ's earthly life;—all that is needed is a higher representation of the *susceptibility of human nature to exaltation to divine dignity*. This, however, leads us to consider the positive aspect of the Socinian system.

The metaphysical separation of the simple essence of God from the essence of the world, lends indeed to the world such an independence relatively to God, that the being, will, and knowledge of God are partially limited by it. The act of creation, absolutely free as it was, was at the same time a divine self-limitation. But the reverse aspect of this independence of the world is, inasmuch as it cannot be God, that its reality is imperfect, that merely a limited measure of the power to be,

¹ Val. Smalcus:—"Si una persona describitur J. Chr., quomodo verus Deus erit et verus homo? Potestne esse verus Deus absque persona sua? Iterumque *verus homo potestne carere sua persona?* Certe nihil minus. Persona enim homo est, et persona Deus est. Itaque aut negandum est Christum esse verum Deum et verum hominem, aut confitendum, eum duas habere personas."

and of reality, is bestowed on it; or, in other words, that transitoriness essentially characterizes it, not only as to the body, but also as to the spirit. The first creation is saddled with death by a necessity of nature; the creative power of God cannot have for itself other products, because it cannot posit beings of infinite power: that would be incompatible with the uniqueness of God. This evil already leaves room for the work of redemption, for a second creation, which, on the basis of the first, and proceeding forth from the unfathomable love and compassion (not merely power) of God, gives us to share in His eternal blessed life. However independent the act of creation may make man in relation to the will, the reverse aspect of this existence outside of God is separation from His light, or the natural darkness of man in divine things. But as man, alongside of his necessary and natural mortality, has a longing for eternal *life*, so alongside of this darkness there is a need of *divine light*;—for otherwise his free will would have been given him in vain. Such a twofold yearning points to our higher susceptibility: susceptibility, however, does not do away with our natural and necessary darkness and mortality; still less with that predominant inclination to evil which has gradually developed itself in Adam's descendants, and has drawn after it death as the punishment. Only a new supernatural act of God could put a stop to the unhappy course necessarily taken by the first creation, in and by itself.

This takes place, in general, by means of the manifold word of God (see Note 36), or His revelations. Only by positive revelations, and they began already with Adam, does man know aught of divine things; in particular, of that which it was God's will to set up as law. The law, however, was first perfectly revealed through Christ; and, at the same time, in an efficient, attractive, and impelling form, in that He was the "*vivum exemplar*" of love. Through Him was it first revealed, that God graciously purposed to forgive the sins and remit the punishment of those who convert themselves;—and this divine announcement, whose messenger He was, He sealed by His life and by His obedience unto the death, in which He sacrificed Himself to His vocation and office. In particular did He proclaim a new world of eternal, blessed life for those who wish to belong to His people, not merely through the promises contained

in His discourses and His prefigurative miracles, but also through His person; for in Him, He appeared through whom God will bring the new creation to pass.

The mission of Christ was consequently not first conditioned by sin; but was intended for the meeting of the need which, on metaphysical grounds, was still left remaining by the first creation. In other words, even apart from sin, there would have been a fitting place for the mission and work of Christ.

But for this work, it was necessary that the Person of Christ should be suitably endowed by God. It is true, God cannot perform that which in itself is impossible; He could not communicate His essence to Christ, for by its very idea it is incommunicable. At the same time, God could not allow that metaphysical separation between Himself and the world, to which the world owes its independence and freedom, to be intensified into total unrelatedness. This is prevented principally by His love, which assigns to men a moral and happy destiny. The relation aimed at by God, and which He cannot establish by a communication of essence, He establishes by communicating, or, more precisely, transferring, divine prerogatives to Christ.

Christ, it is true, might be raised above equality with us, so far as was required by His work; but had He been further exalted above us, something of His mediatorial position would have been lost both to Him and to us: whereas this His office rendered it necessary, on the one hand, that He should be flesh of our flesh; and on the other hand, that He alone should be capable of freeing us from error, punishment, and death—the latter in the future world. For this reason, Christ was not merely bound to obey the law of the Father, but was subject also to the law of nature, of the first creation, to the necessity of death. Not His holiness, nor his dignity, could save Him therefrom; but solely the Father's miraculous power, which raised Him from the dead after, and on account of, His obedience, though not on account of any merit (for there is no such thing as merit), and thus began to lend Him the victory over death and hades.

The uniqueness of Christ, however, consists in His being the only-begotten and natural Son of God; *firstly*, through His conception by Mary in the power of the Holy Ghost. The seed

of a male was implanted in the virgin by God; in consequence of which, Jesus remained free from the sinful inclinations of other men,—nay more, received a will which tended naturally to holiness, which could not stray, nor even be tempted.

Secondly, He was anointed with the Holy Ghost at baptism.¹ Anointing has its place, indeed, in connection with all the three offices; but specially in connection with the kingly. There was thus conferred on Him the reversion to, nay more, He was partially entrusted with, the royalty of God; wherefore, also, He accepted worship and performed miracles already on earth, although He neither could nor durst escape the universal fate of man, death and hades, seeing that otherwise He would not have been perfectly man. *Thirdly*, He was also in an unique manner endowed with *higher knowledge*. But inasmuch as creation, as such, is outside of God, and Christ also is a creature, it was necessary for Him, in order that He might know the truth of divine things, to have a direct vision of God, and to receive His commission immediately from Him. For direct vision alone gives true knowledge. Seeing, however, that heaven is another region than earth, and God is not in the same place which is occupied by the world, it was necessary for Christ to be raised up into heaven prior to entering on His office. There, according to John iii. 13, vi. 62, He stayed for a time,—probably during the forty days in the desert. To Moses also, the antitype of Christ, the archetypes of the things which he was to construct, were shown on the Mount. Perhaps also, Christ was several times in heaven, although He only once entered into the holiest place “through His blood” (Heb. ix. 12, 24). It is possible, adds Wolzogen, that His body was miraculously glorified for moments, as in Matt. xvii., and that He had intercourse with heavenly beings; further, also, His bodily organs were possibly miraculously constituted capable of the direct vision of God.²

¹ Compare J. Crell in Ev. Matth. iii. fol. 47 ff. The Holy Ghost is “divina vis et efficacia,” which, under the form of a holy, material substratum (the dove), really descended on Christ, and conferred upon Him consecration for office, the highest power, authority, and wisdom.

² Comment. in Joh. pp. 707 f., 749 f. He is inclined also to refer the words, “The Word was with God” (John i. 1), to this. Otherwise F. Socin. Opp. i. 675. See Note 33.

But although He was Son of God and anointed King (Christ) even on earth, He first entered on His proper regiment through the medium of His death, after His exaltation. Thus did He become actually the first new creature (*primogenitus*), Son of God *sensu eminenti*. His exaltation was not His work, but that of the Father, like His resurrection: He, however, was thereby personally freed from death and imperfection, as it were through a new birth.¹ And the same miraculous deed of God which conferred this upon Him, gave Him also the fullest and most absolute power and rule over His people, which power had previously been rather a matter of "*spes*" and "*destinatio*" than of reality; nay more, with reference to His kingdom as the final aim, He received power over all men, over good and evil angels, over death and hades. He received the power to give life and the Holy Ghost to men; to Him belonged an all-piercing knowledge; He is the immediate bestower also of spiritual gifts. It is true, He never becomes the Creator, but receives all that He gives from the Father. At the same time, we must not conceive of His activity as though it were properly speaking God, who in every case bestowed gifts through Him as His channel. Christ is not the mere will-less organ of God (as a mere instrument, there would be no need for Him); but He is the free manager of the divine goods, the representative of God, endowed with complete plenipotence for the work of redemption. To such a height is humanity exalted in Him, that He may justly be termed a God, in quite a different sense from that in which authorities are termed Gods: nay more, in a certain sense, He holds a more honourable position than God Himself; for God does not govern the Church in His own person, whereas Christ does.² At this point, therefore, the Socinians agree with the Lutherans in believing that all power was given to the humanity of Christ for its *free* use: here they clothe their very polemic against the doctrine of the high-priesthood of Christ, under the pretence of its declaring too little regarding Christ. His high-priesthood was not perfect so long as He was on earth; its perfection began with His entrance into heaven. There, however, it is to be regarded not merely as intercession, but as a royal

¹ J. Crell i. 357-360, 527, 528, ii. 79. F. Soc. Opp. i. 655, 660 f.

² F. Socin. brev. instit. i. 668.

rule. Undoubtedly the regiment of Christ for redemption, though not His kingdom, will cease with the completion of the work, as the means to which, it was transferred to Him. According to 1 Cor. xv. 26–28, He will then give up the kingdom to the Father, and no longer be His representative; on the contrary, from that time onwards, God will be all in all. Believers will enter into essential equality with Him; like Him, they will participate in the eternal life of God, as sons of the Most High. That, however, is no humiliation for Him, but His joy and the goal of His most ardent yearnings: as a bridegroom, He now prepares for the marriage, and looks forward to the day of union with His bride, not as a day of loss. Besides, even in the kingdom of the blessed there are divers stages and orders, and He still occupies a higher place than all others, at the head of created beings.¹ Until this perfection is brought to pass, we must cleave to Christ as our Saviour and the giver of grace, as our King, and we must adore Him (*adorare*); nay more, on Him we have to call (*invocare*) in all outward and inward needs. He hears and can help us. In opposition to Francis Davidis and Christian Franken, who characterize this as idolatry, seeing that they held Christ to be a creature, and only allowed God to be worshipped, F. Socinus remarks:—The worship of Christ can only be called idolatry, if God is not at the same time honoured thereby. But if Christ is worshipped, not because He is a creature, but because He is the representative of God, He who gives the commission is honoured in His plenipotentary: and this is required by the Holy Scriptures; for example, in John v. 22 f., Phil. ii. 9, Heb. i. 6. Worship would belong to Him, even if it were not commanded. But we are to call upon Him because we are encouraged to do so, and because promises are attached thereto.² Agreeably to the perfect knowledge and ability with which He is endowed, and in accordance with His love, we must apply ourselves with full confidence to Him who, even in His exaltation, has continued our brother. As God has bestowed salvation on us through

¹ J. Crell on 1 Cor. xv. 1, 331 ff.

² Compare in particular the *Epist. de invoc.*, Chr. F. Socin. Opp. i. 353–358. His opinion is not that “*invocatio*” is more than “*adoratio*”; but the latter is a permission, of which we make use; the exhortation thereto is a promise that He will help us, as indeed He can.

Christ, and that as through His representative (*Dei vicarius*, gubernator, judex), God also absolutely requires divine reverence to be paid to His Son; those who refuse it are no longer Christians. It is, therefore, entirely necessary to salvation to know the exaltation of the humanity of Christ, which is the ground of the divine reverence paid to Him. It is true, the Father also must be worshipped; indeed, the benefits of Christ direct our thoughts back to Him. But the Father blesses through the Son, who is one with His will. For this reason, the Son *may* (on the view taken of substitution by the Socinians they ought properly say, *ought to*) be alone called upon.¹

However repulsive the Christology of the Socinians was to their contemporaries, after the exposition given above, it would be very unjust altogether to deny that they were stirred by a Christian interest. This interest displays itself most clearly in the zeal with which they assert that Christ ought to be worshipped. Not merely in a formal respect, however, because of the unity of its character, but also in point of substance, was Socinianism a remarkable phænomenon. It fell like a meteor into the midst of the contending parties, combined in itself essential elements of all the three principal Confessions, and that in an outline, whose simplicity and clearness were well fitted to throw a clear light, at all events, on the confused and artificial character of the other theories, and in the sketching of which the pen was wielded by a hand which aimed, in harmony with the entire Reformatory movement, at doing full justice to the human aspect of Christianity.

Socinianism announced a crisis in the Christology both of the Romish, and especially of the Reformed Church. Like both Romanists and the Reformed, Socinians started with the principle, that there is no "*proportio*" between the "*finitum*" and the "*infinitum*;" but deduced therefrom the unavoidable conclusion, that then a real unity of God and man is an impossibility. They showed that the humanity of Christ must then be reduced to the rank of a mere garment and selfless instrument of deity, which, properly speaking, receives nothing

¹ Only the formula, "Pray in the name of Jesus," occasioned Socinus evident embarrassment; partly because he regarded Christ as a King, not as an Intercessor; partly, because it does not seem fitting to apply at one and the same time to God and to His representative.

from God; or else, that a Nestorian double personality is arrived at, which does nothing for the union of the two natures, and consequently does not really bring out for Christ a higher dignity than that which they themselves asserted for Him, though it obscures the image of the Redeemer, which results when we rest satisfied with the simple and pure humanity. It may sound harsh, but it is nevertheless true, that if we are in earnest in denying altogether to the humanity of Christ participation in the divine, and in representing the union as concluded by the divine Ego alone, without the divine nature; or if the humanity of Christ were a mere theophany, a garment or instrument—the like of which the prophets also might be;—with such a Christ, much less has been given and done by God than with the Christ of the Socinians. For the divine personality, apart from the divine essence, is a dead point without the fulness that lies in the divine attributes. This was perceived by the Lutheran writers on Christology, especially by those who gave it its most complete form, Brentz and Jacob Andreæ. They laid chief stress, not on the personal presence of God in Christ, because God is personally present in all things; nor, in general, on the having of the divine Ego; but on the humanity of Christ having the fulness of the divine prerogatives, omnipotence, omniscience, divine majesty—all which Socinianism does not hesitate to transfer to the humanity of Christ. On the other hand, the Lutheran Christology of the Formula Concordiæ, like Socinianism, has an eye rather for the exalted Lord the King, than for the servile form, assigning but an uncertain and unsatisfactory position to the latter. Socinianism too has its “*Communicatio idiomatum* ;” it also has its “*Unio*,” not indeed through the divine person, but an “*Unio*” of the humanity with the divine prerogatives and powers, which constitute the fulness of the divine essence—in other words, a dynamical “*Unio*.”¹ It gives also still greater prominence than even the Lutheran Christology to the fact, that humanity is raised in Christ to freedom and self-determination, and does not merely stand in a legal position, or discharge the function

¹ F. Soc. T. ii. 798, 799 :—There is a “*duplex divinitas*,”—a communicable, for example, “*immortalitas*,” “*potestas*,” and an incommunicable. This is “*essentia Dei*,” that is, “*effectus essentiæ*,” bestowable either for a time or for ever.

of transition-point to the divine activity. In this respect it is characteristic, that as the Socinians, so also do the Lutherans demand personality for the humanity, with the difference, however, that the latter suppose it to be communicated by the divine aspect. The Socinians excelled the Lutherans in their account of that which pertained to the actual humanity of Christ on earth, and in their recognition of a real, and not merely apparent, growth from step to step. The Socinians must also be allowed to be right, when they reason, that if the essence of God is absolutely incommunicable, and merely His attributes are communicable, God remains as to His essence outside of humanity, and did not become man; that, consequently, there is no ground of complaint against those who, recognising this, say the essence of God cannot at all become man: God can, however, communicate His prerogatives to humanity. In this aspect, Socinianism, by its simplification, by its rejection of elements, which had remained unfruitful, necessarily brought on a crisis for the Lutheran Christology, which reduced it to the dilemma, either of teaching that the essence is communicable, and is rather contained in the attributes (as *Andreas* taught), or to give the palm of victory to Socinianism; in like manner as the two other Confessions were forced to the alternative, either of renouncing the position, that there is no "proportio" between the "finitum" and the "infinite," or of advancing on to the Socinian denial of the incarnation of God. In both instances, Socinianism brought about this crisis, on the one hand, by adopting as its own the false principle held by both, and which restrained and corrupted their Christology; on the other hand, however, by drawing the proper logical consequences, which they absolutely neither would nor durst accept. They themselves, in part, attacked these principles in each other, but without result. The lesson read them by those who accepted their principles, but deduced from them the most doubtful consequences, took all the greater effect.

The system to which Socinianism bears the closest resemblance, both in its fundamental view of Christianity as the perfect law, and in the main features of its Christology, is that of the Romish Church. To *Duns Scotus*, in particular, its likeness is most remarkable. It was in a certain sense developed *Scotism*, which, by appropriating a few, especially critical momenta

of the Reformatory movement, had acquired a certain family resemblance to Protestantism, although it really still occupied the pre-Reformatory point of view. We have found on an earlier occasion, that the essential feature of the Romish Church as such is the combination of the magical and the Pelagian, of which the former may be said to represent Heathenism, the latter Judaism. Now, the Socinian system inclines, on the whole, rather to the Pelagian and legal aspect, as did Duns Scotus, because it was stirred by a powerful moral interest. But so far as room is left for the divine to work, its sphere of action has a magical character, even according to Socinianism; and the conception even of the moral itself is corrupted by magical elements. Even the knowledge of the moral is brought solely in a magical way to the natural darkness of man; positive revelation finds no point of connection in any inner self-legislation of man himself; nay more, that is good which God Himself has willed to pronounce good. So also that God can forgive sin and remit punishment is not brought about by ethical means, but it is magical caprice in Him, having given the law its sanction, to do away with this sanction in forgiving, whilst at the same time upholding its continuous validity. Christianity teaches that we are made free and holy from the law and its curse through the law (fulfilled and satisfied in Christ). According to Socinus, we are made free from the curse of the law by the revelation of another law, which abolishes the first; and yet this dispensation from it, this its non-validity, is represented as the means of establishing its full authority. The moral, therefore, is not that which is in itself absolutely and eternally necessary; it has its origin, not in the divine essence, but purely in a positive act of the divine plenipotence and authority. As, further, the moral commands are only positive and individual, and man in his totality does not stand in any necessary and essential connection therewith, according to the Socinian system complete holiness does not belong to the divine idea of man, and the fullest holiness does what is not commanded (consequently "*opera supererogatoria*"). The raising to this full holiness is, it is true, an exaltation of man; but as it is not demanded by his essence, it is an elevation into a mode of life higher than human. Traces of the doctrine of the transporting of man out of and above himself, which prevailed during the Middle Ages,

are discernible therefore in Socinianism. The same judgment must be pronounced relatively to the bestowal of immortality. According to that metaphysical basis, which involves the necessity of death, it is a magical ravishment of man above himself, above his own original idea. This magical element shows itself in Christology, partly in notion of the ravishment of Christ into heaven during His earthly life; and partly in the mode in which He also is represented as attaining resurrection and immortality, without inner mediation. Further also in the conception formed of His holiness. For, however much Socinus may speak of Christ's growth, the holiness he attributes to Him was really something ready-made and complete, without movement in itself, innate, incapable of being tempted,—in this, contrasting strangely with the importance otherwise attached to the "*liberum arbitrium*." His representing Christ as performing super-ethical works (a notion towards which the "*Formula Concordiæ*" also verges), is also a remnant of Romish doctrine. But most catholic in character is his doctrine of the office and worship of Christ (see Div. II. vol. i. p. 6). The kingly office of Christ threatens to absorb almost His entire mission; as Lawgiver and Ruler He is God's viceroy, although man, and as such is to be worshipped. Papacy and the worship of the saints are done away with, it is true; but still the false thought lying at the basis of both these excrescences was retained, and made the foundation of Christology,—the false thought, namely, that God is infinitely distant from us, and as to essence absolutely strange to us. Whereas the Catholicism of the Middle Ages had made Christ again a naked God, and had put the Church and its saints in His place, Socinianism supposed itself to be effecting a reformation, when it made Christ a saint and the viceroy of God.

But even the two principles, "that the infinite and the finite are absolutely and irreconcilably opposed to each other," and "that the attributes may be separated from the essence, and can therefore be communicated from one essence to another above and against its nature," which Socinianism combined in itself (whereas the Reformed accepted merely the former, the Lutherans, almost solely against their will, pay their tribute to the latter), have, as is clear from former discussions, their real seat in the theology of the Catholicism of the Middle Ages.

For what principle was more commonly recognised than the Aristotelian one, that between the “*Infinitum*” and the “*finitum*” there is no “*proportio*.” And even the other principle, whose home is the magical element in the Romish theology, betrays itself in the Romish doctrine of the original condition of man, and of his “*donis superadditis*,” which are supposed to be communicated to him, and yet not to pertain to his essence; as, further, in the notion that whatever lofty gifts God communicates to humanity, He cannot communicate the highest, His essence, but must retain the best for Himself. Indeed, humanity is not susceptible of this highest, and can only come into contact therewith by being ravished out of itself into God, by losing itself. The only source to which both principles are traceable, is the error that an aseity, infinitude, omnipotence, rent asunder from holy love, and not holy love itself, constitute the highest, the inmost in God, yea, His very essence and nature.

The Reformed Church certainly did raise its voice against the principle that the attributes are separable from the essence, but at the price of denying altogether that God really communicated Himself to humanity; the consequence whereof is, that in its theology even the “*Unio personalis*” had no hold. It is true, the holy righteousness of God which guards distinctions was recognised, but not the power and the essence of holy love; and even if divine communicableness is taught, the communication cannot be said to be complete, unless the divine is really received and possessed. When the Reformed dogmaticians answered, —The fault does not lie with God’s love, but with the idea of finitude, to whose limiting power the world-creating God was compelled to subject Himself, because otherwise a world would have been an impossibility; they plainly confessed the existence of a higher law standing above the “*liberum arbitrium*” of God, —a law which is not the vital law of love, but of a dualistic nature; nay more, which, strictly carried out, must assign to the world that false independence relatively to God which was proclaimed by Socinianism, and with which was connected its doctrine of substitution, and of the communication of divine predicates to the world.

The Lutheran Church alone represented the decisive, new, and fundamental Christological idea, that—“*Finitum capax infiniti*.” This its conviction was rooted in the faith-knowledge

that God, in His inmost essence, is to be conceived as love. In so far, it had a right to occupy the first place in relation to the progress made by Christendom in the matter of Christology : it was most completely entrusted with the *idea* of Christology. But even it, in the "Formula Concordiæ," was only able at first to carry through its new thought in a form accommodated to the principles of the Middle Ages. For, on the one hand, contrary to its own fundamental tendency and the anthropology sketched by Luther, it allowed itself to be so influenced by the fear of commingling the divine and human, as not to allow the divine really to coalesce with the humanity of Christ, and to treat the former rather as something superadded to the latter, contrary to its nature ; or, where it teaches that the divine became the property of the humanity, understands by the divine, the divine attributes alone, at the same time conceiving the essence of God to remain behind in God, incommunicable. On the other hand, however, in following out its idea of the divine-human unity more faithfully, it allows itself to be led away to such a view of the self-communication of God as involves a magically accelerated process of "exaltatio," and a consequent overthrow of the actuality and growth of the humanity.¹ The defects of the former aspect were not universally chargeable on the Lutheran Church, but cling rather to single expressions of the "Formula Concordiæ," whose fundamental thought is, after all, the "capacitas" of humanity for God Himself, and that not merely in a passive form. The second defect, on the contrary, is more universal, and has deeper roots. Its *theological* foundation is the circumstance, that the holy righteousness which guards distinctions was not yet incorporated with sufficient determinateness into the divine love ; and that, consequently, the ethical, and the process which it is indispensable for it to undergo, are still insufficiently fixed. This second, twofold defect, was strikingly recognised and controverted by the Reformed and Socinian theologians : remedied, however, it could not be by springing over to the Reformed or Socinian conception of

¹ Which unquestionably points back to a defect also in the conception of God ; for had the righteousness which watches over distinctions (which was more distinctly asserted by the Reformed Church) been more completely incorporated with love, the view taken thereof would have been more determinately ethical.

God; but solely by viewing God, not as mere holiness and righteousness, nor as mere goodness and communicableness in general, but as love which possesses power over itself, which, because, and whilst, it asserts itself, also communicates itself,—in one word, as *holy love*. Only on the basis of this idea of God, and of the idea of man which results therefrom, is a Christology of one mould possible,—a Christology combining the elements of truth asserted by the different Church parties, and thus also uniting the parties themselves on this central doctrine. The principle of faith stirring in the Reformatory movement, bore in its bosom such a Christology, let it make its appearance sooner or later; and in this sense also, was an infinite beginning.

THIRD EPOCH.

FROM A.D. 1580 TO 1800.

DECAY OF THE PREVIOUS FORM OF CHRISTOLOGY,
AND CHANGE THEREOF INTO THE FORM OF ONE-
SIDED SUBJECTIVITY.

SECTION I.

FROM A.D. 1580 TO 1700.

THE SCHOLASTIC AGE OF PROTESTANTISM, AND ITS
SCHISM WITH ITSELF.

CHAPTER FIRST.

THE LUTHERAN CHRISTOLOGY.

WHAT followed the publication of the "Formula Concordiæ" was the controversy, on the one hand, between the Lutherans who refused it and those who accepted it; and, on the other hand, amongst those who accepted it, regarding its true meaning; for those who had composed it, Chemnitz, Selnekker, Chytræus, and others, on the one side, and the Suabians, on the other, expounded its meaning in opposite ways. Out of the second controversy grew a third, between the theologians of Giessen and Tübingen.

The attempts at mediation made by J. Andreæ and Chemnitz failed, as we have previously narrated, to bring about an inner union, in relation to the proper subject of antagonism, between the Suabians and Lower Germans. All that they

effected was a combination of discordant principles, held by both parties, in one book. The consequence, therefore, was not concord, but manifold discord. Not merely was the "Formula Concordiæ" not accepted in numerous and important territories, or soon again deprived of its authority; but it soon became apparent that the conflicting parties were by no means disposed to give up their doctrine to another, or to the Formula of Concord. On the contrary, they asserted their own views in the only two possible ways open to them,—to wit, by declining the Formula, on the one hand, and by interpreting it according to their own system, on the other. The first course was adopted by the theologians of Helmstädt, who continued the opposition raised at an earlier period by the Lower Saxons to the Suabian Christology. They soon, however, acquired an important support even amongst the adherents of the Formula, in consequence of another sense more analogous to the true meaning of the Lower Saxon co-operators, being set in opposition to the Würtembergers, who tried to show that the "Formula Concordiæ" was exclusively favourable to them. That was asserted to be its genuine meaning, which was afterwards, in the main more comprehensively, defended by the Giessen against the Würtemberg theologians.

Tileman Hesshus and his colleagues, Daniel Hoffmann and Basilius Sattler, refused to recognise the "Formula Concordiæ," subscribed by them in 1577, because it had been subsequently altered in many respects without their consent; and they proposed a new, and that a synodal discussion. But it was feared, and not without reason, that a Synod would lead to new disturbances and confusion. Accordingly, the only thing done was, that the Electors of the Palatinate, Brandenburg, and Saxony commissioned, in 1583, T. Kirchner, N. Selnekker, and Pol. Lyser, as also Körner and M. Chemnitz, to commence negotiations with the deputies from Brunswick at Quedlinburg. The chief demand of Hesshus and his colleagues was,—that the ubiquity should be laid down as limited or "respectiva," not as absolute; and that some inconvenient expressions of Luther should be omitted. (The latter referred especially to Luther's words in the Large Confession, which had been additionally introduced into the "Formula Concordiæ" at the instance of the Würtembergers.) The others, after spending several days

in fruitless discussions about the ubiquity,¹ without being able to convince their opponents (on which occasion Chemnitz, to whose views those of the Helmstädters were so nearly akin, found himself in a difficult position), arrived at the result, "that an union cannot now be established, either amongst the Electors and the Princes, or amongst the theologians (this, after the conclusion of the so laborious work of Concord!); and reported that the Brunswickers called for a properly constituted Council, the notion of which, however, must be thrown aside." Such a Council was out of the question; as vain, too, was it to expect that the Helmstädters would give way; and thus, already at this point, the impossibility became apparent of the Church's authoritatively deciding what pure doctrine was, with the detail and precision that had been attempted by the "Formula Concordiæ." No one could seriously think of excluding those lands from the Lutheran Church which did not accept the Formula. At the same time, there did not lack attempts to brand the controverting of the Christology of the Formula as apostasy, and, where possible, to suppress it by the civil authority. At the instance of the theologians of Tübingen in 1585, Julius Duke of Brunswick was called upon to interfere by Ludwig Duke of Württemberg. When this proved resultless, after the death of Hesshus, the theologians of Leipzig, Wittenberg, and Jena united in 1593 to address a memorial to Dr Hoffmann, with attempts at instruction, admonitions to peace, and threats of excommunication. But all was in vain. The Helmstädters, especially Daniel Hoffmann, were unwearied, and adopted the undermining course of affirming their Christological view to be the genuine meaning of the Formula—only darkened by supplementary, unallowed alterations.²

¹ "Bericht von dem Colloquio der zu Quedelburg versamleten Theologen über dem Artikel von der Ubiquitet und allenthalben Gegenwärtigkeit des Leibs Christi, u. s. w., im Anhang zum Abtruck etlicher Schrifften, daraus minwehr der vorlängst gehoffte genuinus intellectus Formulæ Concordiæ, etc. erscheinet 1597." (Report of the Colloquium between the theologians assembled at Quedlinburg on the article concerning the ubiquity and omnipresence of the body of Christ, etc. etc.) This work was at the same time directed against the Erfurt Apology for the Formula Concordiæ.

² The Helmstädters were unwilling to go with the Reformed; so also with the theologians of Anhalt, who at first had regarded the Lutheran doctrine of the Sacrament with favour, although they controverted the real

The same course had already been taken by the Suabians at an earlier period, in favour of their Christology. Among other things, they published against the Helmstädter theologians, in 1589, the "Gründlicher ausführlicher Bericht, dass die Lehre von der Majestät Christi nicht allein in heiliger göttlicher Schrift gegründet, sondern auch von Dr Luthern und andern Theologen geführt, der christlichen Formulæ Concordiæ einverleibet und aus Gottes Wort erhalten worden."¹ They here seek to show that the old doctrine of Brentz is the genuine meaning of the Formula, by explaining the concession contained in it to Chemnitz, "quando et quomodo voluerit," not as antagonistic to the absolute omnipresence of the humanity, but as referring solely to the *modus* thereof.

In this way, the concession made to the Lower Germans would have been again completely withdrawn, and the Suabian-Saxon "Concordia" converted into a victory of the Suabian over the Saxon view. Chemnitz (who died in 1586), Chytræus, Selnekker, were exceedingly dissatisfied with this interpretation, which began to be declared soon after 1580, and gave expression to their dissatisfaction in letters.² They gave also to understand, that certain concessions in the work of Concord had been snatched from them against their will, whose withdrawal now appeared impracticable, not only on personal grounds, but also because of greater dangers. The existence of a wide-spread antagonism to the Suabian Christology was thus proclaimed. We must first, however, dwell a little on the principal theologians

"Communicatio idiomatum." Hesshus refused to go beyond the hypothetical omnipresence or multipresence (*omnipræsentia respectiva*), which he asserted he had always taught, but which was contradicted in many places by the "*omnipræsentia absoluta*" of the published "Formula Concordiæ." Daniel Hoffmann went on to teach that the body of Christ was present merely for the Holy Supper, but not for the government of the world. See the "Abtruck, etc.," mentioned above, p. 24 f.

¹ "Thorough and detailed proof that the doctrine of the Majesty of Christ is not only grounded in Holy Scripture, but was taught by Dr Luther and other theologians, is incorporated with the Christian Formula Concordiæ, and has been received from the Word of God." Compare also Ægid. Hunnius' "Nothwendige Verantwortung des Concordienbuchs," 1597; "Widerlegung der ungegründeten Anklagen damit Dr D. Hoffmann in seiner Apologie, etc.," 1597. H. Mylius and Polyc. Lyser also wrote against Hoffmann.

² "Abtruck, etc.," pp. 23, 24.

prior to the controversy of Giessen, who made attempts, though fruitlessly, to soothe or conciliate the existing antagonism, ere it found angry and sharp expression in the controversy referred to.

The opposition of the older Helmstadt theologians had not originated in a deeper religious or speculative interest : besides love of controversy and self-confidence, the only other interest that is discernible, is a desire not to allow themselves to be led too far away from common sense and the Scripture by doctrinal conclusions. Moreover, the opposition raised, manifested itself at first rather in an isolated form ;¹ for the Würtembergers succeeded for some time in securing most of the principal theologians for allies, especially Leonhard Hutter and Ægidius Hunnius (who, as well as Chytræus and Polyc. Lyser, were Suabians by birth). These men, however, were moved rather by a desire to maintain the work of concord, than by full agreement with the Suabian type of doctrine. L. Hutter,² indeed, held that the entire majesty, power, authority, glory of God, became the property of the human nature from the moment of conception, in virtue of the “*Unio hypostatica*,” and that it was merely the manifestation of these attributes that was concealed by the servile form ; that the humanity of Christ is never absent from the creatures with whom the Logos is present ;—that would be a *διάστασις* of the natures. Still, even he speaks of a partial non-use of the divine attributes (Controv. 326) ; says only, “*statu exinanitionis caro personaliter fuit ubique*,” which is a matter of course if the “*persona Verbi*” was the person of the humanity ; and represents the activity of the Logos as restricting itself, the Logos as resting in relation to the flesh, in order that it might be able to die (Controv. 332). The exinanition he refers to the lowliness of Christ’s state between His birth and resurrection. He attributes to Him all essential human attributes, yea also weaknesses, which, no less than the necessity of gradual growth, are to be regarded as the punishment of sin. Hunnius, on the other hand, took special pains to carry out the doctrine, that the humanity of Christ was transported into the eternal and illocal Logos ; that it was put

¹ Although Hoffmann was acquainted with many men, even in Würtemberg, who were opposed to Andreæ.

² *Loci theologici* 1609 ; *Controversiæ duæ theol.* Viteb. 1610, pp. 213–383.

in possession of the entire divine majesty from the very first moment of the “Unio;” and teaches also, in his way, that the humanity had two simultaneous modes of existence,—one in the Word, and one in place (ἐν λόγῳ, and “in loco”). To the former he sets limits during the state of humiliation, lest the reality of the being and growth of the earthly humanity should be broken through by a higher, already deified humanity standing behind it. In his view, humanity was in the Logos as to the personality, because the person of the Word had become the person of the man Jesus; but this being (Sein) in the Logos was, like the being (Sein) of the Logos Himself, exalted above the world, space, and separation by space; it is a purely immanent relation of the Logos to the human nature of Christ, having as yet no reference to the world or its government. According to this first mode of existence, the Logos is personally present in humanity with the entire fulness of His being, not outside thereof, which would require space: and humanity is present in Him (præsentia intima), not outside of Him. In the state of abasement, however, humanity is not (actualiter) present with all creatures, does not govern the world, does not know all things; the “omnipræsentia extima, omniscientia, omnipotentia,” appertain to it only since the exaltation.¹ Supposing the incarnation (the *humanification*) had taken place before the creation of the world, ere there was any space, the Logos would plainly not have existed anywhere outside of the humanity. Equally far is space, now that it is in existence, and seeing that the Logos is present everywhere in it, from having the effect of dividing the Person of Christ; on the

¹ “Libelli iv. de persona Christi ejusque ad dextram dei sedentis divina majestate.” Francof. 1595; written at Marburg in 1585. P. 83:—“Q. adhuc ergo censes carnem Christi una cum λόγῳ etiam in utero matris, in cruce, in sepulcro existentem ubique fuisse, cum λόγον nullibi extra eam esse contendas?” Answer:—“Alia nunc est ejus majestatis ratio quam fuit in statu humiliationis. Siquidem λόγος tum quidem sibi naturam assumptam arcano quodam tacitoque modo unitissime præsentem extra locum habuit, sed non habuit eam ceteris in orbe creaturis præsentem (quibus gubernandis tum humana natura nondum adhibebatur), sed extra creaturas omnes intra perfectissimæ personæ suæ complexum intimum præsentissime junctam sibi habuit. Jam autem in statu gloriæ λόγος non sibi tantum habet illam præsentem personaliter: sed eandem quoque creaturis ratione gubernationis præsentem sistit, quatenus λόγος per exaltatam humanitatem omnia gubernat.”

contrary, the Logos has the humanity most intimately present with Himself, wherever He is, although it is not yet endowed with ubiquity; for it is rather confined to one place, although it at the same time participates in the person of the Logos, which is ubiquitous. For the purpose of making clear that the possession of divine attributes on the part of the human nature was compatible with the lack of omniscience and omnipotence during the state of humiliation, he uses the following examples:—The Logos did not always employ His own wisdom in the humanity, but out of regard to the humanity, refrained from its use at certain times. Nevertheless the humanity had wisdom. So also has a new-born child a rational soul in itself (*actu primo*), although it as yet understands nothing; and when it learns to understand, it does not thereby acquire a new soul, but what was previously latent now reveals itself. A philosopher retains his knowledge in sleep, even without actual contemplation. Further, during a swoon, the soul works nothing in the body, but, as regards the body, empties itself, as it were, of its actuality; and even so omnipotence can be conceived to have been possessed by the humanity of Christ, without its being actual. Nor even in the death of Christ is it necessary to suppose that the Logos was severed from the humanity, or that the communicated omnipotence was done away with. All that we need to assume is, that the omnipotence of the Logos, which in itself is unchangeable, emptied itself (that is, drew itself back, withdrew to inactivity), relatively to the humanity. It is true, the natural union of soul and body was dissolved in death; but the “*Unio personalis*” remained intact. As sinless, and in virtue of the “*Unio*,” Christ was immortal; but for our sake He renounced this right, and became mortal (pp. 70, 73, 74, 251). The latent potency of immortality, omnipotence, omniscience, is therefore to be supposed to have been in possession of Christ from the moment of “*Unio*” onwards; but by no means must we assume a hidden use of these attributes, so far as it would be opposed to the state of humiliation.

With all this, Hunnius departed essentially both from the doctrine of the Würtembergers (which had been partially renounced by J. Andreæ during the negotiations), and from that of Luther’s “*Grosses Bekenntniss*,” and took up with Chemnitz, and the principles laid down by Luther prior to the con-

troversy with the Swiss.¹ Whilst the Württembergers deduced from the "Unio personalis" the conclusion, that where the Logos is, there also must the humanity be; but He is omnipresent with creatures, consequently also the humanity: Hunnius, on the contrary, deduced from it merely the inactive possession of the divine attributes, and makes the participation in their actuality dependent on the measure in which the state of humiliation admits of it. He first coincides again with the Württembergers in his doctrine of the state of exaltation.

When Hunnius, in the first instance, posited the humanity as exalted above space and time merely as to the personality (of the Logos) appertaining to it, he laid down nothing with which the Reformed also could not have agreed. For they also were willing to ascribe all divine predicates to the person, seeing that it was at the same time the person of the Logos. And as Hunnius (like Chemnitz, but not Brentz) most carefully formularized his entire doctrine of the "Communicatio idiomatum," so that the participation of humanity in divine predicates should not mean that they became its property as their "subjectum," the Reformed might have agreed with him the more fully. But with the negative freedom from space thus attributed to the humanity, so far as it is in the Logos, nothing is gained for that positive freedom from space, which was required by the Lutheran doctrine of the Supper. If, in the consideration of the omnipresence of Christ, no regard whatever is to be paid to space, how can Christ be represented as in many or all places at one and the same time? Must not His humanity, then, be infinitely extended? He answers (pp. 87, 88),—God is present in all places; but His presence has nothing to do either with space or time. Humanity is taken up into this *a-spatial* and *a-temporal* sphere;² it may therefore be present in space in a manner that has nothing to do with space and time, if the Logos confer on it this presence in space with

¹ And this (which Thomasius, in his "Christi Person und Werk," 1855, ii. 290-446, has entirely overlooked) renders precisely the same, or even better service to Luther's doctrine of the communication of the glorified body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist, than his later principles, with which, as Thomasius also is compelled to acknowledge, the reality of the humanity does not consist.

² "Aufgenommen in diese Unräumlichkeit und Unzeitlichkeit."

all creatures, or this positive freedom from space, which He Himself always enjoys, and through which the universe is to Him as a grain of dust, which He embraces, and endless time as a point: and this is conferred in the state of exaltation.— But alongside of its illocal presence in the Word, the humanity of Christ had also a presence in space; nay more, according to Hunnius, it has even now an “Ubi,” and though in no respect shut in from without, is in itself local and bounded, is a “Quantum.” How now can one and the same humanity be in one aspect a-spatial, yea, free from space; in the other aspect, spatial, limited in itself? Does not this lead, after all, to a twofold simultaneous humanity? What did it help, with Chemnitz and the Helmstäders, to repudiate this twofoldness relatively to the state of humiliation, and to let it remain, without further justification, for the state of exaltation? In this case, both the Suabians (that is, the later theologians of Tübingen), who preserve at all events an identity of both states in this twofoldness, and the Helmstäders, who say with Hesshus, if the lack of omnipresence do not break up the unity of the person in the state of humiliation, it cannot break it up in the state of exaltation, appear more self-consistent.

This difficulty was discussed in many works by Philipp Nicolai;¹ he failed, however, to prevent the controversy which arose between the theologians of Tübingen and those of Gießen. Nicolai's religious and speculative mind was chiefly anxious to free the Lutheran Christology from the appearance of being an absolutely singular and peculiar thing, and to set it forth in the light of a self-consistent general view of the world, allied with, and favourable to, it. This entire view of the world, which connects itself with Brentz and the Suabian Syngramma, evidently indeed owes its rise and form to Christology, but aids

¹ Philipp Nicolai's “Grundfeste des streitigen Artikels von der Gegenwart Jesu Christi nach beiden Naturen im Himmel und auf Erden.” 1604. Compare Thomasius' “Christi Person und Werk” ii. pp. 451–472, and pp. 502–506. A lucid exposition of his view, with which are interwoven notices of his many works on this subject, which unfortunately disfigure the noble kernel by the bitterness of their polemic, is contained in the Apology for the Dutch Lutherans addressed to the States of Holland—“Verantwortung der Evangelischen Kirchen in Hollandt wider die Lästerung Petri Plancii calvinistischen Predigers zu Amsterdam und seiner Consorten.” Hamburg, 1602.

the effort made to give the fundamental truth of Christology an independent basis of its own, by deducing from it a complete and entire system of the world.

He starts with the position, that the world in general has its ground in the eternal a-spatial essence of God; that God circumscribes, maintains, rules all creatures *in Himself*, and is as it were their place. He beholds them all in Himself, and governs them in Himself according to His providence (*πρόνοια*), in an eternal union of knowledge and volition; He is everywhere with them, omnipresent, for He is everywhere and entirely in Himself and with Himself. Where He is, there is He in undivided entirety; where He is entirely, He has the world, not outside of, but in Himself, in the eternal light of His thoughts and of His love. In Him we live, and move, and have our being. He knows the world in Himself and through Himself. The height, the depth, the length, the breadth of the world, its spaces, mass, weight, and number, are circumscribed by God, without its being able to expand His essence; on the contrary, "heaven and earth and all peoples are so in Him, that they appear in His eyes as a drop of water, as a mite in the balance, as a grain of dust, and as an empty nothing. Not as though He robbed the great edifice of heaven and earth, with the material things that are therein, of their spatial qualities, and crushed them to dust; but that, notwithstanding their corporeal magnitude, He sees them all present before Him in the hidden light of His divine government, without any difficulty, as a grain of dust, that circumscribes them all as a point, and holds them in His hand." The infinitude and immeasurableness of God have nothing to do with mathematics; they are of a totally different kind; and whoso has attained a conception of the former will find no more difficulty in believing that to which the Lutheran Christology attaches prime importance.

Were God infinite in a mathematical sense, that is, physically, corporeally, He could only be present in a being as to one part of Himself, whilst the other part would be outside of the being: it would be impossible for God to be in any finite being in His entirety. But it must also be granted that no body can have a spatial or corporeal ubiquity. Nor is this the real opinion of the Lutheran Church; it teaches in its Christology neither such spatial and corporeal ubiquity of the flesh (that is,

humanity) of Christ, nor a mathematical infinitude of the God who dwells personally and entirely in Christ. Instead of this false and childish representation of the divine immeasurableness, which divides God, we ought rather to teach that the essence of God is infinite in itself through its content. "God is not an infinite and immeasurable being as to space, but as to His substance He is infinite and immeasurable; even as we can say also of a virtue, and of love, wisdom, power, or of righteousness, that it is infinite, immeasurable, and incomprehensible. And God is not 'in adjectivo' condescending, wise, holy, almighty, good, and just; but His very essence is Love itself, Wisdom itself, Omnipotence itself, Goodness itself, and Righteousness itself."¹ He seeks, therefore, to view the infinitude of God rather *intensively* than *extensively*, and thus acquires the right to say, that a man in whom it is God's will to dwell is not too narrow and too small to embrace the entire intensive essence of God; above all, not too narrow to embrace love, which is as the ring including all other divine virtues; and that humanity which is thus taken up into God does not need to be corporeally extended "in infinitum." If we only remove the coarse mathematical ideas, which are demonstrably inapplicable to God, we shall see that, notwithstanding His infinitude, God can dwell in a finite being. Above all, he remarks with St Bernhard, "*anima quæ ad imaginem ejus est creata, ejus capax est*" (p. 436). The presence and present government of God embraces indeed everything, and is one; but it is also different for different parts of the universe, the diversity in whose idea and essence are in fact constituted by the difference of His presence. There are three spheres to be distinguished, not indeed locally, but really. Firstly, the visible structure of the world, where God is present as to His almighty *power*. Secondly, the *heaven*. The external heaven belongs to the world; but the proper heaven is the place where God is present with His *grace*. It is divided into the heaven of the Church, in which God is present to faith through the word and sacraments; and the heaven of the glorified and the angels, which is reserved for direct vision. The third sphere is the scene of the revelation of the divine *wrath*, of angry love, or *hell*. These three spheres, however, are not different and removed from each other in point of space; space neither sepa-

¹ Against Plancius, p. 416.

rates nor constitutes them ; they are formed solely by the difference in the revelation or presence of God. They have a real objective existence, but are at the same time stages to which those who are prepared, pass immediately out of the preceding ones, without any journey in space. As the embryo is in the world, and yet does not know it, so long as it is confined to the narrow space of its mother's womb, but at birth looks suddenly forth into the world, which again imposes limits in its physical laws, so do we by faith enter into a new world without any change of place. By faith we stand already in heaven, even as in the other case the embryo was already in the world, although without beholding it. We are borne by the word and sacrament as in the womb of the kingdom of heaven, till we are borne by death into the heaven of direct vision. Nor shall we need any journey for this purpose, but merely the opening of the eyes. On the other hand, hell begins already even now to burn in unbelievers, and their death is but a full awaking and experience of that which already had existence, though veiled, nay more, of that in which they had already begun to dwell. The presence of God, therefore, includes in and under itself the world, heaven, and hell.

Within the second sphere, to wit, heaven, again, the presence of God is not everywhere the same. His presence in Christ is of one kind, His presence in Christians is of another. Nevertheless the pneumatic presence of God in believers may furnish an explanatory analogy of the personal presence which God has in Christ alone, and of its effects. For in Christians also, as in Christ, the presence of God works marvellous mysteries ; it causes human nature to participate in the deity. As the divine nature assumed the human nature in Christ and constituted it its own, so also in the "*Unio pneumatica*" there is an *ιδιομορία* of the human on the part of God ; for example, when Christ regards as done to Himself that which is done to His saints ; or when the Holy Spirit intercedes for us with unutterable groans ; or when Christ, in the power of His love, regards our sin, but also our repentance and faith as His own, as appertaining to His body.—In addition to *taking* part in what is ours, Christ then further *gave* us part in that which is His. Here also there is a resemblance between Christ's humanity and ours ; like His humanity, we experience a marvellous, pneumatic

μεταποῖα of our weakness. And even for the third genus of "Communicatio idiomatum," an analogy may be pointed out in the sphere of the pneumatic "Unio," in that the walk of the Christian in the Spirit is also a co-operation of the deity with our humanity. Rightly considered, this analogy teaches us no longer to regard the "Unio" of God and man in Christ as a strange miracle; it shows us that the Lutheran Christological thought has a deeper religious substance, though at the same time it recommends us carefully to discriminate the "Unio" in Christ from the "Unio" in us. For, as we well know, we all owe our pneumatical union to Christ alone; He owes His to no other than Himself. Inasmuch, then, as He is the original place of the perfect union, nay more, inasmuch as He effects our union, we must needs say that God was in Him in an unique, to wit, in a personal manner. According to Nicolai, this is the purport of the expression,—The Logos is "non extra carnem Christi," but "in carne." The meaning thereof cannot be that the Logos has only the humanity of Jesus present, and is not present at all in the rest of creation; but merely, that He is *personally* present only in the humanity of Jesus, and nowhere else. In the humanity of Jesus, however, He is not spatially present, but illocally, or in such a manner that the uniqueness of the immanent relation between the Logos and the humanity is alone intended to be denoted by the "personalis unio."¹

This uniqueness cannot consist in the Logos having in Christ a peculiar constitution or character, which He has not elsewhere. For the Logos is in Himself simple, and equal to Himself: He everywhere comprises in Himself the world, in the light of His eternity; for both its foundations, its subsistence and its multiplicity, rest in His almighty love; so that when He beholds Himself, He beholds them also, or recognises and has them present in Himself. Consequently, the uniqueness of Christ must be set forth in His *humanity*. The "personalis unio" must express an unique relation of the humanity to the omnipresent Logos—a relation of such a nature, that He is personally present in it alone, although He is present to all

¹ Besides elsewhere, see p. 429. "Entirely is He in every one, so far as He dwells in him, and cannot be divided as to His essence; and entirely is He outside of every one, so far as He forms one 'suppositum' or one person with no one of them."

things, and all things are present to Him. This uniqueness of His humanity cannot refer to His body as an extended, finite, spatial being, which it remains to all eternity: on this ground, this body can never be spatially and corporeally omnipresent. But as the Logos, who is personally united with the humanity of Jesus, and as to His (intensive) infinitude finds room enough in the flesh of Christ, has the world really present in the light of His infinitude, and holds the position of its heart; so also the humanity of Jesus, beholding and possessing the world in the Logos, participates in the knowledge of the Logos, and through Him, makes the world likewise present to itself. In this sense it is present with all creatures, and takes part in their government; not, however, by spatial extension and omnipresence—which not even the Logos has. By way of analogy, he refers to the power which even our soul has, of bearing a world, yea worlds, in the inner light of its thoughts, and of being in distant parts of the world in spirit. It is true, we have not the true image thereof, or their reality, even when we are corporeally present. But the soul of Christ has in itself a true and far clearer image of the world as it is; it is present to Him precisely as that which it is. In virtue of the “*personalis unio*,” it gazes on the hidden light of the divine foresight, which holds the world in itself and encompasses it “*realiter*,” and then Christ has not merely the shadow of things before Him, but their very selves, in their eternal ground—He has them present in their reality: nay more, He is “*realiter*” present to them so far as they really have their ground in the same Logos; He is “*realiter*” present to them, in Himself, however, not corporeally, but illocally and spiritually.

It is true, indeed, that Nicolai thus gave up the corporeal presence of Christ with all creatures, and went back to the *soul*, and its participation in the omniscience of the Logos (from the womb of its mother);—a circumstance which deserves the more notice as the soul of Christ was now so rarely spoken of. At the same time, it was not his intention, as we have seen, to reduce the presence of Christ as to His humanity (soul) with all creatures to a mere knowing of everything; but in God Himself, without detriment to the distinction between Creator and creature, knowledge and being were one to Him, seeing that God derives His knowledge of the world from His

knowledge of Himself, and holds the world "realiter" enclosed in Himself, its ground. And inasmuch as the soul of Christ participates in this highest knowledge, beholding the world in Himself, that is, in the light of the Logos, who dwells personally in it, and who bears the world in Himself, as its real ground, or according to its eternal, illocal grounds, not merely is the world present before it, but it also is itself present to the world,—so far as it rests, lives, and moves in the Logos, who is personally united with it, that is, to the world "*sub specie æternitatis*" (p. 412). But space and time are then treated as something which have no existence for the world, so far as it is in God, that is, as something purely subjective; or, if space and time are conceived to be constitutive elements of the actual world,¹ the knowledge of the world possessed by the humanity of Christ, and its presence therewith, relate not to the actual world, but solely to that ideal, supra-historical world taught by Platonism and the Platonizers of the Middle Ages, which, however, is represented as one with the actual world. Undoubtedly, therefore, the world, according to Nicolai, had not attained to a sufficient degree of independence outside of God: it is still too much confined within the circle of His eternal being, and has consequently a somewhat Docetical character; nay more, when this view is followed out by a mind of mystical tendencies, it leads to Pantheism. In this aspect we must say,—Christological Docetism gave birth in Nicolai to a cosmological Docetism, and this entire mode of thought thus evinced its connection with the Middle Ages. Furthermore, not only does this abrupt separation of space from the illocal being of Christ in the Logos serve no purpose relatively to the presence of Christ's body in the Holy Supper, although Nicolai supposes it to do so; but this presence is thus made impossible; for Christ's body is not supposed to be endowed with spatial, corporeal ubiquity, but is deemed to remain finite and limited, and the omnipresence to relate alone to His soul. His doctrine of the heaven which is everywhere inwardly near us, which is everywhere present as it were behind the curtain of spatiality and corporeality, may indeed assure us that Christ is nigh at hand, even as to His humanity; but as he often repeats, that "the flesh of Christ is physically and visibly nowhere save in heaven,"

¹ As, for example, p. 439.

he cannot allow a corporeal presence of the flesh of Christ on earth in space : all he can allow is a coming forth of the heaven of the Church, and with it of Christ, for faith, that is, for the *souls* of men, analogous to the presence of the world to the soul of Christ. This answers, not to the “manducatio oralis,” but merely to the “manducatio fidei.” It is not, therefore, matter of surprise, that Nicolai’s discussions, which in themselves are so rich in feeling and so clever, should have left behind them no permanent traces of their influence on the doctrine of his age. (Note 37.)

If we take a survey of the principal works published by the generation which succeeded the completion of the “Formula Concordiæ,” we find the Suabian type, and that in a scholastic form, acquiring the predominance ; but still there were many more or less conscious departures from it. In particular, there still prevailed manifold uncertainty relatively to the questions, —whether the divine attributes were not used during the state of humiliation, or their use, like their possession, was merely concealed :—then, whether the unity and self-equality of the person could subsist without this constant use of the divine attributes ; and if so, whether and to what extent this use is to be ascribed to the exalted Lord ? The antagonisms connected herewith, and which had merely been concealed or pronounced, but not really, conciliated, in the “Formula Concordiæ,” burst forth again in bright flames in the second generation afterwards. This took place in the *controversy between the theologians of Giessen and Tübingen* (Note 38), when the question was formulated as follows :—Whether Christ was present with all creatures, as to His humanity, in the “status exinanitionis” also ? and whether He governed the entire universe whilst on the cross and in the grave ?

The Giessen theologians tried to break the predominance of the Suabian Christology by bringing to light again the Chemnitz aspect of the “Formula Concordiæ,” and following out more consequently the Helmstadt tendency. Behind the earthly humanity, which underwent a gradual growth, the Tübingen theologians assumed, with Brentz and the later Luther, the contemporaneous existence of an actual, higher, and already complete humanity : the Giessen theologians protested against this simultaneous dualism, which destroys the unity of the

God-manhood, nay more, which leaves the empirical humanity outside of the "Unio," and taught instead, two stadia or *states*, which they carried rigidly through. In the first of these stadia, exinanition prevailed; in the second, the absolutely actual God-manhood, corresponding to its idea. The exinanition was brought to pass by the withdrawal (*retractio*) or quiescence (*quiescere*) of the Logos, relatively to actuality, in and with the humanity (*κένωσις τῆς χρήσεως*); in other words, by the Logos refraining, for the sake of the work of redemption, from at once communicating to the humanity the actuality, which, agreeably to His essential nature, He always has and exercises for Himself. This actual employment He reserved for Himself, at the same time allowing the humanity so long to develop and manifest itself purely according to the law of its own being, although it had been put in *possession* of divine predicates (*actu primo*) by the act of "Unio," and the Logos occasionally worked through it already on earth (*actu secundo*), and communicated to it single rays of His actual majesty. The place of the double, contemporaneous humanity, was thus taken by another dualism, to wit, by that between the Logos and the humanity, whose actuality was conceived to be usually *only* human, and not at the same time also as the actuality of the Logos:—not to mention that the absolutely complete God-manhood of the Suabian Christology is represented by the Giessen theologians also as interrupting the usual course and continuity of the empirical life of Christ from time to time, after a ghostly manner, and in obedience to a law, external to the person itself, and not conditioned by its own immanent vital progress.

The Giessen theologians aimed especially at ridding themselves of the doctrine of the omnipresence of the body of Christ. In order to gain their end, they took a different view of the divine omnipresence from the usual one, regarding it, not as "*nuda adessentia ad creaturas*," but as "*operatio*;" where the latter fails, there fails also the presence. They connected it therefore more intimately with the omnipotent government. They maintain, that as the humanity of Christ could not possibly have governed the world during its sufferings and death, so also actual omnipresence did not appertain to it during the state of humiliation. Omnipresence falls into the domain of the actual, or of

use, to which, as an usual thing, every claim is, once for all, renounced during the state of humiliation (κένωσις). The possession which belonged to Christ through the "Unio" was merely the possibility (δύναμις) of being present to creatures when and as He willed, and of governing with the Logos. In a similar manner the δύναμις of omnipotence and omniscience is conceded as a *possession* to the humanity; but the use or actuality thereof (actus secundus) is in general denied for the period of His sojourn on earth. It was thus intended to secure a place both for a human growth and for a state of exaltation, in which the "plena usurpatio" first takes place, and which is thoroughly distinct both from incarnation in general, and from the humiliation. The entire Christ is described as the one who humbles Himself; the humanity is described as that which is humbled; but the incarnation is identical neither with the exaltation nor with the humiliation of the humanity; it is the "factum," running through or lying at the foundation of both, and which admits the distinction of the two states into its circle. The essence of the "incarnatio," which extends uniformly through both states, consists solely in the illocal, intimate, personal presence (præsentia intima, indistantia) of the Logos with humanity; but there by no means belongs thereto also the "præsentia intima" with all the creatures, which the Logos, who is united with it, omnipresently governs. Space and time cannot dissolve this most intimate union. For, although the Logos is not merely in this humanity, but remains present with all creatures, wherever He is He has the humanity present *for Himself*, according to His simple, illocal essence, even though it is not present with the creatures; and thus is the indivisible unity of the person completely secured, without actual omnipresence being attributed to the humanity. This unity remained, therefore, even whilst the Logos governed the world alone, without the mediation of the humanity, during His state of humiliation. The essence of the "Unio" consists purely in the relation between the Logos and the humanity, not in His relation to the world. (Note 39.) Although the Giessen theologians accepted the position, "λόγος non extra carnem," as also the self-evident one, "caro non extra λόγον," they understood the former merely as it was understood also by Nicolai and others, to wit, as signifying that the personal "Unio" was

never in any case dissolved, and that the Logos as a person, or personally, dwells in Christ alone, and in no other creature besides; that is, that Christ is the only creature who possesses the person of the Logos, and with it the divine fulness, intensively as His own.

The Tübingen theologians, however, deemed it necessary to take the proposition, “*λόγος non extra carnem*,” in a more comprehensive sense, to deny that the communication of the actuality of the Logos to the humanity was limited in relation to omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscience, and to exclude the above-mentioned distinction between possession and use. Their tendency was to limit the distinction between the two states to the difference between a concealed and manifest use; and to connect the exaltation in the main already with the humiliation. With all the energy of their thought they sought to retain hold on the absolute idea of the God-manhood, apart from whose full reality, they could not consider the incarnation to have been at all effected. Starting from this dogmatical conception of an absolute and identical God-manhood, they approach the empirical facts, the accounts given in the Gospels, and put forth every effort to effect a satisfactory explanation of them.

Omnipresence is by no means to be reckoned already to the actuality, behind which perhaps lay the possibility of being omnipresent or not, according to the use which the will made of the potence; but omnipresence is the presupposition to all the actuality of God in, without itself being able to be reckoned part of, the world. It is the quiescent being which God has by *necessity of nature* with the world, when once it has existence (which of course depends on the divine will); it is a consequence of the essential infinitude of God. So certainly, therefore, as the act of incarnation communicates the divine essence to humanity, even so certainly must this actual omnipresence, and not merely its potence, which does not exist, be communicated to the flesh of Christ. Nor is the exaltation of the flesh of Christ, or its sitting at the right hand of God, but its being taken up into the person of the infinite Logos, in the view of the Tübingen theologians, the ground of its omnipresence.

The divine attributes must communicate themselves as that which they are. Now they never exist in quiescence, but only in “*actus*,” and it is not a mere possibility that God governs

the world, if He once will its existence, omnisciently, omnipresently, omnipotently; it is a necessity which God as it were lays on Himself in willing to create the world, and through which He has once for all renounced the distinction between possession and use in relation to these His attributes.¹

Especially, however, did the Tübingen theologians maintain that the Giessen Christology dissolves the unity of the person;—partly in that it teaches a being of the Logos in all creatures, whereas they maintain that the humanity can only be in one place; and partly, in that it rends asunder the world-governing Logos and the man, who, though held to be united, is not allowed to govern with Him. In the view of the Giessen theologians, therefore, the humanity works according to its own laws “actualiter” without the Logos, works and knows nothing divine save exceptionally, but merely what is human; and *vice versâ*, the Logos works solely as God, without the concurrence of the humanity. This dissolves the unity of the person agreeably to the principle, “*divisis operationibus ipsa quoque dividitur persona*:”—this leads to Nestorianism² and Calvinism.

It must be allowed that the outlines of divine-human *being* sketched by the Tübingen theologians was marked by strict unity; and that they aimed at drawing their sketch free from external influences, and solely in accordance with the idea of God-manhood itself. They take also a much more intensive view of the unity of the divine-human person, although it approached too nearly to absolute identity in heaven and on earth—which identity seemed to them to follow from the commonly recognised principle, that the incarnation has no degrees, but must either be a fact or not a fact; as though that which *is*, could not be the subject of growth. They further justly direct

¹ At this point the argumentation of the Tübingen theologians thoroughly resembles that of the Reformed, who said of the world, that if God once willed it according to the laws of its own idea, He could not at the same time will it in an opposed manner. For the rest, this denial of the distinction between possession and use of the divine attributes, is essentially physical, unethical. But so far as they moderated it through the contingency of the world, whose being depends on the will of God, so far must they, to go merely one step backwards, concede to the Giessen theologians, for the essence of God, this distinction between possession and use.

² There is truth in the objection, because the actual humanity does not appear in the representations of the Giessen theologians as divine-human so long as it is undergoing growth.

attention to the inconsistency of the Giessen theologians in teaching that Christ did sometimes make use of His possession of omnipotence, etc. If these exceptions, say they, are compatible with the exinanition, why should the constant use contradict it? It will depend rather on taking a right view of the ideas of exaltation and exinanition,—a view, namely, which shall admit of their belonging to, and subsisting simultaneously with, each other. This also is required by the interests of religion. The virtue of the high-priestly office consists in the suffering being at the same time the actual King. The exaltation of human nature to the right hand of God, even through the incarnation itself, and its institution into actual divine majesty, consists well enough with the exinanition, if the exinanition be regarded as a veiling (*κρύψις*) of the use. There also remains, further, a place for a series of stages between humiliation and exaltation in the distinction between the not yet open use of the divine majesty correspondent to the world of faith, and that unveiled use which corresponds to the world of direct vision.

The Tübingen theologians' own Christology, like that of Brentz, started from the principle that the "unio hypostatica" consists in nothing else but the *union of the two natures* for the constitution of the person of the God-man; so that if this union should in any sense fail, the God-manhood itself would also fail. Whilst the Christology prior to the Reformation had viewed the incarnation as the assumption of human nature by, or into the person of, the Logos, which allowed of the natures remaining outside of each other, though held together by the Ego as a common third place; the Lutheran Christology, on the contrary, as we have previously shown, took the *natures* for its point of departure;—their union and reciprocal communication appeared to it to be the essential element in the idea of incarnation. According to it, the result of the "unio" and "communicatio" of the natures, was the divine-human person, this new, personal, vital unity. Instead of the mere assumption of the human nature into the hypostasis of the Logos—which necessarily gave onesided predominance to the divine aspect—we now have in clearer expression, communication as of the natures and attributes to each other, so also of the hypostasis of the Logos to the flesh. But if the incarnation itself, and the

“*unio hypostatica*” therewith universally identified, is first brought to pass by that union and communication of the natures, we must also further say that no incarnation has taken place unless an actual and, in its kind, complete vital unity was established, and if the natures, be it in themselves, or in their attributes, or in their activities, still continue outside of each other.¹ From this the Tübingen theologians, inasmuch as the unchangeableness, omnipresence, and eternal world-government of the Logos were to them as unassailable verities as to the orthodox Church in all centuries, deemed it necessary to draw the conclusion, that the humanity must have been introduced, as into the full possession, so also into the use, of the divine prerogatives; and that, inasmuch as the *Unio*, whose essence demands this, is indissoluble, Christ must, subsequently to the incarnation, consequently already in the womb of His mother and on the cross, have been omnipresent, omniscient, and the ruler of the world, even as to His humanity. Only thus can Luther’s position — “*divina natura non extra carnem*,” be adhered to: only thus can we avoid the separation of the humanity from the Logos, which would immediately follow, if the Logos were anywhere where the humanity is not, or if He did anything subsequently to the incarnation which the humanity does not at the same time also do. According to this, their presentation of the doctrine of the “*communicatio idiomatum*” must necessarily take another shape, both formally and materially. Chemnitz and his adherents had discriminated, I. The communication of the natures to the person: II. The communication of the natures to each other; in this case, the communication to the divine nature was usually omitted: III. The communication of the person to the natures, in that the one person gives the impulse to action which the two natures, each in its own way, though both in common, carry into execution. Now, the first genus, according to which predicates of each

¹ The latter was the case with the theologians of Giessen, who could only recognise growth in Christ at the price of denying the humanity as growing to be also divine-human. In this respect, they held it to be purely human; and were therefore agreed with the Tübingen divines in recognising no divine-human growth, and in merely having, partly an eternally perfected divine-human *being*, partly, and alongside thereof, a purely human growth.

nature were appropriated to the entire person, agreeably, that is, to each nature, must naturally be thoroughly foreign to a type of doctrine which treated the person rather as the result of the union of the natures, and not as a kind of third place common to both. A Christology, therefore, which teaches that the incarnation, and the God-man Himself, is the result of the "*Communicatio naturarum et idiomatum*," must needs assign a later place to this genus, presupposing as it does the existence of the person; and so order the genera of the "*Communicatio naturarum et idiomatum*," that the divine-human unity shall result therefrom. Accordingly, the Tübingen theologians¹ posited as the *first* genus, the participation of the divine nature in the human—the appropriation of the latter, with all its weaknesses, defects, sufferings (*οικελώσεις, ιδιοποιήτα*); they make it matter of blame that usually only a communication to human nature is spoken of; and lay down the communication to the divine nature, which since Luther had mostly been overlooked, as the first genus. With the appropriation of the human by the divine is connected, *secondly*, the appropriation of the divine by the human on the ground of the self-communication of the Logos. As in the case of Brentz, so here also, this is represented as so complete from the very beginning, that the ascension adds nothing essential to it. The "*hyperypsis*" of the human nature is already accomplished by the Unio. From the two first follows, as a *third* genus, the community of the activities of the divine-human person thus arrived at, which is an absolute one, so that the humanity co-operates, after its manner, in all that the Logos does. Now, for the first time, can its proper place, and a fuller and more real sense than heretofore, be assigned to the communication of the natures to the person, as the *fourth* genus, previously the first. For whereas Chemnitz still treats this genus (as also the "*genus apotelesm.*") as recognised by both Reformed and Lutherans, and had deemed the difference between them to consist solely in the "*genus majestaticum*;" it is no longer to signify that the two natures with their predicates belong really to the one person, and that it is both possible and correct to affirm the like things concerning the one undivided person: the theologians of Tübingen, on

¹ Hafenreffer already formed the transition to this procedure; see Note 37.

the contrary, regarding the person as nothing but the unity of the natures themselves, explain their fourth genus as signifying that what is declared concerning the one nature, applies to the person only in the sense in which it can be declared also of the other nature.¹

We have thus before us two types of the doctrine of the attributes, answering to the distinction between Chemnitz and the Suabians.

But if the God-manhood is to consist therein, that from the first moment onwards, not merely everything human is appropriated to the Logos, but that the humanity also is omnipresent, omniscient, almighty, and governs the world along with the Logos, even on the cross; how is the reality of the human nature, without which everything great that is said of the incarnation loses its basis, compatible therewith?

Firstly, as concerns *omnipresence*:—to appeal to the illocal presence of the humanity in the Logos, or to the illocal presence of the Logos in the creatures, was not enough. For the freedom from space possessed by the Logos is, at the same time, also power over space, a reaching beyond its limits. This the humanity must also possess. But the actual humanity is circumscribed by space, as also the Tübingen theologians do not deny: according to their premises, omnipresence must be communicated to this circumscribed humanity, or else no incarnation is effected; and, on the contrary, the actual humanity is left untouched by the Unio. Consequently, they would have to postulate, that the same thing which is circumscribedly and spatially in one place, should also be at the same time omnipresent. Of the plan adopted by Luther, who had endeavoured to help himself by referring to the omnipotence by which God reduces the universe to a grain of sand, which, being so little, can be spanned by His humanity, the Tübingen theologians had, strictly speaking, deprived themselves, in that they had objected to the Giessen divines basing the omnipresence on the omnipotence, instead of on the necessary being of God. They approximated, however, to Ph. Nicolai, who referred this omnipresence to the soul, in that they said, “*actu naturæ*” (humanæ) Christ was not indeed omnipresent, but “*actu personæ*.” At

¹ Compare, for example, Thumm. *Majestas J. Chr.* 1621, p. 89. The fourth genus he posits as the first, p. 93.

the same time, it is clear that they thus arbitrarily stopped short in following out the necessary consequences of their premises, according to which the manhood would not be at all divine-human, if it had not also omnipresence "*actu naturæ*," through that which was communicated to it.

The *omniscience*, supposed to be possessed by the humanity from the beginning, clashed strongly with the scriptural account of the growth of Christ in knowledge. As they justly rejected the distinction between the possession and use of omniscience, nothing remained for them but to posit the humanity of Christ, on the one hand, as growing and learning, on the other hand, as from the commencement omniscient:—a view which they actually ventured to deduce from Luke i. 52;¹ whilst, on the contrary, Mark xiii. 33, where ignorance is attributed to Christ, awakened in them the suspicion of interpolation. The theologians of Giessen did not fail to point out to them the contradiction which lies in His being said to learn, who, on the other hand, is possessed of actual omniscience: they directed attention to the circumstance, that the human growth of Christ is reduced to a mere semblance, if back of it there stand the humanity in its complete actuality as divine-human. As important in a logical sense, though more overlooked, is the reverse idea, that here the same holds good as of the spatially limited Person of Christ. Namely, according to the Tübingen premises, the learning, growing Person of Christ (exactly as in the case of the Giessen divines) was not at all actually divine-human, but remained as such outside of the Logos and the Unio, which consists in the "*Communicatio naturæ et idiomatum divinorum*."

The exercise of *omnipotence* involved the difficulty of reconciling therewith the truth of the weakness of the human nature. If Christ governed the world in blessedness during the anguish of Gethsemane, and whilst hanging on the cross, what do we do then with the truth of His high-priestly suffering? The Tübingen theologians could not conceal from themselves, that at this point their theory clashed hostilely and directly with the religious interest which had been, and must remain, the motive principle of the entire movement of the dogma concerning the Person of Christ. For this reason, in the course of their negotiations, they gave way somewhat to the divines of

¹ Thumm. Maj. J. Chr. p. 157: the *πληρούμενον* proves this.

Giessen in this matter; but their concessions were either merely apparent, and did not improve matters, or else they broke up and shattered their entire theory. They said, namely, a "retractio" of the "majestas divina," that is, of its use, took place for the high-priestly office, in order that Christ might be able to suffer. As High Priest, therefore, He was only in possession, He had not the use, of these prerogatives. This retractio, however, was not the work of the Logos alone (like the subsequent reassumption of the usurpatio), as the Giessen theory tended to assume, but also of the humanity; it was, consequently, a joint act of the two natures, having for its object the self-limitation of the humanity in the divine "majestas," by no means of the Logos. Nay more, they showed themselves ready, out of regard to the work of redemption, to extend this self-limitation of the humanity in relation to the "usurpatio," further, to all the momenta of the state of humiliation backwards to the conception, to which Christ submitted; as, for example, to His poverty, weakness, the servile form, His limitation in His growth by time and space, pain, the rendering of active and passive obedience unto death. And this ought to have conduced essentially to the harmonious carrying out of their point of view. For whereas we have just been compelled to charge them with leaving the humanity of Christ, as limited by space and occupied in learning, indeed in general as the subject of growth, outside of the Unio; the Tübingen theory, if it wished, had in the high-priestly office of Christ, requiring as it did exinanition, a bridge from the humanity, as inwardly absolutely complete and united with the Logos by complete "Communicatio," to the humanity as outwardly limited, growing, and suffering. The latter would then appear as the deed of the former, for the purpose of the work of redemption. This, however, is not logically carried out. For at one time the Tübingen divines said,—This exinanition took place for Christ only "qua Sacerdos," but not "qua Rex;" on the contrary, the *exercise of His royal power* continued even during His sufferings, yea, even whilst His body lay in the grave:—indeed, otherwise, the Unio would have been dissolved. At another time, they expressly limit the high-priestly self-exinanition to the use of the power, but suppose that the high-priestly office did not really require the renunciation of omnipresence and omniscience. They main-

tain, therefore, that Christ on the cross was at the same time omnipresent and omniscient as High Priest, but also that He at the same time governed as King,—a distinction whose untenableness does not need further pointing out. Such a doctrine of exinanition leaves the growing humanity alongside of the perfected God-manhood, which, precisely because it is the subject of growth, is not divine-human, but merely human; and thus they do nothing towards overcoming the old Suabian dualism of a twofold humanity.¹ Another inconcinnity is, that, on the one hand, in their doctrine of the four genera, they represent the assumption of human nature in a poor and lowly form as the first genus, and consequently view lowliness as its primitive state;² whilst, on the other hand, they evince an inclination to derive the lowly form from a voluntary self-exinanition, on the part even of the humanity.

From their point of view, which demanded an absolutely complete God-man for the very act of incarnation itself, because in such an one alone could the *Unio* be an actuality, the latter was the only logical course. They did also actually distinguish “*conceptio*” from “*incarnatio*,” in such a manner that, according to its idea, the latter preceded the former. This, however, is at the same time the point where the logical carrying out of their fundamental thought involves their entire theory in ruin. For if the “*conceptio*,” to which the humanity itself first owes its existence, is at the same time also a deed of the humanity, then, as Schneckenburger has rightly discerned, a God-manhood, and that not merely an ideal, but an absolutely and perfectly real one, must have preceded and been the cause of the latter; and regard to servile form would necessitate the resumption of many a feature of the already existent perfect reality of the God-manhood.

To this result, the Tübingen Christology was unavoidably

¹ The Tübingen theory posits in the *Unio personalis* a natural impossibility to suffer and to die, because it posits a necessary participation of the humanity in the divine vital power: alongside of this miracle, however, they posit for the suffering, an act of will temporarily and partially doing away with this miracle, in order that the humanity might be capable of suffering. This reminds us vividly of the monophysitic theories, which first build up a strange scaffolding of absolutely complete God-manhood, in order afterwards to abolish it by a negative miracle, out of regard to the reality of the sufferings.

² Which Schneckenburger overlooks.

driven by the supposition of a divine-*human* act of self-abasement; and this consequence necessarily involved its overthrow, for, with the doctrine of a real heavenly humanity, it plainly passed over into the domain of heterodoxy.

Here, however, again they stopped short of the final consequences of their principles. On the one hand, they were not really in earnest in their assertion of a God-manhood which had an absolutely real existence prior to earthly incarnation, and gave it its form; for, notwithstanding their discrimination of the incarnation from the "conceptio," they again represented the former as beginning with the latter. Nor, on the other hand, were they in earnest with the self-exinanition; for they held that behind the growing, suffering man, who was in the form of a servant, there lay concealed, from the very commencement, an absolutely complete King. This supposition reduces the whole of the earthly life and struggles of Christ to a mere dramatic rôle (Note 40); and involves a dualism which threatens the unity of the person more than even Nestorianism, and makes the incarnation itself a mere show.

Indeed, if the humanity were once possessed of its perfection, it could not again do away with, at all events, the intellectual aspect thereof, not even by an ethical act, but must retain it inwardly or latently; in consequence whereof, acquirement would become mere seeming, a mere exhibition of that which had already an inward existence. But an absolute perfection of humanity without ethical growth is magical, ethical Docetism. For the rest, the Tübingen view would thus be accommodated to the Giessen doctrine regarding possession, with which it otherwise became identical in principle on the subject of the high-priestly "Retractio."

No wonder that the Saxon "Decisio" of the year 1624, in the main, took the part of the Giessen theologians in opposition to the Docetism of Tübingen; though, it is true, without lightening, nay more, almost without feeling, the difficulties of the Giessen theory. For, on the other hand, we are equally warranted in saying,—Logically carried out, the Giessen theory passes into that of Tübingen. The partially perfect "usurpatio" of the "majestas," on the part of the humanity, presupposes the existence of an absolutely complete God-man back of the growing one, who, as the subject, can manifest this "majestas"

in act whenever He wills; it has, therefore, alongside of a Logos who temporarily governs omnipresently without humanity, a further double humanity, which cannot be considered to be preferable to that of the Tübingen theologians, because it actually manifests itself only occasionally, usually, however, remaining latent; or because only isolated divine-human operations manifest themselves here and there, like fragments of a perfect divine-human subject. Also what we have just said regarding ethical Docetism, holds as true relatively to the theory of a possession which was complete from the beginning as of a complete use. Herewith the theologians of Giessen conjoined the serious fault of not establishing any inner connection between the humanity as growing and the humanity as possessed of the divine fulness. The former is supposed to move and act in a purely human manner, as though it had not been assumed by the Logos: the humanity, in the very aspect in which a process by which the divine and human should interpenetrate each other is of prime importance, is supposed to have a merely human growth; whilst in another aspect, the humanity is represented to be as completely in possession at the very beginning as at the end. As though that which had not yet at all developed itself forth from the humanity could already have perfect possession of the divine; as though, further, omniscience were conceivable as a possession without actual knowledge, and the reality of Christ's learning were not as truly excluded by the supposition of the humanity being in perfect possession of all knowledge as by the Tübingen theory.

Most theologians took, in the main, the part of the Giessen and Saxon divines, the eclectic character of whose view recommended it to the multitude. Accordingly, the Suabians, who since Brentz's time had played the role of leaders of Christological orthodoxy, lost their position for the seventeenth century, and their doctrinal type, to which they supposed themselves to have secured the dominion in the "Formula Concordiæ," became now as isolated as the Helmstadt type had been a generation previously, the latter having since then secured the predominance to a far greater extent. It is true the Tübingen divines, with few exceptions,¹ adhered to their type of doctrine

¹ Joh. Val. Andreae, grandson of Jac. Andreae, was already a forerunner of the newer Suabian type of doctrine of a J. A. Bengel and others.

as the alone orthodox one till towards the end of the century,—this was especially the case with Joh. Adam Osiander;¹—but over against the now prevailing doctrine, they could only rebut the charge of heterodoxy by denying to their opponents all right to judge their orthodoxy; by refusing to submit to the decision of any self-constituted tribunal; and by declaring their determination to take their stand on the right of further freely moving in accordance with their doctrine. Here, therefore, we have the second case since the Helmstadt movements, in which, despite all the artificial means employed to secure full doctrinal unity, the question, What is pure doctrine? was obliged to be left undecided. The third and last, and in consequence of its failure, decisive effort of this nature, was the Anti-Calixtine “Consensus Repetitus.”

These two last theories, occupying the point of view of the Ancient Church and worthy of mention, represented unquestionably, each of them, an indispensable and fully justified interest. The Giessen divines sought a true growth in the humanity of Christ (without knowing, it is true, what belonged thereto), and laid particular stress on the reality of the distinction between the two states; those of Tübingen, on the other hand, laid stress on the *identity of the Person* of Christ, notwithstanding its lowliness and exaltedness, conceiving this same lowliness and exaltedness as a simultaneous and actual twofoldness.²

Their fault, however, was not principally that of mutual exclusion; for both aimed after all at uniting the principles of the identity and the growth of the God-man, and the difference between them resolves itself rather into a quantitative predominance of the one or the other. Indeed, in another aspect, they

¹ Compare Pfaff Senior's “Diss. de naturæ Chr. hum. præsentia in Statu exinanitionis,” 1709. They reckoned as belonging to themselves the two Meisners, Calov, Scherzer; only partially, however, with just ground.

² They reproach the Giessen theologians with arriving at a “Deus potentialis,” who is quite different from the veritable God; in general, they charge them with losing sight of the identity of the person in the antithesis of the states. Not “the unity of the person” is exactly the characteristic feature of the Tübingen theory; for otherwise they would have been necessitated to offer quite a different resistance to the doctrine of two humanities, which stand alongside of each other almost void of connection. What they aimed at securing by their view of the Logos “non extra carnem,” was the identity of the God-man both in exinanition and exaltation; hence their unwillingness to allow the distinction between *κτῆσις* and *χρῆσις*.

stand so near to each other, that the one inevitably passes into the other. Through being interwoven with each other, their difference has no opportunity of arriving at full growth; this interweaving, at the same time, also prevented the momenta of truth represented by each assuming their true form, the form in which it would be possible for them to unite with each other. To form a composite of their principles, could, therefore, not help the matter. The premises common to both is the *presupposition*, that the entire fulness of the divine majesty communicated itself to the humanity of Jesus, in the very first moment of His life. All they disagreed on was the question,—What belongs to this fulness by which the God-manhood is constituted? This inherited premiss owed its rise in the first instance to the circumstance, that (in connection with the doctrine of the Supper) the image of the ready and complete Christ had been taken for the point of departure, and had involuntarily been carried back into the period of His earthly life. If we distinguish between the person in itself, and its manifestation in action, we must say that the Giessen theologians allowed entirely the same idea of the person of the God-man to rule at the beginning of the incarnation, as did those of Tübingen. If this conception were not the right one, it could serve no purpose supplementarily to supply the remedy in the sphere of active manifestation, and there first to take due account of the humiliation, of the truth of the humanity and its growth. The only thing that could result therefrom was the moderating of dubious consequences drawn from false premises; an unharmonious, unsteady image of the person, lacking identity with itself. The Tübingen theologians, therefore, must be allowed to have been justified in maintaining that the constitution of the person and its activity must correspond. But from this principle follows, in opposition to them, that if the divine-human activity which necessarily results from their conception of the person in the “*Unio hypostatica*” cannot be carried out without destroying the truth of the humanity, consequently of the incarnation, their view of the constitution of this person, their premiss regarding the communication of the absolute fulness of God to the humanity from the very beginning, with which human growth is incompatible, is plainly untenable. And for the theologians of Giessen, it follows, that if their idea of the limitation of the use of this

fulness, by which they aimed at securing the truth of the human growth, is to have any significance, it must be extended to the person of the God-man Himself, to the initiatory possession of the fulness of God,—a step which no one felt himself at liberty to take.

The Tübingen divines clung more tenaciously to that premiss than those of Giessen, but show also the more clearly to what inextricable difficulties, or, to adopt the language of their opponents in Giessen, into what a “sea of absurdities,” it leads.¹ No marvel, then, that they themselves stopped short of the full consequences of their premises in order not to be compelled to declare all the growth, all the weakness or limitation of Jesus, either for mere show and seeming, or to characterize it as the act of an absolutely perfect, self-abasing, *God-manhood* which preceded the “conceptio,” and was therefore *heavenly*.

The Tübingen theologians, therefore, stand as a sign showing whither the premiss they had for a time adopted from the Suabians of the 16th century, and from Luther in his later days, inevitably led. They, the more logically consistent thinkers, cannot go back so long as the premiss to which they cling drives them irresistibly forward; and they cannot go forwards nor draw the conclusions which necessarily follow, because then nothing awaited them but evasive heretical expedients, as offensive to Christian feeling as to common sense.

The theologians of Giessen masked these consequences, out

¹ In addition to the above we may further add, that, according to the Tübingen theologians, because the Unio of the Logos with the body of Jesus was never dissolved, and the union consisted in the communication of the majesty and vital fulness of God, the body of Christ was full of life and full of power to take part in the government of the world, even whilst it lay dead in the grave.—Now, as they were convinced that the Logos was and remained much nearer and more communicable to the man Jesus than to any other creature, it followed all the more certainly that the body of Christ was full of life even in death, that consequently His death was a merely apparent one.—For the rest, the reality of the death of Jesus shows that any supposition of the identity of His person already on earth, which does not leave a space between the idea of the perfect God-manhood and its realization, nay more, which does not recognise that the Logos and humanity were partially outside of each other at the beginning, is false. For if the Logos and the humanity had been in each other at every step, as to the corporeal aspect, it would have been impossible for the body really to die.

of regard to the reality and truth of the state of humiliation, but were unable to change them. They also fail to establish the fact of a true growth, unless it be that they give a different definition of the communication by which the incarnation was constituted, and connect not merely the possibility, but also the necessity of a true growth, with this commencement.

The dogma thus fell into a Syrtis, from which it could escape neither forwards nor backwards; nay more, it fell into a contradiction between its premises and its conclusion; and during this last controversy, this was brought clearly to light. This abyss escaped the notice of such as examined the matter superficially; the majority of the theologians went on unfruitfully and securely in their uncertain eclecticism, more inclined on the whole to the Giessen theologians, because those of Tübingen, with their greater acuteness, set forth the impracticable result in a clearer light; whilst the former showed, by the modification they admitted, that they had at all events the will to do fuller justice to the evangelical history. It was not merely the tumult of the Thirty Years' War that drowned the noise of the controversy concerning *κρύψις* and *κένωσις*: it died out because the several parties had nothing more of consequence to say, if they did not retract; and because, though they needed to retract, they would not. The claim formerly made with such boldness by the Suabians, to give a Christology well connected, harmonious, and in all points identical with itself, and the glad and hopeful labour bestowed on this work, was now converted into a tedious, spinose, scholastic defence of the principles once laid down; and instead of fairly facing the problem before them, they began to make their appeal to inexplicabilities and mysteries which owed their existence to their own speculations, and not to the scriptural image of Christ.

But the cause of the Lutheran dogma falling into this abyss lay not in the fundamental Lutheran thought, in the tendency of Lutheranism to assert the perfect vital union of the Logos and the humanity; but in the circumstance that the new feature embodied in Lutheranism was again overshadowed by pre-Reformational elements, and its development hindered, even in its application to the earthly life of Jesus, or the doctrine of the states of humiliation and exaltation.

The notion of an humanity complete at one stroke, even

though merely as regards possession, from which Luther was at first, as we have shown, so far removed, but on which he fell, alas! during the controversy about the Supper, without its materially serving his purpose, is essentially of a magical character, and belongs to the period prior to the Reformation. It bears the blame of all those difficulties which beset the Lutheran dogma; and it was necessary for it to be retracted, without any attempt at disguise, ere the Lutheran Christology could be carried out and bear its proper fruits for the doctrine of the Atonement, of the Supper, and of the Church.

That representation could only be retained without suspicion so long as but a very imperfect knowledge had been arrived at of that which pertains to the essence of human nature. Considered in this aspect, it was both desirable and necessary that philosophy should arise, to deliver the dogma from its stagnant condition, and from the unendurable self-contradictions which threatened utterly to destroy it in this its boldest and hitherto most developed form, and to save its proper kernel and substance, by giving it a new construction.

The dogma assumed again also a pre-Reformational form, in so far as the divine aspect again acquired its old predominance over the human, and the latter was Docetically dissipated. This was also the case, in so far as scarcely any use was made of the deepest, that is, the ethical, categories of the divine and human essences, which had given the Reformation its life, and through which the divine and human natures were brought into the closest proximity to each other. In the doctrine of the *Idiomata*, taught during the seventeenth century, the ethical attributes usually fail; they rested content with the attributes of majesty, omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscience, as though the true seat of all majesty were not the ethical. The stress thus laid on the former betrays also pre-Reformational influences. The Tübingen divines had a right presentiment of the fact that glory and lowliness were very compatible with each other, nay more, that they must co-exist in Christ. But because they lacked the ethical spirit of the Reformation, they contented themselves with the non-ethical determinations, and arrived at the absurd propositions of an humanity which was at one and the same time physically weak, yea, dead and alive, yea, omnipotent and omnipresent; instead of seeing that true lowli-

ness undoubtedly incorporates itself with moral loftiness and majesty, nay more, that even ethical growth constitutes one feature of the worth of this person and its work. (Note 41.)

This leads, however, to a still wider point, in which both in like manner approximate again more nearly to the doctrine which prevailed before the Reformation, and remove further off the possibility of a true divine-human unity. This was the falling away from Luther's principles¹ concerning "a new humanity"—principles which, continued by Brentz (at a later period by Ph. Nicolai), found an expression in the "Formula Concordiæ," in the idea of the "Capacitas" of humanity for deity. Even the theologians of Tübingen constituted herein no essential exception. One of its main defenders, in fact, was Lucas Osiander, the Scourge of Mysticism, yea, even of a John Arndt. A lifeless theology is under an inner necessity, nay more, it has a relative right to posit the essence of God as foreign to humanity; only it fails to see that it itself, and not God, establishes this gulf between God and humanity. We have thus the strange spectacle of men, on the one hand, most zealously (specially in continuance of an inherited polemic) contending for the inward unity of the Person of Christ and for the communication of the entire divine majesty, nay more, of the person and nature of the Son of God to the humanity; and on the other hand, refusing to allow that the humanity possessed that which was communicated to it as its own; or, in other words, denying that the communication arrived at its proper goal. Even Thumm (Majest. J. Chr. 79) says, The communication of the person of the Logos to the humanity did not take place *κατὰ μέθεξιν*, but merely *κατὰ συνδύασιν*! As fire penetrates into the finer pores of iron, so the Logos into humanity. What the humanity thus undergoes is not simply a glorification of itself,—that would be merely "dona finita;" but, again, it is not given such a possession of the divine as constitutes it actually the property of the humanity, and as that the humanity of Christ might thus be said to have attained the fulfilment of the idea of its own essence; but the "Capacitas" has, as it were, merely the following local significance:—The humanity so occupies a place, that, in and alongside of it, though outside of its essence, there is room for the deity to be present

¹ See above, pp. 532 ff.

with all its fulness ; on the ground of which coexistence (*συν-δύασις*¹) the humanity also is termed God; omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, quickening, and worthy of worship.—Looking to the actual substance of the doctrinal principles, and not merely to the tendency, which had failed to attain to its full and corresponding expression, how insignificant here appears the difference between the Lutheran and the Reformed Christology ! But this very impotence to find expression for that which they wished,² and which undoubtedly differed from the Reformed doctrine, intensified the polemic instead of softening it, and caused them to cling all the more tenaciously to formulas, which had gained for themselves the position of watchwords.

The Lutheran Church, it is true, never *meant* to adopt the Reformed dualism between the essence of God and man ; at the same time, the theologians of Giessen and Tübingen showed themselves incapable of overcoming it : on the contrary, they themselves still remained connected therewith. The Lutheran Christology, in particular, fell into the dualism of a twofold humanity—an empirical, growing humanity, and an humanity bearing in itself perfectly the divine idiomata, and in so far complete. It endured this dualism of two humanities, inserted as it were into each other, and which in their manner the Giessen and Saxon theologians also held, because it aimed, not so much at a complete image of the Person of Christ in and by itself, as rather at that in it which was required for His redemptive office. It was no longer, it is true, concerned solely about the exalted, perfected God-man ; but also not about the knowledge of Christ from His beginning ; and during the sixteenth century it was the doctrine of the Supper that gave its direction and character to the concrete development of Christology. Now it is, more comprehensively, the work and office of Christ that require the recognition of His lowliness equally

¹ This word, in frequent use by old writers on dogmatics, relates properly to the image of marriage.

² What they desired was the actually perfect union of the divine and the human ; and this desire expressed itself, in particular, in the demand that equal worship should be paid to the humanity as to the deity, and in the affirmation of the attribute “*vis vivificandi*” of the humanity also. Besold represented the Holy Ghost as proceeding also from the humanity of Christ, in the year 1636. (See Walch’s “*Religionsstr. innerh. d. luth. Kirche*” i. 175.)

with His exaltation ; and these were intended to be provided for by the doctrine of a twofold humanity. The voluntariness and ethical worth of the sufferings of Christ depended on His not submitting to death from impotence and constraint, but on His being in possession of divine power to resist death, although He did not make use of it. But to transfer this picture of Christ, the colours for which were drawn from His fully ripened life as Messiah, directly to the very beginning of His career, is as inadmissible as to draw the picture of the exalted Christ from this same beginning. *The doctrine of the Person of Christ* has a right to independent consideration, and ought not to be overshadowed by the doctrine of His offices. Only by starting with the doctrine of the person can the doctrine of the offices acquire its right form : as, for example, that of the Holy Supper. The old dogmaticians took delight in considering the entire life of Christ from the point of view of His offices, and that not merely mediately, but immediately ; which of itself implies that He was held to be completely God-man from the very beginning, and that they were purely external considerations which induced Him to delay appearing in public till His thirtieth year. On this view, His growth must have been a mere appearance, because it secured nothing for His person : everything He did was done purely for the sake of others, as a service to them. The intention hereby naturally was, not to give a low representation of Christ ; but they failed also to see that a *δόξα* of Christ lay in His not having been constituted inwardly complete from the very commencement, by a miracle of omnipotence, in order from that time forth, like a mere noble plant of nature, to reveal by physical necessity that which was within. They supposed it necessary to raise His person above an ethical process, above temptation, above assaults, and so forth, without seeing that in this way His victory loses its ethical glory, and that His work also is unethically exposed to the categories of necessity and power, if, instead of seeking to gain us by earnest conflict, as one of our own kind, He merely outwardly played the part of one who submitted Himself to the law of God. In one word, they still lacked the knowledge of that which pertains to the essence of true humanity, consequently also of that which pertains to the incarnation. (Note 42.)

Let us now further consider the dogmatics of the Lutheran

Church in the seventeenth century, subsequently to the controversy between the Crypticists and the Kenoticists (κρυπτικοί, κενωτικοί). The less productive of new thoughts was the Christology of the seventeenth century subsequently to the just mentioned controversy, and the less it really furthered the problem, the more inexhaustible became dogmatical theology in the formal carrying out of less inconsistent ideas. We will give a specimen from a very fruitful, but less accurately known theologian, who may be taken as a representative of the doctrinal character of the seventeenth century. *Calov* discusses "Christognosia" in his system (Tom. viii. 1-737) in six articles:—I. Of God's compassion. II. Of the sending of the Son of God on earth. III. Of the hypostatical union of the two natures. IV. Of the work of Christ. V. Of the twofold state of Christ. VI. Of the stages of humiliation and exaltation. The third article shows (pp. 200-420) that, by the act of incarnation of the Logos, such a state of the "Unio hypostatica," such a "communio et communicatio personæ et naturarum," is brought about (Note 43), as that we are justified, not merely in such utterances respecting His person, as "man is God," "God is man" (propositiones personales), but also that the real "communicatio idiomatum" is established. (Note 44.) The old dogmaticians, however, do not dwell equally on all the divine attributes;¹ but along with omnipresence only, on omnipotence, power of quickening, and omniscience, though they failed to arrive at an expression which was either clear and confident, or which did justice to the original tendency. On the contrary, as early as the seventeenth century, the "Communicatio idiomatum" underwent various restrictions whilst it was being more carefully worked out. (Note 45.) Amongst the Lutheran theologians, Georg Calixt in particular perceived the untenableness of the Christology both of the Tübingen and of the Giessen and Saxon divines, and subjected the doctrine of the "Communicatio idio-

¹ It is specially the operative attributes of the divine majesty that are made the subject of consideration. Compare Note 44. The ethical attributes, on which Luther had laid such great stress, that he deemed them to constitute the inmost essence of God, are scarcely touched upon (only in connection with the "potestas judicii extremi" through the God-man); which is very characteristic. The sole interest was concentrated on the metaphysical attributes, and they were regarded as constituting the divine majesty.

matum" in general to a critique,¹ which, notwithstanding the opposition of Abrah. Calov and Hülsemann,² aided in causing to be constantly more universally conceded the necessity of a limitation of the "*Communicatio idiomatum*," in harmony with the distinction between the active and inactive divine attributes.³ Still more did the unsuccessful attempt to exclude Calixtinism from the pale of the Lutheran Church aid in breaking the hegemony of the Wittenbergers, after the controversy with the theologians of Tübingen; nay more, in breaking the force of the old orthodox theology in general, and withdrawing from it the confidence of the Church, although Calixt himself was not able to give anything better in its place. (Note 46.)

Far removed from the religious power and inwardness of Luther, the theology of the seventeenth century, given up to its intellectualism, involuntarily accustomed itself ever more and more (like Deism) to conceiving God and the world as it is in itself, as absolutely and essentially separated by a dualism which can only be broken through by thoroughly supernatural acts. The most significant Christological expression of this state of things was the conversion of the principle of the "*capacitas humanæ naturæ*" for the "*natura divina*," into the principle that the "*incapacitas*" of the humanity was changed by the divine power into "*capacitas*," that is, in Christ. How different was the position even of Ph. Nicolai, who, notwithstanding the uniqueness of Christ, saw in believers and their fellowship with God an analogy of the *Unio*.⁴ If humanity in Christ requires to be first made susceptible of fellowship with the divine by a miraculous act, and humanity outside of Christ is not susceptible to the divine life, His humanity was essentially, nay even, in the principal point, different from humanity in all other men, and consequently a true incarnation has not taken place. And if believers also attain to participation in divine life by a

¹ Compare G. Calixti *Epitome Theol. posit.* 1619, pp. 140-153. Dreier also, one of his scholars, wrote discussions on the Person of Christ.

² Abr. Calov. *Syncretismus Calixtinus*, 1655; pp. 281 ff. Hülsemann, *Calixtin. Gewissenswarm*, 1654. *Consens. Repetitus fidei vere lutheranæ*, ed. Hencke.

³ For example, Hollaz. *Examen* iii. 136, ad *immediatam prædicationem* are only become the *ἐνεργητικά* of the humanity. Compare Note 45.

⁴ Quenstedt, who otherwise formed a more living conception of God, allowed it to be of little advantage to Christology.

similar magical and miraculous act, without any connection with a higher element of the general human nature, then other men are separated from Christians as the *πνευματικοί*, as a different class of beings. But if thus the universal "capacitas" of human nature is converted into an universal and original "in-capacitas," what can be the meaning of the hot antagonism to the Reformed Christology on this point? "Capacitas" denotes, then, not a constitution of the human *nature* freely willed by God, but simply the fact, that the Logos dwells in humanity, and that humanity cannot withstand the operation of His power, by which it "capit" Him, contrary to its nature. Let us now consider this matter in a related aspect. Although the principle constantly recurs, that the attributes are at the same time also the essence of God, those dogmaticians, who wished to retain even within the "Unio" the absolute and essential distinction of the natures, found themselves compelled either to conceive the divine attributes as not having actually become the property of the humanity, or else, so far as they are actually communicated to the humanity, to deny to them divine essence, and to find the properly divine essence in the quiescent, as distinguished from the strictly communicable, attributes. But in this way, unless the idea of a twofold humanity be accepted, the "Unio" is involuntarily transferred ever more completely out of the sphere of the divine essence into that of the divine will. The "Communicatio idiomatum" (say they) brought to human nature participation in the "idiomata divina operantia." We are not, however, to suppose that these "idiomata" thus underwent a duplication, or passed over, or were poured into the humanity in order to equalize it with the deity or to destroy its essence; but the communication was of such a kind, that the divine nature stood in the relation to the human, which is a *δύναμις* perfectibilis, of an "actus perficiens" (or entelechia), though this "perfectio" is not to be supposed to have really inhered in the humanity "formaliter, subjective." On the contrary, all that is brought about is a common possession and use of the operative attributes of God *κατὰ* syndyasin, *i.e.*, per unionem et conjunctionem, so that a *κοινωνία* of two was involved. (Note 47.) Such a participation on the part of human nature, without actual appropriation (*μέθεξις*), would have been, not indeed Eutychian, but still near enough to Nestorianism, and stands in contradic-

tion with the supposition that the human nature of Christ itself was perfected through its union with the divine. For if the human have its perfection in the divine, then the idea of the former must point to the latter, and the latter must form part of the full idea of the former; so that it can no longer be said that the divine *idiomata* never become "formaliter, subjective, inhæasive," the property of the humanity. But this the Protestant Scholasticism did not wish. Through the prevalence of intellectualism and formalism, and through the rising hostility even against the nobler forms of mysticism, the need and susceptibility of God felt by human nature was thrown constantly more completely into the background. The notion that humanity, although in contradiction to its nature, still attained to the possession of divine *idiomata*, might content for a time; but on the soil of Protestantism, in opposition to such a magic of grace in Christ, the mind must ever again be irresistibly impelled to acknowledge that what is opposed to the nature of humanity cannot be truly received by it. The recognition of this truth is contained in a veiled form in the above-mentioned denial of *μέθεξις*; it was destined to be soon enough openly and loudly proclaimed in a different manner.

With this weakening of the force, or rather completely changed explanation of the "*capacitas humanæ naturæ*" for the divine, as once taught by Luther, by Brentz, and even by the Formula Concordiæ, the old dualism which the Reformation had endeavoured to break down, was again raised up and established afresh. The reverse side of this, however, was, that according to the "*Communicatio idiomatum*" so much was from the beginning appropriated to the humanity of Christ, that a true human development was impossible. To this latter point the Reformed Church in its Christology clung more strictly and seriously; but it effected the less for the union of the natures, nay more, it participated in the fault of the Lutheran theology, of conceiving the *person*, from which the attributes cannot be separated,¹ to have been complete and perfect from the very commencement.

¹ Some of the Reformed theologians maintained that the divine person alone without its nature, consequently without its attributes (like many Catholic theologians), became man. Compare Note 43. But a divine Ego without any divine attributes is neither conceivable, nor would it be essen-

On the whole, the Christological activity of the period subsequent to 1700 was solely formalistic, destitute of new and advancing thoughts. As soon as the impulse towards logical development was satiated, the mind, in its declining productiveness, applied itself ever more and more to single spinose questions, such as had already been frequently enough treated by the Scholasticism before the Reformation. By way of characterizing it, we will give a few specimens.

As a point of transition, we may take a subject of controversy, in connection with which, whatever answer might be given, the inextricable difficulties of the Lutheran Christology of the seventeenth century come very clearly to light. This is the question,—Whether Christ was man also in *triduo mortis*, that is, whether during that time the *human-ification* (*Menschwerdung*) really and entirely continued? That the person of the God-man in itself was not yet completed whilst on earth; that, on the contrary, its factors were still partially separable, and had not interpenetrated to absolute unity; that, consequently, the doctrine of an *Unio* complete at one stroke, and raised above all degrees and stages, is untenable: this was demonstrated especially by the death of Christ. Death is a separation of body and soul. Now, if we say,—Christ's soul, as omnipresent through the person, was still united with the body; and so the body, which, as pertaining to the person, is supposed also to participate in the divine attributes, still continued united with the soul; the bond between body and soul cannot have been really broken by death: on the contrary, the place of the natural bond between the two must have been assumed by the still less dissoluble, supernatural bond of the *Unio*, and the death of Christ, therefore, was mere show and seeming. Nor can it at this point help to appeal to the non-use of the omnipresence; partly, because the descent into hell was accustomed to be counted already as pertaining to the state of tially different from an human Ego. Thus, therefore, we should fail to arrive at an actual God-man. This doctrine was still controverted by Woken. Buddeus (l. c. p. 745), on the contrary, says,—“The result of the *unitio* is the *unio*, which is termed *personalis*, quia *unitio ista ad unam personam constituendam tendit*.” But the new and apt element contained in this expression was not further followed out. He says, however, the *conceptio* and *incarnatio* do not belong to the *exinanitio*, that is, to the activity of the divine-human person.

exaltation; and partly because the vinculum between the deity and the humanity was represented as absolutely complete from the very beginning, with which a remaining dissolubility of the factors of the humanity was plainly incompatible. Recognising this, and anxious about the work of the atonement, above all, about the truth of the death of Jesus, Lütke-*mann* resolved on making the sacrifice of conceding that, during the three days of His veritable death, Christ was not a true man; that, consequently, the humanification was temporarily resumed. This answered, indeed, completely to the universally recognised premises, that the union must either exist in all completeness, or not exist at all; but it gave a serious blow to the important doctrine of the indissolubility of the *Unio*, and threatened to reduce the incarnation to something which, like a theophany, may at one time be a fact, and then again cease. For this reason, the view of Lütke-*mann* met, on the one hand, with much opposition; though, on the other hand, it gained great approval, especially as a proper answer to it was not forthcoming. (Note 48.)

The importance of this question, which, it is true, wore almost solely the appearance of a play of scholastic acuteness, lay in the circumstance of its rendering clear, that no other *Unio* is compatible with the truth of the humanity and of the death of Christ, save one which leaves room for a relative dissolubility of the factors of the God-man whilst on earth, and which insists on the necessity of a process of interpenetration. And this is nothing less than to demand that the premises of the Christology of the seventeenth century should be exchanged for more correct bases.

They were further agreed, as far as concerns the *body* of Christ, that it was derived not merely from Mary, but in a certain way from the fathers also (Romans ix. 5). Some asked, however,—Was Christ then already in the loins of Adam? And if He were, how can He have been without sin? Of the interests which were favourable to Traducianism, the majority inclined to an affirmative reply. With some of the physicians of that age, they assumed that, “in Eva formaliter, actu ac seminaliter stamina omnium fuisse hominum, ne uno quidem excepto.”¹ But, as the seminal existence of Christ in

¹ Compare E. F. Kesselring's “Diss. de massa ex qua Christus natus præservata,” held in 1707 under the Wittenberger Fecht, and re-edited in

the primal pair cannot be conceived to have been first increated after the fall, but, like that of other men, was coincident with creation, the thought might easily suggest itself, that the connection of the Person of Christ with our race was not dependent on sin, and thus a more extensive significance might have been given to the question above referred to. To this connection belongs the question, whether the word of blessing, "Be fruitful and multiply," included Christ as a branch of humanity? This conclusion, however, was mostly declined, in an artificial manner, which proved nothing. They said,—“Not so much *seminali et naturali propagatione vi benedictionis* Gen. i. 28, quam ‘etiam’ *foederali promissione* Gen. iii. 15, Christ came into existence; at all events, as a sinless being.”¹ It is true, all other men, who were “potentialiter” in Adam and Eve, are supposed to have been also actually born with necessity:² Christ alone “*ex occasione peccati*.”—so that, on this view, the potency of the humanity of Christ, which already had a real existence, would have been reduced to nought if the development of the race had been sinless. More barely it could scarcely be expressed, that the Person of Christ has no worth in itself, that it is not an end to itself like all other men; but was thought and willed by God as a mere means:—a supposition which is scarcely compatible with its human homoeousia. On the other hand, the proposition regarding a certain pre-existence of the humanity of Christ in Adam and Eve is further discussed in the form of the question,—whether the mass of Mary, out of which Christ’s body was formed, was sanctified and purified at its assumption by God; or whether it had been already preserved in the Protoplasts at the fall? In favour of the former alternative, Luther had already declared (Walch ii. 1761, § 99, 100); it continued to be the prevailing doctrine of the two Evangelical Confessions;³ and Luke i. 35 and 1716, p. 14. “*Spiritus*” also have in their way “*seminali virtutem sese multiplicandi*,” as bodies have in their way. Page 20.

¹ Of this treats, amongst others, Joh. Ad. Osiander *Colleg. Theol. System.* p. iv. loc. ix., and Grapii *Compend. Theol.* c. 13, § 7 f. See Kesselring, p. 26.

² Kesselring l. c. p. 27.

³ Zanchi assumed the latter. A somewhat different turn was given to Zanchi’s ideas by Petri Molinæi *Anatomia Arminianismi*, c. 7. Kesselring, pp. 29, 41 f.

Matthew i. 24 were willingly appealed to in its favour. Towards the end of the century, however, the latter opinion gained many friends in the Lutheran Church; as, for example, J. B. Carpzov, J. F. Mayer, Friedlieb Fecht, J. A. v. Krakewicz, Wegner.¹ The sinlessness of Christ, urged they, cannot be properly held fast, if the material which Jesus assumed was ever at any time stained by sin. It is not sufficient merely to conceive Christ free from actual sin; nor to suppose that His humanity was sanctified on a later occasion, to wit, at the conception; whereas, previously, that which was, and was destined to be His, was marked by original sin: this would not be absolute freedom from original sin. Otherwise the mocker Democritus (Dippel) would be right when he says,—It was not necessary that Christ should be sinless from the beginning, if only He became so at a later period, for example, through His death. If we assume that this mass was *purified*, and not that it was *preserved* pure at Adam's fall, and the line of the holy fathers (and mothers) down to Mary, we arrive at the absurdity, that Christ made satisfaction for Himself, in order to accomplish the purification of His flesh; unless we are prepared to accept the still more dangerous error, that a purification from sin could have taken place without satisfaction. The above passages of Scripture offer no proof of the purification of the material out of Mary, etc. From the fall of Adam and of all other men, it does not follow that Christ also, as to His humanity, so far as it was in Adam, participated therein. He was in Adam after a different manner from the rest. For, as Carpzov “elegantly” observes, “the prohibition of the apple only pledged those who were in Adam as mere men, but not Christ. For though, as the son of Adam, He was, it is true, also in Adam, He was not in Adam as a mere creature, but as the future Adam and Lord of the law, who therefore, as not bound by, could not sin against, the law, and consequently did not deserve to be born without the divine image.”²

The theologians who supposed that a human germ was *preserved* pure from Adam downwards, in the holy line of the

¹ For others, see Kesselring l. c. pp. 50 ff.

² L. c. pp. 15, 16. The later sins do not appear to have been thought of: in the holy line, they were deemed to be the mere effects of original sin, without themselves producing any effects of their own.

patriarchs and ancestors of Christ, we find vacillating between two opinions; to wit, that of an actual pre-existence of the body and soul of Christ in the fathers, and the opinion that the proper existence of the humanity of Christ first began with the conception in Mary.¹ Had the latter supposition been seriously adopted, the purification of the material out of Mary would not have left room for the opinion, that Christ's humanity had ever been impure; for, indeed, prior to the purifying appropriation, the mass was not at all the humanity of Christ. But how are we to explain the rise of this view of the "*præservatio Massæ Adamiticæ*?" It forms the Protestant counterpart to the idea of the "*immaculata conceptio*" of the Virgin, recently constituted a dogma by the Pope. Religious materialism desires, so to speak, a material, real guarantee of the perfect purity of Christ, in a sanctity present in the race prior to His conception, and thence derived to Him. To the doctrine of the immaculate conception of Mary (which had already risen, in the case of Pet. Gelatinus, to the point of assuming that Mary herself also shared that "*præservatio massæ*" in Adam's fall), they continued undoubtedly opposed; for the Lutherans were concerned, not about the exaltation of Mary, but about that of Christ. At the same time, they came into suspicious proximity to Roman Catholic representations. A Christian interest spake in favour of Mary's having given something of her own substance to Christ. Consequently, the mass that had been kept holy, out of which Christ was formed, must have been the property of Mary, and belonged to her herself, have consecrated and sanctified her above all others of her sex; and only by a miracle could such a divinely preserved sanctity have remained without influence on her entire person. The Roman Catholic doctrine of Mary gained thus a strong support, notwithstanding that the holiness, according to the theory of preservation, related to the entire series of the fathers.² The Pelagianism which we justly

¹ From the notion of a heavenly pre-existence of the humanity of Christ the defenders of this earthly historical humanity remained far; mystics and theosophers like Poirét had more affinity with it. The idea of an earlier incarnation, be it in Melchisedek (as the Englishman J. Asgil maintained), or in Adam or David, is naturally rejected.

² The inclination to represent a glory as reflected on Christ from those who surrounded Him, and the tendency to a materialistic view of His holiness, shows itself also in the circumstance that the permanent virginity

discern in the Romish Mariology, is clearly present, indeed, also in this theory of preservation. For, as the holy element out of which Jesus was born belonged also to Mary and her ancestors, the novelty of Christ, and the distinction between the first and second creation, is essentially limited by the theory of preservation. They did not shrink from saying,—“Even in a rotten trunk there may still be a healthy root, which can again send forth branches; the continued existence of such a holy mass in corrupt humanity testifies to its dignity;”¹—a supposition which traceably enough diverges from the doctrine of original sin laid down in the Formula Concordiæ. In connection herewith, it must not be overlooked, that the most resolute defenders of Lutheran orthodoxy, and the warmest opponents of the pietism of Wittenberg, showed themselves specially inclined to the theory of preservation. They were the men whom Spener charged with flattening altogether the distinction between nature and regeneration. There was, of course, no lack of that cloak of the Pelagianism which we find in all false orthodoxy, namely, the magical; for Pelagian the theory of the preservation of the pure seed through all generations plainly is. When, amongst recent theologians, Olshausen, in his remarks on Matthew i. and Romans xi. 17, likewise supposes that a line of holy men extended like a golden thread through the generations down to Mary, he appears to refer not merely to a spiritual (John iv. 22), but also to a physical preparation for Christ. In a more historical (though also not in a properly ethical) spirit is the same thought applied by those recent theologians who, though they do not indeed assume that Christ had a kind of pre-existence in Adam or the fathers generally, regard the preformation or the growth of the sarkical existence of Christ as accomplished in and through the Old Testament.²

of Mary is asserted with ever increasing decidedness; an idea which, after Helvidius (sec. 5), Ratramnus further (sec. 9) had controverted, against Paschasius, and to which the Reformation had attached no importance, whether Mary were thought to have given birth “*utero clauso*,” or to have born no children to Joseph after Christ’s birth.

¹ Kesseler. l. c. pp. 44 f.

² Compare Baumgarten, Comment. 2. Pentat. i. lxiii. ff., ii. 9, 493, 544. (In opposition to Baumgarten, as also to Hofmann and Lange, compare Delitzsch, “Die bibl. profet. Theologie,” 1845, pp. 295 ff.) This is in contradiction to the notion entertained also by Olshausen, that cor-

We must not indeed overlook the fact, that the theory of preservation contains also the true thought of the abiding susceptibility of human nature for the assumption of the Person of Christ, which is excluded by a Manichæan doctrine of original sin. But the reaction against Manichæan principles took, in the case of these last representatives of rigid orthodoxy, a false direction; through the miraculous preservation of a particle of humanity, that is secured which ought rather to have been attributed to human nature in general, to wit, the capability of receiving Christ. Consistently, they ought to have posited a similar preservation of the power to receive Christ as the Redeemer by faith; or else, if human nature retained this susceptibility notwithstanding original sin, on the same principle it may be said also to have been susceptible of the birth of Christ in and out of it, independently of that magical preservation, and without interfering with the truth of the position, that a spiritual preparation formed part of the fulness of the times.¹

Another question related to the *blood* of Christ shed on the cross. In a disputation held at Rome in 1462, the Dominicans had maintained that the blood of Christ had been separated also from the deity; the Franciscans denied it. A Bull of Pius II. in 1464 was necessary to bring the controversy to a close. But in connection therewith stood another scholastic question,—Whether a single drop of the blood of Christ would not have sufficed for atonement? This the Lutherans were accustomed to deny, in that they maintained the necessity of the appearance and all the sufferings of Christ for the blotting out of the debt

poreality is the *end* of the ways of God. In the Old Testament, in the requirements and symbols of the law, in prophecy, we must only look for an ideal pre-representation of Christ,—a pre-representation which moves, it is true, within the limits of the real world.—In a similar manner, some of the older writers held that Christ's humanity was indeed of the seed of Abraham, though not of the same substance as the fathers; that, on the contrary, it was a heavenly and spiritual germ, received by the fathers in *faith*, out of which Christ was born. So Hartwig Lohmann, Nic. Tetinge, Paul Felgenhauer, Christian Hohburg, Barth. Herxheimer. Compare Kesselnr. pp. 23, 43.

¹ The last-mentioned idea of the preparation of the humanity of Christ in the Old Testament, contains also a true element; for, for example, the faith of Mary was not non-essential relatively to the incarnation. But a "holy flesh" cannot be said to have existed prior to the incarnation, unless sanctification is to be rent loose from the historical Christ.

owing to the divine righteousness.¹ The material blood shed by Christ also occupied the minds of theologians; for example, whether it became corrupt? which almost all denied; also denying corruption of the dead body of Christ altogether, because of its permanent union with the Logos;² further, whether it remained on earth, that is, whether some portion of the earthly body of Christ did not pass into the resurrection body;—a supposition which (not without a polemical reference to Relique-Worship) was commonly denied by the Protestants, and affirmed by the Thomists: whether, as the Lutherans generally supposed, the blood was resumed into the heavenly body of Christ, in order (as Bengel, Storr, Steinhöfer, Osiander held) to be brought before the throne of God as a monument of our eternal salvation, after it had been *entirely* poured out on earth, though remaining in union with the Person of Christ.³ Theologians occupied themselves also with the question, whether Christ will come again with or without the marks of the wounds?⁴ Of such for the most part unfruitful, spinose questions which cannot be answered, we might bring forward a multitude of other examples.⁵ The Lutherans in general assumed for the *soul* of Christ also a “*præexistentia seminalis*,” but not “*realis*,” in the fathers: He had also His soul from Mary.⁶ Many indeed objected thereto, and inclined all the more to the notion of a real pre-existence, as they supposed themselves able in that way to make the “*Exinanitio*” a real

¹ For example, Weickhmann, “*de ortu Christi piaculari*,” Viteb. 1759.

² Vasquez, Calvin, Sadeel, Perkin, took the opposite view.

³ Compare Becker: *An Christus in sua exaltatione—aliud substantia et forma quam quo natus, passus et mortuus est corpus assumserit*. Rort. 1768.

⁴ The latter view was taken by Brentz, Hunnius, Förster, Gesner, Calvin; the former, after Luther and Chemnitz, by Gerhard, Glass, Hoe v. Hoenegg, Jac. Rambach, and others.

⁵ Compare, for example, Steph. Clotzii (General-Superintendent in Schleswig Holstein) *de Jesu Christi sudore sanguineo, animæque ejus tristitia atque cruciatibus*, Exercitt., Hamb. 1710 (a work which for the rest contains many good points). *Zach. Grapii Systema Noviss. Controvers.* 1722, T. i. Q. 20, pp. 158 ff., T. iii. pp. 1–64.

⁶ Kesselring l. c. E. A. Mirus, “*Kurtze Fragen aus der Pneumatica sacra*,” 1710, pp. 206 ff.; compare Delitzsch, *Syst. der bibl. Psychol.* 1855, p. 82,—according to whom Christ derived not merely His body, but also His spirit and soul, from Mary, and therefore refuses altogether to see an immediate divine creation in the Person of Christ.

divine-*human* act of love. So Henry More in his Cabbalistic Catechism; J. Glanville, Ed. Fowler, Poiret in different ways, which we shall notice in the proper place.¹

Not a little were questions of this kind suggested or fostered in the Scholasticism of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches, by the Indian summer which the Scholasticism of the Romish Church enjoyed in Spain after the Reformation in that country. (Note 49.)

CHAPTER II.

MYSTICISM IN THE EARLY PROTESTANT CHURCH.

THE doctrine laid down in the Confessions was not able to satisfy the friends of Mysticism. As presented in the systems of the various churches, even in that of the Lutheran, the Person of Christ stood without inner connection with us; and it was not the manner of the new Scholasticism to gaze, with Luther, into the infinite depths of human nature, that is, of its susceptibility to God. It is true, the doctrine of the "*Unio mystica*" remained; but it every day less and less served the purpose of Christology. Moreover, the view taken of that *Unio* itself became every day more superficial. The ideas of the nobler forms of German Mysticism, which had not yet been incorporated with the dogmas of the Church, were not merely continued, but also further developed, by men like Val. Weigel, Joh. Arndt, Jac. Böhm, and others. In particular, the essential affinity of man with God, as described by Paul, was cherished by the Mystics with special preference, nay, even with a decision and onesidedness, which can only be excused on the ground that they felt themselves to be giving strong expression to sadly misunderstood principles: and this truth was constantly more completely overlooked by the official theology of the Church, to its thorough damage.

These men were the inaugurators, in a theosophic form, of what, in point of substance, was a new Protestant philosophy. A philosophical form or method was not arrived at till a later

¹ Compare Grapii Syst. Contr. l. c. T. iii. pp. 1-12.

period: the Mystics substituted in its place a method of mystic vision.

In the view of Val. Weigel,¹ between whom and Theophrastus there is a close connection, man is the microcosm (Note 50); and he cannot find words enough to express this his dignity. All his knowledge is self-knowledge: all comprehension comes from the eye, and not from its counterpart or object.² The eye by which everything is known, is the man himself; only, however, in relation to natural knowledges. In supernatural knowledge, on the contrary, man himself is not the eye, but God is the light and the eye in us. Our eye must be passive, and not active, in connection therewith. Still God is not foreign to the man in whom He is the eye; but that passive behaviour of man signifies, that he is the self-surrendering instrument, through which God is the seeing eye.³ In this manner God or His Word, Christ, knows Himself, and *through* Himself; for the spirit that has become passive, or is born again, is not its own, but God's; wherefore God sees and knows Himself in His birth and image in, with, and through man.⁴ This light in us, the Word, is, in his view, the veritable Christ: the God-man is pushed completely into the background (c. xxiv.). The book out of which all wisdom comes, is the word of God. A book is inscribed by the finger of God in the hearts of all men, although not all are able to read it. Out of this book all other books are written. This book of life, to which the Holy Scriptures are an outward witness, is the image of God in man, the seed from God, the Light, the Word, the Son Christ (c. 26).

¹ Compare, in particular, "Der güldene Griff, d. i. alle Ding ohne Irrthumb zu erkennen durch V. Wigelium," Neuenstadt, 1616; "Erkenne dich Selbst," Neuenst. 1618; "Kirchen oder Haus-Postill," 1618.

² See "Erkenne dich Selbst" i. c. 27; Güldn. Griff, c. ix. xxi.

³ Güldn. Griff, c. xiii. pp. 39-42.

⁴ The concluding prayer in "Erkenne dich Selbst," first book, p. 56, gives particularly strong expression to this:—"O my Creator and God, through Thy light I know how wonderfully I am made. I am of the world; the world bears me and encompasses me, and I bear the world and encompass the world. What is in it, is apprehensible in me. But Thou hast also created me in Thine image; Thou art in me, and I in Thee. All this I see in Thee and Thou in me; yea, mine eyes are Thine eyes, and my knowledge is Thy knowledge. They see what Thou wilt, and not what I will. Thou knowest and seest Thyself through Thyself, that is, through me; and thus I am blessed. In Thy light I verily know light."

This book or word lies hidden in the heart ; it lies hidden in the letter, and is also hidden in the flesh. But that which is hidden in the Scripture and in the flesh could not become manifest if it were not *in us*.¹ The Scripture could not be understood, nor the word be preached into us, if it were not in us, nay more, in unbelievers also ; for otherwise, indeed, these latter could not be judged. Had we remained in paradise, this inner word would have sufficed (c. 26, pp. 69, 70) ; as children still do not need it, and yet are the most skilled of all to the kingdom of God. But inasmuch as we have been driven out of it, and have become outward, world-men, have in addition lost the body and the Holy Spirit, it is necessary for us to be born anew out of Christ ; for we must have a new heavenly body with Christ out of the Holy Spirit, which is not mortal. Partly because of the body from heaven did the Word become flesh ; partly because men could not read the inner book, God causes it to be awakened by the Scriptures, by preaching and in the flesh.² Although books, that is, external things, even the incarnation itself, are unable to work anything substantial in man, still, says Weigel, in the same manner as Carlstadt, they are written for fallen man for proof, testimony, and memorial of that which man knows before, for remembrance, awakening, and information, whether we are so or not ; but we must not cleave to the shadow and to the husk, but enter further to the book of life.³ We must not say, that because the light is previously in man, it may not be further corporeally born man in Mary ; nor, because it was born man in Mary, is it right to say that it is not always in believers. For the fire lies previously in the steel and flint ; but thou must strike them together if it is to come forth.⁴ This effect, however, he did

¹ He conceives therefore wisdom and the word as lying ever in man in completeness ; the development of the capacity is not regarded as essential ; the whole realization of the ideas is found in the *per se* (an sich). This reminds us again of the Cartesian doctrine of ideas.

² "Erkenne dich Selbst" ii. c. 17, p. 109 : Through visible things we are in general led to the invisible ; in Jesus Christ, therefore, God has given us a visible mirror, in which we may recognise, feel, and apprehend His eternal, unchangeable will. On the other hand, however (c. xiv. p. 100), this Will, or Christ, is put into us, in that image of God which we bear.

³ Der güldene Griff, c. xvi. p. 49 ; Erkenne dich Selbst l. c. xiv. p. 35.

⁴ Erkenne dich Selbst l. c. xvii. p. 51 ; ii. c. xxi. pp. 121 ff.

consider to be bound to Christ, as the God-man; but God was man already in Abel, Noah, Adam, Abraham, Mercurius, Proculus.¹ A distinction must be drawn between the heavenly and the earthly Adam. To the simple it appears as though the earthly were first, the heavenly afterwards. But the outward Christ from Mary, born at Bethlehem, is rather an expression and open sample of the inward Christ, who was now in Adam, and then in Abel, Lot, Mercurius, Proculus, and the like. Weigel reminds us here of the Clementines: Christ he looks upon as the universal divine spirit in man, buried and as it were covered over with rubbish in the most,² but in certain individuals coming forth to consciousness; so, in particular, in Jesus of Nazareth; and where it comes forth in such a way, there is also an incarnation of God. The same thought lies also in his doctrine of the eternal wisdom of God, which he terms a virgin, the heavenly Eve, whose sons are David and Solomon, and all believers. It bore the Son of God from eternity in the Trinity; it gave birth to Christ for us in time. In heaven they are one, Wisdom and the Son; on the earth they are separate, like Mother and Son. Mary is the appearance of the heavenly Eve; she, as the second Eve, gives birth to the heavenly Adam, out of whose side, on the cross, the Christian Church was born.³

At this point, however, Weigel endeavours to enter into closer connection with the historical Christ, to wit, through his doctrine of a higher heavenly corporeality, which was necessary for our deliverance. He follows, in this matter, in the footsteps of the theosophic and natural-philosophical thoughts of Paracelsus. By sin nothing was lost to the soul; the will only became fragile; but sin corrupted the body; it belongs now to the worms. The soul does not need even renewal by regeneration; regeneration consists solely in clothing the soul with a new body, and this result is attained in particular by holy baptism and the holy Supper.⁴ Christ now, in his view, has the advantage, that His humanity possesses this new body by na-

¹ "Erkenne dich Selbst" l. c. xvii. ii. c. xxi. p. 121 ff., cf. p. 222.

² "Erk. dich Selbst" l. c. xvii. p. 52; ii. c. xx. pp. 120, 122.

³ "Die dritte Eva," Postille ii. pp. 285, 286.

⁴ "Der Guldene Griff," c. xvii. p. 53; "Christl. Gespräch vom wahren Christenthum," 1614, p. 36.

ture, in that it is formed of heavenly substance. Christ, in the view of Weigel as in that of Schwenckfeld, is as to His humanity the natural Son of God; for He is derived from the Holy Ghost. His flesh and blood were not out of the earthly virgin or Adam, but out of the eternal virgin, through the Holy Ghost, in order that we might be made new creatures through this heavenly flesh, that we also henceforth might no longer be out of Adam, of the earth, but out of Christ from heaven, and in possessing such flesh, possess heaven. But this divine body was invisible, immortal: in order that He might be able to dwell with us on earth and be of use to us, He assumed in addition a visible earthly body from the Virgin Mary, with a view to redeeming us therein as a man. The one Christ, therefore, has two bodies; for who would dwell with the sun if it were with us on earth?¹ What is of essential use to us, is His heavenly body, which must communicate itself to us for the vanquishment of death. However indifferent he otherwise is to the external, he here does homage to a realism, which treats a merely spiritual eating at the holy Supper as an eating which would be of no use. With A. Osiander and Schwenckfeld, he demands a "justitia essentialis;" by which, however, he understands, not a spiritual regeneration, but the reception of the spiritual body along with the awakening of the consciousness of that which we are and have previously. To the Manichæan element, which sees evil in the body alone, corresponds the Docetism of assuming an invisible body with a heavenly, complete substance, which is not a product of the ethical process undergone by the God-man, but becomes the portion of Christ, as by a magical stroke, and is magically also transferred to men. That this doctrine of a double corporeality of Christ is in many respects merely the stronger, more plastic, and freer expression for the twofold humanity, at which just the most decidedly orthodox Lutherans had arrived; and that both parties look at Christ predominantly in His corporeal aspect;—to this we will now refer merely with a single word. But that the dawn of a deeper truth is thus also announced, we shall also see further on.

With the ideas of Weigel and Theophrastus, Jacob Böhm's

¹ Postille i. pp. 213 ff., 38 ff., 78, etc.; "Christl. Gespräch," etc., p. 12.

doctrine of Christ stands in close connection.¹ In his system, also, the eternal virgin and the heavenly body, which is derived from the holy element, plays a great rôle.

According to Böhm, the virginal birth is the natural; for Adam was intended at first to multiply himself as an Androgyne by thought, and was not clothed with this rough coat, our mortal body.² He was created after the holy Trinity (c. iii. p. 20). At one and the same time he was the hungry fire (male) and the image which has the water of meekness and love (female); he was a chaste virgin in pure love (p. 23). Heavenly substance grew in the outer substance of his body and outward mind. The likeness of his soul (c. iii. § 24) stood in the image of the divine virgin, Wisdom, which had been perceived in the Deity from eternity.—The image of Adam was out of God's wisdom (that is, the eternal Son of God). For God wished thus to see and reveal Himself in an image; and this was the likeness according to God. Nay more, Adam was not alone a likeness, but in the same image (to wit, of the eternal Virgin), the child of God, born of God, of the essence of all essences. But he lost the virginal wisdom which he had in Him; he fell through the devil, who envied him, and who found a point of attack in the dissolubility of the union of the three principles in him (c. v. § 6 ff.). And as the heavenly virgin retired from him, the unity of the sexes, which subsisted in him, also divided itself; he acquired a garment of coarse, rigid matter, and became mortal. But as the darkness longs for the light, even so Adam, who was chosen to be the bridegroom, longed for the heavenly wisdom, his bride; and no less does it long for him—it calls to and draws him continually, knocking at him in various ways, until at last it itself became man. It became man, in order that man might be again restored. For this reason it had (in Jesus) a birth, such as corresponded to

¹ Works belonging to this connection are, "Von der Menschwerdung Jesu Christi," Th. i. specially c. vii.–x.; in the edition of his works of 1730, vol. iv. pp. 54–84;—"Von den drei Principien," cap. xvi.–xviii. vol. ii. pp. 215–299;—"Vom dreifachen Leben des Menschen," c. iv. § 58, vol. iii. p. 120, etc. Compare Baur's "die christl. Gnosis," pp. 596–604; "Trinitätslehre" iii. 259–294, 320 ff., 541 ff., 548, 772 ff., 813, 821; Wullen's "Böhme und seine Lehre," 1838.

² "Von der Menschwerdung J. Chr." Th. i. c. vii. § 6.

the true essence of man, to wit, a virginal birth.—He describes this birth more precisely as follows.¹ The deity strongly lusted to become flesh and blood. And although the pure, clear deity remains spirit, it nevertheless became the spirit and life of the flesh. At the creation of Adam, the spirit of God alone out of the heart of God moved Himself; but now when man had fallen, the centre or heart of God, which had rested from eternity, moved itself, and the divine fire burst forth and was kindled (vol. iv. p. 65). This, however, took place in such a manner that Mary was first raised through the heavenly virgin to a high degree by the benediction, like the first man before the fall; what of humanity was dead and closed was made alive again in her (vol. iv. pp. 64, 67). Thus she stood in the pure chaste virgin; thus could the Word of life become man in the outward Mary, who at the same time had the image or the heavenly virgin, as her possession in herself (ii. 382). And Mary became a mother of the heir to the throne.² The virgin of the wisdom of God, in the Word of God, entered into the womb of the Virgin Mary, into her virginal “matricem,” and married itself therewith peculiarly, unyieldingly to eternity, to wit, into the essences and in the tincture of the element which is pure and unspotted before God. Thereby is the heart of God become an angelic man, as Adam was in the creation.

Christ, therefore, owes His origin to Mary, who, however, was again restored to paradisaical substance by marriage with the eternal virgin, or the Word of God, into which her nature was again transported, or which again shone out in her. For this cause, then, the God-man is not, like others, formed out of coarse material, but is out of an holy element, is an angelic man. Yea, further, He is not merely again like the paradisaical Adam, in whom the antitheses were still dissolubly united in an unity that had not been tested; but this high angelic image is greater than Adam or any angel, through its issue out of the heart of God, with the full fulness of the deity.³ And you must here understand very loftily and sharply that this new creature in the holy element is not born of the flesh and blood of the virgin (Mary); but of God, out of the element, in full

¹ *Drei Princip. c. xviii. § 38 ff. Von d. Menschw. J. Chr. c. viii.*

² *Drei Princ. c. xviii. § 41.*

³ *Drei Princ. c. xviii. 41, 42, pp. 281, 282.*

fulness and union of the holy Trinity, which with full fulness without wavering abides eternally therein; which everywhere fills all things. For this reason, the Word, with its surrender to the holy element created by it, with its entrance into the virginal "matricem" (that is, into the paradisaic essence of the corporeality of the blessed Virgin), was not separated from the Father, but abides eternally in the Father, and is present at all ends in the heaven of the element, into which it entered and became in man a creature, which is termed God.

This *holy element*, which belongs to the paradisaical humanity, out of which alone the pure birth of the Son of God could be effected (after the manner in which Adam was intended to generate before the fall, by believing imagination, or by the thought of the soul which stands in the eternal wisdom), corresponds to the birth of Jesus out of the nature of God, as taught by Schwenckfeld, or from the heavenly Eve, as Weigel teaches. Böhm, however, again also expressly declares that the corporeal element of this creature is *under* the deity, for the deity is spirit; and this spirit, the Lord, also entered into the servant, whom all the angels of heaven admire, and who is the greatest miracle which has been performed from eternity, for it is against nature, and this is love!¹ This lofty, princely, angelic nature was for the moment figured in the Word and Holy Spirit, in the holy element; Mary added earthliness to the holy element of the new creature, but without impurity; and this was the dividing goal (Scheideziel, § 50), for the Word of the deity prevented the impurity. But Christ received also a natural soul like all the children of Adam; then did the human soul again receive its princely seat in the kingdom of heaven, out of which it went along with sin in Adam. He distinguishes, however, a double birth of the soul of Christ. As to the one aspect or birth, it came into existence along with the natural body, and stands in the kingdom of the world; as to the other aspect, it reaches unto the deep gates of eternity, into the Father's primitive will, and became the natural, eternal Son of God;² and the soul of Christ in the Word became an independent, natural person in the holy Trinity; and in the entire depths of the Godhead there is no such marvellous person as this Christ. He intends thus

¹ "Von den drei Principien," c. xxii. § 44.

² "Von den drei Principien," c. xviii. § 53-57. Cf. c. xxii. 77.

to characterize the soul of Christ as essentially divine, even as he derived the body from the holy element. But according to the relation of the natural human soul to its divine birth and essence, the duality appears to be merely a transient one; for the former exists solely in order that the heavenly virgin with the Word may form herself in it, may kindle in it the light by which it either becomes the divine personality of the Son Himself, or is absorbed into that personality. The possibility thereof lies in the human soul generally, even in its fallen state; although Böhm does not speak of an universal incarnation of the Word apart from Christ, in the manner of Weigel. But then a similar process takes place in relation also to the body of Christ. After Mary had laid hold on the heavenly virgin by faith with her soul, she clothed herself with the pure element in which God dwells (that is, the divine nature), not by her own power; but the power and compassion of the heavenly virgin clothed the soul of Mary with the heavenly, pure, new garment of the holy element, as with a new, regenerate humanity. Whilst, therefore, all that is born of flesh and blood in this world is impure, Mary's regenerate humanity was able to conceive and bring into the world the Saviour of the whole world.¹ Accordingly, Christ (although through Mary) descended from heaven as to His paradisaical or heavenly body. This body is the "ternarius sanctus," our lost paradisaical body; the heart of God took it to Himself; the invisible deity entered into it, for an eternal marriage with it. It is derived from God, although Mary, the regenerate one, conceives it, and God and "ternarius sanctus" become one thing, not in spirit, but in essence, as body and soul. But this body out of the Holy Ghost is first formed with the incarnation, when Christ at the same time, without commixture with the paradisaical, assumed the mortal body. Whilst that body out of God became the body of the soul, in which the soul is holy, earthly essences out of flesh and blood (of Mary) clung to it during its life on earth: these, however, Christ, when His soul entered into death with the new creature, *left in death*, and rose from the dead with the new body, and triumphed over death. That paradisaical body became the master of the outward, tangible body. Death lay hid in our body; but the heart of the mortal body of Christ is the death

¹ Ibid. c. xxii. § 36-44.

and vanquishment of our death. God became man that He might beget anew in Himself the poor soul of man, and might deliver it from the chains of the fierceness of wrath; He sunk His own self into the fiery fierceness in order to extinguish it, and to bring in the revelation of love: this revelation, however, has nothing to do with the redemption of the animal body, which must again be dissolved into the four elements, and become a nothing. For had we been able to subsist with this body, God would not have become man, nor have died for us.¹ Another soul, however, is not born in any man; but, putting on a heavenly body, out of the holy element, the soul is renewed, and this holy element is in all places, and our soul is a spirit, and so there lacks nothing, save that our soul lay hold on the holy, and become possessed thereof, as its own property.² The heavenly virgin was the soul in Christ's heavenly body (*ternario sancto*), and this soul, with its corporeality, desires to be a bride to our soul.

Although Böhm also lays the chief stress on the heavenly body, he was far more anxious than Weigel to keep hold on the historical significance of Christ. It is true he represents the eternal virgin as married not merely with Jesus Christ, but man in general is her bridegroom; nor does this eternal virgin enter merely into the circle of vision of those who have been made acquainted with the historical appearance of Christ. Indeed, in his efforts to show the heavenly, noble birth of Christ, he falls into the danger of representing the Virgin Mary as married with the eternal virgin in such a manner, and of so identifying the two, that nothing distinctive remains for Christ; seeing that He also is the unity of man with the heavenly virgin. He not only says, however, that the *entire* fulness of God was in Jesus, but reserves also for the God-man alone the second place in the Trinity, and the dignity of introducing men again into paradise by His redemption; where, clothed with His body, through the medium in particular of the holy Supper, they become by faith members of His body, and move in blessedness around Him as their centre and sun. The deeper conception of sin, which distinguishes him above other Mystics, though, it is true, it approaches nearly to dualism,

¹ Von den drei Principien, c. xxii. § 50 ff.; c. xii. § 47, 68.

² "Von den drei Principien," c. xxii. § 38.

caused him to cling more firmly to the historical God-man. Still that spiritualism, which manifested itself without hindrance in the case of Weigel, was not overcome by Böhm, but merely not allowed to play so decided a part. And as, not the logical consistency of his system, but his humble-mindedness and churchly piety, preserved him from many of the by-paths of Mysticism; so we learn from the example of many of his later friends, who struck off into a separatistic and naturalistic tendency, how far the immediate union of Christianity and speculation attempted in his system was from being satisfactory.

A phenomenon here further deserves mention, which occupied a middle position between the old form of Christology and a new form, in which special attention was paid to the humanity, and made its appearance ever more frequently in the entire Evangelical Church, as the 17th century drew to a close:—both in the Lutheran Church, which, as we have seen, might aid in furthering its rise, by its doctrine that the servile form originated subsequently to the “*Conceptio*,” in consequence of the humiliation of the God-man; and in the Reformed Church. This phenomenon is the idea of a *heavenly pre-existent humanity of Christ*. Even in it we see that stress is laid on the humanity, nay more, that an attempt is made to secure to it an eternal significance in God Himself, and to form a kind of surrogate for the doctrine of the “*Communicatio idiomatum*,” which had assumed so spinose a character, especially in connection with two states of Christ. For, to bring humanity when exalted above earthly limits, or humanity as to its idea, into unity with the deity, appeared comparatively easy, especially as its lowly form also might then be conceived as its own deed. Luther’s own thought of a new, higher idea of humanity, was fermenting in this doctrine of a heavenly humanity,—though, it is true, in a fantastic form, that might easily lead to Arianism.

Let us consider, firstly, the different *turns* that were given to this theory, and then its *significance*.

The *Quakers*, above all, belong to this connection. Barclay¹ says, that the flesh that makes alive, of which John speaks in chapter vi., is a spiritual body come from heaven! But as the Quakers have no intention of doing away with the work of redemption (although the significance of the historical Redeemer

¹ Theolog. vere Christ. Apol. Thes. xiii. ed. 2, Lond. 1729, pp. 381 ff.

is thrown, for them, very much into the background by their doctrine of the universal, inner light, that is, Christ), they also were driven to posit two bodies of Christ; and this Barclay actually does.¹ On the other hand, Barclay differs from the hitherto mentioned friends of this view, in his inclination to suppose that the Word of God revealed Himself to men in all ages by means of the same body, and that it was not for the first time assumed at the incarnation in Mary. In this way he endeavours to establish the possibility of men at all times becoming participators in the life which is in Christ; even as it is possible now for faith to receive the spiritual body of Christ independently of the Eucharist.² The "spirituale corpus" he designates "corpus de divino et cœlesti semine."

That, and in what manner, the Anabaptists also—in particular, M. Hoffmann and Menno Simonis—taught that Christ had a heavenly body (although their "Brevis Confessio" does not mention it, and the orthodox doctrine was recognised again by them at a later period), we have related above (pp. 152 ff.).

But P. Poiret, in particular, deserves fuller consideration.³ The six periods which precede the end of the world, the eternal Sabbath, are in his view characterized, on the one hand, by an ever increasing power of sin; and on the other hand, by ever higher manifestations of grace. To the latter belong essentially, and in each case, appearances of the Son of God, and that in the human form. Thus did He speak already with Moses and the people Israel through the medium of His sanctified humanity: then already was the Son of God united with humanity, as to body and soul, even as He had previously appeared to the Patriarchs in a corporeal shape.—According to the "Œc. du Péché" (chap. xi. § 13), the very first man received a body with regard to redemption, in order that his sin, if he should fall into it despite the divine arrangements, might assume a more sensuous than spiritually egotistical (demoniacal) character. At the same time (§ 15, 16), it was thus made possible for the Son

¹ Ibid. Thes. xiii.

² "Sicut igitur Christus habebat externum et visibile corpus aut templum a Maria Virgine, ita etiam spirituale corpus Christus habebat, *per quod ille qui erat Verbum in principio cum Deo, et erat et est Deus, revelavit semet ipsum filiis hominum omni ætate.*"

³ Œconomie divine, ou système universel, etc., Tom. v., Amsterd. 1687.

of God to appear in the flesh; for God to hold intercourse with men from without, through the Incarnate One; and for God, if He assumed a human body, both to rule over, and to give Himself to be enjoyed by, the lower powers, through it as His organ. And the Son of God did actually assume *humanity*, and that soon after the creation of man, prior to the fall; moreover, this incarnation took place in the manner that the Son of God derived *from Adam His body and a divine soul*.¹ Adam, namely, had a very lofty destiny. Not as though God had created him for the purpose of setting forth Himself; this is effected already by the immanent self-revelation of the trinitarian God.² But if God wished to represent *Himself* in a living manner, that is, as a God outside of Himself, He could only do it in a "divine nature." God, however, is God through *Himself*; man is God through God, through grace. And as the soul is highly adorned by God, so also the body. The human body was meant to be a compendium of the universe, and of its entire perfection,³ nay more, king and regent of the universe. Adam's body, then, was also of a high spiritual kind, like his soul, divine. In order then to be able to represent the Son of God as a true man, and that at as early a period as it seemed to Poiret both necessary and scriptural, he teaches that He drew (tirer) humanity from Adam's glorious body and divine soul; so that in Christ and His indissoluble Unio with humanity, the *truth* of human nature, which Adam lost by sin, or its ideal, is *preserved*. Here again, therefore, we have the theory of the preservation of the pure "Massa Adamitica," taught by the Lutheran theologians, only in a more plastic form (see pp. 308 ff.).

Poiret accordingly attributes to Christ, even prior to the incarnation, not merely manifold appearances, but also human "emotions" and sufferings, and a never-wearying intercession for men, His brethren,—in love and prayer, in which he considered the high-priestly office of Christ mainly to consist. These many manifestations of Christ may remind us again of

¹ *CEconomie du Retablissement avant l'Incarn. de J. Chr. chap. v. § 8*:—"Ayant tiré d'Adam un corps glorieux et une ame divine, par où il a intercédé pour les hommes envers Dieu." The main passage, however, is *CEcon. du Retabl. après l'Incarn. c. ii. § 11*.

² *CEc. de Créat. ch. x. § 6 ff.*

³ *Ibid. ch. xxii. § 9.*

the Clementines; but what distinguishes him, like Tertullian, essentially from them is, that he does not attribute to Christ a change of persons. He rather is and remains God-man throughout the entire history.—But what is the relation between this incarnation since Adam and the incarnation in Mary? He wishes the name of incarnation to be retained for the latter alone, because Christ assumed *mortal* flesh in Mary.¹ As a shining white garment dipped in and thoroughly pervaded by a dark colour does not therefore become two garments; so also Christ's body does not become two bodies through the assumption “de notre corruption mortelle” in Mary. Now this body that He assumed troubled His knowledge, had a disorderly nature like ours, and had to be regulated by Christ amid severe conflicts.² But through this deepest humiliation Christ delivered us, and by His victory He was glorified.—Poiret appears, in part, like Menno, to have been led to his theory by a Manichæan view of the human body: indeed, he confesses that he owed it to the ascetic Antoinette Bourignon, who on the ground thereof laid claim to the character of a divine prophetess. As he deemed the soul to be essentially divine, the corruption of sin cannot reach unto it;—in the matter of redemption, therefore, the chief stress must fall on the body. And this Pelagian tendency he shares with all the friends of the inner light; indeed, like them, he is unable to draw any essential distinction between the ante-Christian and the Christian time. The office of Christ, after His birth from Mary, is essentially the same as that which He had always discharged, and is absorbed in His prophetic office, and in His office of Intercessor. Still he derives everything good

¹ Œc. après l'Incarn. de J. Chr. chap. ii. § 11 ff. “La Majesté divine voulut convirir son corps glorieux de notre chair mortelle, qu'il voulut prendre dans le sein d'une Vierge. It may perhaps appear incomprehensible how le corps glorieux qu'il avoit tiré d'Adam et qui étoit crû à la stature d'un homme parfait, se bornait dans le sein d'une Vierge.” He answers:—“It was for God an easy thing de reduire son corps au même volume, qu'il avoit à sa naissance d'Adam, etc.” § 12:—“Le corps de Jesus Christ, se revêtant de la chair et du sang de la bien heureuse vierge, fera aussi peu un composé de deux corps différents, qu'un habit blanc et lumineux plongé dans un vase de couleur chargée et obscure, ou il se charge de la matière, qui produit cette opacité, ne devient pour cela un habit double on deux habits au lieu d'un.”

² Besides other passages, see § 3, 14 ff.

prior to Christ from the co-operation of the *God-man*. By means of the above described artificial doctrine he endeavours to avoid Docetism, and to remain in connection with the entire history of the divine economy. In the assumption of an incarnation from Adam onwards, he was led by an anthropological, historical interest,—a regard for human sin, which rendered divine appearances necessary,—not by a speculative interest.

It is more likely that the view which represents the humanity of Christ as eternally pre-existent, owed its origin to a speculative interest. Of the three different turns which might be given to the idea,—to wit, that both body and soul were pre-existent; or the body alone; or the soul alone,—we will here examine merely the last, because it was not seldom taught, even by the orthodox. Those who adopted the second aimed at putting the Logos in the place of the human soul; and this turn we shall examine further on, in connection with Paul Maty: the first we have already had under consideration in connection with the Quakers;—it leads directly to Docetism. This third turn, which had been already adopted by Hugo de St Victor, found many advocates, especially in England, during the 17th and 18th centuries. Among these were Henry More¹ (during the latter half of the 17th century); Edward Fowler, Bishop of Gloucester;² and Robert Fleming.³ We may also mention in this connection J. Hussey, Francis Gastrell, Bishop of Chester, Dr Thomas Bennet, Dr Thomas Burnet; besides whom are several others. This view, however, is defended with special acuteness by Dr Isaac Watts, a writer who is still held in high esteem by his countrymen. His “The glory of Christ as God-man, in three discourses” (published in London in 1746), contains a careful summary of the arguments in favour of this view. Watts says,—In order to express the intimacy and universality of the relation of Christ to humanity, we must lay down that the incarnation existed eternally, either in the decree of God or in reality, in the sense, namely, that God was united with an human soul even before the creation of the world. For

¹ “The Mystery of Godliness.”

² See the “Discourse of the Descent of the man Christ Jesus from Heaven,” with the “Defence.”

³ See his “Christology,” in three volumes, of which the first and third defend and carry out this view with great cleverness.

the former alternative he appeals to Dr Goodwin,¹ who, in relation to Colossians i. 16, says,—“All things are created, 1. ἐν αὐτῷ, in Him (that is, as God-man), as the exemplary cause; that is, God set up Christ as the pattern of all perfection,—and he drew in scattered pieces in the rest of the creation the several perfections met in that human nature (viz., of Christ as God-man) as a pattern.” Christ, therefore, as God-man, eternally in the divine decree, or “by way of anticipation,”² was the pattern or archetype, and the different perfections which are embodied in this humanity of Christ as in the archetype, are contained in a separate and scattered state in the rest of creation. 2. “δι’ αὐτοῦ, through Him, all things were created, He having been some way the instrument of the creation, as He is actually of Redemption.” According to this, the *God-man* was destined to be the instrument of creation; and in fact God gives Him “virtually the glory of creation,” although He did not actually become man till 4000 years after the beginning of the world. For He was destined to become incarnate in time, even before all others, and is in fact the first-born of all creation; but His incarnation was “suspended for glorious ends.” Sin was the cause of the delay: on its account He came in the middle of the ages, when the time was full; but it was compelled also to contribute to His glorification.—If now the God-man be termed, not merely the “pattern,” but also the “instrument” of the creation, it is more consistent with Watts to suppose, that not merely the *idea* of this archetype was eternal, but that the archetype itself had a *real* existence before the world. Watts carries this out as follows:³—The soul of Christ was “actually,” and not merely “virtually,” the first-born of creation. A glorious creature was assumed by God as an organ prior to the world, and through it all things were created. This glorious soul took up into itself as much of the divine as any created being could grasp. It is the mirror, the image of God. We, however, who are said to be created in God’s image, were really created in the image of this God-man.⁴ This explains many obscure passages of holy Scripture, which

¹ “Knowledge of God the Father, and His Son Jesus Christ,” vol. ii.

² Watts, as above, p. 218.

³ In his third discourse,—“The early existence of Christ’s human soul,” l. c. pp. 147–256.

⁴ Besides other passages, see pp. 218, 166, 194, 203, 227, 117, 229.

speak of a subordinate higher being even prior to the incarnation. In this way was it possible for God even in the Old Testament to put Himself into living communication with His people. But in Mary, this soul assumed in addition human *flesh*: in connection herewith, great stress is laid on the words *σὰρξ ἐγένετο*. From this view to Arianism was but a short step (as was proved in the case of Paul Maty); which the author himself feeling, he endeavours to show that, on the contrary, it deprives the chief objections raised by the Arians of their force. They, namely, adduce passages which, even apart from the incarnation,—that is, therefore, in relation to the pre-existent element in Christ,—have a subordinationian tone, and by their means try to establish their Subordinationism. If Christ's soul pre-existed, this objection falls to the ground. The Arian objection, further, that the orthodox doctrine is unable to acknowledge a true humiliation of Christ, seeing that God did not take part in suffering, and that consequently we must assume the existence in Christ of a higher being, subordinate to God, which truly humbled itself in the incarnation and truly suffered, also falls to the ground. The assumption of the pre-existence of a glorious soul, which was from the beginning united with God, offers the like advantages. And the circumstance that his theory does not favour, in particular, any definite view of the Trinity, he considers to be a recommendation; though, at the same time, it is undoubtedly his intention to attribute to this soul true deity, personal union with God. In favour thereof, besides exegetical considerations, he adduces the following further arguments:—It was fitting that the soul of Christ, ere the God-man appeared in lowliness and for the purpose of redemption, should give its consent to the sufferings. Further, the *ἐνσάρκωσις* becomes more intelligible, if the human soul of Christ formed the already existent medium thereof.¹

As regards the value of these various theories, they are all

¹ No article of faith is endangered thereby (p. 229); “on the contrary, this doctrine greatly magnifies the self-denial and the condescending love of our Lord Jesus Christ in His state of humiliation and death; it casts a thousand rays of glory upon all the scenes of His humbled estate; it makes His subjection and obedience to the will of the Father appear much more illustrious, and His charity and compassion to perishing mankind stand in a very surprising light.” P. 222.

alike marked by Docetical features. The latter alone, in case a creatianistic view was taken of the origin of the human soul, would constitute an exception. The others betray their Docetical character principally in the Manichæan estimate they form of the human body. By means of this view, the Friends of the Inner Light hoped in particular to be able, notwithstanding their spiritualistic bias, to keep up their connection with the person of the God-man, and to discriminate it from the universal Logos. If a turn were given to this view, such as involved positing, in any sense whatever, the *pre-existence of the humanity*, it clearly showed that an effort was being made to universalize the significance of the Person of Christ, either in an anthropological or in a metaphysical and speculative manner. The former in the case of Poiret, who aimed at representing the God-man as the re-establisher of the race in all ages, in order that man may never lack a deliverer. The latter, particularly in the case of Robert Fleming and Isaac Watts, whose view approximates most nearly to the doctrine of the Church; nay more, for which very good biblical reasons may be adduced. It remains, indeed, incomprehensible how the development undergone subsequently to the incarnation by a soul so perfect can be other than merely Docetical. Moreover, the entire theory rests on the presupposition that the relation between body and soul is a very external and non-necessary one. In that, however, it represents the God-man as preceding the creation of the world as its organ and archetype, it gives utterance to a very important thought, though in an unsatisfactory form,—to the thought, namely, that the God-man, Jesus Christ, is not merely a means for humanity, that is, for the work of redemption in particular, but is also an end in Himself, served by the entire world; to which thought too little importance has frequently been attached. What remains to be noticed, both in this and in many others of these theories, is, that they refer so much to the *human nature* of Christ. Quite in accordance with the spirit of the commencement of a new age, reflection concentrated itself on this aspect of the matter; efforts were above all made to exalt it; and by this expansion of the limits of its significance and dignity in all directions, an essential relation of the human to the divine was now predicated in the *form of representation* (in der Weise der Vorstellung), which it remained for the Church to establish in

a scientific manner. This is particularly perceptible in the case of Barclay, Poiret, and Watts. But it belongs to the form of *representation*, that Watts was unable to regard it as the destiny of the Logos to become man, without conceiving this destiny also to have been at once realized; and that he further, in order to be able to attribute the *first* rank to the God-man, believed it necessary to represent Him as preceding everything, even in point of time. Nor does he yet venture to treat the incarnation as an *essential* determination of the Logos; for otherwise his premises would have compelled him to accept the doctrine of the eternity of the humanity of Christ, and to advance onward to declare the Logos to have been ever and eternally man (Adam Kadmon).

But even this latter turn makes its appearance, especially in the system of Swedenborg. To his mind, man appeared so completely the necessary and universal form of spirit, that he not merely denies the existence of angels, and views them allegorically, or seeks to show that they are men; but even God Himself he considered to have been man from the beginning, at the first, in order then to become also man, at the last, in the world.¹

One would suppose, that if God is originally and essentially man, He cannot need afterwards to become man. In Swedenborg's system, however, Christ, "the Lord," occupies such a position, that everything converges in Him,—the Trinity, the perfection of man, and the perfection of the Church.

Swedenborg, it is true, as is well known, spoke only very bitterly, yea, even passionately, regarding the Church doctrine of the Trinity, in which he was unable to see anything save a triplicity of Gods. God is, in his view, a Triune Person—Christ the Lord, but not a trinity of persons. The divine in the Lord is the Father; the divine-human is the Son; that which proceeds forth from this Lord is the Holy Spirit.² He regarded the doctrine of the Church as excluding the unity of a personal God, by the three hypostases, and derives all possible mischief from this supposed idolatry. In this respect he takes up the polemical position of Servetus, and other Antitrinitarians. He controverts also the doctrine of two opposed natures in

¹ "Doctrine of the New Jerusalem," vol. i. pp. 85, 72 (German Translation). Tüb., 1823.

² Besides other passages, p. 124.

Christ. This, however, is merely one aspect of the matter ; his distinctive characteristic lies elsewhere.

However strongly he insists on the unity of God, in opposition to a plurality of divine Egos, he still aims at conceiving God as an unity, in distinction of "powers, attributes, or essential parts," as "*distincte unum*."¹ To him, God is above all, love (goodness), wisdom (truth) ; consequently volition and knowledge ; finally, operation. Love is, as it were, the being, the content ; Wisdom is the *ex-istence* of God, or the form which encloses this content within itself. Figuratively also, it is true, he designates the existent Wisdom which arises out of Love (which again is Love, though as existent), the Son of God ;² and the working of the Deity, which is Love and Wisdom, at the same time Holy Spirit. This Deity, now, or the True and the Good, creates (as it appears, eternally) a world, such as accords with this essence of God ; that is, a world which is destined for love and knowledge, which is in the image of God, and therefore free. The love of God wills this world as a free end to itself, not as a nature which is likewise divine ; for otherwise He would be merely loving Himself therein. God wills it as a really *other*—as something which can only arrive at actual likeness to the divine image through freedom. Nor did he hold that a self-communication of God to the humanity took place at the expense of freedom of choice ; still less correct would it be to represent Swedenborg as entertaining the notion of a process in the life of the world, in which, and through which, God Himself had His own growth, and His own history.³ It

¹ The proper object of his hatred was the Lutheran doctrine of Justification, which he considered to be morally pernicious ; as also the doctrine of a substitutionary satisfaction presented to the divine righteousness. But he regarded the Church doctrine of the Trinity as the root of the doctrines in question ; for it requires different rôles to be assigned to God, which can only be filled by different persons. Accordingly, out of the one God there have been made a God to be reconciled, and a God who reconciles.

² Son, and a particular person, can the Lord properly only be called, since His generation and birth from Mary, and that for the period of His life on our earth. We can, to a certain extent, conceive of there being two persons, so long as the Lord sojourned on earth in a human body, and prayed to the Father. But since the glorification of the human element in Him with the Father (His union), even this is no longer the case.

³ I cannot consider Baur's view of Swedenborg to be in harmony with his doctrine of freedom, or with the numerous passages which, at all events

is the inviolable order of God, that He cannot employ His omnipotence against free beings, for the purpose of leading them to the true and the good. The history of the world is a process of freedom. But a great apostasy has taken place. Adam's fall, indeed, Swedenborg referred allegorically to the fall of the Church, which he, Swedenborg, was sent to restore. Still he does not deny the universal power of evil—not even the inherited evil of a bias towards wickedness. Only, he supposes the Lutheran doctrine of original sin, which traces it back to Adam, to be dangerous to freedom; and leaves it open to assume that original sin is grounded in the arrangement of our nature, as an incitement to evil, which, however, first becomes sin and guilt, when freedom gives its consent,—an assumption which was adopted by a part of his followers. Further, according to Swedenborg, the assaults of evil and hell on the good order of the world were so mighty, that all things threatened to fall into confusion. In this world, indeed, humanity occupies only the lowest place amongst rational beings; but if the pedestal of the throne fall to pieces, the throne itself will be overthrown. Nor could the omnipotence of God here interfere: men must fight out the battle themselves, otherwise the fundamental (moral) order of the world would be offended against, and merely the semblance of a result arrived at, but not a world in which wisdom and love prevail. On the other hand, however, as God cannot quietly stand by and see hell conquering, the true and good shut out, and the world therefore closed against Himself, He did the only thing which remained to be done, to wit, He Himself became man, in order to enter into, and take an active part as one of the combatants in, the world's conflict (the humanity constituting His "arm"), in order to bring His essence to the consciousness of men, and to set forth humanity in its true form. The form of God as *intuible* (*schaubar*), approachable, is that of a man. Men therefore need no longer now to gaze as into vacancy; for in Christ, God's form is fixed for them. The efforts of men by themselves would pass into the unlimited and void: God has therefore made Himself accessible to men, so that they may believably and lovingly lay hold of love and wisdom in Him, the manifested God, and then put them into implicitly, deny that a divine element is in the world, even though in the form of alterity.

practice themselves.¹ As God is man in Himself (in the first), so was it possible for Him to become man in the world (in the last);² at which time, more concrete reality in the flesh was given to that which the one God was ideally already in Himself, to wit, sonship, or the *form* of the divine essence. In the world of revelation, the "caro" is the Son; the content of the "caro" is the divine aspect of the Father. According to Swedenborg, then (even as according to Praxeas), the one God became man in time, that is, in the stricter sense, through the flesh, the *Son* of God, in that He appeared in Mary in a human body. The soul of Jesus was the divine in the Father Himself: His body was produced by this same divine element, even as our soul creates its own body for itself. The body also is of the substance of the Father, out of substantial love. He was not minded, however, to attribute to Christ a merely heavenly body, but also a material, derived from Mary. On this supposition, He was truly in the last, as in the first. In this way, however, an inequality of the God-man with Himself is posited. There is thus a contradiction between God who is man in the first, and God who is man in the last, which requires to be conciliated. As His soul is the divine in the Father, His body must correspond thereto. But the material which was assumed from Mary was not capable of conversion into the divine essence (p. 78, § 35). The process of gradual adjustment must therefore be accomplished in such a manner, that that which was assumed from Mary (which merely served to Him the purpose of a hand by which He interfered in the affairs and relations of the world) was gradually cast aside, and the human element from the Father (that is, the corporeality which arises from His own divine soul) was put on. That unclothing and clothing began already on earth, and thus, even then, Mary ceased to be His mother (pp. 80 ff.). Now is "the Lord" in heaven one substance with God. His human and divine elements are united to one person, like soul and body; nay more, His human aspect is now divine. In this way, he supposes himself to have overcome the Church's doctrine of the duality of the natures. But also the triplicity of persons taught

¹ Compare "Vera christ. religio," pp. 43, 69. Further, § 626-649.

² Everything divine strives to attain to an human shape. Compare the work, "Of Heaven and Hell," Nro. 73-77, 453, 460.

by the Church. In Him, God Jehovah, the eternal God-man, rests also the Spirit, or the power to pour forth wisdom and love into those who are willing to believe and love. Christ is to him, therefore, the triune God, Jehovah.¹ Strictly speaking, however, not during His earthly life. For, as he represents the God-man as growing, learning, struggling, suffering, being tempted on earth, yea, even as becoming a participator in perfection in reward therefor,² he cannot identify the eternal God with Christ on earth, but must assume for the period of the growth of Christ, that the God who is in Himself eternally man, and the God who becomes man in time, are in some respect separated from each other. He must needs confess that the soul of Christ was, at all events at the beginning, not yet absolutely the divine in the Father Himself, but perhaps the initiatory point of the being of God as love and wisdom in the world: no less must he also allow that the divine corporeality developed itself gradually out of the soul, that the divine substance therefore informed itself only by degrees into space and time, whilst the essence of God is above time and space. The consistent development of the patripassian germs in Swedenborg's system, would therefore give us Sabellianism.

The incarnation occupies, therefore, in the system of Swedenborg, merely the position of something that *sets forth* that which exists eternally, even apart from it, to wit, God as the true and the good. But we have shown previously (see Div. II. vol. i. pp 7 ff.) that the prophetic (and kingly) office, by itself, presents no sufficient reason for a real incarnation in distinction from a theophany, and that, on the contrary, a Christology of such a nature must always bear a Docetical character. This manifests itself, in a special degree, in the case of Swedenborg. Apart from what has just been mentioned, according to which the incarnation brings us nothing essentially new, being rather the mere means of awakening the consciousness of that eternal God-manhood into which the temporal God-manhood returns: this is particularly evident, further, from Swedenborg's doctrine of the Holy Scriptures. In his view, it is essentially nothing but His Christ, to wit, the Logos in the form of the letter. As we ought to pass out beyond the literal

¹ See "Of the Lord," at the commencement.

² "Vera chr. relig." p. 69.

to the heavenly meaning, so also is the humanity assumed by Christ a veil which will have to fall away. This second form of the incarnation (the Scriptures) keeps the *first*, or in the last instance, the eternal, God-manhood present; but only when it is rightly, that is, allegorically understood; and to this allegorical understanding, Swedenborg has received the key. With him begins the heavenly understanding, the heavenly Jerusalem, which applies, it is true, the absolutely supernatural scaffolding of his theory of inspiration and interpretation to the purpose of obliterating the distinction between nature and grace, by his doctrine of the God-manhood; of emptying the grand doctrines of atonement and justification of their force; and of substituting in their place an essentially rationalistic doctrine of the eternal love of God and of man's reconciliation by love.

CHAPTER THIRD.

THE REFORMED CHURCH.

THE Reformed Church had its most flourishing period, in a scientific point of view, subsequently to the age of the Reformation. During that period, the Swiss took the lead, first in Holland; somewhat later, in the seventeenth century, in France (especially through the theologians of Montauban, Sedan, and Saumur); finally, in England (see pp. 327 ff.). But even in Germany the science of the Reformed Church always had its representatives, especially in Heidelberg, Marburg, Frankfurt on the Oder, Herborn, and Duisburg. How it continued to controvert the Lutheran doctrine, we have narrated above in detail (see pp. 226 ff.). We have now, therefore, only to narrate how the Reformed Christology itself underwent further development;¹ and then how a schism gradually arose, partly in

¹ Relatively to the literature, compare Note 34. Sam. Maresius, *System. theol.*, Groning. 1673, pp. 438-579; J. H. Heidegger, *Medulla theol. Christ.* L. ii. Tig. 1714, pp. 1-98; H. Witsius, *de oeconomia fœd. dei cum hominibus*, ed. 4, 1712, pp. 128-240; P. van Mastricht, *theoretico-practica theologia*, Traj. 1699, L. iv. cap. 4-18, pp. 435-636; J. Cocceji *opera*, t. vii. *De fœdere et testamento dei* (1660), pp. 298-315. Others, like A. Hul-

consequence of the adoption of Lutheran elements, and partly through the introduction of foreign and destructive elements, which made their appearance at an earlier period in it than in the sister Church.

Although the Reformed doctrine did not distinctly attribute an independence to the humanity of Christ after the manner of Adoptionism, Christ was still regarded as the object of the divine predestination, both in the sense that the saints are elected in Christ, and that it is God's eternal decree to bless those only who are united with Christ; and in the sense that the humanity of Christ, the glory of the head and the glorification of the members, is predestined. This predestination is a counsel of the triune God, in whom, according to later representations, such as we meet with also in the Lutheran Church, the different, individual persons play a different rôle (*pactum salutis*). The Logos took the part of Mediator already within the deity itself,¹ in virtue of His readiness to become incarnate, and in the form of a man to offer satisfaction for God. However strictly any changeableness on the part of God, or confusion of the divine with the human, is excluded, an "inclination misericordiæ," a "quasi humiliatio," is ascribed to the Logos, which drew Him to become incarnate.² Herein is involved the deep thought, that love to what is below it has a mediatory significance, which appropriates to itself the lowliness and the misery, which puts itself on an equality with the humble in the spirit of sympathy, without at the same time renouncing itself.

Now humanity was assumed in time, for the purpose of revealing this eternal reality of the love of the Logos. It is the

sus, H. *Alting Scriptorum Theologic. T. iii. 1644*; Rodolph. *Catech. Palatina, Bern. 1697*. See Schneckenburger's "*Vergleich. Darstellung der luth. und ref. Lehrbegr.*" 1855, 1, xlv. ff., and "*Zur Kirchlichen Christolog.*" pp. 222 f.

¹ H. Witsius, L. i. cap. 2, p. 14; L. ii. c. 3, pp. 142, 143:—*Ex hac constitutione (id est æterno trinitatis consilio) Filius ab æterno peculiarem σχέσιν erga servandos habuit. Mox post lapsum hominis deo—offenso se obtulit ad ea actu præstanda, quæ ab æterno sponderat. Qua intercessionis Christus actu mediator constitutus et talis declaratus est mox post lapsum.* Coccej. l. c. c. 33, 34; Heidegg. l. c. pp. 235 ff.

² Heidegg. loc. 18, i. loc. ii. p. 223. The Reformed dogmaticians were accustomed in this way to refer the "Exinanitio" to the two natures; wherefore also the "Exaltatio."

instrument through which He gives actuality to His loving sympathy with humanity. In this sense, they frequently teach that the "incarnatio" is in itself an "humiliatio." Not that it was intended to represent the state of humiliation as enduring so long as the incarnation endures, still less that the Logos in Himself was changed, as the Lutheran dogmaticians often supposed and blamed them for teaching; but the intention was solely to characterize the incarnation as an act of condescending love.¹

As far as concerns the incarnation itself, the Reformed Christology was mainly characterized by the effort to preserve the distinction between the human and the divine natures, and the full reality of the former in its likeness to us, with the exception of sin. Humanity in its poverty, it deemed to have been inwardly, spiritually taken up into the "inclinatio" of the compassionate Logos; and it believed itself no longer to need the full means by which the Lutheran Church set forth the unity of God and man, till it almost ran the risk of dissipating the humanity. On the contrary, its endeavour was to show that the full actuality, humiliation, and homoousia of the humanity with us, was the proof and expression of the fact that the Logos had actual sympathy with our nature as it is. To this end, many of the Reformed theologians contented themselves with saying that the person of the Logos¹ (in which that "inclinatio" is concentrated), but not the divine nature, united itself with the human; for this appeared to them to be a physical thing, and to lead to a confusion of the two natures. This same anxiety led to their giving the Holy Spirit the important position He occupies in the Christology of the Reformed Church. It is too much, indeed, to say that the Logos recedes for it into the background, and that the Unio becomes in reality an unio of the

¹ As there is room for love not merely where sin is, but also where man is at all, they might easily here have arrived at the idea of the decree of an incarnation, which was not first modified by sin,—an idea which was adopted amongst the Reformed, besides by those mentioned in Div. II. vol. i. p. 366, by Bucanus Institut. Art. 10, and Willetius de Statu hom. L. i. (compare Maastricht, p. 441); though it was opposed by the majority. The Supralapsarians also were able to represent the predestination of Christ as coincident with the decree of creation and of the perfection of the world itself.

² Mares. l. c. p. 449 :—"Incarnatio est actus personalis non naturalis."

humanity with the Holy Ghost, and not with the Logos.¹ The "Incarnatio" is rather the union of the person of the Logos with human nature; but the Holy Ghost is assumed as the bond between the humanity and the divine nature of the Logos. By sanctifying the humanity, He makes it possible for the Logos to assume it; and in so far His activity goes before, though it does not supersede, that of the Logos. (Note 51.) Accordingly, this activity of the Holy Spirit is the Reformed surrogate for the "*capacitas humanæ naturæ*" taught by the Lutherans. But, further, the type of doctrine prevailing in the Reformed Church, with a view to forefending the dissipation of the human nature by the divine, if the latter were appropriated by the former, required the insertion of the Holy Spirit between the nature of the Logos and the human nature, *after* the assuming act of the Logos; and compelled it rather to go back to the Holy Ghost and His anointing, for the humanity's own participation in the divine. The Holy Spirit, it is true, proceeds forth from the Logos, but represents principally His ethical power and influence on humanity, which does not endanger its own distinct actuality. Thus the "*unctio spiritus sancti*" is the surrogate of the Lutheran "*communicatio idiomatum*."² In it divine power streams forth from the Logos to the humanity, determining it, nay more, animating it in such a way, that, through the power of the Holy Ghost, the humanity itself is exalted, raised, and completed in its own essence, though the divine nature never becomes immediately the property of the human. In Christ also, the divine is merely that which determines the humanity: it never becomes human, nor does the human ever become divine.³ Maastricht derives all the principles

¹ On the contrary, says Coccejus, t. vii. p. 10, "Aphorismi breviores":—"The πνεῦμα ἅγιον, Matth. i. Luc. i. is the persona filii Dei."

² Yet Heidegg. says (l. c. p. 12, § 21 ff.):—"From the Logos proceeded forth *communic. gratiæ*, *eminentiæ* (*supra omnes creaturas*) et *gratiæ habituales*, *i.e.* dotes quas ὁ λόγος naturæ sibi unitæ contulit et implantavit, but which only gradually took place. Coccejus understands thereby the "*inhabitatio divinæ personæ in humana natura*."

³ Humanity is organon, Mares. l. c. p. 469; remains *infiniti non capax*, p. 471, which Coccejus carries out with particular strictness. Heidegger, on the contrary (l. c. p. 18), though speaking strongly against a communication of the *idiomata* in the nature, specially of the *omnipresence*, maintains that the power of "*vivificatio*" and to judge (as an *opus apoteles-*

of the Lutheran Christology which he controverts, from the doctrine that the "persona" of the Logos pertains to the humanity—a doctrine which earlier dogmaticians of the Reformed Church had allowed to stand. Still it was not his intention to claim for the human nature of Jesus merely the sustenance afforded by the Logos to men in general (*sustentatio communis*), but the "*sustentatio personalis*," and says, "*Persona filii Dei ingreditur constitutionem unius personæ, Christi*" (l. c. p. 443). With this is connected the importance attached by all the Reformed to a truly human development. Only that the more distinctly the humanity is conceived to be impersonal within the incarnation also, the more it is reduced to the rank of a mere organ of the deity. It is self-evident that the impossibility of sinning must then also the more be absolutely predicated of Christ. The growth of the humanity was in no sense mediated by its freedom, but consists solely in its having been gradually and passively transformed and glorified.¹

With the same tendency to assert the full actuality of the humanity, harmonized the circumstance, that the sufferings of Christ were regarded by the Reformed theologians specially in the light of sufferings of the *soul*. This they understand usually by the descent into hell, which they considered to form part of the state of humiliation (Note 52); nay more, which they regarded as the very climax of the sufferings, by which He became a substitute for us, and completely satisfied God.

The question now arises, whether the Reformed doctrine of the Person of Christ had any perceptible influence also on the doctrine of the offices, and on that of redemption. In the case of the former, it cannot in part be denied, although Schneckenburger here also allows himself to be carried too far by his subtlety. He supposes that, as the suffering and active

matic.) ought to be attributed to the humanity. It was the custom also, with the exception of Coccejus, to designate the humanity *ἐνυπόστατος* in the Logos.

¹ That its growth, at all events in relation to the consciousness of blessedness, so long as the Church, that is, Christ's body, is imperfect, is even now not yet completed, is a mere conclusion drawn by Schneckenburger, not a doctrine of the Reformed Church. But not even is the conclusion correct; for the Logos, notwithstanding His blessedness, always has the "*inclinatio amoris et misericordiæ*," and has been able to communicate the consciousness of victory to the humanity which sends the Holy Spirit.

humanity remains finite, and without "communicatio idiomatum," it is not it that offers the infinite satisfaction; consequently it is the Logos who, properly speaking, offers satisfaction. On this supposition, however, the divine-human work would be converted into a self-satisfaction, which God presents to Himself, and the whole world become a mere dramatic play. But this contradicts the earnestness with which the Reformed Church was accustomed to speak of the divine "ira," and of the necessity of a satisfaction.¹ If God offers satisfaction to Himself, He simply gives the satisfaction which He receives; and this would scarcely be different from the principle, that sin is eternally forgiven, even though it be through the divine "liberum arbitrium."² In itself, undoubtedly, the doctrine of an absolute, divine "liberum arbitrium," stands in contradiction with the necessity of a satisfaction. But it is precisely the moral consciousness which opposes an obstacle to that doctrine, be it even at the cost of consistency.³ To what purpose, then, that transaction within the deity itself, in which the Logos declared Himself eternally ready to take upon Himself the burden of sin? To what purpose the doctrine of the "ira dei," and of hell, if its teachers were of opinion that the "liberum arbitrium" of God could also regard evil as not deserving of punishment, nay even, as not evil? What else could be the significance of the opposition to the Arminians?

¹ Wits. l. c. pp. 213 ff. The satisfaction through the Son, and His atonement, have a knowable necessity in the *essence* of God, and are not merely declarative: compare pp. 144 ff. 177. "Natura et actiones Dei necessitatem satisfactionis docent." God is not therefore less free, ipse enim est necessitas sua. Mastricht l. c. pp. 544 ff., 612 ff., 616 ff., 625 ff. The atonement was not *μονόπλευρος*. This tells also against Schweizer's Reform. Dogm. ii., and Güder, p. 266.

² Wits. l. c., p. 167, does not intend to deny that God was able to hold and bear our human nature, not personally assumed, in such a way that it should be superior to all sufferings. But then it would not have been our surety, so much as God through Him, who conquered the enemies; and for this work that was not enough. Our surety must present it by His own power, consequently be God-man. Heidegg. l. c. 67 ff. The "satisfactio" must take place through the "pœna vicaria" of a man, because man is subject to the law. Mares. l. c. p. 533: *necessitas satisf. arcessitur a dei justitia essentiali*.

³ In the federal theology, the ideas of human freedom and the absoluteness of the ethical, stir already with greater distinctness.

It is the serious opinion of orthodox Reformed divines, that sin demands satisfaction, and that Christ must needs offer it, in order that we might be redeemed. And yet the opposite is supposed to follow from the circumstance, that the Reformed Christology attributes propitiatory energy, which must necessarily be infinite, to the deity alone, allowing the existence of no communication by which the divine could be conferred on the human. We have shown, however, with sufficient clearness, that even the dogmaticians of the Lutheran Church were not in earnest with their doctrine of the appropriation of the divine by the human, but, on the contrary, disclaimed all *μέθεξις*. On the other hand, the dogmaticians of the Reformed Church taught also that the human nature was appropriated by the divine person, and represent the action and suffering of the human nature as possessed of an infinite worth, because the *person* who acted in it was the Logos Himself. Or is this bestowal of an infinite value on the doing and suffering of the humanity to be supposed to be able to proceed solely from the divine nature, and not also from the person, notwithstanding that the latter is realiter united with the humanity in personal Unio; and that thus, in accordance with the eternal decree, the real basis was supplied for the divine judgment, according to which, propitiatory power pertained not merely to the divine, but to the divine-human? For does not the Logos, in virtue of His "inclinatio," include the humanity of Jesus in Himself, in order to apply it to the purposes of the actual satisfaction? If we once obliterate the boundary-line between doctrinal principles and conclusions, we must draw also from the Lutheran Christology conclusions which convert the propitiatory sufferings and doings of Christ into an epideictic show; for the humanity, according to it also, is completely determined by the deity, so that God only appears to receive that which He gives Himself; not to mention the Lutheran "visio beatifica," and the government of the world in blessedness by Christ, in the midst of the suffering, with which the Reformed Christology contrasts the infinite anguish His soul endured, and His spiritual presence in the tortures of hell.

In relation to the matter of satisfaction, therefore, we must say, the Reformed doctrine is undoubtedly in conflict with the supra-ordination of the divine "*liberum arbitrium*," prevailing

in the strictest Calvinism;¹ for therewith would harmonize merely an accidental condemnableness, and punishableness of evil, and obligation to atone for it. So far, however, the Reformed theologians did not go: their tendency was to assert that Christ really made satisfaction by His sufferings and doings;² and in agreement therewith are the doctrinal principles which they laid down. Not even the double "decretum" changes the inner nature of the satisfaction of Christ. (Note 53.)

With J. Piscator, who considered the grounds for the necessity of the "*obedientia passiva*" to be taken away, if we assume a propitiatory "*obedientia activa*," because, by rendering the latter, men would satisfy the law without punishment, very few of the Reformed agreed. On the other hand, many of them divided the obedience of Christ in such a manner as to regard the "*obedientia passiva*" as the satisfaction for guilt, and the "*obedientia activa*" as the means by which eternal life is gained. But Maastricht, in particular, set his face against this discription of the one indivisible obedience. Satisfaction appertains also to active merit, also to suffering obedience.³ It is therefore incorrect also to say, that the Reformed Church denies propitiatory significance to the "*obedientia activa*." On the other hand, it is correct to say, that the Reformed Christology limits the kingly office of Christ in the state of exaltation mainly to the kingdom of grace, on which Christ constantly bestows the

¹ So Mares. l. c. p. 551:—"Nec enim datio Christi in redemptorem ipsiusque satisfactio præordinatur electioni æternæ—sed ei tamquam illius completiva et executiva subordinatur." God is not moved to will the salvation of sinners by the "satisfactio," but because He willed it with the intervention of the atonement, this latter brings to pass that He "salutem peccatorum volitam ex solo bene placito in tempore conferat et conferre posset convenienter suæ justitiæ," and without change. On the other hand, compare Note 13, the passage from p. 533. So far as that which is wrought can produce no change in Him by whom it is wrought, so far must Maresius, it is true, properly say that the being reconciled was *μονόπλευρον*, pertains not to God.

² Schneckenburger (in his "Zur Kirchlichen Christologie" pp. 62 ff.), justly directs attention, in opposition to Rudelbach, Guericke, and others, to the circumstance, that the doctrine of the "*obed. Christi activa*" has a greater significance in the system of the Reformed Church than in that of the Lutheran. So, for example, in Wendelin, Perkins, and others.

³ Mastr. l. c. pp. 626 f.

gift of the Holy Ghost, through whom He governs His body.¹ Not as though the dogmaticians of the Reformed Church were ready to deprive the kingdom of Christ of eternal power and authority; for, on the contrary, that Church zealously endeavoured to give outward form and substance to this kingdom of grace, nay more, in the circle of those who belong to this kingdom of grace, to subject to it all the things and arrangements of the world. That, however, which lies outside of the kingdom of this grace, the Reformed Christology considered to be still under the dominion of the Father; and in their view, the advance to the government of the world, on which the Lutherans deemed Christ actually to have entered after the ascension, is brought about by the spread of the kingdom of grace. The regiment of Christ is, and remains, therefore distinguished from that of the Father by the circumstance, that His power, and the outward display thereof, are to be the result of the inner victory of the Spirit,—for which believers also have to co-operate,—in the sense, however, that the sending of the Spirit Himself is the work of Christ, the Head. In relation to the conciliation of men with Christ, the Holy Spirit occupies a similar mediatory position soteriologically as Christologically.² But as far as they are Christologically from intending to teach that the Holy Spirit became incarnate, instead of the Logos, even so far are they soteriologically from substituting fellowship with the Holy Spirit for fellowship with Christ. So far from this, the Holy Spirit establishes by faith the “*unio mystica*” with Christ, and from Him, the Head, the Vine, and that from His humanity, stream forth all the powers of the Spirit into the members. (Note 54.)

But when the work of redemption has been accomplished in all believers, the “*depositio regni*,” that is, of the kingdom of grace, takes place. The kingdom of mediation and of media-

¹ Heidegg. l. c. pp. 81 ff. A more comprehensive view is taken of Christ's power by Mastricht: see below. For the rest, the “*regnum naturale ad muneris mediatorii in mundo functionem ordinatum*.” Heid. l. c. p. 90.

² Mastricht l. c. p. 640. *Fundamentum applicationis salutis est unio et communio cum Christo, but without immediata conjunctio. Vinculum intercedit fides et spiritus s.* The Unio is unio federalis et mystica secundi Adami, qua sumus in Christo (to wit, agreeably to the pactum salutis); cum Christo uniti we receive justificatio, adoptio, sanctificatio, etc.

torial redemption reaches its end in perfection : Christ presents His people to the Father as an acceptable offering. The reverse aspect of this "depositio regni" is, that Christ, who remains eternally the Head, and through whom the Father has determined always to communicate all His blessings, now enters on the kingdom of power and glory through the Spirit, and through His people, that is, His body, which He governs. (Note 55.)

Taking a survey of the whole, we find that the dogmatists of the Reformed Church, till about the year 1700, clung firmly to the principle, "Finitum non capax infiniti;" though they also endeavoured to secure the union of the two natures by the Holy Ghost and His anointing; from which followed a special charismatic endowment of the humanity of Christ. They developed also, with special industry, the aspect of the homoousia of Christ with us, in the matter of a true human growth. The attributes of infallibility and sinlessness were regarded as unalterable consequences of the Unio; as also the consciousness of fellowship with God; whereas growing charismata were the knowledge and wisdom of Christ, power, positive holiness and blessedness.¹ There was greater hesitation in regard to the personality of the God-man. For the principle of the impersonality of the humanity was regarded as established: moreover, those who express themselves more definitely, deny that the personality of the Logos had been made the property of the humanity; from which position it followed, that the humanity could only be a selfless organ, temple, or garment of the Logos. With this, it is true, as Schneckenburger remarks, the just-mentioned predicates do not agree,² appearing as they do to presuppose a focus of habitual self-consciousness. Still more is this the case with the intellectual growth of the man Jesus. Is it then allowable to take the standing distinction made by the Reformed Church between the Logos in Christ and the Logos "extra Christum," in the sense that, as the absolute, world-governing self-consciousness pertains to the latter, so the Logos in Christ is the divine-human consciousness rendered finite. On this supposition we should have a double Logos-consciousness (as Schneckenburger supposes), and thus

¹ Compare Schneckenburger's "Vergleichende Darstellung des luth. und reform. Lehrb." 2, 198; Maastricht, p. 439; Heidegg. l. c. p. 12 f.

² Ibidem, p. 199.

the humanity might be conceived as personal in the Logos, so far as the Logos, who is embraced by and modified according to it, is the one in whom it has its subsistence and personality. But to represent the Logos in Himself as mutable,—at the thought of this both the Reformed and Lutheran dogmaticians shrunk back.¹ The distinction between the Logos in and the Logos “extra Christum,” was not meant to denote a double Logos. If, accordingly, the orthodox Reformed dogmaticians had deprived themselves of the path to the personality of the humanity which lies through the depotentiation of the Logos,² the only course that remains, is either to treat the humanity as a mere organon, or to allow the man Jesus to have in Himself the personality which He is not supposed to have from the Logos. The first leads to Nihilianism; the second to Adoptionism, if not to Socinianism. The old school of Antioch, like the dogmaticians of the Middle Ages, vacillated between the two. Even the early theology of the Reformed Church had here no way of escape, and accordingly continued marked by contradictions.

In the Reformed Church of Germany there arose, even in the seventeenth century, specially as the result of the favour of Brandenburg, not merely tendencies towards union (in the Lutheran Church amongst the theologians of Helmstadt, Altdorf, and Königsberg, with Spener, Pfaff, and others), but even at an earlier period many Reformed theologians approximated more closely to the Lutheran Church in a Christological respect. So, for example, Sohn, Berg, Crocius, Alting, and others; the Reformed theologians of the Colloquy of Cassel in 1661, J. Heinius and Sebastian Curtius. In consequence, Calov, in his writings against the Syncretists and the Calvinists, was able, to his joy, to quote, by way of conclusion to his proofs, an important series “testium veritatis” from the Reformed

¹ The passage from Turretine, adduced by Schneckenburger (ii. 263), proves nothing else. Rather the “Compressio Majestatis div. nat.” Heidegg. l. c. p. 12.

² Gaupp, in his “Die Union,” 1846 (pp. 72 ff., 96 ff.), thus understands the Reformed of the Colloq. Lips. I cannot, however, see with Schneckenburger that it is more agreeable to the Reformed type to represent the Logos as putting Himself on a level with men; with the Lutheran, to raise humanity to the level of deity. See above, p. 338.

Church, in favour of most of the specifically Lutheran doctrines.¹

In Holland itself, which in the sixteenth century had at first inclined towards the Lutheran form of doctrine, and not till the second half of the same century was converted to the Genevan type of doctrine by divines from France and Belgium, there made its appearance, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Arminian reaction, which, though Lutheran in many respects, retained Christologically a nearer resemblance to the Reformed type, soon, however, putting into the background or limiting the divine aspect of Christ.²

The Arminians (as did already J. Arminius) started primarily with the question concerning the *αὐτοθεότης* of the Son, which had agitated the Reformed Churches during the period of the Reformation, and formed a negative decision; whereas Calvin had taken the affirmative view.³ The Son they regarded, not, in an Arian manner, as a creature or as originated in time, but like Origen or Eusebius of Cæsarea allowed Him to be a person within the deity itself. This middle position, however, necessarily showed itself again to be untenable, and unavoidably led either to the denial of the true deity of the Son, to the assertion of His being a creature in an Arian, if not in a Socinian sense, or to a perfect equalization, be it in a tritheistic or a Sabellian form. If they were agreed that "generatio" subordinates, they

¹ Similarly Rudelbach's "Grundveste," p. 67. Compare Schneckenburger's "Vergleichende Darstellung des luth. und reform. Lehrbegr." ii. 206.

² Sim. Episcopus Instit. theol. Amst. 1650; de Christo, 415-23; Steph. Curcellæi Opera theol. Amst. 1675, pp. 74 ff., 219-34; Ph. a Limborch theol. Christ. Amsterd. 1735, pp. 219-236, 236-282.

³ Episcopus l. c. p. 334. "The Generatio divina est fundamentum subordinationis inter P. et F. Plus est esse a nullo quam esse ab alio, generare quam generari." All three have divine nature, and are persons; not, however, collateral, but "subordinate." Curcell. l. c. pp. 70-79: deitatis apex in patre residet, omnis divinitatis fonte. The Spirit is also subordinated to the Son. The old doctrine of the Church aims at *ιδιότητας* (pp. 74, 79 ff.), not at equal persons. Limborch l. c. p. 102. The Father has the *prærogativa ordinis* as fons et principium divinitatis. This formula of the Greek Church is still regularly accompanied with a reference to the unsearchableness of the mystery. Still, the Arminians did not advance as far as the Arian principle, that the essence of the deity consists in *ἀγεννησία*; they rather conceded divine nature to the Son and the Spirit also.

must either let "generatio" fall, in order to maintaining the *αὐτοθεότης* of the Son; or they must give up the latter, consequently the *ὁμοουσία*, in order to keep their hold on the "generatio." The Arminians preferred the latter alternative, but did not follow it out logically; the former alternative was adopted by Alex. Roëll. (Note 56.)

The difficulties attendant on the Arminian doctrine of the Trinity showed themselves especially in connection with their Christology. For how can a subordinate person become one with a man? They rejected the Arian method of denying the existence of a human soul, rather combating most zealously for the full truth of the humanity, to which Curcellæus reckons also Egoity (*Ichheit*).¹ At the same time, every sort of mutability is most distinctly denied to the Son of God; and, after the example of the Socinians, John i. 14 is explained by *caro*. It was no longer open to them to resort to the idea of the self-conversion of the Logos for the purpose of establishing the existence of a man. They had no alternative, therefore, with their premises, but to defend a more than Nestorian double personality; and, in point of fact, we find them regularly defending Nestorianism. The unity required by the Council of Chalcedon, whose authority they recognised, they find in the "specialis influxus" and the "operatio" of the "divina natura."² The Unio reduces itself to assistance, but is followed by the communication of spiritual and divine powers, so far as is possible to a creature. Notwithstanding their polemic against the Lutheran doctrine, they ascribe to Christ the constant possession of miraculous power, and the use thereof according to His own will—even as He also communicates the Holy Ghost.

The Arminians also develop a doctrine of the two states of Christ, but refer the distinction between them to the humanity alone; and reckon to the "exinanitio" (*humiliatio*), not the "conceptio," but the "passio, mors, sepultura," and the "de-

¹ Suppositum rationale is also person; every soul with intellectus and voluntas has, in his view, also personalitas, p. 75. Limborch, on the contrary, inclining in general rather to the orthodox Christology, denies human nature to be "persona per se," p. 220.

² Curcellæus l. c. p. 229: "Videtur spiritus Christi divinus in humanam ejus naturam peculiariter influxisse et tam excellenti modo in illa operatur, ut in nullo unquam alio homine perinde."

scensus ad inferos.”¹ According to them, His “conceptio” was distinguished by the anointing of the Holy Ghost.² The “conceptio ex spiritu sancto” denotes, not the material, but the operative cause; and the πλαστικὴ ἐνέργεια, or mascula vis fœcundans, was “infusa” or “afflata” by the Holy Spirit. At the same time, the Anabaptist view, which represents the body of Christ as taking its rise out of the essence of God by self-conversion, is regularly controverted.³ Whilst ready to concede the greatest freedom of opinion in regard to most of the other determinations, they laid the greatest stress on the truth of the humanity; particularly because the main feature of their doctrine of the office of Christ on earth was His example. The reason, also, why they gave such prominence to the freedom of the will is, that they assert merely His actual sinlessness, but not His “impeccabilitas.” If Christ had been unable to sin, His obedience would not have been free, nor worthy of love and reward. Still, the divine nature was never inactive in Him, but moved and strengthened Him always.⁴ Only during the passion did it leave Him for a short time alone, so that He required to be strengthened by angels.

To redemption belonged deliverance from guilt for the past, from the dominion of sin for the future. As far as concerns the former, a forgiveness of sin bestowed as a gift would have sufficed, had it been the pleasure of God. But God, on whose “liberum arbitrium” it depends to change His arrangements, willed that freedom from guilt should be attained through the medium of the shedding of His blood; and, by His eternal intercession, Christ keeps this blood in constant force, and presents and offers it ever afresh. All this together constitutes the priestly office of Christ, which must hold the first place. On the other hand, to deliverance from the dominion of sin belonged the clear revelation of the righteous, holy will of God against sin, and the communication of sufficient means for victory (the prophetic office); and, finally, deliverance from the condition

¹ Limborch (l. c.) understands by the “descensus,” the burial of Christ; He did not preach in hell.

² Limborch l. c. p. 219. Further stages of the Unctio are Baptism and the Resurrection.

³ Episcopus l. c. pp. 416 ff.; Curcellæus l. c. p. 219.

⁴ Curcellæus l. c. p. 75 and 229 ff.

of death into a state of life requires that Christ have irresistible power, and the highest authority after God (Royalty). So Episcopius (pp. 423 ff.). Curcellæus represents the teachings of Christ, especially His doctrine regarding the forgiveness of sin, as sealed by His death. The love of God is therein an example of love; the sufferings of Christ are a table of virtue. His sufferings thus fall to the prophetic office: still it is also taught that He must needs die, in order through His blood to have the right of appearing on our behalf, and asking the forgiveness of our sin. Otherwise than through suffering He could not enter into glory; but by His office as King He gives resurrection and blessedness. His priestly office appears, therefore, properly to fall under the heavenly "intercessio."¹ Limborch represents the priesthood as begun in death and perfected in heaven. But Christ could not have borne the punishments of the damned, or of those who deserve to be damned, that is, eternal death, not even intensively; for eternal death has an extensive, not an intensive, significance. Despair also would form part of the punishment merited by the chosen; and this no one can be prepared to attribute to Him. Christ continued always in the enjoyment of the joy and confidence which flow forth from faith. The object of the absolute love of God could not have felt the anger of God, not even as our surety; but God can desert even pious men for a time, "non effectu, sed affectu," so that they shall not be sensible of His love. In this way it was ordained that Christ should become a compassionate High Priest with God for us. Recompense (*æquipollentia*) does not form part of the sacrifice; but merely presentation and intercession, in order that satisfaction may be offered to that which the injured person wills, and thus free forgiveness be attained.² As with the Socinians, so also, consequently, with the Arminians, the main feature of the priestly office of Christ was transferred to heaven. To the royal power of Christ in heaven also they assign a great, although a spiritual, signifi-

¹ Curcellæus l. c. pp. 231-234.

² Pp. 222-29. Nevertheless, says he, *reatum peccati abolevit* as sacerdos. By the power of His death and His grace-propitiating sacrifice (*sacrificium propitiatorium*) He obtained from God that He, though angry with us on account of sin, yet became actually reconciled to us, and was willing to bestow on us the means for faith, obedience, and eternal life. P. 279.

cance; and they conceive that His dominion will endure eternally, inasmuch as, even after His mediatorial work, He will triumph with the Father in eternal glory as the Head of the Church. Hugo Grotius, as is well known, had already represented Christ as a mere passive example of punishment, not because righteousness demands an atonement for guilt, but in order that forgiving grace, which in itself already properly stands in contradiction with the law and its threats of punishment, might not be the cause of carelessness for the future, taking the place of obedience. The later Arminians allowed this notion of an example of punishment to recede to the background, but left the problem standing, why it was only at the price of the blood of Christ that God was inclined actually to forgive sin. On the other hand, however, in their theory of *Acceptilation*, they developed the idea, which lay already at the foundation of the system of Grotius, that God is perfectly at liberty to change His laws and ordinances. In their view, the law is not connected with the essence of God, but is merely positively established by His "bene placitum" or "liberum arbitrium."¹ God's will, however, in accordance with His wise good pleasure, always asks, how, with the given constitution of man, their welfare can be best advanced. Herein is involved a deviation from the old Reformed doctrine, that God made everything for His own sake, amounting almost to Eudæmonism. Arminianism is far behind the lofty and earnest doctrine of the early Reformed theologians, which, in fact, assigned to man also a much higher position, in requiring of, and asserting it to be possible for, him to love the honour of God more than himself, at the same time representing this readiness to sacrifice as communicated by the love of God. Nevertheless, the family resemblance to the Reformed Church is still plainly enough discernible in Arminianism; specially in the prominent position given to the "bene placitum" or "liberum arbitrium." When the early Reformed theologians so decidedly taught that punishment is necessarily grounded in the essence of God, and refused to trace back righteousness to divine arbitrariness, they ought consistently to have assigned freedom to man also, especially as even a Maastricht allowed that righteousness as punitive, presupposes

¹ Steph. Curcell. l. c. p. 87; de ira Dei, p. 70. Episcop. l. c. p. 311, 318, 321. Limborch l. c. de amore, odio et ira dei, p. 74.

“culpa.” On the other hand, if they had consistently carried out the idea of the “bene placitum,” which rules in the doctrine of predestination, no necessary place would have remained for punitive righteousness and for the atoning work of Christ; but God might then (see above, Note 1, page 345), without violating His own nature or His righteousness and holiness, according to circumstances alter His laws, and characterize sin at one time as deserving, at another time as not deserving, punishment. This now is asserted by Arminianism, out of regard, not indeed to the divine “bene placitum,” but to the well-being of changeable man.¹ The antagonism of Arminianism bears in itself the traces of the influence of Lutheran reaction, only so far as it seeks to secure for man, over against God, an independent and free position. Arminianism, however, like our Supernaturalism, does this in such a manner, that for Christology there only remains an external position between the divine and the human. It retains its affinity with the Reformed Church, in that it does not seek to establish an essential connection between the divine and the human, but contents itself with a fellowship of operations (assistance), leaving the two natures outside of each other. There is undoubtedly a distinction also. So long as the orthodox doctrine of the Reformed Church rested satisfied with the impersonality of the humanity of Christ in itself or in the incarnation, it was not, it is true, Nestorian (on the contrary, it reduced the humanity to a selfless husk). But Arminianism, so far as it coincided with the Lutherans in asserting, though after a different manner, the personality of the humanity (a circumstance which was particularly painful to the Reformed dogmatists), was plainly chargeable with holding to a double personality. And this must necessarily degenerate into Socinianism; for, on this view, the relation between the Logos and this human person is a completely loose one, and Christ is no longer *qualitatively* distinguished from other men, by having been taken up into the person of the Logos, but merely *quantitatively*, by having the assistance of the Logos more constantly and in an intenser degree. And as the doctrine of a personality of the Son of God is thus made useless, nay more, as the problem is thus rendered more difficult, and as even the special assistance

¹ Compare Episcop. l. c. L. iv. sect. p. 2, c. 28, 29; de Justitia Dei, pp. 321 ff. cll. sect. 5, c. 10, p. 423.

enjoyed by Jesus might have been bestowed by the divine Spirit in general, Arminianism undoubtedly leads step by step, and from premises that are apparently innocent enough, to the Anti-Trinitarian theory which had made its appearance long before in the Socinianism of the sixteenth century; though, as the way for that theory had not been sufficiently prepared, it failed to exert the influence that might have been expected. How Curcellæus approximated towards Socinianism, we have already seen. Still more was this the case with Joh. Clericus. Whether Conr. Borstius (about 1620) ought to be reckoned to the number of these men, is doubtful.

Though driven out of the Church, the Arminians continued notwithstanding to exercise a considerable influence. The Remonstrants gained an ally against the old Reformed orthodoxy, on the one hand, in Cartesianism, to which churchly dogmaticians also, and not merely Remonstrants like J. Clericus, gave in their adherence;¹ and, on the other hand, in the school of Cocceius, so far as both contributed to shatter its foundations. In Switzerland, where the stricter type of doctrine made the greatest and most decided efforts to maintain itself, precisely in the second half of the seventeenth century, the change to Arminianism was effected by Turretine in Geneva, D. J. Osterwald in Neuenburg, Werenfels and Wetstein in Basle, and Zimmermann in Zürich (1700–1750); but this was but a prelude and intermediate stage to still greater alterations.²

It was not accidental that many of the Reformed theologians of Holland became adherents of the philosophy of Des Cartes, whilst it exerted no influence worth mentioning on the Lutherans. Dualistic determinism was the point in which the two coincided. The more remarkable, therefore, are the approximations to principles of the Lutheran Christology, which resulted, notwithstanding, from this philosophy. So, for example, the Cartesians said:—Circumscription pertains to a body, not through space, but in so far as it is different from others. But, in particular, many now ceased to regard the incarnation, after the manner of the Reformed Church at its earlier stages, as consisting in the assumption of the humanity into the person of

¹ Compare Scholten, "De leer der herformde Kerk in hare Grondbeginselen," i. 266.

² Compare Schweizer's "Die Centraldogmen u. s. w.," 1856, ii. 744 ff.

the Logos; and taught rather, in agreement with the Lutherans, that it consisted in the union of the natures.¹ Amongst the theologians who pursued this course, Christoph Wittich, Burmann, Braun, and Allinga are specially deserving of notice.² Wittich says with Des Cartes:—God is *res cogitans*; so also the essence of the human mind is thought alone (*Deus et mens humana sola cogitatione definiuntur*). For this reason God and man can only be united by thought; any other union would leave precisely their essence disunited. To this union the personality can present no hindrance. Personality is incommunicable indeed; and the expedient adopted by the Lutherans, of saying that the person can communicate itself to the nature, if not to the person, cannot be adopted; but still, says Wittich, the “persona” by itself is not something positive, but merely the limit or determination of something that exists; taken by itself, therefore, it is nothing, merely declaring the circumstance that a substance (= an “individuum”) is not bound, that it has an existence of its own by itself. The divine nature, which is the Son, can combine with the humanity to form an unity, to which, as an unity existing for itself and not bound up with others, the name of a person belongs. In this person, now, the divine and human aspects have become momenta of a higher unity.³ According to this supposition, human nature by itself is as truly a person as the divine; seeing that by person is under-

¹ See above, p. 244.

² Chr. Wittich's “*Theologia pacifica*,” § 228, 231; Francisc. Burmann's “*Syntagma theol.*” lib. v. c. 8 seq.; Thom. Bonartes Nortanus Anglus *Concordia scientiæ cum fide*, L. iv. p. 322; Liberius de Sancto amore (the Arminian Clericus), *Epistol.* i.; Pet. Allinga *erotem. illustr. decad.* 10 erot. 10, pp. 361 f.; Braun *Doctr. foeder.* 1691. Compare, besides Grapius (see below), the *Instit.* of Buddeus, pp. 747 ff., specially on Clericus.

³ This reminds us strikingly of the idea of a higher personality over the human and divine person, taught by the later Nestorians (see Div. II. vol. i. Note 14). Clericus, however, says (l. c.):—*Quemadmodum—duæ aquæ guttulæ separatæ sunt supposita, quia ad nullius rei compositionem concurrunt, sed si conjungantur, perit suppositalitas, quia jam conjunctæ ad majoris guttæ compositionem concurrunt: pariter Deus posset duos homines vel duos meros spiritus ita inter se conjungere, ut periret utriusque personalitas, atque in aliam tertiam coalescerent personam.*” So in Christ. The higher nature was undoubtedly an ens incompletum, in respectu of the new, the third, but not in itself.

stood merely a substance in distinctness (as, after the example of Aristotle, was taught by the Monophysites and the Nestorians). These two persons—the divine also—are then constituted the new person, which is the result of the union of the two separate natures. That in this view the Trinity must be viewed tritheistically, as in the case of J. Philoponus, is self-evident.¹ But out of the two persons, the humanity and the Son of God, which are taken up, a third new one is formed by cogitatio. Both, the Son of God and the separate humanity of Jesus, think (and will) themselves connected; and in that their thoughts thus meet in the same point, and their essence is thought, they are united by “consensus.” (Note 57.)

With the Cartesian controversy was connected the Cocceian; for many of the Cocceians were also Cartesians.

The Federal theology, unwilling as it might be to confess it, did really contain within itself the germ of the doctrine of an human freedom which is a determining momentum in the divine plan of the world; consistency, therefore, required it to assign to the humanity of Christ a more independent position. For Christ is the surety of the covenant of grace; by His perfect obedience He makes Himself surety to God for His people. This was seen especially by Witsius, who teaches that it is not God who had to make the “satisfactio” to Himself, but man who had to make it to God; he also, with others, lays special stress on the fact of Christ’s being under obligation, as man, to fulfil the law (see above). Although he combined therewith an imputation of the “obedientia Chr. activa,” his views were still controverted by Lutheran writers.²

Arminianism with its Subordinationism gained many adherents, especially in England, during the seventeenth century, and that in particular amongst the so-called Latitudinarians. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, Arianism, and in general Subordinationism, began to recommend itself, even to dignitaries of the Church, as a reasonable middle thing between Orthodoxy and Deism; whereas in Germany, Christoph Sand, both Father and Son, who taught in Königsberg from 1650 onwards, continued to be regarded as a strange phænomenon.

¹ Similarly at first A. Roëll also.

² Niehenck diss. theol. de Christo, 1704, quæst. 4, 5, pp. 10 ff. So also Grapius l. c. p. 33.

Hobbes, it is true, made little impression with his denial that Christ had already founded a kingdom or community, intended as it was to favour the omnipotence of the State.¹ The ideas which Locke set afloat answered more fully to common sense, and remained popular in England notwithstanding their being little favourable to Christianity.² So also was the excitement greater than the actual effects produced by the eccentric William Whiston, who took great pains to show that Arianism was identical with primitive Christianity, and undertook to restore the latter again.³ Against him wrote Peter Allix, Grabe, Thirlby, J. Hughes, 1710–12; and in 1710 he was deposed on the ground of Arianism. In 1712, however, Samuel Clarke made his appearance on the scene, and took again for his point of departure the question of the *αὐτοθεότης*, which had been brought under discussion in Switzerland (see pp. 168 f.) in the time of Calvin.⁴ The Father alone, teaches he, has aseity, independence; He alone is unoriginated, is the final source and first cause of all that which the Son and Spirit do. The Son is not from Himself, but derives His essence and attributes from the first cause, the Father. He is a real person, but the Scriptures do not teach when He took His rise, and whether by the power of the free will or of nature: for the incarnation He “diminished, emptied” (*depotenzirt*) Himself. If we ascribe aseity to the Son, Sabellianism is inevitable. But if the Father alone have aseity, He alone is the highest of all beings, although He created the world through the Son. Against Clarke, in

¹ Hobbes says in his *Leviathan*:—The sole object of the work of Christ was to bring again the immortality which Adam lost. This, however, does not take place till the resurrection, when His kingdom will first begin; the present belongs to the State alone. *Redemptor non habet jus in redemptum antequam pretium solutum sit*; consequently He had no kingdom prior to His death. Nor did Christ found a kingdom after His death; for which reason the State alone is justified, not the Church. Compare Elster, “*Deutsche Zeitschrift*,” 1855, No. 32 f.

² J. Locke’s “Reasonableness of Christianity,” 1695. Compare Walch l. c. i. p. 566.

³ He taught also in his “*Essays and Sermons*,” like some more recent writers (for example, Kinkel), that Christ ascended several times. Against him compare Buddeus’ “*Meditationes sacræ*,” in his “*syntagma dissertationum*.”

⁴ P. 891. S. Clarke’s “*The Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity*,” Lond. 1712.

defence of the doctrine of the Church, wrote Nye, Lorimer, Jon. Edwards, and Daniel Waterland.¹ Arianism and Arminianism, however, made such rapid strides, that the question began to be agitated, whether, and in what sense, an Arian could sign the Thirty-nine Articles of the Anglican Church. In favour of an Arian's subscription, it was pleaded that the biblical and general Christian form of prayer is directed to God the Father in the name of Jesus Christ, His Son,—a form which is contained even in the Apostolical Constitutions, and which the Greek Church observes. This must be sufficient. All efforts to define the Trinity more exactly must be renounced. Against Waterland was published a series of works between 1720 and 1730. Nay more, several defenders of the doctrine of the Church (and this was the circumstance fraught with most danger) wandered themselves into bypaths, or fell under suspicion of heterodoxy. So, for example, Thomas Bennet,² who supposed the only way of avoiding Arianism to be by assuming the pre-existence of the soul of Christ prior to creation; to which he referred passages teaching the pre-existence and subordination of Christ. It is true, the divine nature united itself with the human, but it remained entirely quiescent until the death of Christ; for which reason the disciples knew nothing of it, but only of His humanity, which was led by the Spirit of God. Even George Bull went so far as to teach that the Son, though of like essence with the Father, had still received His deity as a communicated thing, and is in so far subordinate in rank or origin to the Father: in respect of deity, the Father is greater.³ In refutation of Bull wrote Daniel Whitby, 1718, who as early as 1691 had controverted Arianism: subsequently, however, he found Sabellianism taught by the later doctrine of the Church as compared with the Nicene Creed; and at last openly turned over to Arianism.⁴ For the supposition of an inequality amongst the persons of the Deity, agreeably to which one of them is superior to the other, the

¹ A Vindication of Christ's Divinity, 1719.

² "A Discourse of the ever-blessed Trinity in Unity," Lond. 1718.

³ G. Bull, *Defensio fidei Nicænæ ex scriptis cath. doctorum, qui intra tria prima ecclæs. Christ. sec. floruerunt*, etc., Oxford, 1685; ed. Grabe, 1703.

⁴ In his *ὑστέραι φροντίδες*, Lond. 1727.

name of "The Platonic Trinity" was invented, which was intended to denote a milder species of Arianism. Amongst those to whom this remark applies, may be mentioned, besides Bull, Ralph Cudworth.¹

In a similar manner, William Sherlock had undertaken at an earlier period to defend the Trinity against Socinianism;² but, starting with Cartesian principles, arrived at a Tritheism, which, by way of securing the unity of the three persons, did nothing but affirm that the consciousness which each had of itself and of the others was identical. His opponent, Robert South, by describing the persons as nothing but eternal relations of the one divine substance to itself, fell into Sabellianism; whilst others, as for example Edward Stillingfleet, endeavoured to find a middle path between the two.³

We thus find in England, in place of the certainty of conviction that had once prevailed with regard to the Trinity, from 1690 to 1730, a wide-spread uncertainty; and in that the dogma entered on the first stadium of dissolution, the Christian mind in that country began to experiment with earlier and long transcended theories, though without presenting them from new points of view. The utmost that was attempted were new combinations of the already existing material, which threatened to fall to pieces. So, for example, Paul Maty,⁴ in Holland, supposed it possible to escape all difficulties by a theory which is a compound of Sabellianism, Arianism, and Tritheism. Son and Spirit, says he, have in the Scriptures, at one time, subordinating

¹ *Systema intellectuale hujus universi*, ed. Mosheim, 1733, pp. 686 ff.

² *A Vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever-blessed Trinity and the Incarnation of the Son of God*, Lond. 1690.

³ Works, T. iii.; also the Treatise on the Trinity. Against Bull, Heidegger wrote "*Corp. theolog. christ.*" lib. iv. (p. 122). So also Jurien, in his "*Religion des latitudinaires*," etc., Rotterd. 1696, refuted the professed Tritheism of the Nicene Fathers, with which J. Clericus and others asserted them to be chargeable.

⁴ "*Lettre d'un theologien à un autre theologien sur le mystère de la Trinité*," 1729. Against him wrote Arm. de la Chapelle, *reflexions en forme de lettre au sujet d'un systeme pretendu nouveau sur le mystère de la Trinité*, Amst. 1729; whereupon Maty issued his *Apologie*, etc., Utr. 1730. Several works were published against Maty in Holland, France, and Germany; amongst which, Mosheim's "*Modesta inquisitio in novam dogmatis de ss. trinitate explicationem quam vir cl. Paul Maty nuper proposuit*," Helmst. 1735, is deserving of mention.

predicates, at another time, co-ordinating predicates. This is explicable, if the Father be the entire deity, and Son and Spirit two other persons, each with two natures,—an infinite nature equal to the Father, and a finite one. From the Scriptures this cannot be proved concerning the Holy Spirit; but he fancied that he could show the Scriptures to teach that the Son had two natures even prior to the incarnation. This seems to contradict the eternal generation of the Son, because we cannot assume such a generation for a finite being; whilst, on the other hand, the distinction between the Father and the Son consists alone in the finite essence of the latter, which therefore would appear to be necessarily eternal. One cannot, however, see any reason why God could not have created a finite being from eternity.¹ We thus arrive at a subordination of the persons and a distinction of the substances, though we at the same time retain an unity of their essence and of the deity.

This theory can only be regarded as an expression of the impression of importance made by these new trinitarian discussions, not merely on Maty, but also on the public, which, whilst not adopting, took so lively an interest in, his theory. His work is a confession that the numerous attacks made on the doctrine of the Church, on physical, historical, and speculative grounds, were not unimportant; as also, that Subordination, Co-ordination, and Sabellianism, each by itself, represents and embodies a momentum of the truth. Maty's artificial attempt to unite them was intended to bring finitude into closer connection with the deity; nay more, to import the former as completely as possible into the latter. He further supposes that the deeper distinction between Father and Son owed its existence to the union of deity with finitude—an union conceived as eternal—by which the second person, as such, was constituted.²

¹ At this point he coincides with the above theories of a pre-existent, heavenly humanity of Christ. See above, pp. 860 ff.

² For the rest, he says also, it is not necessary to believe that the Father begot the Son from eternity; which clearly shows that, like Origen, he had in his mind a Subordinationism, resting on the foundation of a Sabellian equality of essence. His theory is substantially that of Origen, with the difference, that he does not distinctly identify the pre-existent finite nature of the Son with the soul or heavenly humanity of Christ; which he certainly ought to do, unless he be willing to recognise in Christ two finite persons alongside of the divine nature.

Finally, we can trace very clearly in this theory the tendency which lay in the womb of the age; and which manifested itself also, both in Arminianism and the reawakened Arianism, to lay stress on the finite, as compared with the divine aspect; which finite aspect was curtailed no less by the orthodox Reformed doctrine, that the humanity was a mere organ of the deity, than by the Christology of the Lutheran dogmaticians, which led to Docetism.

SECTION II.

THE SPREAD OF INDIFFERENCE TO THE OLD FORM OF
CHRISTOLOGY.

FROM 1700—1750.

THE Christology of the Lutheran Confession retained, in general, its authority till about 1750; but as compared with the seventeenth century, an essential difference is observable in the tone and manner of treatment. The unwearied attacks on the part of the Reformed and Catholic theologians, however much that was apt and striking might be contained especially in those of the former, would by themselves scarcely have wrought a change. On the contrary, a feeling of confessional honour caused the Lutheran dogmaticians to cling with a certain tenacity to their position, even after they had ceased to regard it with inner satisfaction. And as the others had nothing essentially better to offer, the opposition which was encountered tended rather to awaken in them an inclination to maintain the ground they already held. Nor are we justified in ascribing to the English Free-thinkers, or to French unbelief, much influence in the production of the altered and cold feeling towards the orthodox form of the Lutheran Christology, which is observable in the first half of the last century. The proper and main reason lies in the inner history of the dogma itself, and in the position into which it had come.

In the preceding section we have narrated how the Christology of the Lutheran dogmaticians, so long as the old premises were recognised, could neither go backwards nor forwards; whilst, at the same time, its inner contradictions called for either the one or the other. Nothing therefore remained but internal decay and ruin. In the eighteenth century, the symptoms of decay made their appearance with ever greater rapidity. Spener had laid down the principle, that the works and benefits

of Christ are of more importance than accurate definitions concerning His person. In correspondence herewith, we find the doctrinal writers after Hollaz already treating the article on the *Communicatio idiomatum* with much greater brevity. Some—like Mosheim, Börner, Clausing, and others—drew back relatively to the whole of Christology, on the fact of its being a mystery; a clear proof that the desire and hope of understanding it more fully had disappeared. Even a Löscher warned against subtilities.¹ He supposes the essential feature of the *Unio* to consist, not in the communication of the “character personalis” to the humanity, but in the “*exhibitio mutua et maxime realis*” of the two natures; in connection with which, he treats the “genus apotelesm.,” which the Reformed also recognised, as the main point. In Mosheim’s view, the essential feature consisted in God’s having communicated Himself entirely to humanity, “so far as it was susceptible thereto.” The doctrine of the old dogmatists, says he, was dominated by the Aristotelian philosophy; it is a “*labor improbus*” merely to understand these spinose, scholastic, and controversial theological works about the “*Communicatio idiomatum*,” exceeding as they do the number of two thousand. He retains the more general formulas (such as *περιχώρησις*, *majestatis divinæ communicatio*), but with the proviso that they are “*mysteria*,” which, as far as concerns omnipresence, he holds to be identical with “*symbolical*.”²

Köcher, in his day, had occasion to complain that the “*Communicatio idiomatum*” was no longer treated by theologians, and that although they were pledged to the doctrine. Down to

¹ Börner, 1740; Clausing, 1737, in *Dissertat.* Mosheim also (see *Elem. theol. dogm.* vol. ii. 80 ff.) concludes from 1 Tim. iii. 16, where the incarnation is termed a mystery, that it cannot be positively, but only negatively, explained—not even by analogies. E. V. Löscher, *Theologia Pretiosa*, 1750, p. 73.

² *Elem.* ii. p. 110. He endeavours to help himself, also, by a further development of the distinction between the “*mediata*” and “*immediata communicatio*.” If a son have rich parents, he also may be called rich because of his birthright. That is “*mediata possessio*.” To this title Heilmann and Zachariä reduce the “*Communicatio idiomatum*,” a course which Mosheim did not yet venture to take. Danov, in his “*Theol. Dogm. Inst.*,” observes rightly, that they ought in this case to give up the old terms also, and either set forth the altered meaning openly, or abide by the substance of the old. Pp. 382 ff.

the time of F. Buddeus, it continued to be universally held; in his day, however, began even attacks on it.¹ Sartorius says,²—The simple doctrine of Scripture, which has been darkened by many subtilties, is sufficient for salvation. All that is necessary he finds in the *Unio personalis et περιχώρησις*, with the negative formulas of the Council of Chalcedon.

But the overthrow of the old form of the dogma was aided, not merely by the lukewarmness which had entered, and by the dissatisfaction with it on scientific grounds, and in favour of a simple practical theology, which gradually made its appearance, but also by a *positive* element which contained in itself the distant germs of a different Christology. From the eighteenth century onwards, namely, there is discoverable in the orthodox theologians also, the effort to give fuller prominence to the actuality and independence of the humanity of Christ; but in the measure in which the mind was directed mainly to the humanity, in the same measure did it begin to transform, or put into the background, the doctrine of the “*Communicatio idiomatum*” as it had hitherto been held. By the more orthodox, chief stress was laid on the communication of the ethical attributes of God; on the heels of which soon followed efforts to secure an ethical independence for the humanity also. One party, indeed, with a view to preserving the human nature more completely from commixture with the divine, said,—The divine person cannot communicate itself; the humanity of Christ was impersonal, was merely an organ of the Logos:—a breaking off of the point of the old Christology which gave the divine nature the predominance, and leads to the Reformed Church type of doctrine. And, in point of fact, we find them teaching,—humanity is finite, but the finite is incapable of receiving the infinite. So, for example, Matth. Pfaff.³ But this was merely an intermediate stage. Others, with the design of pre-

¹ Seiler, Theol. Dogm. Polem. 1774, pp. 174 f., understands by the “*communicatio mediata*,” the adjudication of the attributes to the humanity, on the ground of the *Unio*, which properly belong to the Logos alone. But the humanity has received the divine, *ea quidem ratione, qua hoc fieri potest* (p. 173). Let the Reformed deny this if they can! Omnipresence he tries to explain from Jeremiah xxiii. 24, that is, from omniscience.

² Comp. Theol. Dogm. 1782, pp. 210 ff. 217.

³ De impersonalitate, etc., 1722. Joh. Georg Walch also allows the

serving the truth of the humanity, limited the possession of the divine attributes to the *title* thereto; and Heilmann, by way of decidedly excluding the notion of a pre-existent God-manhood, that humbled itself, converted the self-abasement of the God-man to the form of a servant into the supplementary approval of the servile form on the part of Jesus; according to which, therefore, Jesus was only a man, with the title to divine predicates through a special relation of the Logos to Him.¹ Others gave closer consideration to particular personal acts of the man Christ, which are most clearly distinguished from the life of the Logos. So, for example, Haferung in Wittenberg, who wrote a work on "The Prayer of the man Christ for Himself" (Note 58), and defended the position, that as to His humanity, Christ owed obedience to the law. Because all creatures are created for the praise of God also through prayer, and Christ as to His humanity belongs to the creatures, He also was under obligation to pray: not, indeed, to humble supplication (*ἱκετηρία*), which implies guilt, and which He only presented as a Mediator for us; but certainly to offer simple petitions. Faith, hope, love, were communicated to the humanity of Christ, not in vain, but with the result that He was inwardly impelled to keep the entire law: for this reason, prayer could no more be failing in His case, than in the case of Adam before the fall, or in the case of the angels in heaven. He did, moreover, unquestionably commit His life to God, as the one who was able to deliver Him from death (Hebrews v. 7); He confessed, too, that He came to do the will of God, and acted in accordance with that will. This controversy is of great significance, because it related to the soul of Christ; and because the ethical interest being now for the first time brought to the foreground, stress was laid on the truth of the humanity, and on growth through practice and acquirement, as opposed to the notion of a physical completeness of the sanctity of Christ from the very personality of the humanity in the Logos to recede very much to the background. Löscher (besides elsewhere, p. 74) denies to the human nature the "*communicatio characteris personalis*," and says,—the soul of Christ progressed no less than the body.

¹ This theory of the supplementary approval of the servile form, Reinhard derived from Heilmann (according to which, Schneckenburger is to be corrected). Compare Reinhard, *Epit. Theol. Christ.* 1804, p. 135; Heilmann, *de humili Christi infantia*, in his *Opusc. T. ii.* pp. 501 f.

moment of His birth ; or, expressed in other words, because it asserted the personality of the humanity in a manner that presupposes a more thorough state of humiliation than was taught by the Lutheran dogmaticians, in contradiction to the germs of a more perfect Christology contained in Luther's own works, to which attention has been directed above.¹ The mere circumstance that Christ prayed for Himself, is, Haerung maintains, a proof that, notwithstanding the Unio, He was not yet in a perfect condition whilst on earth. On the contrary, His lowliness and His conflicts are in contradiction to the supposition, that the God-manhood was already an absolute reality in Him. This God-manhood, therefore, was still fettered, and had not attained to full reality. Not, of course, from any inner impotence, nor from caprice, did He remain in humiliation and conflict ; but even His love and faithfulness to the human race were of such a nature, that He had at the same time to maintain and complete His own person. (Note 59.) The profound Haerung was led to these principles by the strength of his moral convictions, to which the thought was unendurable, that the law, and in general the will of God, should stand in a merely external relation to human nature as such, or even to the divine essence, and in the former respect be accidental, in the latter capricious. For this reason, in another treatise he laid down the principle, that the Gospel also has an obligatory force, that it is a duty to believe in its truth, to accept its blessings. On which ground an obedience of faith is spoken of. It is the Father's will—a will binding on all—that men should believe in Jesus. Christianity was thus brought into connection with the universal moral law ; and its ethical character and inner agreement with the law of the first creation ensured, in opposition to an abstractly religious doctrine of grace. But

¹ At a former period, also, Christopher Francke, in Kiel, like Witsius, had taught that Christ fulfilled the law for Himself also, though in such a manner that He at the same time fulfilled it for others. Compare Habersack's "Dissert. de Christo," 1704, p. 12 (under Niehenck in Rostock). Consequently this view had adherents in the Lutheran Church long before Töllner. Kramer's idea, that Christ merited something for Himself by His humiliation, must also be classed under this rubric. The same notion was further carried out at a later period by Storr, who taught that Christ begged for the reward earned by Himself on behalf of Christians, and transferred it to them.

the line of thought which was thus initiated, was not merely unusual, but awakened the suspicion that there was an intention of converting the Gospel into a message of repentance, or of confounding it with the law; besides which, this phraseology was considered inconvenient, and destitute of proper ground.¹ There is no obligation without law, and no law without obligation; everything is law to which pertains obligatory force: now the Gospel is not law; consequently, it is not obligatory. The obligation to believe in Jesus is derived, not from the Gospel, but from the revealed law. As to its subject-matter, the Gospel is not requirement; it wishes to bestow something; it cannot, therefore, have any obligatory force. It is a duty, it is true, to accept the Gospel; but this duty springs not from the Gospel, but, as Walch says, from the general principle of the law, that we must do everything that conduces to our true blessedness. How far is Walch removed from recognising that the ultimate purpose of the Gospel is the perfection of creation in sanctity; nay more, that it is merely the law of spirit and life, instinct with power to make itself obeyed.

That special emphasis was beginning to be laid on the relative independence of the human aspect, is evident also from another series of traits. (Note 60.) Amongst these, we may reckon in particular the discussions which were conducted prior to 1750, by Franz Buddeus and Walch, Trautermann and Schorcht, relatively to the question of the *anointing of the human nature* of Christ, which had so important a bearing on the Christology of the Reformed Church.² Walch confesses that the distinction between the anointing and the "*Communicatio idiomatum*," as understood by him, clashes with the common opinion, according to which the former is absorbed by the latter. As favourable to his view, he adduces Buddeus, Breithaupt, and others, and takes the anointing to denote gifts of grace from the communication of the Holy Ghost, by which the natural powers of Christ were heightened and increased by new ones. But the mere circumstance of there being still a need, or even only a possibility, for gifts with such a bearing, implies that the

¹ Walch v. 544 ff., 890 ff.

² Compare "*Disquisitiones de unctione Christi, num ista a communicatione idiomatum divinatorum differat necne, cum præf.*" J. G. Walchii, Jenæ, 1749.

“Communicatio idiomatum” was conceived to be restricted. Joachim Lange, on the contrary, understood by the anointing, the communication of the divine attributes, on the ground that only thus, as Trautermann seeks to prove, can a distinction be established between the natural gifts of Christ and the anointing with the Holy Ghost.¹ Like Walch, Schorcht, on the contrary (pp. 84, 85), speaks of three kinds of gifts of Christ as to His humanity:—1. The purely natural gifts; 2. the spiritual ones from the anointing; 3. the purely divine ones, in virtue of the “Communicatio idiomatum.” Anointing is ascribed to others besides Christ: it denotes, therefore, gifts of the Holy Ghost (see 1 John ii. 20, 27). According to Psalm xlv. 8, the difference between Christ and His fellows, in the matter of anointing, was merely one of degree; consequently, the anointing must be something different from the communication of the divine attributes, which appertains to Christ alone. The latter is a necessary consequence of the Unio of the persons and the natures; whereas the anointing rests with the free divine will alone. By this means, it is true, the position of antagonism to the Reformed doctrine was preserved; but, at the same time, the attention was drawn more determinately to the spiritual perfection of the man Christ; and if, as we have shown, the communication of the attributes to the humanity began to be limited, and the communication of the person even to be forgotten, the consequence could not but be that the “unctio Christi,” which was held to include within it the powers necessary to the work of salvation, came to be regarded as having a closer connection with religion, though the “Communicatio idiomatum” continued for a time to hold its traditional position. As the unctio was universally held to have its stages,—the first dating from the conception of Christ, the second from the baptism, and the third from the state of exaltation,—it was fitted to show to those who (like J. Lange) identified it with the “Communicatio idiomatum,” the necessity of a *gradual* development of this communication;—from others, however (like Walch), to force the acknowledgment, that, as anointing and communication take place to one and the same person, the latter must bear a certain proportion to the progress of the former, in that otherwise the

¹ In the “Davidisch-Salomonisches Recht,” p. 14. So also Trautermann, and most of the theologians of that time, l. c. 12.

former would become totally unnecessary. For a "Communicatio idiomatum" complete from the very commencement, leaves no room for a special communication of the Spirit.

The better Lutheran theologians, from 1700 till about 1750, thus endeavoured to appropriate to themselves Christological momenta which had been greatly overlooked in their own Church and asserted by the Reformed: just as we have noticed previously a similar supplementary process taking place in the Reformed Church, by the appropriation of Lutheran elements. At the same time, so long as each Church clung to the old foundations, all that this, in itself good tendency, could result in, was a decomposition of the existing doctrine, but not a self-consistent whole.

Unfettered by the previously existing tradition of the Church, Count Louis Zinzendorf, with the energy and boldness which in a special degree characterized him in a religious point of view, sketched the outlines of the Christology which formed the objective background or foil to the distinctive character of his Christian piety. It is well known how inwardly and exclusively he clung in his piety to Christ the Saviour, and that as the one in whom alone the infinite majesty of God has taken the form which invites to the most confiding love. Starting from this point, he arrived at a conversion both of the doctrine of the Trinity and of Christology.¹ The Trinity, says he, is to be treated as a mystery which stands behind Christ, and is perceived in Him. The doctrine of the Church has become a false theology, and the apple of discord concerning the Creator and the Saviour. It owes its origin to false, and in part, heathen wisdom. Its fundamental fault is the assumption—an assump-

¹ Compare Schneckenburger's "Zur Kirchlichen Christologie," pp. 200 ff., and his "Vergleichende Darstellung des lutherischen und reformirten Lehrbegriffs," published posthumously by E. Güder, i. pp. 226 ff.—C. G. Hofmann's "Gegründete Anzeige derer herrenhutischen Grundirrhümer in der Lehre von der heiligen Dreieinigkeit und von Christo," Wittenb. und Zerbst. 1749.—"Nöthige Prüfung der Zinzendorfschen Lehrart von der heiligen Dreieinigkeit," von einem Liebhaber der geoffenbarten Wahrheit, 1748.—Of Zinzendorf himself belong to this connection his 21 discourses on the Augsburg Confession published in 1740, "Homilien über die Wundenlitaniei," and the Herrnhut Hymn-book; as also "Die gegenwärtige Gestalt des Kreuzreichs Jesu in seiner Unschuld," and his Confession of Faith of the year 1735.

tion which has been conceded to the Unitarians without further consideration—that it would be interfering with the honour of the Father to make the Lord Jesus God. But, in that case, the Socinians are in the right. On the other hand, so soon as they are convinced that they must come to grace for the sake of the blood of Jesus, they join themselves at once to the brethren. The Church distributes to the three persons (whose existence he does not deny) different works,—as, for example, creation, redemption, sanctification; it wishes to assign to each person His office, instead of leaving all three to Him, to whom they belong, to wit, Jesus Christ. In this way the Scripture truth of the “fatherly office of the Son” has been darkened; by which truth he declared his readiness to live or die. Creation is to be attributed to the Son. It is He in the Godhead who breathed into us the breath of life: He is thus “our direct Father.” The holy Trinity remained for the most part unknown in the Old Testament; but the God of the Old Testament also was Jesus Christ. Even so are redemption and sanctification to be connected with the Person of Christ. Father and Holy Spirit only co-operate in the service of the Gospel. In the Trinity, it was the Son who first entertained the thought of creating and redeeming. His alone also is the regiment of the world; only an interruption occurred during the continuance of the state of humiliation. “As it was His mission and will to enter into the world, He resigned with all His heart the workings and activity of His own deity, and gave up the regiment of the world ‘*plenarie*’ to the Father. Jesus Christ the God, emptied Himself entirely of deity at His incarnation, and became a mere, natural man.” “His entrance into time, into His mother’s womb, as the first grave, was a departure from His glory. It took place, however, in such a manner that His humanity was made subject to the divine nature, and His soul also is a part of the divine essence.” The conception He represents to himself as follows:—“The Holy Spirit, who moved on the waters and made all things alive, as the universal mother,” moving over the God, who was emptied to a potency, and who was of His own nature, in the Virgin, formed Him to a man.¹ The human soul of Jesus was thus inbreathed as a

¹ Sammlung öffentlicher Reden, vol. i. p. 43. The Holy Ghost he styles the Consort of the Father.

glorious, holy, chaste, divine substance, by the Son Himself.¹ Nay more, he designates Jesus the natural Son of God.

On the other hand, however, he insists on the complete homoousia of Jesus with humanity, and describes Him as a "mere natural man." As He was merely a man on earth, so is He most pleased, even now, to be worshipped as man in His deepest humiliation. He "performed miracles as a man can; He was holy as a man should be; He was irreproachable as a man may be irreproachable." He did not wish to be anything but a natural man, accompanied through the world by the Holy Ghost. "Everything which He did, although He was alone the Lord and Master thereof, presented itself to Him, during the time He sojourned on earth, in no other light than as the business of His Father."

His designating Jesus, on the one hand, the natural Son of God, of divine essence, and, on the other hand, mere natural man, can only be reconciled if we assume Zinzendorf's idea to have been, that the self-exinanition of the Son of God to a potence was at the same time, in itself, self-conversion into a human germ, which then appropriated to itself material elements from Mary, so that the Son of God woke up to life in Mary a man.²

After His exaltation, the Father gave over again to Jesus the kingdom which He had ruled in the place of His Son whilst He was sojourning on earth. Jesus is the living Head of the Church, to which He sends the Holy Ghost; the Father conducts the wars for the Son, and marries the creature with the Creator, that is, with Jesus.

It is plainly the image of a family, which Zinzendorf applies both to the Trinity and the Church. His piety is so characterized by familiarity, or even by playfulness, that he

¹ Elsewhere also he says,—The Holy Ghost took the place of the Father.

² The Herrnhuter Hymn-book, No. 222, ver. 12 :—

"Auf! und dem Mann, dem Herrn euch hingegeben
Dem Mann, der sich in unser Fleisch verkleid't,
Und leert sich aus von seiner Göttlichkeit,
Um in Maria menschlich aufzuleben."

"Up, and surrender yourselves to the Man, to the Lord,—to the Man who clothes Himself in our flesh, who empties Himself of His divinity, in order to wake to life a man in Mary."

represents the Persons of the Trinity as behaving and acting in a completely anthropomorphic manner. But the collective force and the principal actuality of the Deity are transferred to the Son; He is, as it were, the jewel and the joy of the divine family. For it is the Son who first had the thought of creating and redeeming man. But He is also the joy of true humanity, a bias towards which dwelt in Him from eternity; and the momentum of finitude which was in Him was meant so to chain men to Him, that they should have in Him their God. Jesus is God *κατ' ἑξοχὴν*, the actual, living, sympathizing God; and because He has presented Himself to us as such, in that the Son made Himself finite in the man Jesus, Zinzendorf's piety led him to regard precisely the finitude of Jesus as the divine itself, to wit, His self-realization as love, which wills and needs such condescension; and he clings with the steadfastness and inwardness of a worshipping soul, not merely to the humanity, but also to the servile form of Christ, believing himself therein to discern His divine dignity.¹

Had this idea been scientifically developed, the result would have been a trinity, in which Father and Spirit appear as the potences out of which, in the course of a history taking place within the Godhead, and resembling that of a family, the Son proceeds as the blossom of deity and its true actuality, and as compared with whom Father and Spirit are quiescent potences.² How closely this is related to recent theories, which represent the Deity as taking up growth into Himself, needs not to be further exhibited.³ Schleiermacher's Christology, in particular,

¹ Compare Vinet, who avoids the theopaschitic element :—

“Jamais dans la gloire du Père	“Au séjour de la Beauté même
Jamais dans le repos du ciel	Jamais ta Beauté ne jeta
D'un plus céleste caractère	Tant de rayons, qu'au jour suprême
Ne brilla son front immortel.”	Où tu parus sur Golgotha.”

² So, for example, Zinzendorf says,—The Son created the world as it were *pater dormitante*: compare Schneckenburger l. c. p. 200.

³ Zinzendorf's ideas found at first no further development in his community. Spangenberg (“Idea fidei fratrum,” Barby, 1779) abides more soberly, though also with less determinateness, by a juxtaposition of Scripture passages; so, indeed, that he retains the doctrine of the Son as the proper Creator and Regent, the Jehovah of the Old Covenant (§ 28, 99 ff.); though he designates Him even whilst on earth the true God (§ 66).

betrays a certain family likeness to that of Zinzendorf; if we only separate from the latter the anthropomorphic and theopaschitic feature of self-conversion. Between Zinzendorf and Schleiermacher we find repeated the inner relation between Patripassianism and Sabellianism.

S. Urlsperger made more consequent efforts to transform the doctrine of the Trinity.¹ In his view, the words *beget* and *proceed* refer solely to revelation, not to God's inner essence: nevertheless, inasmuch as God reveals Himself in the Trinity as He is, we must draw conclusions from the œconomical to the essential Trinity. His spiritual nature must be so constituted, as to render it possible for it to pass over into revelation. In the spiritual nature of God, an active and a passive aspect is to be distinguished, through which a true generation may be effected. Accordingly, there are three subjects in God as spirit, each peculiarly different from the other, all united to constitute one Spirit, the one God. This Trinity is the essence of God. Its different aspects reveal themselves in succession. In this sphere of revelation, the Son and Spirit are subordinate to the Father (the source of life); whereas within the Godhead there is neither a first nor a last Person: in particular, the Father cannot, without inconsistency, be designated "*principium et fons deitatis*." The going forth of God from Himself into revelation, Urlsperger seeks at the same time to represent as the transition out of the infinite into the finite. How, he asks, does God, the infinite Cause, come to a finite effect (the world)? And as God's infinite perfection cannot rest satisfied with a finite work, which stands in no relation to His perfection, how can God make an infinite work out of the creation of the world, which, after all, remains finite? And as God and the world must continue in connection with each other, but things of different kinds cannot be united, how does God go to work to make finite and infinite one with each other? He answers,—The Son of God is the bond which unites in itself the opposed qualities, finitude and infinitude, and He therefore can conciliate God and the world; for He is God, infinite: but having at the same time proceeded from God,

¹ Compare his "*Versuch einer genauen Bestimmung des Geheimnisses Gottes und des Vaters und Christi*" u. s. w. Stück 1-4. Compare Baur's "*Trinitätslehre*" iii. 705 ff.

and being distinct from God, outside of God, He is able by infinite power to determine Himself to finite workings, and to restrict it thereto. He can also unite Himself with finite powers, and by such an union raise the finite work of the world to infinitude. The Son, the Mediator, came by condescending ever further into the world, first as the Angel of the Covenant, then as Shechinah, till in the incarnation it reached its climax, through the voluntary humiliation and limitation of His essential infinite powers. The deepest stage of His humiliating descent into the world, was His death; for in His body, which rested in the grave, He descended to the depth of apparent lifelessness,—by this means making it possible for the least of the simple powers to participate in union with Him, and in the consequences of that union. But this depth of humiliation was followed by the exaltation. If the former was the result of a self-limitation, the latter is the expansion or outspreading of His essence and His glory, until all the ends of His coming are reached, and He is no longer outside of, but in God. The entire œconomy then ceases, after it has attained its end; the Son submits Himself to the Father, and ceases to be Son, though He remains a divine Person, as He was prior to proceeding forth. On His entire path the Son was accompanied by the Holy Ghost, who also proceeds forth from the Father, in order to be with the Son. Like Zinzendorf, Urlsperger designates the Spirit a divine mother, which gives birth to the Son, whom the Father generates.

His chief thought is,—In the Son is to be seen the unity of the infinite and the finite:—he thus seeks to arrive at a more real distinction of the Persons of the Trinity. The three eternal potences, or subjects, which constitute God's inner essence, are condensed in the sphere of revelation to more determinate distinctions, which describe a vital process of themselves; and not merely is the world also drawn into this process, but its rise, progress, and perfection are the proper object of the procession of God out of Himself. A finite world, which shall at the same time be an infinite work, is to come into existence: an object which is gained thereby, that the infinite Son incorporates Himself with it, and through His Spirit raises it into His own infinitude. As specially deep and pregnant in connection herewith, we may mention, firstly, that the incarnation is given

a place in a more comprehensive series of deeds, wrought by the Son from the beginning,—deeds which constitute both a gradually progressive humiliation of the Son, and an incorporation of Him with the world; and secondly, no less that the exaltation of the Son is conceived solely as the middle of the process of perfection which embraces the world.

As we have already seen, Emanuel Swedenborg went a step further in controverting the doctrine of an immanent Trinity.

But from quite another direction also, there announced themselves the forerunners of a transformation of Christology; and this took place, in that one-sided prominence was given to the humanity. This is already traceable in treatises whose aim was to explain the miraculous power of Christ as an efflux of healing forces from His natural body. (Note 61.) Very different was the position taken up by Christian Fend, who denied the Trinity, the deity and satisfaction of Christ, and asserted a sinfulness of His human nature, though he at the same time allowed that it fought therewith, and overcame it.¹ Far more noise was made by Christianus Democritus or Conrad Dippel² and Edelmann. Dippel attacks in particular the doctrine of the atonement of Christ, and of justification by faith. Redemption takes place through Christ in us, without external means. There is no anger in God. An atonement is therefore not necessary. As Christ did not assume His humanity out of paradise, but out of the weakened substance of fallen man, He was under the necessity, on His own account, of going through the narrow gate of self-denial to glory; not in our place, but for our good, did Christ set an example by His holy life. The Word of God, in his view, is not in Christ alone. It is an immediate efflux from the mouth of God, which communicates itself to the hearts of all men, even without the Scriptures: in every man there is a divine seed or efflux of the

¹ "Kurze Anweisung u. s. w." 1730. (Walch, *Religionsstreitigkeiten* in der K. V. 1071 ff.) Further, "Des hocherleuchteten Apostels Pauli vortrefflicher Brief an die Ephesier nebst Anmerkungen—von der—Wiederzusammenfassung aller Dinge in Christo, wie auch desselben Sendung in der Gleichheit des Fleisches der Sünde," 1727. He was controverted by Joachim Lange, Rambach, and others.

² On his many writings, compare Walch a. a. O. ii. 718 ff., v. 998-1020. A collected edition appeared under the title, "Eröffneter Weg zum Frieden mit Gott und allen Kreaturen," 1709.

divine nature. After the fall, however, there was in man the seed of the serpent, which totally concealed the Word of God implanted in us. To the end of awakening and ripening this seed of God, the eternal Word of God was compelled to assume a lucific body in heaven, by whose means the flesh assumed in Mary was tinged and deified; and the seed of the serpent in His flesh was killed by His sufferings and death. Through both, however, an universal tincture was prepared, through which the seed of God is awakened in us, and we are clothed with a new lucific body for our deification. This, however, we do not receive through external means of grace; in true Christianity nothing takes place mediately: it is God's will to speak directly to our heart by inspiration; it is Christ's will to begin His process again in us, in each one separately.¹

Dependent on Dippel, and especially on the French Free-thinkers, was *Johann Christian Edelmann*, whose *Confession of Faith*, published in the year 1746, is likewise pantheistic. That in the creatures which is real, actual, good, is God Himself in them, because He is the essence of all creatures: the assumption of persons in God is absurd. All our knowledge of God is fragmentary; so also the knowledge contained in the Bible, which is a very good book, though its original has not improbably been lost. Obedience to the voice of God in conscience gives us heaven; disobedience gives us hell. In his view, the world is from eternity; it is God's shadow, God's son, God's body. Christ was a true man, endowed with exceptional gifts and virtues; for which reason, He was designated Son of God by the disciples, and deified by the priests. But He Himself

¹ The Trinity is in his view a triplicity of operations; but, at the same time, he conceives also the essence of God to be revealed in these operations, both in creation and in redemption. The Son, however, he subordinates to the Father. His doctrine of the double body, the heavenly and the earthly, and his idea, that Christ, in the process of denial and suffering, annihilated the earthly body, and offered it up a sweet smelling savour to the anger of God and the devouring power of the Father, remind us of Jacob Böhm. He holds it, however, to be possible, that as in Christ, so also in us, even on earth, the renewal may become perfect, nay, so vigorous, as that we shall tinge other men with divine power:—a notion which was developed into the so-called Melchizedekian priesthood amongst other followers of Böhm. As Dippel derives all things from the essence of God by a double creation, an invisible spiritual, and a material one, so also does he teach an universal restoration of things.

designated God His Father, even as we do; and His chief design was to unite all men in love, and to abolish the ground of all religious disputes, which consisted in men being compelled to propitiate, in one or another way, a God who is angry because of their sins. It was not His purpose to introduce a new religion; but He delivers men from the error which drove them to a redeemer. He suffered death through the envy and pride of the priests; not only, however, did He rise from among the dead amidst whom He then lived, as to the spirit, but comes again daily in many thousands of His witnesses. The last day dawns on every man who wakes up out of the sleep of his errors, in order that God may be all in all.¹

In casting a glance backwards at the process of decomposition undergone by the old form of the dogma, so far as it had attained completion down to 1750, we find that the Calixtine and Pietistic movements, and finally Herrnhutism, were unquestionably not without negative and positive influence thereon. The *Calixtine* movement exerted an influence, on the one hand, as the representative of a milder, freer form of Lutheranism, which was willing to appropriate to itself philological, historical, philosophical culture, and was opposed to Scholasticism; in particular, however, because the failure of the attempt at its extermination, by means of the "Formula Consensus" in 1675, gave the first decisive blow to the sole supremacy of the old orthodoxy, after this same orthodoxy, in its most advanced form as taught by the Tübingen divines, had unwittingly been forced into the position of heterodoxy. *Pietism* added to the estrangement of the theoretical, the estrangement of the practical mind from the old form of Christology. It unavoidably regarded the new scholastic Christology as solely calculated to throw into confusion the grand question of personal salvation, and to lead away from the goal; for it lacked, in its view, far too strongly the breath of ethics and religion. Finally, *Herrnhutism* missed in the Christ of the Lutheran Scholasticism condescending lowliness, the brotherly relation,—in a word, true humanity, which draws us to a vital communion of love and of religious feeling with the Son of man.—It was very bad for the old Christology, that it satisfied neither scholastic thought, nor an earnest ethical

¹ Klose Joh. Chr. Edelmann's Selbstbiographie geschrieben, 1752. P. xxi. f.

mind, nor the religious feelings. But all this would not have thrown it down from its position, had it not had an enemy within itself—had it not been compounded of heterogeneous elements, and had it not been impossible for it to acquire a form of unity and self-consistency. The prevailing eclecticism between the tendencies of Tübingen and Giessen concealed merely for a time the inner antagonisms, which, so soon as the one or the other member was logically carried out, led necessarily to absurdities, from which all parties shrunk back. Confidence in the old Christology was undermined as early as 1700. And although, in agreement with the law of gravity, tradition maintained its ground for a time, especially as there was nothing better to be substituted for it, the first half of the last century witnessed the completion of the first act of the dissolution of the old Christology by the theology which was still deemed to be orthodox.

The stages of this dissolution are the greater in number than they were in the Reformed Church, as the Christological edifice of the Lutheran Church had been carried to a higher point. In the Reformed Church, the doctrine of the union of the natures had not been further developed than it had been by the Chalcedonian Council (if we except the idea of the anointing of humanity); and this explains why the first attacks on the Reformed Church were directed, not against the doctrine of a "*Communicatio idiomatum, naturarum et personæ*," but against the true *divinity* of Christ. In the Lutheran Church, on the contrary, the removal of the old edifice advanced, until about 1750, only so far that it arrived substantially at the Christology of the Reformed Church. The positive element which gave the impulse to this entire process, was the tendency to attribute a higher significance to the humanity of Christ. Three stages may be distinguished through which this tendency passed.

I. The *first stage* ends merely with a loosening of the close bond by which the Lutheran Christology had connected deity and humanity, and, to the prejudice of the independence of the latter, had swallowed up the one in the other.

1. The first, but also decisive step, was the denial of the *Communicatio personæ*, consequently of the determination which forms the very apex of the Lutheran Christology. At first

sight, it is true, the breaking off of this point appears to give the humanity a still more dependent position. For now that it is no longer itself "personata," and has its subsistence solely in the Logos, it is a mere organ of the deity, not possessed of power by itself. Thus, however, the first step was taken towards keeping the deity and humanity still further apart from each other: the form of Nestorianism was thus already arrived at, which reduces the humanity to the selfless organ of the deity.¹

2. The "Communicatio naturæ" was thus given up and reduced to the mere *συνδυασις* of the two natures, as the persona of the Logos is not without the nature, and this persona is not supposed to belong to the humanity as its own. In this way a "Communicatio idiomatum" also was, properly speaking, excluded, unless they are to be something realiter different or dissoluble from the "natura."

3. And in reality, as early as the end of the seventeenth century, the idea of the communication of the predicates of divine majesty began to undergo more and more restrictions. Even during the seventeenth century, the participation in the divine attributes had been reduced from the use to possession; and not all the metaphysical divine attributes were allowed to be immediately transferred to the humanity, but eternity, immeasurableness, infinitude, were held to fall to it only "mediate." Subsequently to 1700, this was extended also to possession. The humanity possessed these attributes merely *mediately*, that is, in the way of *title*. Nay more, as far as concerns, in particular, the omnipresence of the humanity, it was reduced partly to the presence of all things to Christ (in other words, to omniscience), partly taken symbolically, and partly ascribed to Christ merely "secundum personam," or "actum personæ non naturæ (humanæ):" which the Reformed theologians could also have said. Others limit the communication of the divine idiomata to the bare common activity (*genus apotelesm.*), covering their position with the Wolfian principle, that God's essence is "actus purus," and that, consequently, participation in God's essence

¹ Compare ii. p. 16 f., 21 CB. 384. Substantially, indeed, the prevailing Christology had not at all more. It asserted the communication indeed, but always denied afresh to the humanity, the necessary consequence of a completed communication, to wit, the *Having* (*μέθεξις*), both as relates to the persona and natura and to the idiomata divina. See above.

cannot be more than participation in the "actus dei." Herein betrays itself the anti-mystical, yea, even deistical character of the Wolfian mode of thought.

II. To the loosening of the tie by which the human nature was so bound to, as to be swallowed up in, the divine, was added a *second stage* (about 1730). In this stage the independence of the human nature was emphasized and strengthened. This interest sought satisfaction, 1. in the form of a more complete development of the doctrine of the *idiomata*. So, for example, when special stress was laid on the communication of ethical attributes, for which human nature evidently possesses susceptibility, and that not solely in the form of the "*doni superadditi*." Or, when the Logos also was represented as inwardly determined by the humanity, and a "*permeatio naturarum mutua*" was spoken of. Thus Reusch. 2. But as it was scarcely possible to distinguish the sanctity of the humanity which was due to the "*Communicatio idiomatum*" from its own; nay more, as the Christian interest enjoined the regarding of sanctity, not merely as a "*donum superadditum*," but as appertaining to the proper essence of Jesus; the doctrine of the "*Communicatio idiomatum*" began to pass over into that of *Unctio*: of which latter doctrine the significance is to bring to perfection the humanity's own proper essence. But a "*Communicatio idiomatum*" alongside of the "*Unctio*" received an outward, and, if not totally non-essential, yet precarious position. 3. As, further, attention was directed to acts of the humanity which could not appertain to God the Logos by Himself, and yet are inconceivable without personality, as, for example, prayers and obedience, the result was that the humanity began again to be conceived possessed of personality, and not merely as an organ of the Logos; moreover, as personal in itself, and not merely through the communicated "*persona*" of the Logos: and this came to be ever more universally counted as pertaining to the completeness and truth of the humanity. No blow had hitherto been aimed at the divine aspect and its uniting deed: in strengthening the humanity to the point of personality, there had been no intention of denying that the Logos was personally present in Christ. But now theologians had suddenly arrived at the other form of Nestorianism (*Div. II. vol. i. p. 18*), at a double personality;

and the question became, how to avoid this unbearable thought, without renouncing the so thoroughly justified tendency no longer to curtail the humanity of Christ.

This led to the *third stage*. It appeared possible to preserve the relative independence of the humanity, without detriment to the unity, only by abstracting from the *divine* aspect. And such an abstraction was effected in the divine, not merely so far as it was in Jesus, or so far as concerned its activity in Him, but also in itself. For we find that the Christology of any particular age invariably reacts on its Trinity. Accordingly, the opposition to the Church's doctrine of the Person of Christ ended, in Germany also, in an attack on the doctrine of the Trinity; and thus Deism, which had gone in advance, was overtaken.

A P P E N D I X.

I.

NOTES.

NOTE 1, page 8.

SUSO says (p. 203),—"A resigned man must be loosed from the form of the creature (*Entbildet von der Creatur*), be conformed with Christ, and be transformed into the deity." Tauler says (see the *Weihnachtspredigt* i. *Franf.* 1, 92),—"If two are to become one, the one must take a passive position, the other must be active.—By its powers, the soul is susceptible of all that which God has and is.—But if a thing, whatever it may be, is to receive, it must be simple, empty, bare.—When a man, therefore, has prepared the way (by self-abnegation), it cannot be doubted that God will come and fill his soul entirely : the heaven would sooner rend itself and fill up the empty void (according to *Surius* : *Deus et natura non tolerant vacuum*). But the subjective process by which the spirit is brought to resignation, to silence, is by no means merely theoretical, and as little magical." Tauler says further (*Vigil. Pasch.* p. 190),—"Freedom is man's noblest possession ; and not even God Himself is willing to put a constraint on it. But God also regards it as the possession of highest value—therefore give it God." Suso again (*l. c. c.* 52),—"Truly to quit ourselves, or to forget ourselves, is not annihilation ; nor is it mere ravishment into God, in the manner of a vision ; but a giving up of the will in order to be resigned to God at every moment." *Epiph.* i. p. 80. The "*Passio*" of resignation is "*suprema actio*."

NOTE 2, page 9.

In Tauler's *Predigten*, *Frankfurt*, i. 56. Substantially to the same effect, *Meister Eckhart* : compare *Convivium Ecc.* in

Surius, p. 832 ; but especially the Sermon for St John the Evangelist's Day, pp. 537 ff., where we read,—“ Misit Deus filium suum in mundum—in *plenitudine temporis animæ*, ubi illa omne transegit tempus et spatium. Cum enim anima temporis et loci expers est, mittit Deus omnipotens et gignit in ea filium suum” (p. 540). Then in the work, “De duodecim donis et gratiis Euchar.” in Surius l. c. 778 ff., specially Nro. 5, 7, 8. Tauler's “Sermon for Christmas Day,” in Surius pp. 40 ff.; comp. therewith the second “Christtagspredigt” (pp. 44 ff.). He speaks, indeed, of a manifold birth of God; the third is the birth in the soul, which must become a Mary. But he also conceives of this birth as the continuation of one and the same divine act, of the eternal generation of the Son. God has spoken but one Word; and in this one word, without beginning and end, all creatures. The eternal Word brings forth itself, yea, thoroughly itself and nothing less, without intermission, in the soul. Serm. iv. p. 53. As God generated the Son in Himself, even so does He generate the child of God in the soul,—not in another manner. That the eternal birth of the Son, and the birth in time, are one and the same, he expressly maintains in the second Sermon for the Feast of Epiphany (p. 77, Vigil. Pasch. pp. 190 ff.). In the third Sermon for Easter (pp. 206 ff.; compare ed. Frankf. ii. 20, p. 190), he says,—“To the loving soul God speaks, Factus sum hominibus homo. Si ergo vos mihi Dii non estis, injuriam mihi facitis.” God, therefore, became man in such a way, that the deity, or, at all events, the use thereof, was completely merged in humanity. So become gods, that your humanity shall be completely merged in Me, and you shall appear as entirely divine. In us also, God desires to become man, in order that we may become God: Christ has set us an example how God becomes man, and how a man can become God. An old teacher says (p. 206),—“Non invideo Unigenito dei filio quidquid boni illi collatum est. Nam et ego filius illius possum evadere—per gratiam. Ibi vero tam homo unum fit cum Deo ut nulla pars supersit.—Plus aliquid dico: Vere divinus homo nec accipit Deum nec cogitat unquam de Deo extra se ipsum. Ubi namque Deum accipit, ibi capit simul et se ipsum. Unum quippe factus est cum Deo, quem et invenit intra sese, nec extrospicit extra se, nec quæquam parturit extra Deum.—Sed cum Deus sese accipiat in illo et moveat perficiatque omnia

illius opera per ipsum, eundemque tanquam se accipiat (unum quippe sunt in uno) : ideo, ubicunque sese non Deus accipit et movet, ibi et ipsum accipit et movet, operaturque per illum et principaliter ipse homo operatur." He then carries out the words of Eckhart the Younger, regarding the nature and person of Christ, as follows (ib. p. 207, Frankf. ed. ii. 21) : —"The human nature, which our good Lord assumed, is as near to me, and as truly mine, as His, and I possess as much of it as He or thou, or all other men. The nature is as close to me as to our Lord Christ ; but not the personality. This nature, which is also my nature, He took upon Himself, and thus drew me completely into Himself as to my nature ; and if I am resolved to remain out of Him as to my personality, what can He do ? He assumed the whole of our nature so completely, that with this nature, He is as veritably the Son of God, as He is the eternal Word.—He thus communicated Himself, and all that the Father had given Him, to me ; so that now He is as much mine as His own. But woe to me, if I am like Him as to my nature, and do not incline to a loving union with Him as to my personality ! As to their nature, all men stand on the same footing, and are alike near ; the lowest and the highest, the most foolish and the most wise. Our Lord's human nature, therefore, is as near to Him as to me, and to me as to Him ; but woe to me, if I am like Him as to nature, and stand nearer to myself, in love of myself and selfishness, than to another."

NOTE 3, page 15.

Compare Suso, c. 51, p. 189, c. 50, and pp. 422 f., the beautiful *Gespräch mit dem Wilden*. Page 189 : "When man is delivered from the images which cleave to him, he soars exultingly above time and above space ; although previously he was deprived of freedom, and could not make use of his natural nobility.—Then a man is struck with amazement, when he looks upon himself, and considers what he was and what he now is. It seems to him as though he were full of God, and that there is nothing which is not God, and that God and all things form one undivided unity ; and he takes too quick steps : he becomes puffed up in his soul, like fermenting must. He is ready, in his self-complacency, to let all things go, and all things, even hell and heaven, escape him—and he has not yet been able

to know the things in their very roots, in their distinctions, in their permanence, in their transitoriness. Such men are like bees when they first rush out of the hive; they fly about confusedly hither and thither, and know not whither—some fly away and get lost, but others are again brought into the hive.” At p. 219, the spiritual daughter objects,—There are some who profess that the only way to arrive at truth is by ungodding and unspiriting (*Entgottung*, *Entgeistung*). They say,—God Himself is a means (the objective idea of God itself is an hindrance): one must apply oneself alone to the clear truth, that is, to man himself. He answers,—No other ungodding of God may take place, than that which converts the angry God into a God full of tenderness and love. But we must be unspirited, so that we may lose ourselves in resignation to God, in loss of sensuousness, and in forgetfulness.* The passages, Matt. v. 2, 3, John xii. 26, and Gal. ii. 20, are applied with peculiar frequency. Compare also p. 187, c. 50, Ruysbroch “*Von der wahren Beschaulichkeit*” (c. 20 ff.); and especially, “*Von der geistlichen Hochzeit*” (B. 2). The sections which treat of those who are falsely at leisure and free, of spiritual unchastity and voluptuousness. Tauler in Surius, pp. 326 ff. and 104 ff.

NOTE 4, page 58.

In the sermon entitled “*Seht welch ein Mensch*,” of the year 1518, he says,—“Whoso desireth to meditate in a wholesome manner the sufferings of Christ, and to derive fruit and use therefrom, must put on such a sympathy, and so clothe himself in it, as though he were verily associated with Christ, suffered with Him in His sufferings. Therefore, when he hears that which Christ endured, he ought to imagine and think to himself that he also is enduring it along with Christ; and then, when he is as though he felt pains and anguish, let him know and believe that the like pains and anguish, though in an incomparably higher degree, were endured by Christ; let him also remember that he suffers such things justly, whereas Christ took upon Himself all this for his sake and for the sake of other men (x. 1407, § 3, 6). Our spiritual death He indicated by His physical death; nay more, He took our death upon Himself,

* “*Entgeistet aber sollen wir werden, so dass wir uns zu Grunde lassen in Gottgelassenheit, in Verlorenheit der Sinnesheit und Vergessenheit.*”

killed it and endured it. What Christ was, therefore, as to His sufferings, that were we, and that is still our appearance as to our spirit and soul, or as to our spiritual man. Wherefore *we ought to sigh and weep over ourselves*, so that we may, at the same time, die with our dying Lord Christ. The first and principal thing that Christ intended to teach us by His sufferings and death, is our own inward condition, what sort of people we are in the sight of God. The conclusion of the matter then is, and remains, that that man does not at all rightly understand the sufferings of Christ, who does not see his own state pictured in them; and that our sympathy with Christ is foolish and in vain, if His sufferings do not teach us to have compassion on ourselves and to bewail our own misery. Thou art a fool if, when Christ is troubled on thy account, thou goest away quite secure, and dost not bewail thyself, as though thou fancied thyself not to be an object of compassion; if thou busiest thyself with compassionating the Person of Christ, pitying Him and not thyself, as though thou wouldest thus accomplish something better, and as though it were more fitting for thee to weep and lament over Him in thyself, than over thyself in Him." Luke xxiii. 28; Apoc. i. 7 (x. 1407, § 7-10; compare the year 1521, T. xi. 786 ff. and iv. 1740 ff. on Psalm. xxii.). It is allowable, indeed, to preach about the sufferings of the saints; but we ought carefully to distinguish between them and the sufferings of Christ. For a long period the Papists have preached about the sufferings of Christ, as though their only purpose was to show men *how to follow His example*. Accordingly, they spent their time in setting forth the sufferings and sorrows of Mary, and the sympathy with which we ought to regard Christ and His mother. All that they aimed at, was to draw affecting pictures and move the people to sympathy and tears; and whoso succeeded best in these things was held to be the best Passion preacher. We, however, preach the sufferings of Christ as the Holy Scriptures instruct us. He then goes on to show that, in His sufferings, Christ was indeed an example of obedience, and that His death, like the sufferings of martyrs, was a praise of God. "But, besides that, there is another special reason why Christ suffered: to wit, He intended by His sufferings to save the whole world, to open up heaven, to shut up hell, and to gain eternal life." (Compare xiii. 770, year 1534.)

NOTE 5, page 80.

Schenkel l. c. i. pp. 313–325. Had Luther been concerned merely about the concrete presence of God, humanity would have been treated by him as a mere impersonal means of revelation;—the humanity would then be regarded, not as a good and aim intended by God, but merely as an organ fitted to show or to teach what He is. But the Son of God has to show *Love*; and the actual presence of love can only be demonstrated and taught by positive deeds. The very idea of love, therefore, requires that the humanity of Christ be also an end of God. In the humanity of Christ, God loves humanity in general. In vol. xiii. 2577 we find the words,—“When I take my child in my arms and kiss it, it is looked upon as a great act of love. But God goes so far as to assume the nature which I and all men have: He becomes man.”—ii. 583, § 96. What are we to understand, then, when Schenkel directly again blames Luther for wishing to represent Christ also as a man who had become God, instead of as a “revelation of God,” as the incarnate God (thus surely retracting his first charge), and maintains he was equally concerned about the concrete presence of the perfected *man* in Christ? Surely that cannot deserve blame; for Schenkel justly condemns those who see in Christ merely the presence of God. We should, on the contrary, be perfectly at liberty to take such a view, if we consented to that which Schenkel demands, namely, to see in Christ merely the revelation of God, or the incarnate God. Can God really have become man (and not merely a theophany or divine indwelling have been effected), if the result is not that the Son of Man is also Son of God?

NOTE 6, page 89.

Luther was a long time ere he made up his mind as to the commencement of the state of exaltation. In his exposition of the first twenty-two Psalms, published in the year 1519 (see iv. 1251 f. to Psalm xvi.), he had declared, in reference to Acts ii. 24, though with a measure of hesitation, that Christ had been in hell, not merely in the sense of His soul having operated there, but realiter. The question remains, however, What are we here to understand by hell? It is the place of souls after

death, as the grave is the place of bodies. But when Peter refers to the loosing of the pains of hell, it would appear as though he meant to say, Christ, above all other men, not merely endured death, but also the pains of death or of hell, and after death, hellish pains and torture, in order to deliver us; notwithstanding that many saints had been in hell, without experiencing pain and torture. For Christ, therefore, it was the place of punishment; but on that account, not for the pious after death. At a later period (in the year 1530; see iv. 2006), also, he still expressed his opinion, that the descent into hell ought not to be reckoned to belong to the state of exaltation; but he also maintained that it should not be held to form part of His proper passion, not so much because of the expression *τετέλεσται* in John, as because the true hell of fire, which is prepared for the devil, had as yet no existence. He accordingly takes "hell" in connection with "burial," to denote the place of the rest of the soul, as the grave is the resting-place of the body. And yet "he is at the same time willing to let pass the images which represent the descent into hell as occurring for the deliverance of the Fathers, and so forth, as though he had corporeally descended into hell." On the other hand, in his "Hauspostille" (see xiii. 1078 ff., year 1532), and in his exposition of the second principal article at Torgau (see x. 1354 ff., year 1533), he decidedly regarded the descent into hell in the light of a triumphant march of the exalted Christ to the vanquishment of the devil. If no detraction from the victorious death of Christ was thereby intended, it is difficult to see that it could have had more than an epideictic character, or that indeed, in general, it could have been in any sense a physical manifestation of power. Yet he left room for another view of the matter, by representing it as the overcoming of the devil, consisting especially in the breaking open of the prison, and the deliverance of them who were kept captives by the devil (T. xiii. 1084). Remarkably enough, he further maintains, with great emphasis, that Christ was in Hades in the full unity of His person, therefore also with His body, and not merely with His soul; although he confesses himself unable to explain how that was compatible with His lying in the grave. To have resorted to the explanation of an omnipresence of the body, would have proved too much.

NOTE 7, page 90.

In answer to this, it is not right to say, that among the doctrines which were, in the strictest sense, his own, should be counted that of the Ubiquity, and that such a doctrine does away with the truth of the humanity of Christ. At present let the following suffice. Luther did not, strictly speaking, apply the doctrine of Ubiquity to the Person of Christ, so long as it was in process of growth, but when it had attained to the perfection which is superior to the conditions of space. He really resorted to the idea by way of helping out his doctrine of the Eucharist, at all events for a time. The kernel of the doctrine, as far as it affects Christology—a kernel, the truth of which he regarded as established prior to the sacramental controversy—was the perfect completion of the humanity of Christ, through its participation in the all-penetrating power of God. But the supplementary principle of the “ubiquity of the humanity” of Christ, which he had developed out of the above-mentioned kernel for the behoof of his eucharistic doctrine, necessitated recourse to another supplementary principle, to wit, that it is involved in the very nature of the Unio, that, subsequently to its realization, the Logos never was anywhere, where the humanity was not; consequently, as the Logos did not lay aside His omnipresence—a notion which Luther abhorred as blasphemous—that the humanity was omnipresent in and with Him. The putting of the first celebration of the Eucharist on the same level as the following ones, also contributed to make Luther forget the principles he had otherwise laid down with reference to the period of the growth of the God-man, during the course of this controversy. It was a false step in argument, from which he himself afterwards receded; and in the light of which, therefore, it was not at all allowable, as happened at a later period, to form and judge his entire Christology. By so doing, the new and the best feature of his teachings was lost; whereas the application of the idea of ubiquity to the period of Christ’s earthly existence indicated a falling back to the stage at which Christology stood prior to the Reformation, though with the difference, that previously the possibility of a growth of the soul of Christ had been shut out by prematurely asserting it to be complete and perfect, whereas now the reality of His body also was done

away with. It is possible to deny the ubiquity of the body of Christ prior to His perfection, even though we may concede it after the exaltation; and so, on the other hand, a real presence of the entire Christ in the Holy Eucharist might be assumed even where His ubiquity was denied.

NOTE 8, page 96.

Such was the view taken by him even as early as his discussion with Hier. von Dungersheim in the year 1519 (see xviii. 605 ff.; x. 1526 ff.). The figure or form of God is not the *essence* of God; for, in the first place, Christ did not lay down nor renounce the divine essence; nor, in the second place, did He assume the *essence*, but merely the appearance and form of a servant. As to His inner being He continued to be a free Son. "Form," however, must in both cases be taken in the same signification. By the "Form of God," therefore, we must understand the wisdom, might, righteousness, piety, and freedom of the God-man. The sense we arrive at, consequently, is the following:—Christ was man, free, powerful, wise, subject to no one, excellent in those forms which chiefly befit God. Nevertheless, He was not haughty in this form; He did not act disdainfully towards others who were servants, nor did He regard as a robbery that which He was; He did not presumptuously attribute or assume this form to Himself, but attributed and gave it up to God, and for Himself renounced and laid it down, not wishing to be unlike us, but determining to become as one of us. The meaning of the Apostle (for which he appeals to St Bernhard and Erasmus) is,—If any one have wisdom, righteousness, power, forms of God, above others, he ought not to retain them for himself, but should sacrifice and ascribe them to God; he ought to become as though he had them not. In a word, every one ought to forget himself, to lay down, as it were, the gifts of God, and to deal with his neighbour as though the weakness, sin, and folly of his neighbour were his own (x. 1528). Dungersheim appealed to the circumstance that the passage had always been used in proof of the deity of the Son (xviii. 602–620); to which Luther replied (xviii. 622 ff., 656),—The Fathers have often enough erred; it is enough that we do not cause them to be pronounced heretics; the Scripture is not to be interpreted and judged through them, but they through

the Scriptures. Even though he should grant that the passage may be mediatly referred to the deity, still it is more fitting to refer it to the humanity of Christ. Referred to the humanity alone, we arrive at a real abasement of Christ; otherwise not, seeing that the deity cannot, strictly speaking, be abased.

NOTE 9, page 107.

This fundamental idea, according to which we look through revelation into the heart of God, that is, into His love, plainly requires us to hold that divine grace is sincerely offered to all through the word, sacraments, etc.; for in the love of God there is no shadow; unbelief alone is the darkness, which will not lay hold on God. First at a subsequent period, and in consequence of the doctrine of predestination then taught, did a cloud of mystery again gather around this matter; darkening, not indeed the love revealed in the work of redemption, objectively considered, but yet the love displayed in the appropriation of redemption to individuals. But, however important, even in a speculative respect, may be the Lutheran view of the relation between the outward and the inward, between thought and word, between body and spirit, etc., one and the same formula of the organic conjunction in one of the members of these antitheses, does not suffice for everything that is brought under it. It must take one form as applied to the Word in God, another as applied to the Person of Christ, another as applied to the sacraments, another as applied to the Holy Scriptures.

Weisse, in his account of the Christology of Luther, endeavours to represent it as a harmonious, self-consistent whole, and to set forth its important religious and speculative features (l. c. pp. 40-71, 169-206); nor does his account lack just and true hints. But still the picture is defaced by many an arbitrary explanation, intended to give praise to Luther where he would unquestionably have been compelled to decline it. Weisse has justly perceived that, as we have above shown, Luther's fundamental views on the subject of Christology were settled previously to the controversy with the theologians of the Reformed party, and that the additions made during that controversy contrast unfavourably with his previous teachings. He makes the difference between the two Evangelical Confessions consist in the

Lutheran holding to the ideal Christ, and the Reformed to the historical Christ; and appeals for support to Baur, although in a somewhat different sense. Weisse takes for the starting-point of his exposition the relation in which he believes Luther to have put the resurrection to the death of Christ (see above, note, p. 87). The work of redemption, according to Luther, did not include a satisfaction for the divine law, for the holy and righteous God; but the death of Christ was a conflict with the devil and with the law, considered as an hostile power. In Luther's view, Christ drunk up into Himself the sin of the whole of humanity; and the resurrection was the vanquishment of the devil, the extinction of sin, and the termination of the law. The law he regarded, not as the demand of a propitiation or satisfaction which must necessarily be met, but as a determinate phase of human consciousness, to wit, the antagonistic, sinful, unblest phase; and held that we ought to look upon this phase as having been transcended by humanity in Christ. Not by His death, however, as propitiatory, but by His resurrection, was this effected; for the resurrection shows us the Godmanhood completed in Christ, humanity raised into God and constituted a momentum of the divine substance, or part of the nature of God. He conceived the connection between the resurrection of Christ and our redemption, more particularly, as follows:—In the resurrection of Christ, humanity rose again, and not merely Christ as an individual. As an individual, Christ rather ceased entirely to exist subsequently to the resurrection: the human soul, the human will, etc., of Christ went back, at His death, into the general human nature, but in the resurrection was recognised as deified, as a momentum of God Himself (an idea which coincides with the old doctrine of a nature in God). Of this divine-human potency, of this divine nature ("flesh of Christ"), we may become partakers: of which capability the sacraments of the Church, baptism and the Eucharist, are symbols; as Schwenckfeld saw even more clearly than Luther. If we appropriate this to ourselves, we become part of the *body* of Christ, and the Logos, who holds human nature as an universal principle in Himself, works out this body, that is, the Church, constantly; whereas the body of Christ, as a particular individual, does not come further into consideration. The resurrection of Christ was the "reversed incarnation," that

is, the resumption of the individual humanity of Christ, its universalization, the object of which was a general incarnation, in which, by giving humanity a share in the divine nature (or by making it conscious of its participation therein?), God converts it into the "body of Christ." After what we have advanced above, it is unnecessary to show that such could not have been Luther's opinion. Weisse's representation confounds the exaltation of Christ to a position of universal significance by the resurrection, and by the putting off of finite limitations, with the volatilization of individuality. To one thing alone let attention be directed, which Weisse seems to have overlooked:—This view would have been an essential approximation (as must be clear from the entire preceding history) to that of the Romish Christologians, who taught that the humanity of Christ was resorbed into God, or, as the Reformers expressed it, was buried, in order that the Church, the body of Christ, might be substituted in its place. If it be impossible so to view the individuality of Christ as that it shall, at the same time, possess an universal significance; if the individual Christ must die, that is, cease to exist for faith, in order that the ideal Christ may rise again in the Church, which is the stage of the true divine-human consciousness; a Lutheran Christology is an impossibility, and the antagonism between God and the concrete man, assumed by most teachers of the Church, from the time of the Council of Chalcedon down to the Reformation, must be characterized as invincible and essential. Whether this dualism clothed itself in deistic or pantheistic, in Nestorian and Ebionitic, or in Monophysitic and Docetical forms, makes no difference.

NOTE 10, page 107.

What necessarily became of Germanic Mysticism, so far as it did not debouch in the Reformation, may be seen from Bishop Berthold's (Pirstinger) of Chiemsee so-called "*Tewtsche Theologie*," 1528; a work which has been recently republished, and unmeritedly praised, for party purposes, by Reithmaier, with a preface by the General Vicar Windischmann. The book is tricked out with compilations from Raymond de Sabonde, Tauler, the original "*Deutsche Theologie*," Nicolaus Cusanus, Thomas Aquinas, and Augustine, very frequently

without mention being made of the sources. The ideas of Mysticism are, however, purposely reduced back to the sphere of the operations and sacraments of the Church, and there is no trace whatever of the idea of a personality animated by faith, and made free in God. On the contrary, the work is pervaded by a spirit of antagonism to the Reformation, but is involved in numerous contradictions. Compare, for example, cap. 2, entitled, "How are we to believe?" Faith has seven qualities :—1. It estimates what is to be believed, not according to animal sensuousness, but according to the dictates of reason ; it prays, and learns to understand, through secret instructions in its reason, that Christian faith is good and credible. 2. It prays with hope for the strengthening of weak faith. 3. Faith is adorned and well formed with love. 4. It manifests and evidences itself in works. 5. Man must also render obedience and fulfil the commands with works. 6. Faith must be steadfast. 7. Faith must be "adjusted to the truth," that is, must agree with the truth (!) ;—this is made clearly known by the Church. This intellectual view of faith is enough of itself to show that the fountain of Mysticism was here sealed up. A few theosophic elements are substituted in its place. Amongst these may be mentioned the doctrine of the Word, of the Macrocosm and Microcosm, of the *Nothing* (Nichtding), and of the cosmical significance of the incarnation of God.

God is fruitful in Himself ; He has begotten a Son (compare D. Scotus) in His likeness, as also, all the creatures without intermission. The Holy Spirit owes His rise to their common love (c. 7). This triplicity, which exists inwardly in God, flows forth outwardly into all creatures (c. 5, 1). God's will is to reveal Himself ; He reveals Himself by five kinds of words : 1. By the inward divine Word, or Son of God ; 2. By the Word which became incarnate through Mary ; 3. By the inspired word, in the prophets, sacraments, and fellowship of the Church ; 4. By His word in nature. In the last four ways the inward word of God is revealed outwardly. God was unwilling (c. 8) to dwell merely inwardly in Himself, and to put into operation divine powers in Himself alone. He desired to have also such a dwelling and operation in His creatures, specially in rational creatures. Alongside of the "natural realization" in the Son, it is God's will that there should be an

artificial one, which, like a skilled master-workman, He brings into being in time, through His divine "Idea," not out of His nature, nor out of any other material than the *nothing* (Nichtding, c. 7, 3). There are three kinds of "nothing and unsubstantiality" (Nichtding und Unwesen), which may be compared to three adders. The *first*, God has banished, in order that its poison may do no injury; but out of it flow many kinds of fruits of useful creatures, which God creates out of it. The *second nothing* is immoderately evil, and comparable to an overpoisonous adder, which no one can banish; but God has cursed this same serpent among all the vermin and beasts of the earth, and so tamed it, that without the will of the creature, which God is willing to help, it is unable to kill any one. In the form of this serpent, "Lucifer" disguised himself when he seduced Adam and Eve. Afterwards this dragon was bound, but now it is again let loose (in the heresy of Luther). 3. This cursed viper gives birth to many smaller vipers, sins, the third *nothing*. The *first* nothing is not so much as nothing at all, or as "eternal unsubstantiality;" but it is only moderately evil, always under God's power, obedient also, and it suffers that something be made of it. But in itself it is imperfect, unordered, unsubstantial, unsteady. Creatures are indeed made of this; but the very essence of the creature is not founded and built on nonentity, but on its divine substance; so that God is the ground and beginning of the creature, and the creature can abide eternally in its substance, and is not necessitated to grow into nonentity. But prior to the existence of any creature, such a nothing was an unsubstantiality, and therefore (?) older and stronger than the creature. For this reason it would fain overcome the creature as its enemy, and again reduce it to nought. But God existed even before all *nothing* (Nichtding), and has the creature therefore in His power, maintains its substance, and never allows it to fall into the first kind of nothing, although He does permit it to fall into the third, to wit, into sin. The second nothing is completely opposed to God, as eternal unsubstantiality to eternal substance, evil above all other evil things. Out of it God makes nothing; otherwise an immeasurable creature would come into existence, a God against God. But corrupted creatures presume to make something out of it, and to employ such an evil nothing for their own purposes.

So did Lucifer, for example, when he aimed at making himself equal to God. To this same most evil nothing, corrupt man clings by the nature (in virtue) of the first nothing out of which he is created. Hence it arises, that we deadly men are inclined, not to good, which is far from us, but to evil. For although the human spirit ought to draw itself and the body upwards to good, the body has grown old in evil, and is to such an extent shattered, that the spirit is noticeably burdened and drawn below itself by it (c. 20, 3, 4; compare 68, 3; 78, 5). The fellowship of the soul with this impure body brings on man corporeal death; gives also occasion to the soul's dying spiritually, and being eternally ruined. The soul sucks in all its evil poison out of the viper, the natural body; but it is able also to suck in salvation out of the "body" of Christ (in the sacrament), in which stands the divine help. To this end it has received freedom, that it may seek this help.—We are thus presented with a physical conception of sin, dualistic in character, as the presupposition to a magical view of grace: freedom is given to man, that he may turn towards such grace.

The *world*—macrocosm (c. 19)—has been eternally in the living God. The eternal God is archetype of Himself and of all creatures—idea, beginning, end. This he conceives, after a Platonic manner, as real being. When the creature becomes perverse, and causes confusion, this cometh not from God, but from its own nothingness, which it derives from the evil nothing. Consequently, corrupt people have been evil, and so forth, eternally in themselves, not in God. The world as a whole is the image of God, to wit, as to its idea, which has flowed into it from God; but not as to its material, which is the nothing out of which it was formed (c. 19, 1–4). Man, however, God created apart, to be an image of the great world; for which reason also he is termed microcosm. The great world is divided into heaven and earth, into spiritual and corporeal nature;—of which the latter does not know God. Now, in order that He might be known also by corporeal nature, God created man, who is compounded of body and soul, corporeal and spiritual nature. And so is the entire created world included in man as the little world. Hitherto, however, God and His creature were not with each other. Wherefore, God finally included the universum, that is, deity and creature, in the one

Person of Christ. Further (see c. 27, 4);—all corporeal creatures are ordered for each other, and are fitted the one into the other, up to man, in whom are included spiritual and all physical nature, with its steps. But as all corporeal creatures are ordered unto man (who is destined to be the image of God in a special sense); so, following after all, men are ordered unto Christ, and in Him unto God. All creatures, therefore, are ordered unto God through Christ. The human race is the mediator between nature and Christ: Christ, by His humanity, is the mean between God and men. From this he deduces at once, that the redemption of Christ will extend also to nature.—(See above on Nicolaus Cusanus.)

The necessity of the incarnation is still more plainly involved in his doctrine of the nothing (c. 10, 1):—It is credible, inasmuch as God has made the creature outside of Himself, and out of nothing, that the essence of the same creature should naturally grow again to the nothing out of which it was made, unless it were bound to God as an eternal substance, and to His sure end. But this cannot take place *naturally*, seeing that the creature has no hold nor likeness in God, on which it could eternally lay hold. For this reason, the nature of the creature requires that God take a creature to Himself in which all other creatures are included, to wit, the humanity of Christ. In Him hangs all creation (c. 19, 6); in Him as a man is the likeness of all creatures; and in Him as very God all creatures can be eternized. “The unchangeable person has taken to itself mutable humanity, in order that this same humanity might become immutable together with all other creatures which are included in the humanity.” Therefore, also, says he further (after the “Theologia Germanica”), did He become man, because God wished to confer upon Himself, in the humanity He assumed, certain virtues, such as obedience, humility, patience, which do not properly accord with divine dignity. Further, by His incarnation, God has made and filled all creatures entirely. He would therefore have appeared as man even independently of Adam’s fall, though He would not have died. Man, however, fell: the natural Son of God has therefore worked by His incarnation, that we can become the adopted sons of God (c. 10, 10). But Berthold’s exposition of the plan of salvation is full of Pelagian and magical elements, the union

of which is meant to retain men in connection with the Romish Church. The cross of Christ, indeed, he designates the vital root of salvation, which is to be implanted in us : by this, however, he understands the example of Christ in suffering, which we are to imitate. Still, he says also, that this suffering has eternal, living power : we are to offer it inwardly in our soul, even as the Church offers it outwardly in the sacrifice of the Mass.

The necessary effect of his doctrine of the nothing is, that deity must always be foreign to humanity, unless the former be reduced to a merely Docetical existence (c. 10, 2) ;—"Man may not come to God, because He is a *foreign nature*." He finds, however, a point of connection between God and humanity in the fact, that the *form* of the world is the image of God. Christ's soul, in particular (which, according to the scholastic philosophy, is partly the formative principle of the body), through its holiness and purity, was available for union with the Son of God, and was constituted a person by Him. In Christ there are three *births* (after Tauler),—(1.) the eternal one of the Son ; (2.) that from the Virgin ; (3.) that from believers, who constantly give birth to Him afresh (c. 10, 6, 7) :—three *unions*,—(1.) of the deity with the soul of Christ ; (2.) with His body ; (3.) of the soul with the body, which was dissolved in death, when Christ's body was in the grave, and His soul in the ante-hell (10, 8) :—finally, three *wills*,—(1.) the eternal one of the Son ; (2.) the rational will in the upper part of the soul of Christ, which was always obedient to the divine ; (3.) the sinful, temporal will, in the lower part of the soul, which inclines to the flesh, and is therefore foolish. Carnal incitements (*fomes*) are not sinful in themselves (c. 35, 3, 4) ; though they are a sickness, an injury, a spot or defect, in order that the spirit may fight, may acquire virtue, may expel vice, and so forth. With such a doctrine of Christ is far from harmonizing his doctrine of Adam in Paradise, "which was perhaps somewhere in the firmament above the elements." Notwithstanding his rise out of the nothing, Adam is represented as pure, without deadliness (c. 31). And although he says that created, mutable nature could only first be eternized and established through Christ, he represents Adam as already by nature an adopted son of God, and teaches, that if the fall had not happened, he and his de-

scendants would have had what we have in Christ (compare 68, 9, 10, 11). Both the body and soul of Christ were changed and made entirely divine by the deity, so that He laid aside quantity, and is totally spiritual;—for this reason, such a divine body is able to be sacramentally ubiquitous (68, 8). He employs in this connection several images which Luther had used.

Of more consequence as a theosopher is Theophrastus Paracelsus. (Compare Arnold's "Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie," vol. i. pp. 1500 ff., "de coena domini," pp. 1511–1521: "Secretum magicum de lapide philosophorum.") He aims at one science, one principle, not fifty, and at proceeding forth from the centre. The wisdom of man must be entire: he himself must *be* wisdom, for he knows it only when he is it. As life is not broken into pieces, but is completely and unbrokenly one; so also is wisdom indivisible, and it has only been divided into members through falling into the deathly (the mortal): now accordingly there exist many arts and wisdoms; wisdom now is awakened first in this place in man, then in that.

But man is able to attain this wisdom, for he is the microcosm. All the understanding of animals on earth and in the air is in man; besides this, his soul contains also the understanding of the angels. Accordingly, the body lies in both spheres: heaven and earth are its father. Man does not learn, but everything is in him previously, only not awakened up and manifest. All men are members of God; no one has an advantage over another; no one is deprived of wisdom. The thing however is, that we forget it, and do not admonish ourselves of that which is in us: we are idle, and sleep in our inheritance. We arrive at this wisdom through the conversation of the Holy Ghost with His pupil, in that He kindles a light which is not extinguished, for it is kindled by Him. Starting not with man, but with God, the Father of wisdom, does he aim to comprehend what God is, and what man is. For what God the Father is, that is the son, man: man lacks nothing. After God, he is the noblest being, as to body and soul: the latter especially is not created by God, but is of the breath of God, is formed out of the purest spirit. And this invisible divine fire, God, in His unfathomable love, has poured into man, and created above all angels.

But if man is placed so high ; if he is the son of God ; and if no one has more, and no one less than the other, because all have all ; what place remains for Christ ?

He wishes to build his philosophy on Christ, the corner-stone. The light of nature, however much it reveals, is not sufficient ; but Christ is the true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. Therefore is it possible for us Christians to understand all secrets ; for this understanding advances the glory of God in Christ, and He gives His Spirit to those who seek. Through Him he hopes for disclosures relative to the entire sphere of nature and spirit. The difference between him and Trithemius, Cornelius Agrippa, Petrus de Albano, is, that he aims to build on the Scriptures. This, however, he does not do.

Through the heart, says he, we come to God ; through faith, to Christ ; through the imagination we receive the Holy Ghost. One comes from the other, and therefore nothing is impossible to these three. But whenever he tries to show how we arrive at true knowledge, he comes at once on propositions according to which Christ and the Holy Spirit are merely the universal, the true light, which lightens every man. Nature, says he, learns all things ; what it cannot learn, it gains from the Holy Spirit, who teaches it. The Holy Spirit and nature are one ; to wit, nature is daily a light from the Holy Spirit. This reminds us of His contemporary, Franc. Puccius, who regarded Christ as the universal ratio, λόγος in man.

In order, then, to be able to say something more definite regarding Christ, he joins on again to the doctrine of the Church, though without effecting a true conciliation between it and his own principles. Here also, however, he has some distinctive elements. Man is seduced by the envy of the devil ; now we are impure, and blind, and mortal ; and so we remained till God came to our help. To the end that 'body and soul might be purified again, and the body which had become mortal might be again united with the soul, the second person of the Godhead became man. But if Mary had not been perfectly pure, she could not have conceived the Son of God. Through her pure soul she knew God and believed God ; and so she was overshadowed by the Spirit of God, magically, with the consent of the soul in the chaste body, and God and man were united.

The magical power which he attributes to faith, is in his view intimately connected with the "imaginatio," which, when it is of a true kind, works what it thinks in the power of the Holy Ghost, even as faith is an omnipotence. Through Christ now we are born again; with Him also are we exalted. But as, according to Theophrastus, the soul, being from God, cannot become sick, it is the body that is to be redeemed and restored. He thus finds a place again for his natural-philosophical thoughts. At this juncture, he takes the Holy Eucharist in particular as a point of departure. Christ's body is not of human seed; but as, in the case of Adam, the earth was the material, so for His body was the Holy Spirit the material. Whether or not he deduces therefrom that Christ had a heavenly spiritual body, is not clear. As he speaks of the satisfaction and sufferings of Christ, it is probable that he conceived this divine substance of the body of Christ to exist first in the form of a servant. At all events, he lays the greatest stress on this divine body of Christ in connection with redemption or regeneration. From Christ's blood, namely, which is bestowed on us in the elements, flows the divine power, which creates for man the new spiritual body. This divine force he designates the Holy Spirit; as indeed he derived the origin of the body from the nature or substance of the Holy Ghost. Through the Holy Ghost, says he, Christ makes "incarnationes" in all His believers. In the Holy Eucharist we eat neither a mere sign nor the body of Christ as He sat at the supper-table, but, as it were, the germ (*surculum*) of His body, His Spirit. This life-giving spirit goes forth from the body of Christ in the Eucharist; Christ thus became our body from being His own personal body, and yet His person is not our person. Christ works merely through His Eucharist as through a seed on the copies of His body, in order that believers, who are essentially members of His body, may come into heaven with Him. At this point, he coincides with Schwenckfeld and Valentine Weigel.

NOTE 11, page 111.

Osiander adduces, among other arguments, in his favour, the following:—By the image of God we are to understand, as all allow, righteousness and holiness. But these are essentially God the Son. He is termed *sensu eminenti* the image of God

as the incarnate one; accordingly, when Adam was formed in the image of God, he was formed in the “*imago Christi futuri*” (as Tertullian and Irenæus had already taught), and consequently the coming of Christ did not depend on the Fall. Moreover, apart from sin, man must have undergone a completing change; and this was only possible through Christ, into whose image they were to be glorified. According to the opposite view, Christ would have been made in the image of Adam, whereas Adam must have been created in the image of Christ. Furthermore, men and angels would otherwise lack their King if there were no sin, and the mystery (Eph. v. 32) between Christ and the Church would not attain to actuality. He appealed, in particular, to Gen. i. 26, Luke xix. 12; besides, like earlier writers, to Col. i. 18, Heb. ii. 10.

NOTE 12, page 114.

In opposition to the principle of Osiander, that the divine nature alone is our righteousness (in which formula the Trinitarian distinction of the Son is not taken into consideration), Franc. Stancaro, appealing to the Lombard, with whom very many teachers of the Catholic Church agreed—for example, Scotus and Bellarmine—takes up the position, *that, on the contrary, the humanity of Christ alone discharged the mediatorial office*. Compare Heberle’s “*Aus dem Leben von S. Blandrata*,” in the *Tübingen Zeitschrift*, 1840, H. 4. So far as in accordance herewith, the deity of Christ would have had to play an almost passive part (for only “*autoritative*” can it be called “*mediatrix*,” and lend to the humanity the power for the sufferings which God (acceptilationem) allows to stand for a satisfaction); the way is prepared for the view of the incarnation of the Son of God as not strictly necessary—a view to which he himself approximated at a subsequent period. At the same time, he had no intention of denying the Church doctrine of the Trinity, but meant rather to carry it out in opposition to Arianism and Tritheism. Had Christ been Mediator also as to His divine nature, says he, He could not at the same time have belonged to the deity, with which a conciliation was necessary, but must have been subordinate. Full equality with the Father would be lacking to the Son, if the Son alone had become incarnate; this would also have been against the canon of

the Church,—“*opera ad extra sunt indivisa.*” The Son, therefore, must stand in the same relation to the humanity of Christ as the Father and the Spirit; the *triune* God, therefore, stands in a peculiar relation to the man Christ. The assumption of a special relation of the Son to Jesus, or of the mediatorship of His divine nature, would even be an hindrance in connection with the work of redemption; for it would be empty play if the Son of God, to whom, as the second person of the Godhead, the satisfaction required to be offered along with the others, were at the same time to present this satisfaction to Himself. He deemed himself compelled, therefore, not to regard the Son of God as Mediator, and to leave Him merely the relation to the man Jesus that pertains also to the entire God, so as to avoid representing the Son as at one and the same time judge over Himself and the condemned. Stancaro, therefore, evinces a tendency to Arianism and Tritheism rather than to Sabellianism; at all events, he considers the Trinitarian God to have been active in Christ merely as though He were not a trinity. Nay more, in his doctrine of the human mediatorship, which implies that he conceived the humanity to be personal without God, we discern already slight traces of Ebionism. However much the worth of the Person of Christ and its work was thus threatened; however near lay the danger of Nestorianism, or even of Ebionism; Stancaro thus touched a point which became important at a later period also, during the controversy about the *κρίσις*. There is a heightening of the earthly God-manhood of Christ which dissolves precisely the work of atonement itself into mere seeming.

NOTE 13, page 121.

It is true that, in the Lutheran Church also, the blessing conferred by the Holy Supper was for a long period limited too much to the forgiveness of sin; in consequence whereof, too slight a distinction was made between it and the blessing conferred by baptism and absolution: nay more, the Lutheran theologians appeared thus to have approached much more nearly to the Swiss view, so far as it regarded (even before Calvin's time) the Holy Supper as a pledge of the forgiveness of sin, than they really were. We must not forget, however, that the Lutherans derived the forgiveness of sin conferred in the Holy

Supper from the sacramental fellowship realized with the Lord Himself, and did not put one in the place of the other. So that the defect consisted solely in their treating this "unio" with the Lord in the "communio," too much as a means to other ends, and not as an end in itself, as a participation in the highest good, Christ. It is true, "where there is forgiveness of sin, there also is life and blessedness." But it would have been more natural to find, above all, real, vital fellowship between the entire person of the Redeemer and ourselves, in the sacrament. The reason why this was not done, so far as I can see, was, along with the stress necessary to be laid on the forgiveness of sin, which was the common starting-point of both, that the attacks on the doctrine of the corporeal presence of Christ drew attention principally to that aspect of the matter, and thus the *totality* of the Person of Christ was involuntarily, though not without disharmony, forced into the background. The *body* received, inasmuch as by itself alone it is not the very gift of redemption, came to be regarded as the *pledge* of the forgiveness of sin (xx. 926, § 22 ; 1019, § 132), so far as the reception thereof certifies us of our fellowship with Christ. In opposition to which, the Swiss replied, that on such a view the elements would be made the pledge of a pledge ; whereas they themselves are quite as able to be the pledge of the forgiveness of sin (like the elements of baptism). The Lutherans, for their part, did not dwell long on the "inhabitatio" or "unio" of Christ with us in the Supper, but reduced the reception of the body of the Lord almost to a reception of the surest pledge of the forgiveness of sin (communicated with the pledge) ; whilst baptism and absolution were already supposed efficiently to precede the Holy Supper. In opposition to the idea of the forgiveness of sin being sealed by the reception of the body and blood of Christ, Œcolampadius, for his part, urged also the principle of faith. Such a view, urged he, would be equivalent to laying down a new condition of the assurance of salvation : either this certainty failed apart from the Holy Supper, or else there are two methods of salvation (compare above, Zwingli to Alber).

NOTE 14, page 121.

That this was the religious principle by which Luther was impelled in this controversy, is unquestionable. Not, however,

that we by any means intend to say, that he in every respect adequately set forth that which he really meant. Indeed, the contrary is evident from the preceding note. In his view, as well as in that of the Swiss, the forgiveness of sin is the proper good contained in the Holy Supper (Walch xx. 936 f. § 47-50). It is for this good, according to the Swiss, that the guests, who ought to be already believers, are to offer thanks: according to Luther, they are to receive it, even though they do already believe; for, indeed, he held that all blessings were contained therein, even though he sometimes connected other things with the ordinance. The Roman and the Reformed doctrine, each in its own way, attracted the mind so strongly to Christ as He *was* in the state of humiliation, but as He at present no longer is, that even Luther was unable at once to take complete possession of the soil in which lay his real strength. Moreover, the first supper, when Christ was not yet glorified, was a hindrance in the way, so long as no distinction had been drawn between it and later celebrations. Finally, the identity of the glorified and the earthly body of Christ was again to be maintained up to a certain point, and the sacramental connection between the body of Christ and the elements easily gave rise to the notion of the two being, in a certain sense, homogeneous. The Swiss, however, contributed to the clearing up of the matter. For when they called attention to the ascension (by way of showing that He cannot be again in the Holy Supper without a new humiliation), Luther was able to refer to His present exalted condition as a proof of His presence in the Holy Supper. Compare xx. 1010.

NOTE 15, page 129.

§ 122 ff. When it is said, "Must not Christ needs suffer," Zwingli juggles it into, "Christ stands for human nature." But Christ is the one entire person: suffering and life are also to be appropriated to the Son of God; otherwise Christ would at once be to us, with His suffering and life, no more than another bad saint. (This would be the necessary consequence, though Zwingli himself refuses to accept it: see above.) If now that old weathercock, *Frau* Reason, who is the grandmother of the Alloiosis, should say,—“Yes, the deity cannot suffer;” so answer thou,—“True; but nevertheless, because

deity and humanity are one person in Christ, the Scriptures, for the sake of such personal unity, ascribe everything to the deity that happens to the humanity, and to the humanity, everything that befalls the deity. And, in truth, this is the state of the case. For, although the deity does not suffer the one piece (if I may so speak), still the person which is God, suffers at the other piece, as in the humanity.

NOTE 16, page 134.

Occasioned by Servetus, he writes to Brentz in 1533,—*Περὶ τοῦ λόγου, εἰ ἔστιν ὑπόστασις*—non dubito quin paulo post magnæ de hac re controversiæ exorituræ sint. Etsi autem sunt pleraque quæ jure reprehendi possunt ἐν τοῖς σχολαστικοῖς διδασκάλοις καὶ αὐτῶν πατρὶ περὶ τῆς διχοτομήσεως τῶν δύο φύσεων ἐν Χριστῷ, oportet enim statuere *filium Dei naturalem humilitatum* esse, tamen hoc mihi nequaquam placet, quod Servetus non facit Christum vere naturalem filium καὶ γνήσιον Dei, h. e. habentem *σωματικῶς* aliquid substantiæ Dei. The Logos cannot be merely the thinking Father, or a “vox transiens:” He is “aliqua in Christo manens natura.” Corp. Reformator. ii. 661. In this letter he also announces his intention of discussing these doctrines (which, as is well known, he had not deemed it necessary to touch in the first edition of his “Hypotyposes” or “Loci Communes”) in the new edition.

NOTE 17, page 137.

The *metaphysical* view of the relation between the divine and the human taken by the Swiss, has its final roots in the peculiar shade of their piety, just described. It is therefore by no means enough to say, that the piety of the Swiss drove them out always to the absolute causality as its ultimate ground, at the same time scarcely leaving for Christ a *mediatory* significance. For whatever may be said against it, Zwingli decidedly meant to retain the latter; and even Zeller (Th. Jahrb. 1853, 2) has not been able to convince me of the contrary. But the question then remains, why does he go back to the absolute causality only in opposition to the finite, and not venture to lay hold on this causality in the finite in Christ? The answer is, because reverence for God seemed to forbid the entertainment of the idea of His actually communicating Himself to the finite. This then produces all kinds of vacillation in his doctrine; but not more.

NOTE 18, page 149.

Christlich. orthodox. Bücher i. 427. Faith to him is, as it was to Luther, something substantial, not merely a character, not merely "motus creatus," but a self-communication of God; the substance of faith is something divine, not creatural. God the Father has not merely the office of creation, but also of "generatio:" He is a true Father of those who are born of Him; by His first-born, natural Son, Christ, the "incarnatio" continues itself. Epistol. i. 590 ff. Christlich. orthodox. Bücher i. 145:—"Faith is an hypostasis, essence, or independent substance, an heavenly ray that proceeds forth from the essence of God; it is a sun which lightens into eternity, in which all things future are seen as though they were present." N. Gallus first laid down the principle, in opposition to Osiander—"the righteousness of Christians is not "substantia," but "qualitas." Compare Schwenckfeld's "Hypothes." at the commencement; "Vom Worte Gottes;" "Ableinung und Verantwortung der 9 Calumnien."

NOTE 19, page 150.

Christl. orthodox. Bücher i. 511-523. There are in the beginning two natures (which he also designates different substances), through which an inequality is posited in Christ with the eternal Son, who is not enclosed by the humiliated humanity, but is unalteredly raised above space and time in heaven. Since the resurrection, which he describes as a new birth, after a momentary dissolution of the unity, the transitory was overcome and thrown aside, the inequality equalized; so that the humanity of Christ, although never extinguished, yet never is, has, or works less than the deity, is, like it, exalted above space and time, nay more, is assigned a place in the Trinity itself. Ibidem i. 228 ff. Our opponents pay no heed "to the *growth* of this man in God, and that although He was thus alone *prepared* to give the Holy Ghost to all flesh." See further his Letter on Corvin and Epistle to Bader. Epistolar. i. 580 ff. and 630 ff. "Gr. Confess." l. c. p. 143.

NOTE 20, page 150.

Confess. p. 181-205. Specially pp. 187, 188. Compare Epistol. i. 527 ff., 572, 724. My opponents, says he, especially

Vadian, wish to suppress the *exinanitio*, and to refer it, as well as the sufferings of Christ, to the humanity alone. But all the utterances of the New Testament are to be referred to the entire person, and not merely to one nature. The words, "The Father is greater than I," hold good not merely of the humanity of Christ, but of the entire Christ, to wit, in the state of humiliation. Confess. pp. 180, 181. For although Christ, the eternal co-omnipotent Son of God, is in all points equal to His Father as to His divine *essence* and *nature*, He emptied Himself in time, and subjected Himself to suffering. Still the emptying was not a never-having, but a non-using, and therefore it experienced growth in the servile form, as Hilarius teaches, who is one of the favourite authorities to whom he appeals. He never left the bosom of the Father although He became man; His divine nature was not weakened, lessened, changed; He was not circumscribed, nor shut in by the flesh, but whilst on earth remained in heaven, above space and time. P. 189:—"Christ, say I, the divine light and word of His Father, is the heavenly, eternally abiding sun which shone everywhere for God, even during the time of His suffering and humiliation. But in Judea it was covered over with a cloud of the flesh, in order that it might take away the darkness of all flesh, and that its light might shine in us to eternal enlightenment. And He who remained in heaven, and was also man on earth, was the same one Son of God, Christ." Compare i. 511-523. P. 194:—"If the *exinanitio* fell only on the human nature, a man would have been able to accomplish the work of our deliverance." In the letter against Corvin to the Augsburgers, he says,—Those also suppress the "*exinanitio*," and make both Christ's sufferings and the two states impossible, who represent the humanity as becoming God soon after the beginning. Compare, in particular, also his "*Summarium von Zweierlei Stande Ampt und Erkandtnus Christi*," and "*Ein schöner Sendbrief vom sätig machenden Erkandtnus Christi und von seinen zweien Naturen*" (after John i. 14, and Luke ii. 48), 1558.

NOTE 21, page 151.

It is not quite clear whether Schwenckfeld refers the *exinanitio* to the eternal Word Himself, who stripped Himself of His nature, that is, of His fulness, or whether he conceives the

personal Logos to have been in Himself absolutely unchanged, but more and more appropriated by the humanity. Compare Note 20. It is further unclear how, on the one hand, he could hold that there were permanently two natures, and yet, on the other hand, assume a conciliation of the two in the state of glorification. (Epistol. i. 580 ff.; Confess. 262 f.) He declares himself against the distinction between substance and accident, so far as it is supposed possible for the divine attributes without the divine substance to be communicated (in opposition to Cocceius, Bl. 47, 48); on the ground that the divine idiomata are identical with the divine substance. Confess. p. 214. When he adopts the doctrine of the "*Communicatio idiomatum*," he understands thereby substantial deification, the equalization of the divine and human natures. Confess. pp. 219, 231. On earth the body of Christ was bounded by space; now it is raised above time and space. During the first "*status*" neither the Word was shut up in Christ, nor the flesh was everywhere wherever the Word was. Now, however, the flesh is so assimilated and incorporated with God and united with the Word by the glorification, that there can no longer be an inequality in the "*Esse ubique*" or in any other respect. Confess. p. 257. The right hand of God is the eternal deity, p. 260. He is distinguished from Luther by assigning to ubiquity a more negative and exclusive position relatively to space and time; and he is therefore unable to allow that Christ, in His present, second state, can bind Himself to a particular place, for example, to the word or the sacrament; for, on the contrary, Christ is absolutely exalted above space and time, because he regarded space and time solely as imperfection, and as something which ought to be rejected.

NOTE 22, page 153.

P. 674. The eternal Word has "*hem selven verkleynt ende um onsent wille zyn godlyck behoor, recht en heerlychckheydt eenen tyt lanc te buyten gegaen is.*" The eternal glorious Word did not remain in His first form, but lost something which He again begged from His Father. In order to serve us, He left His glory for a time, and became a poor miserable man, and died a bitter death for us. John iii. 13; Eph. iv. 9, 10; Phil. ii. 7. Christ says He came down from heaven; conse-

quently the man Christ also is originally from heaven, not from the earth. He is designated the Son of man, who, whilst on earth, is in heaven, because His deity did not remain so untouched as the learned pretend. Menno was frequently charged with teaching that Christ was born of the Holy Ghost: this he denies (Fol. 689 f.), but allows that the substance of the Word underwent a change, though not such a change as did away with the substance. Adam also was created out of the earth, and yet he remained earth. Fol. 690, 698, 704 f.

NOTE 23, page 155.

Menno thus distinguished himself essentially from others, for example, Antitrinitarian Anabaptists. He attached a high significance to the sufferings of the Son of God. Walch, in his "*Einleitung in die Religionsstreitigkeiten der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche*," 1736, i. 689, speaks much of Menno's vacillation. At one time, says he, he acknowledged an incarnation; at another time, he denied that Christ derived His human nature from Mary. We have seen that in his actual doctrine the two things did not contradict each other. But Walch says further, that he at one time derived the body of Christ from the essence of the Father; at another time, from that of the Holy Ghost; at another time, from that of the Word by a creation out of nothing. In Menno's writings, however—which Walch does not appear to have had before him—there is no vacillation: he teaches that the Word became a man, but complains of misunderstandings such as Walch adduces from Schyn, and denies ever having said anything of the kind. Compare Fol. 689–712.

NOTE 24, page 165.

The coarsely material stuff out of Mary must have occasioned Servetus also difficulty. He conceived the body of Christ, after the resurrection, to be absolutely free from that which might have been derived from Mary: *de Trin. div. L. v. p. 195*; Trechsel i. 105; Dial. ii. pp. 275 ff. "*In resurrectione illud esse creaturæ quod per incarnationem acquisivit, ita ac si esset res accidentalis, omissum est.*" Christ has now returned to the "*pristinus Verbi status*," and is God and in God as before. At an earlier period, Servetus had also maintained that the economy

of the Trinity would cease. At this point, therefore, there shows itself a dark remnant of dualism, which even his idealistic view of nature was not able to overcome, but could only evade. One might feel inclined to advance on from this point to the supposition of a conscious or unconscious dualism in his system, and in favour thereof adduce the great stress which, without being impelled by motives of an ethical kind, he lays on the *realization* of the content of the Word; which in the divine sphere by itself was still lacking, and could only be attained through the medium of a material, in which the ideal manifests and realizes itself through the will of God. Servetus appears, however, to have assumed an universal conversion of the divine potences into growing mundane actualities through the will of God; for in his work "*de Trinit.*" (L. ii.) he compares the "*transire*" of the "*potentissimum Dei Verbum in carnis materiam*" therewith, as if "*ego proferens verbum ex ore meo projicerem aurum et margaritas,*" seeing that then "*vox mea*" would, in the very strict sense, be "*facta aurum.*"

NOTE 25, page 176.

In the Suabian Syngramma, Brentz had not yet arrived at his later Christology. Still traces are already discoverable of his later view of time and space, and of the inclination to substitute the idea of the revelation of an already complete being in the place of a process in the Person of Christ. See Pfaff's *Acta*, pp. 175, 184 ff. His earlier doctrine of the Supper, as we have seen, had affinity with Calvin's (p. 194). But—and perhaps not without being influenced by the Schwenckfeld discussions in Württemberg in the thirty years, after the Sacramental controversy had broken out afresh (1552), and during the controversy between Timann and Alb. Hardenberg in Bremen, in 1556, Christology had again been more deeply touched,—he urged strongly on Melanchthon, through Peucer, at the Colloquy of Worms in 1557, to publish a Confession regarding the *Sitting of Christ at the right hand of God*, offering at the same time to do his best to secure concord on this point. (Calvin's dialectic also, especially in the *Ultima Admonitio* to Westphal in 1557, drove back to this same point; Planck, p. 102.) Melanchthon, knowing Brentz's views and firmness, declined, urging that the matter was not yet ripe enough, and

would only excite controversy; nay more, he controverted Brentz's view, without mentioning him by name, as an abolition of the "*Communicatio idiomatum*," because alongside of the "*Communicatio dialectica*" it posits a "*physica*," a "*confusio naturarum*;" if the natures are identified, we cannot talk about a communication (see his work against the "*Articuli Bavarici*," 1559); at which Brentz was very much offended. As, further, Duke Christopher of Württemberg took Brentz's part against Melancthon with the Elector Augustus and others, this point of controversy greatly embittered Melancthon's last days. "*Hi nunc sunt dogmatum architecti*," said he, in reference to the Synod of Stuttgart in the year 1559.

NOTE 26, page 177.

Jac. Andreae Hundert und sieben Schlussreden von der Majestät des Menschen Christi, u. s. w., Ulm, 1564; and, after the Jesuits of Ingolstadt and Mainz had disputed against them, his "*Brevis et Modesta Apologia*," 1564; "*Assertio doctrinæ de personali Unione*," 1565 (against Beza); "*Pia brevis et perspicua expositio controversiæ de duabus in Christo naturis*," 1565; "*Widerlegung der Prädicanten Antwort in Zürich auf Herrn Johann Brentzen Testament*," Tüb. 1574; "*Sechs christliche Predigten von den Spaltungen so sich zwischen den Theologen Augsburg. Confession von 1548–1573 nach und nach erhoben*," Tübingen, 1574; by other writers, Schegck's "*de una persona et duabus naturis Christi sententia Jac. Schegkii D. Medici et philosoph. clarissimi—Tübing., ex fundamentis quidem scripturæ sacræ, analysi autem philosophica et pie et erudite explicata*," 1565. Compare Walch's *Religionsstreitigkeiten ausserhalb der lutherischen Kirche*, Bd. iii. pp. 313 ff. For the rest, Jac. Andreae, even as late as 1561, at the Colloquium in Poissy, accepted an "*Instructio*" of Duke Christopher's, which represents the presence of Christ in the Holy Supper, even as to His humanity, as the principal matter, and, on the contrary, treated the doctrine of ubiquity, on which then already Brentz laid stress, as a mere evidence of this presence, and as a view which may be left over "*suis autoribus*," if it appear less probable. Pfaff's *Acta*, pp. 347–349. Compare in general, on J. Andreae's Ambiguities, Martin Chemnitz's letter to him of the 5th of September 1575;

ibidem, pp. 516-518 ; not to mention R. Hospinian and others.

NOTE 27, page 180.

It is rather illocal, although power over space ; space is merely an accident of being ; the angels are not in space. Time and space relate merely to this world : pp. 951, 933, 1001, 1050. Still he does not go so far with his idealism as to deny space, time, growth ; he regards them as a defect, which will one day cease ; as a real, though vanquishable limit, nay more, as one that no longer has an existence for God and the perfected. To faith this is even now accessible and intelligible. As contrasted therewith, the Reformed doctrine holds a realistic position. It conceives even God as extended in space. Brentz says,—Where is Christ now ? With God. Where the angels ? With Christ. Where God ? With Himself. *Sibi ipse est locus*. All space is, as it were, sunk in God : pp. 957 ff. As Calvin represented the spirit of the believer, in his doctrine of the Supper, as illocal, so Brentz conceived the pneumatical body of Christ, and even ours, to be illocal in the state of perfection.

NOTE 28, page 191.

Refut. Orthodoxi Consensus, pp. 328 f., 340 f., 461 ; compare Hoffmann l. c.—He aims at keeping the incommunicable and the communicated deity further asunder ; firstly, in order to avoid the charge, that the man who has the communicated deity is identified with God ; secondly, in order the more certainly to be able to identify susceptible humanity with the *εικασία* of God. The former is also the aim of the distinction he draws between the working and essence of God. Accordingly, the *εικασία* which streams forth from the Logos, and is at the same time the property of man, was supposed to form the “terminus medius” between the finite body and the Logos. But of this hold good only still more fully the observations made above in connection with Brentz. Against Andreae was brought the charge of duplicating the Son after a heathen manner, of discriminating a lower from a higher Son. But we see from this how, so long as attention was so predominantly directed to the body of Christ, almost without even a

thought being given to His soul, they robbed themselves of an important intermediate link. Further, we perceive how the increasing efforts to distinguish the communicated from the communicating deity, could scarcely, under the given conditions, end otherwise than in the distinction between essence and attributes, or, as with J. Wigand (see his “*de Communic. idioma-tum* ;” compare Wittenb. Grundvest. 1571, Mmij till Rr.), in the distinction between essential, or incommunicable, and communicable “*proprietares*.” Incommunicable is it in his view, that God alone *gives*. As communicable he designates the *persona* (at a later period, particularly carried out by Calov), the Majestas, the Actiones. All the acts of Christ were divine-human ; so that even the humanity was the real vehicle of and participator in all divine Actiones. He appeals to the words in Leo’s Epistle,—“*Agit utraque natura cum communicatione alterius* ;” but forgets at the same time the additional clause, “*unaquaque agente quod proprium est, altera enim succumbit injuriis, altera coruscat miraculis*.”

NOTE 29, page 192.

See Note 26. From his work, “*de una persona et duabus naturis*,” compare in particular pp. 24, 25, 51–64. Seductively he remarks at first :—The Son of God works all the works of His omnipotence through the human nature, as His most proper instrument, and it veritably possesses all divine predicates. But this is in Schegck mere seeming. God, in whom all is Actus, and nothing mere *δύναμις*, has established an Unio with humanity, not as to His nature, but in the person of the Son. It is true, the “*persona*” is “*incommunicabilis*,” but it is able to put the humanity in dependence on itself ; for in the humanity by itself is mere *δύναμις*, mere susceptibility to being determined. On the other hand, the humanity can never have divine predicates substantially and actually ; the Unio, therefore, cannot be “*essentialis*.” At the same time, however, the Unio is not merely a contingens. That God gives is contingent ; but not that the humanity possesses what God wills it to possess. He cannot become or gain anything through the Unio ; for there is no mere *δύναμις* in Him. But it is His will to determine this man in a peculiar and unique manner ; this is the “*Unio quasi per accidens*.” Humanity

now, though impersonal in itself, has *mediately* that which the Logos has immediately. For Christ is an unity through His “persona;” but His “persona” is also divine *nature*,—consequently, for example, omnipresent: wherefore, so certainly as humanity is by its nature under the necessity of being in one place, and cannot in itself be omnipresent, even so certainly does it form an unity with the omnipresent person as to its will, and must therefore be termed omnipresent “per accidens,” to wit, *in the person*. This attempt to establish Brentz’s view, which made its appearance with such great pretensions, does not therefore, in reality, advance beyond the Reformed doctrine, that the person alone (that is, the Verbum) is omnipresent: for which reason also we can easily understand Schegck’s later vacillation and concessions to the Reformed doctrine, which was defended against him by Th. Erastus and Sim. Simonius. But undoubtedly, if the “persona” also were reckoned to the humanity, were conceived as its own, the case would be a different one. We should then arrive at the doctrine of an *illocal* omnipresence of the humanity as to the *persona*, alongside of a limitation to space as to the *natura*, such as was taught, for example, by Æg. Hunnius, who developed further the views of Wigand.

NOTE 30, page 192.

Bishop Mörlin had taught more indeterminately, that the humanity by itself was finite, circumscribed, but that in its union it has much that goes beyond the general character of human nature. Wigand agreed with the Württembergers (see above): Hesshus said in his work,—“Assertio Ss. Testamenti J. Chr. contra blasphem. Exeg. Calv.,”—not merely must we teach that the man Christ (in concreto) is almighty and omniscient, but we can also say, the Abstractum, the humanity of Christ (*humana natura hypostatice λόγῳ unita*) is omnipotent, and so forth. The preachers, Morgenstern, Conrad Schlusselfburg, and later also his brother-in-law Bishop Wigand, explained these his words to mean, that even apart from the union, consequently as to its natural qualities, the humanity is omniscient, to be worshipped; and concluded therefrom that he recognised two who are to be worshipped, and so forth: whereas he merely used the Abstractum, humanity, in order

to ward off the Calvinistic turn, that either the man Christ was omnipotent, and so forth, in concreto, or the *person* of the Logos alone in Christ is and remains omniscient, without any real communication to the humanity (1574). It is true, had he, like Wigand, assumed also a "*communicatio personæ*," he would scarcely have been able to fall into his mode of speech: on the supposition in question, however, he had only one *nature* in humanity; Wigand, on the contrary, teaches that the "*communicatio idiomatum*" relates both to the *concretum naturarum* and the "*concretum personæ*." The Herzberg theologians, Andreae, Selnekker, Musculus, Körner, Chemnitz, were content with Hesshus, as he had declared that he did not wish for a separation of the human from the divine nature (1577). Hesshus was concerned about the *reality* of the "*communicatio idiomatum*," but far less than Wigand or the Württembergers about its *completeness*, as it subsequently showed itself. Compare Hartknoch's "*Preuss. Kirchengeschichte*," 1686, pp. 463 ff.; Leuckfeld's "*Historia Heshusiana*," 1716, pp. 129-188.

NOTE 31, page 192.

Compare Henr. Bullingeri *Tractatio Verborum Di. Joh. xiv. 2*, Tig. 1561, where it is asserted that Christ occupies in heaven a certain space; nay more, that the right hand of God is a particular place in heaven, and His proper dwelling-place. This is signified by the words, "sitting at the right hand of God;" see Planck, B. 6, p. 480. To the "*Sententia*" of Brentz on this work he opposed his "*Responsio*" in 1562, and his "*Fundamentum firmum*," etc., in 1563. P. Martyr also wrote his "*Dialogi de Christi humanitate, proprietate naturarum, ubiquitate*," 1562; Theodore Beza the "*Responsum ad Brentii argumenta*," 1564; whilst Jac. Andreae, in his "*Assertio doctrinæ de personali unione*," 1565, and in other writings, defended Brentz. More particular notice of the polemic of the Reformed Church will be given below.

NOTE 32, page 192.

"*Disputationes de majestate hominis Christi*, adv. Dr Jac. Andreae Theses, etc.," 1564. Compare also the "*Theses adv. Disput. Dr Jac. Andreae*," published by Busæus of Mainz at a

somewhat later period. Thesis first says:—"The (Roman) Catholics are agreed with the Calvinists and the Lutherans, who reject the "Formula Concordiæ," in this, that—*nec re nec nomine in persona Christi aut communicatas esse aut communicari potuisse vicissim naturas earumque proprietates.*" Thesis 28:—"Personam Christi non conflari ex duabus naturis, nec humanam naturam, ad personam Christi ejusque integritatem pertinere." Compare "Wiederholten und verständigen Bericht von den neuen Amlingiten im Fürstenthum Anhalt," Leipzig, 1585, pp. 106 ff. Thesis 79:—Christ is only Mediator as to His humanity: to the humanity, however, the cultus *λατρείας*, does not pertain. Similarly taught Gregory of Valentia (against Heerbrand); Bellarmin "de Christo," L. iii.; Tanner, and others. Compare Joh. Gerhard's "Loci Theol.," ed. Cotta, T. iii. c. 12, pp. 530 ff. Gerhard brings against them the charge of a Nestorian "duplicatio adorationis Christi."

NOTE 33, page 195.

So in particular an opinion (addressed to the Elector, to whom the above works of Brentz and Andreæ had been sent through Duke Christopher of Würtemberg on or against these writings and their Christology) by Paul Eber, Crell, and Major, 1564. Compare Hutter's "Concordia concors," pp. 49 ff.; Planck l. c. Buch vi. c. 8, pp. 513 ff.; further, the "Propositiones complectentes summam præcipuorum capitum doctrinæ christianæ sonantis dei beneficio in Acad. et Eccl. Viteb., de quibus confessionem suam edituri sunt ad diem, 5 Mai 1570, Mollerus, Widebramus, Nicol. Selnecker, Christoph. Pezel, Joh. Bugenhagius (jun.)." Further belongs to this connection a Latin catechism which left room for the Calvinistic doctrine, and in particular, through the translation of Acts ii., "until He is received by heaven," by "until He had taken possession of heaven," as through a pretended corruption, gave offence, and gave rise to a flood of controversial writings. The chief writing of the Wittenbergers, however, is the above-mentioned "Grundvest." 1571.

NOTE 34, page 226.

Of Beza's works there belong to this connection his "Epistolæ," his "Quæstiones et responsa," as also his works on occa-

sion of the Mömpelgarter Colloquy with J. Andreae, and his "Refutatio dogmatis de ficticia carnis Chr. omnipotentia."

Of Danæus in particular, "Examen Libri de duabus in Christo naturis a M. Kemnitio conscripti," Genev. 1581. Further, his "Apologia ad Jac. Andreae," and his "Isagoge Christiana," Genev. 1591. Of A. Sadeel the "De veritate humanæ naturæ Christi," 1585; in his Opp. Genev. 1592. Then the "De Libro Concordiæ Admonitio Christiana," Neostad. 1581; with which is connected the "Defensio Admonitionis Neostad. contra Apologiæ Erfordensis (by Selnekker, Chemnitz, and T. Kirchner) sophismata, ab aliquot studiosis Theol. in Schola Neostad. 1584, with the participation of Ursinus. Ursinus wrote also a "Compendium doctrinæ Christ." 1584, and an "Explicatio Catechetica;" Zanchius "de Nativitate Dei," and a disputation "de prædicamentis post Unionem." The Reformed theologians of Bremen, who continued the struggle with the Würtembergers, were joined by those of Anhalt, particularly by Amling, with whom Adam Crato, Tim. Kirchner, and the Helmstadt divines, Daniel Hoffmann and Til. Hesshus, were already engaged in controversy. Of later divines we must further mention those of Herborn, in particular Piscator and Martini; those of Heidelberg, as, for example, D. Pareus, with his "Methodus contra Ubiquitarios," and Barth. Coppenius, "de mysterio Immanuelis," 1620; of Marburg, Raph. Eglin, "de magno illo insitionis nostræ in Christum Mysterio," Marp. 1613, and the "de fœdere gratiæ," 1613. Against Sadeel, B. Mentzer wrote his "Antisadeel," 1593, with an introductory preface by Æg. Hunnius, who wrote one of the principal Lutheran works, "de persona Christi, Lib. iv." Fref. ad Moen. 1595; when Martini defended Sadeel in Herborn in 1597, Mentzer replied in his "Antimartinius" in 1604, 1620. We must further mention Keckermann's "Systema Theologic." Hanov. 1607; Alstedt's "Theologia didactica exhibens locos communes methodo scholastica," Hanov. 1627; M. Wendelin's "Christianæ Theol." Lib. iii. Hanov. 1641; Sohnius' "Exegesis Conf. Aug.;" Polanus a Polansdorf's "Syntagma Theolog." 1624; Bucanus' "Institutiones Theologiæ," Genève 1604. Besides these, compare the Dutch Alting, 1644; Hoornbeck's "Summa Controversiarum religionis," Traj. 1653; Hulsius' "Systema Controvers. theologic."

Lugd. 1677; J. Markius' "Compend. Theol. Christ. didactico-elencticae," Amst. 1690; P. von Mastricht's "Theoretico-practica theologia," Traj. 1690.

NOTE 35, page 249.

Compare Catech. Racov.; but, in general, the "Biblioth. fratr. Polonorum, Irenop." 1656: amongst the "Opp. Fausti Socini," particularly his writings against Franz Davidis, T. ii. 709, and Christian Franken ii. 767, as also his letter "de invocatione Christi" i. 353-358. Further, amongst the works of Socinus, his "Christianæ religionis breviss. Institutio" i. 654 ff.; "De Christi natura" i. 781 ff.; "De Jesu Christi filii Dei natura s. essentia" ii. 375 ("De Christo servatore adv. Covenantum" ii. 121 ff. gives scarcely anything besides the Socinian doctrine of the office of Christ), against the *Objectiones Cutenii Respons.* ii. 454 ff.; "De Carne Christi," against the *Mennonites*, ii. 461. Of Joh. Crell ought particularly to be compared *Opp.* i. 13 ff., 45 f., 68-71, 83, 157, 260, 264, 291, 331 ff., 357-360, 527 f., iv. 133, 144; of Wolzogen, *Opp.* i. 177 ff., 546, 707, 750, ii. 300, 742. Other Socinians who belong to this connection are Val. Smalcus and Ostorod. Compare "Refutatio Thesium Wolfg. Franzii Viteb. (de præcipuis chr. relig. capp. 1609 and 1610) 1614; his "Refutatio duorum Martini Sunglecii Jesuitæ libr. quos de erroribus novorum Arian. Scripsit," Rac. 1616; "de Christo vero et naturali Dei filio," Rac. 1616. Compare also Fock's "Der Socinianismus," Abth. 2, pp. 510-551, 1847. Among elder works is deserving of special mention, Joh. Hoornbeck's "Socinianism. confutat. Ultraj." 1650, T. i-iii., particularly i. 30, and T. ii. "de Christo."

NOTE 36, page 251.

The passages which refer to a pre-existence of Christ are to be understood of the divine counsel to send Christ. Where the creation appears to be ascribed to Christ, as in John i. 1 ff., 10, Col. i. 13 ff., Heb. i. 2, 3, according to the Socinians, we must explain it of the new creation (*refectio, reformatio*) of humanity, in which the angels also participate. So also are the words *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως* to be understood of such a new creation, in which new world, Christ, the second Adam, is the

first in rank and in time. Compare F. Socin. i. 660 ff. The "Word of God" is God's command, of which there are many, which are distinguished from each other. Christ also is such a Word of God, but not the Word through which the world was created; for this Word was not a person, but Christ is a personal sending. The "beginning" in John i. 1 is the beginning of the proclamation of the Gospel of the kingdom of God, which took place through the Baptist: the sense therefore is, "In the beginning (when the Baptist had already made his appearance), the Word (Christ) already existed, hidden indeed to men, but known to God." The word *ἔγενετο* in John i. 14 is taken for "was," as in verse 6; so that the sense would be, "The Word was a man like us, dwelt among us, and so forth." John viii. 58, on the contrary, Val. Schmalz translates, "before Abraham becomes,—sc. Abraham, that is, the Father of the faithful, from among the heathen also,—I am, I must work and rule." Phil. ii. has nothing to do with incarnation or Lutheran "exinanitio," but refers to Christ's humility in lowliness. Col. ii. 9 is *σωματικῶς* antagonistic to *σκιὰ*, the prototypical, the unreal.

NOTE 37, page 281.

Hafenreffer's "*Loci theologici*" (1603) contains little that is distinctive. He distinguishes between possession and use; allows of the latter on earth also, agreeably to the "*liberum arbitrium*" of Christ; but takes all pains to bring the doctrine of the "*Communicatio idiomatum*" into order. The kinds thereof form, in his view, the following progressive series:—1. The appropriation of the human nature, with its predicates, by the Son of God. 2. Communication of divine predicates to the humanity. 3. Community of activity. Only he calls attention to the fact, that there must be added thereto that kind, according to which the attributes of both natures are predicated of the entire person (pp. 350 ff.), which is not indeed so much a new kind, as a declaration regarding the consequences of the other kinds. For this reason, the Tübingen division into four met with little approbation; indeed, they themselves (Hafenreffer, for example) treated this fourth, at one time, merely as an introduction; at another time, as a consequence of the other kinds. Hafenreffer treats, I. *de persona Christi*; 1. *de un. person.*; 2. *de Comm. idd.*; 3. *de Statuum carnis Chr. diversi-*

tate: II. de officio Chr. (triplici). It is remarkable that he says (p. 307),—"unus verus et singularis homo" was assumed by the Logos, who, as to His nature, could indeed "*propria personalitate subsistere*," but "*personalitate ipsius suspensa et impedita*" He is taken up "*indissolubiliter in ipsius filii Dei hypostasin*," and is thus "*perfectior*."

NOTE 38, page 281.

On the 17th of November 1616, Balth. Mentzer, in Giessen, a friend of Æg. Hunnius, had laid before Hafenreffer his doctrine of the Person of Christ, which differed from that of the Suabians; on the 10th of September he begged again for an explanation on the part of the Tübingen divines. An answer was given on Sept. 1, 1619. After Hafenreffer's death, Th. Thumm was the chief representative of the Tübingen theologians; his associates were Luc. Osiander, Melchior, Nicolai. With B. Mentzer associated themselves Feuerborn and Joh. Winckelmann in Giessen. The principal works of the Tübingen school are:—Of Thummus, "*Majestas J. Chr. θεανθρώπου*," 1621; the "*Acta Mentzeriana*," and "*Ταπεινωσις γραφία sacra h. e. Repetitio sanæ et orthod. doctr. de humiliat. Chr.*" 1623;—of Nicolai, the "*Consideratio theologica*," etc., 1622.—On the part of the Giessen theologians, we must mention the "*Sciagraphia de div. Jesu Christo juxta humanitat. communicatæ majestatis—usurpatione*," by J. Feuerborn, and his "*Κενωσις γραφία*," 1627; by Mentzer, the "*Necessaria et justa defensio contra injustas criminationes L. Osiandri, M. Nicolai, et Theod. Thummii*," 1624. In addition to this comes, besides, the Saxon Decisio of 1624.

NOTE 39, page 283.

From this, however, follows strictly, that even in the state of exaltation it is not necessary to assume an actual omnipresence of the "*Caro Christi*." It is sufficient if it have the freedom to be wherever it wills, and if it participate in the government of the world. Nay more, inasmuch as everything depends, in the last instance, on His "*libera voluntas*," even in the state of exaltation, and inasmuch as this state of exaltation is supposed to have been a reality even previously, the distinction between the two states is done away with; the person must have been

complete in itself from the very beginning; the only difference is in its *doing*, its self-manifestation. The Giessen theologians were as far from a true idea of spiritual *growth* as, for example, the Cartesians, with their doctrine of innate ideas. Growth, in their view, does not acquire anything; it merely shows that which already is. The “*ignorantia*,” which they attribute to Christ, is accordingly, at the same time, possession of omniscience, even as finitude is at the same time the possession of omnipotent omnipresence. Nay more, they have even a twofold humanity of Christ: the one has a real development and growth, but is purely human, not divine-human; the other is in complete possession of all divine attributes with the “*libera voluntas*,” which never renounces itself, even though, with the will to become man, it subjected itself to the necessity of refraining in general from the use of those attributes.

NOTE 40, page 293.

Hafenreffer already gives naive expression to this in his “*Loci Theolog.*” (p. 400), in the words,—“The *exinanitio* is the *forma servi*. Id quod interdum principes etiam in peregrinationibus facere solent: qui dum ministris suis famulitia præstant, nihil ominus tamen Domini sunt et manent.” When the Tübingen divines made such a rush to the “*Majestas Christi*,” even for the humanity, that, like Brentz and others, they see in the *exinanition* merely a concealment of the use of the majesty by the humanity, how very far are they from any tendency such as that attributed to them by Thomasius, to represent the *Logos* as lowering Himself, or becoming a mere potency. Their eye was fixed not merely, as Thomasius would have us believe, on the absolute unity or identity of the person, but quite as much on the institution of the humanity of Christ into divine majesty. Indeed, this is clear even from the title of Thumm’s writings. The second “*genus Comm. idd.*” (in Thumm’s *Maj. J. Chr.* p. 149, the third), the *μετάδοσις*, not the *οἰκείωσις*, contains, in their view, the principal and the new feature of the Lutheran Christology. For the *οἰκείωσις*, to which, it is true, they firmly cling, they abide by the old principle, “*divinitas impassibiliter passa in carne realiter appropriata*,” l. c. pp. 125 ff.; in connection with which they constantly repeat that it “*non in sese passionem sensit*,” that it remained “*simplex*,

immutabilis ; e majestate suâ non præcipitata." Compare pp. 81, 160.

NOTE 41, page 300.

Further details of the controversy just narrated, and which ended in abstruse scholastic questions, are of no importance relatively to the history of dogmas. More precise information is contained in Thomasius's "Dogmatik," which devotes to it almost sixty pages (ii. 391-450). His account of the matters of fact must be acknowledged to be in general accurate. Whoever allows himself to be led, as does Thomasius also, by the view of the Christological movements of the sixteenth century, subsequently to the death of Luther, which is laid down in the foregoing section, has the key to the understanding of these controversies. Only, Thomasius does too little to meet the need of having a connected view and picture of the principles of the Tübingen school. In order to attain to this, greater stress must be laid on the circumstance that they aimed at deriving the exinanition from an act of the majesty of the God-manhood, from its power over itself ; which majesty, however, did not lose, but rather affirmed and continued its existence, through this use. In this way, it is true, Christ is reduced to a king in disguise, travelling incognito. At the same time, it would be made clear that their view, carried out to its logical consequences, involves a God-manhood in some sense pre-existent, possessed of majesty and positing the entire state of exinanition, in other words, open Docetism ; and that the efforts to avoid this absurdity lead to inconsistencies. All this comes more clearly to light when we take as the main point of view of the Tübingen school, not so much the unity, as rather the identity or self-equality, of the person, even during the state of exinanition ;—a self-equality which involves reckoning participation in the entire fulness of the actual majesty of the Logos to the full idea of the God-manhood, and which identifies the absolute realization of the idea with the actual being of the God-manhood. Thomasius, however, seems to me to obscure the matter, when he refuses to allow the position which he himself assumes—namely, that the divine-human fulness was limited for the beginning—to be regarded as a proposal to negative an incorrect premiss common alike to the Tübingen and Giessen theologians, and maintains it

to be a logical development of their doctrine; whilst, on the other hand, he himself declares a complete reconstruction of the dogma to be unallowable (p. 445). When he tries everywhere to make out that what is faulty, even in the "Formula Concordiæ," is merely a defect, a coming short of the perfect, it is not a mark of thoroughness; on the contrary, it is just as if a dogmatician should convert evil into a mere not yet having possession of the good. Historical accuracy rather requires us to acknowledge that there is no lack even of erroneous principles where the sole remedy is simple retractation,—to wit, intellectual penitence,—not progress in the path previously pursued; where what is wanted is a renunciation of the form of the dogma which had been precipitately adopted, and a return to a purer formative impulse, not a mere supplementing or more precise determination of preceding principles. Thomasius speaks as though the main matter to the Tübingen theologians, as well as to himself in sketching the image of Christ on earth, had properly been merely the unity of the person, and as though, therefore, a theory of the limitation of the God-man for some time, which merely preserved this unity (towards which the efforts of the Giessen theologians tended), was quite in accordance with their wishes, nay more, the complement of their own thought. Both parties, on the contrary (as also the "Formula Concordiæ"), laid it down as a fundamental principle of their Christology, that the full divine majesty was communicated to the humanity from the beginning. Indeed, Thomasius himself is unable to conceal this from himself (see p. 374, note), and lets it fall rather as untenable. Only in and with this full communication could they regard the incarnation itself as accomplished; and they would by no means, like Thomasius, have been content with a divine-human unity of the person, which lacked the substance of divine majesty, which was, as it were, a mere empty form. So far were the Tübingen theologians from being willing to conceive humanity in Christ as ever without the entire divine fulness, that they rather viewed it solely as an act of the divine-human majesty, which continued to exist even during the state of humiliation. Still less did either they or the Giessen theologians intend to teach that the Logos Himself emptied Himself also of the possession or use of divine majesty. For indeed, with the Church in all ages, they repudiated this

thought as a monstrosity. Nor was the thought a too lofty one for them, but rather too low. It would not have accorded with the spirit of the Tübingen divines to seek to secure the unity, or rather identity, of the person of the God-man, by the assumption of such a self-conversion of the Logos into a potential mode of existence homogeneous to the beginnings of humanity; for they saw, to their horror and abomination, in the Giessen theory a "*Deus potentialis*," a "*Christum alium atque alium*." The only course they could consistently take, was to trace all exinanition back to an act of the God-man. Schneckenburger, however, is mistaken in supposing that they saw or even intended the ultimate Docetical conclusion pointed out above. It is, therefore, in vain that Thomasius endeavours to show that *his* idea, that the Logos converted and accommodated Himself to the beginnings of a man,—an idea adopted out of regard to the unity of the person,—is the key to that controversy, and the only possible logical consequence of the premises with which both parties started. So far from this, the Giessen doctrine, if its authors, continuing to treat the idea of growth lightly, assumed that the humanity was in complete possession (as, in his manner, Des Cartes also assumed), necessarily ended in the Tübingen doctrine; and a necessary consequence of the Tübingen view was the pre-existence of the incarnation. But had the Giessen theologians taken the idea of growth seriously, they would have been compelled to let fall, and recognise as erroneous, the common premiss of the completeness of the person of the God-man, and instead thereof to assume a limitation for the beginning, which was not a self-limitation of the humanity (as the Tübingen school wished, and which leads to mere seeming); still less a self-limitation of the Logos in His own being, an emptying of His own majesty, for that would clash with the primitive canon, always held fast by the Church, "*Mansit quod erat*;" but a self-limitation of the Logos in reference to His being and action in humanity, such as Luther and Chemnitz, in harmony with Irenæus, Justin, and others, meant to teach when they spoke of the quiescence of the Logos. I feel compelled to give the greater prominence to this error, as I myself did something to occasion it, and the theory to which Thomasius has resigned himself, by the first edition of this work. (Compare his "*Beiträge zur kirchlichen Christologie*," 1845, in the

“*Zeitschrift für Protestantismus*,” p. 236.) For I had said there (see pp. 177–181),—“The fault of the Lutheran Christology lies ultimately in the incomplete carrying out of the ‘*Communicatio idiomatum*,’ or in the circumstance that the communication is not represented as actually reciprocal, that the finite determinations are not really taken up into the divine nature.” I had, at the same time, stated, as the possible development of Christology indicated, precisely that which Thomasius subsequently carried out in his “*Beiträge*,” to wit, that for the purpose of humiliation the Son of God so took up finitude into Himself, and reduced the *χρῆσις* of His divine attributes, in the first instance, to the latent form of *κτῆσις*, in order, on the other hand, afterwards to be able to represent the perfect communication of the divine to the humanity as taking place in the state of exaltation, through the medium of a truly human development. Further researches, however, have compelled me to acknowledge this thought to be unripe and untenable; as in fact I long ago declared in my review of the theory of Thomasius in Reuter’s “*Repertorium*.” This theory is based on a conception of God, which, being unethical, is therefore unworthy, and still far too closely related to the pantheistic notions of the age. The love of the Logos exists solely as actual and self-conscious; whereas humanity cannot at the beginning be self-conscious love. And as this love is the highest good, nay more, the highest reality, it can never give itself up out of love, but can only admit such exhibitions of love as are in themselves again the self-assertion of self-conscious love. For this reason, although from the abstractly logical point of view I can blame it as an inconsistency, that the beginning of the Lutheran “*Communicatio idiomatum*” was not developed into the doctrine of the Logos making Himself finite or emptying Himself, I must at the same time praise the early dogmaticians of the Church and the “*Formula Concordiæ*” for treating as unworthy of the Son of God, and expressly and unanimously rejecting, the idea of a self-conversion of the Logos into a mere potential existence. I recognise also in the *thought* of a not merely nominal “*Communicatio idiomatum*” a great Christological step in advance, notwithstanding the objections against the form of this doctrine, contained partly already in the first edition of this work, and partly in a sifted, it is true, but also at the same time in a strengthened

shape, in the second edition ; and even now also I see, with Thomasius, that a limitation during the state of humiliation, relating also to the Logos, is necessary to the carrying out of the *thought* of the "Communicatio idiomatum." But this self-limitation can no more affect the essence of the Logos than the incarnation can affect that of humanity ; it will not have to be referred, therefore, to the mode of existence of the Logos, to His being in itself, which is immutable, but only, on the one hand, to His being and action relatively to humanity as its essence requires it, and, on the other hand, be declared of Him for the sake of His appropriation (*οἰκείωσις*) of the man, and of His participation in lowliness. Besides this, I cannot avoid a certain feeling of astonishment that Dr Thomasius should be able to suppose himself holding the position of advocate of the "Formula Concordiæ," in opposition to me. It does not at all accord with the rôle thus assumed, that he deviates far more fundamentally, to wit, in relation to the very conception of God, from the "Formula Concordiæ, than in my opinion is scientifically allowable. In my weightiest objections, which grouped themselves mainly around the thought that the image of the perfected God-man had been precipitately, although involuntarily, transferred to the temporal life of Jesus, he agrees ; he blames the vacillation between the tropus of Chemnitz and that of Brentz ; he allows that the "Formula Concordiæ" teaches, on the one hand, an actual growth of Christ, on the other hand, that in virtue of the "Unio personalis," the absolute divine fulness dwelt in the humanity ; further, that it at one time represents the full use of the "majestas" as given along with the "Unio" itself (as Brentz supposes), at another time as beginning with the state of exaltation ; that it at one time describes the incarnation itself as the exaltation of human nature, at another time represents the latter as a distinct process ; that in particular, in relation to omnipresence, it now adopts the formula of Chemnitz, and again, with the Suabians, teaches, instead of the hypotheticalal, not merely the actual "omnipræsentia generalis," but also that this omnipresence is necessarily involved in the "Unio personalis" (pp. 376-380). He sees also clearly enough that these principles are opposed to each other ; and yet he maintains that these contradictions between the Lower Saxon and Suabian Christology, which existed prior

to the "Formula Concordiæ," which broke out again in fresh controversy after it, and which are merely placed in conjunction in it, do not indicate that the parties merely compromised their differences, established merely an apparent unity, and merely "welded together" heterogeneous elements. Thomasius speaks as though only one fault found with the Formula Concordiæ were to be set aside, to wit, that it did not go far enough in accurately defining, and had left so many things in a doubtful state. He must, however, have known well enough that the charge brought against it was that of having precipitately tried to define and decide too much—points for which the development of the Church was not yet ripe. Dr Thomasius has, as is well known, demonstrated to us, that whoso accepts the "Confessio Augustana" must also accept the "Formula Concordiæ" as a confession, if doubts are not to be entertained of his claim to the former. In the year 1848, when all the pillars of the old order of things appeared to be shaking, when the first Church Conference assembled, and the churches began to prepare inwardly for the dissolution of the tie between Church and State, he had no better counsel to offer than that of seeking the salvation of the Lutheran Church in its Confessions, from the "Confessio Augustana" onwards to the "Formula Concordiæ." But what can be his idea of subscription to the principles of an article, when even he himself acknowledges it to contain an expressed yea and nay?—But as, on the one hand, according to Thomasius' own principles, I have said nothing regarding the "Formula Concordiæ" which has not plainly a good ground; so, on the other hand, must I here, as I have done in the text, take up arms for the "Formula Concordiæ," and maintain that it expressly rejects his own Christological theory. But for more precise details see below. So also must it retain the honour of having, in its principle of the "*capacitas humanæ naturæ*" for the divine nature, laid a foundation-stone of a new anthropology—a doctrinal principle, whose truth Thomasius assails, and to which he arbitrarily gives an evil signification when I lay it down (pp. 375, 376); whilst he himself, on page 188, is compelled to say the same thing, in precise agreement with the manifold considerations by which I sustain it.—Be it also here further remarked, that he puts the view I take of Chemnitz in a false light. He seems to think

that I have treated Brentz with love, Chemnitz with less favour. But however superior (in my view, and also in that of Thomasius) Brentz may be to Chemnitz in speculative depth and energy of thought relatively to the *idea* of God-manhood, I affirm with equal distinctness, that Chemnitz alone has had a more correct insight into the conditions of growth and humiliation. Accordingly, I feel myself rather warranted in charging Thomasius with a defective recognition of the Christological merits of M. Chemnitz, who alone asserted the momentum which I have described as so significant in Luther, to wit, the growth of the God-man. For Thomasius knows only one way of settling Chemnitz's (and Luther's) doctrine of the quiescence or "Retractio" of the Logos, to wit, by designating it Calvinistic, or even Nestorian; which must certainly appear very surprising, if its design were not evidently to make up, by branding others with evil names, for the lack of favour with which his own theory of the self-conversion of the Logos into a mere potence has been received. At the same time, that Chemnitz should have rejected the Suabian doctrine of the perfect participation in the majesty, which was deemed to involve the full use, and yet have allowed principles of the "Formula Concordiæ" to pass which contain the same thing, can only be characterized, in view of his own just view of the growth of Christ, as a concession which he ought never to have made. And this judgment I see no cause to withdraw. That Thomasius should regard the principles relating to a twofold divinity, a communicated and a communicating (and in part also the idea of an equalization of the natures), as a mere charge brought by the Reformed, and has been unable to find them in Brentz and Andreæ (p. 374), is not my fault. Nor is it any more my fault that he has not referred to the passages I have cited (ii. 677). But when he, notwithstanding, professes to correct my account, I feel it necessary to quote a few passages in defence, and that in part from works to which Thomasius himself refers. In his book, "de Majestate," p. 929, Brentz says,—"*Voco in præsentia (sicut et suis locis supra) divinitatem Christi non eam, quam filius Dei in se ab æterno habuit, sed quam tempore incarnationis filio hominis communicavit seu participavit. Alia enim est divinitas communicans seu participans, alia communicata seu participata, sicut alius est donator, aliud donum ipsum.*"

Christus igitur juxta participatam carni suæ Deitatem implebat cœlum et terram." P. 924 :—" Christ fills heaven and earth majestate divinitatis, non solum æternæ illius quam habet a Patre suo—sed etiam illius, quam filio hominis communicavit." Jac. Andreæ Apolog. contra Ingolstad. p. 25 :—"Divinitas Christi non est *οὐσιώδης* illa et æterna cum Patre et Spiritu S. essentia communis, sed communicata a secunda hypostasi, qua ad dextram Dei sedet. Ib. p. 42 ; Majestas (that is, divinitas) donata humanitati extrinsecus a divinitate, quasi per accedens humanitati in persona accedit. Others I will pass over. In the account of the Maulbr. Colloquy, Collatio I. iiij., J. Andreæ has said,—“ God has communicated all His majesty to man in such a manner, that man has become equal to God.” Similar passages may be found in Brentz. As late as about 1580, J. Andreæ repeated a noteworthy judgment on Schwenckfeld. Dr Hofmann (see his “Abtruck,” p. 38) says regarding it,—“ I have good reason to be grieved that Dr Jacob, a year before his death, caused to be reprinted the Esslinger Sermons, with a preface against correct Saxon teachers, and in particular against Dr Hesshus, in which he represents the sermons as his Testament. In the one relating to Schwenckfeld, he says, that Andreæ’s opinion of the Lutheran doctrine, and Schwenckfeld’s controversy on the majesty of the man Christ, is at the bottom nothing but a strife about words.”

NOTE 42, page 302.

This is the proper place to make a few remarks on some points of Schneckenburger’s now celebrated view of the orthodox Lutheran Christology. Mention has been already made of the stress he lays thereon, that inasmuch as it represents the “Exinanitio,” and specially, as a momentum thereof, the “Conceptio,” as a deed of the humanity, or at all events of the God-manhood (in order to be able to ascribe to the office of Christ not merely an instrumental, but also an authoritative significance), it teaches the existence of an humanity of Christ prior to the humanity, which in reality properly commenced with the “Conceptio.” As to this main point, however, Schneckenburger is in error. When the Reformed Alting charges the Lutherans with teaching the pre-existence of the humanity of Christ, it is no proof of their having really taught it. Schneckenburger has made alto-

gether little use of the great Lutheran dogmaticians in his representation, and brings no proof from them for his opinion; even the works of second-rate writers, like Mengwein and Gisenius, do not say what he reads in them. That the idea of the illocal existence of the humanity in the Logos has an entirely different sense from that of the pre-existence of a real humanity which then humbled itself, we have shown above (see above, pp. 246 ff., 271 ff.). Quite as little does the, of course, important distinction between the Incarnatio and the "Exinanitio" and "Exaltatio" belong to this connection (see above, p. 293); unless we should permit a logical to be converted, without more ado, into a temporal "prius." Logically, of course, the first place is assigned to the "Incarnatio," because it is the more general idea, which is more precisely defined by the ideas of "Exinanitio" and "Exaltatio." It is said that incarnation and self-exinanition are not in themselves identical ideas; indeed, remarks Gerhard, the incarnation might in itself have taken place in such a manner that Jesus, like Adam, came forth at once as a complete and perfect man:—an analogy to this is supplied by the fact that Christ continues man even in the "Exaltatio." On the contrary, "Incarnatio" is the fundamental idea, to which "Exinanitio" stands logically in a mere relation of contingency, as something which more precisely determines its modus. (The old dogmaticians, be it remarked, thus recognised an important premiss of the doctrine otherwise rare in their writings, that the incarnation may have a significance and truth without reference to sin, and apart from the modus which sin rendered necessary.) We are assured, on the contrary, that the "Incarnatio," as far as time, in the form which it now actually bears, is concerned, is to be conceived as simultaneous with the modus of the "Exinanitio." Gerhard's "Loci Theologici," ed. Cotta, T. iii. 570; Quenstedt's "Systema" iii. 338. Further, so far as I know, it never occurs that (as according to Schneckenburger we ought certainly to expect) the humanity, which submitted to the "Conceptio," is designated the "subjectum exinaniens," but the "persona τοῦ λόγου," for example, in König, substantially also in Gerhard (l. c.); or still more frequently, relatively to the "Exinanitio" altogether, the God-manhood is described as this subject, on which supposition the "Conceptio" is naturally disregarded; for it is self-evident

that what has not yet an existence cannot act, and that therefore the rule applies, "*a parte potiori fit denominatio.*" According to Mentzer, Feuerborn, and in general the Giessen Christology, which had acquired the predominance, the "*Exinanitio*" was brought to pass by a quiescence on the part of the Logos (Gerhard iii. 570, 562 ff.); not by a laying aside, on the part of the humanity, of that of which it had had the use, but by its willingly and without self-exaltation entering into the will of the Logos, who restricts the communication of His activity. And this humility of the humanity, in cheerfully willing the lot appointed for it by God, is even on this supposition not an empty act, but a very serious matter. For the lowness rendered necessary by His office stands undoubtedly in striking contrast with the divine-human content of this person, as given through the union—a contrast which was first to be set aside at the conclusion. It is the contrast of the King's Son in the condition of a servant, which is, at all events apparently, heightened, if not merely the *claim* to, but, as was universally the case, the inner actual possession of majesty, were attributed to Him from the beginning. (Schmid, in his "*Die lutherische Dogmatik*," Ed. 3, p. 294, tries inaccurately to reduce the doctrine of the dogmaticians back to the former point.) But if this is the state of matters with the pretended doctrine of the Lutherans of a pre-existent humanity, it will not be allowable to attribute to them "the deeper thought, the speculative truth, that humanity altogether pre-existed and eternally worked with God, for example, in creation also; but that God emptied Himself and passed over into His altereity (*Exinanitio*), in order out of it to return to Himself," with which they are said to have struggled. Besides, this thought would clash not merely with the constant doctrine, that the Logos is unchangeable (for example, Gerhard iii. 423 f., 562, 563), but also with Schneckenburger's own view of the Lutheran Christology, according to which that which underwent humiliation (*subjectum quo*) was the humanity, and not the deity. The actual doctrine of the old dogmatics is one thing; the conclusion which may be drawn from it, another. In this respect, we also have conceded (pp. 297 ff.) that the most strictly logical form of Lutheran Christology must be driven to the assumption of a pre-existent majesty. Speculative elements are contained, not so much in the Christology of this age, as rather

solely in the fundamental thoughts of the Christology of a Luther, Brentz, Nicolai, and other Mystics; which elements, however, were merely partially and in a scholastic manner asserted, but not furthered, during the seventeenth century. When, further, Schneckenburger characterizes the development of the doctrine of the states, that is, the distinction between the "status exinanitionis et exaltationis," as the distinctive merit of the Lutherans, whilst the Reformed put this distinction into the background; this assertion also needs limitation. For that Brentz and J. Andreae, to whom Hafenreffer, Thumm, Luc. Osiander, and Joh. Ad. Osiander remained faithful, intended to teach and maintain Lutheran doctrine, is clear enough; but precisely they failed to lay down a satisfactory doctrine of the state of humiliation. On the other hand, the Reformed cannot be charged with the same fault; indeed, we may rather complain that they did not advance beyond the state of humiliation (see above, pp. 242, 247). And thus the Würtemburgers and the Reformed, these two extremes, moved by opposed reasons, are one in so far as they fail to discriminate in a tenable manner between the states of humiliation and exaltation. After Chemnitz, however, the Giessen divines did most to solve this question. But how very strongly they, and the majority which agreed with them, were still characterized by the same faults, we have shown above; accordingly, almost the only thing we can praise, is their tendency towards the formation of a doctrine of the two states. But the same merit must be conceded to the Reformed also.—It is, lastly, a striking observation of Schneckenburger's, that because not God or the Logos by Himself could atone, and the humanity, therefore, had not to hold the position of an instrument, but of an originator (authoritative), the Lutheran system logically involved laying stress on the truth of the humanity of Christ. This same point has been repeatedly discussed and proved above, in other aspects. But precisely if a causatively active humanity, possessed of power to acquire, and not a selfless humanity, were necessary for the sake of the atonement, Schneckenburger ought not to have laid so little stress on the as good as universal Lutheran doctrine, "that the humanity of Christ was not impersonal, but personal in the Logos, in that the personality of the Logos was communicated to it," as he does in merely incidentally mentioning it in a note

(p. 27). Still less ought he to have allowed it to pass, that Philippi adopted the traditional error of representing the doctrine of the impersonality of the human nature of Christ as that of the Lutheran Church. Schneckenburger is quite right also in saying that it is a perversity, with Philippi, to attempt to base the substitution of Christ on the impersonality, that is, incompleteness of human nature. (I am therefore unable to understand how he could attribute this view to me, when I have already more than once controverted it.) But why has he not refuted this opinion of Philippi's from the old Lutheran dogmaticians, who, in opposition to Reformed and Catholics, maintain with the greatest decision, that the humanity of Christ must not be conceived as impersonal? So, for example, Ægid. Hunnius, "de persona Christi," p. 49; so Thumm, "de majestate Jesu Christi," 1621, pp. 26, 27, 52, 53:—"Humanity, impersonal in itself, becomes a person through the Logos, and subsists for itself like other beings, so that 'Actus personales' are to be predicated of the humanity also, nay more, that even the body participates in these 'Actus'" (p. 29). Similarly, B. Mentzer, Calov, Systema vii. 204 ff. 1677; as also his "Examen doctrinæ publicæ ecclesiarum reformatarum et syncretismi cum orthodoxis in Artic. de persona Christi," 1663, pp. 118-137; Gerhard iii. 422-427. Compare Note 43.

NOTE 43, page 303.

Page 200:—"Unio hypostatica vel personalis est duarum naturarum conjunctio, arctissimam et indissolubilem mutuam naturæ divinæ et humanæ præsentiam et communionem afferens." After then showing that this Unio is neither merely "notionalis" nor "virtualis," but "realis, substantialis," not *ἔνωσις σχετική*—relative, as, for example, marriage—nor verbalis, accidentalis or *παραστατική*, not merely *κατὰ ταυτοβουλίαν*, *ὁμόνοιαν*, *συνέργειαν*, *εὐδοκίαν* or concursus ad eundem effectum, but also not unio *κατὰ σύγχυσιν*, *μέθεξιν* (i.e., as genus and species), *μεταμόρφωσιν*, *μεταβολήν*, *πρόσθεσιν* (asseris instar), *ἀλλοίωσιν* or *φυρμόν* (like Gerhard iii. 423 ff.); he passes on to the question, Whether God's Son truly communicated His eternal, infinite person to the humanity? After having further shown how the Jesuits and many Calvinists make a mere sustentatio of the human nature through the Logos out of the

"Unio personalis," and expressly deny that the person or the majesty of the Son of God were really communicated to the human nature (so the Crypto-Calvinists in Wittenberg, Joh. Piscator, Sadeel, Trellkatus, Alsted, Sam. Maresius, Wendelin), he demonstrates that without the "communicata personalitas," the humanity would only be borne by the Logos, like ourselves, "actu secundo" as a creature; that, on the contrary, even Luther demands that the Son of God be conceived already "actu primo" as a man, and not merely as sustaining humanity "actu secundo;" that at the very least an "obedientialis capacitas finiti ad infinitum" must be ascribed to the humanity of Christ; and, finally, that "actus personales" must pertain to the human nature, that consequently the "subsistentia" is communicated to it (p. 209, de pers. Chr. 127, 128). Many of the Reformed also, as, for example, Zanchi, Beza, Polanus, Sohn, Scharpius, Maccovius, Walaëus, Ludw. Crocius, and Alting, allow that humanity is constituted a person by the Logos. Humanity, it is true, is not a person by itself; the hypostasis pertains "primario et per se" to the divine nature; but on account of the "unio personalis" the same hypostasis is communicated to the humanity also, and belongs to it as a "possessio, usurpatio and denominatio." Not by "transfusio," but by mystical "communicatio," did the "hypostasis filii dei" become also the hypostasis of the human nature, so that the two natures have one and the same hypostasis. The human nature became, not a "persona," but a "natura ὑποστᾶσα, personata." Quite similarly Gerhard iii. 421, 427. The "hypostasis filii" is the ἐνοποιόν in this person; after the incarnation it is "hypostasis duarum naturarum." Quenstedt iii. 77, 86. To say that human nature by itself was not hypostatical, is not to say that it was ever impersonal; for it was personal in the Logos from the beginning (ἐννύστατος), that is, "particeps subsistentiæ τοῦ λόγου." Similarly the others. Hollaz calls this a rich compensation for the human personality. At the same time, they always cling firmly to the position that the "divina persona" is nothing foreign to humanity. Balth. Meisner, it is true, in his fifty Christological disputations (Christologia Sacra, 1673, p. 80), materially limits this "communicatio personæ." But if, Calov goes on to maintain, the person of the Logos becomes the person of the human nature, it must be therein as its centre, and

not outside of it (Logos non extra carnem : Calov. de Pers. Chr. pp. 78 ff. ; System. T. vii. 225 ff.) ; for the "extra" would transfer us again into space. The "unio hypostatica," however, exists "absque locali commensuratione vel circumscriptione ἀδιαστάτως" (de Pers. p. 93). By its nature (actu naturæ) humanity may be outwardly circumscribed, although its "actus personalis," through which it subsists illocally in the Logos, causes that it is not "actu" circumscribed from without, and enclosed in one place (p. 95). But as now the hypostasis of the Logos becomes the property of the human nature, so also do the two *natures* become the property of each other. There exists "vera et realis naturarum communicatio," not merely "communio." The περιχώρησις is the medium. "Divina natura humanam intime et profundissime permeat, inhabitat, perficit sibi que appropriat, ut particeps fiat vere ac realiter ipsius humanæ naturæ ; hæc vero ita inhabitatur ac perficitur a divina natura, ut et ipsa ejusdem fiat particeps cum omni ejus plenitudine." De Pers. Chr. 157–192 ; System. 234 ff. Accordingly we can now say of this humanity, which has received the divine person and nature for its own, that in Christ man is God and God is man. In this connection the opinion is then fully controverted, that merely the "persona," and not also the "natura filii dei," became incarnate. The person of the Logos and His nature are really and simply the same (de Pers. p. 158 ; Gerhard iii. 440). It is true, in the inner complex of the deity there is a communication of the nature without that of the hypostasis ; the only place for the communication of the latter is ad extra, to the "natura humana ;" but the hypostasis cannot be communicated without the nature. This is required by the idea of hypostasis ; for the "*modus* nequit esse extra et citra naturam suam ;" the Unio does not separate the "persona" from the "natura." Calov. de persona Chr. p. 166, vi. This is recognised also by Polanus, Ursinus, and others, although the Reformed, for the most part, allow of no Unio between the natures themselves, but only an Unio in the person. So Danæus, Zanchi, Sadeel, Trelcatius, Maresius ; on the part of the Romish Church, besides the older writers like Thomas Aquinas, Ad. Tanner, Bellarmin, Suarez.—But even in the Lutheran Church during the seventeenth century, there were some who said,—The "persona," not the "essentia filii dei," became incarnate,

because otherwise Father and Spirit also would have become incarnate as to their essence, which is common to all. So, besides Calixt (Calov. Syst. vii. 150), also Joh. Hildebrand and Rixner; compare Walch's *Religionsstreitigkeiten innerhalb der lutherischen Kirche* iv. 840. Against this position Deutschmann protested, saying with Calov (Syst. vii. 150),—The divine nature became incarnate, not in so far as it was common to the Father and the Holy Spirit, but so far as it subsists in the “*persona filii*.” This leads to the thought to which Ægid. Hunnius gave expression, that the distinctions of the Trinity are reflected also in the attributes, that is, that the hypostases have the same essence, but each in its “character hypost.”

NOTE 44, page 303.

The three “gradus” of the “Communicatio” laid down by Chemnitz were subsequently converted into three genera or classes (by the Tübingen school into four), and the order frequently changed, but never settled in exactly the same way. Gerhard iii. 472 ff.: 1. The predicates of the two natures are declared concerning the person. 2. The divine nature communicates its idiomata to the human (*genus maj.*). 3. Genus apotelesm. Calov, *Theol. Posit.* 1682, p. 327, Syst. vii. 290 ff., distinguishes two main genera, of which the first again falls into two species. I. On the part of the nature there is a communication to the person: 1. From one *nature* to the *person*; for example, Christ has suffered, or the Son of God has suffered, or the man Jesus Christ is almighty. Here restrictive particles find their proper place; for example, Christ, or God's Son, suffered as to His human nature. 2. A communication takes place from *both natures* to the *person* (agreeably to the words of Leo,—*utraque natura agit quod cujusque est proprium cum communicatione alterius*). P. 294. This is the “genus apotelesmaticum,” or the *κοινοποίησις*. II. The second class or third species relates to the communication “*a natura ad naturam*.” “Genus majesticum” or *ἀνχρηματικόν*, in that there takes place, not indeed a *μετάδοσις*, a *μεταποιία* of human attributes to the divine nature, but a *μετάδοσις* of divine attributes to the human nature. Still only the *ἐνεργητικὰ ἰδιώματα*, not the “*operationis expertia*,” are, according to Calov, communicated for use; for possession, however, all (*κτῆσις*, p. 299).

(In his Theol. posit. (332), indeed, Calov seems altogether to regard the former alone as communicable.) Similarly then, also, Quenstedt, for example (iii. 102), Baier, and others:-- The "operativa" alone are communicated for "usurpatio" and "prædicatio immediata." From the "communicatio naturarum et personæ" follows the "communicatio idiomatum" of itself; for, in the view of Calov also, the "idiomata" are in reality nothing but the natures themselves. Whilst Chemnitz had described the two first genera as lying outside the controversy with the Reformed, Calov in his manner extends the war to all the three genera, and violently attacks the Reformed theologian Berg, who therefore complains of the Lutheran logomachies (p. 815.) It is a matter of course also, that, on the one hand, the attributes are affirmed to be the essence, and the natures are said to communicate themselves to each other, so that, for example, the divine nature pertains to the human (competit) through the Unio; though, on the other hand, the principle is abode by, that the two substances remained unchanged in themselves, that each retains its natural "idiomata." These attributes are made an actual possession in the Unio; "usurpatio plenaria" begins with the "exaltatio" of Christ; they are actually divine, infinite attributes, and the property of the humanity, although not formaliter inherent in it; the *πρῶτον δεκτικόν* thereof remains the deity. For this reason also are they widely distinguished from the high excellences which the human nature of Christ has in itself (*dona habitualia excellentissima, sed finita*). The anointing of Christ Calov recognises (Syst. vii. 445 ff.) as an anointing with the Holy Ghost; but it denotes "*dona infinita*," in proof of which he appeals to John iii. 34, and not "*finita*." In what relation these "*dona infinita Spiritus sancti*" stand to the idiomata communicated by the Logos, he does not more particularly explain. All he does is to assure us, that the "Unctio" was not the "*æterna generatio*," nor to be confounded with the "Unio hypostatica" (which earlier writers had done), and that it did not commence with baptism, but was coincident in point of time with the "conceptio," though substantially it is a momentum by itself, to wit, the preparation for His office (pp. 449 f.). We have set forth this doctrine after Calov, on whom Quenstedt, for example, is greatly dependent, because he has hitherto scarcely been noticed. But

an entirely similar course is pursued also by Joh. Gerhard, Scherzer, Quenstedt, König, Baier, and Hollaz; only that the "genus apotelesmaticum" is accustomed to be designated the third.

NOTE 45, page 303.

The participation of human nature occasioned more difficulty in connection with some of the attributes, with others, less; for example, in connection with omnipotence, less difficulty than with omniscience and omnipresence. For the first might be conceived as the mere possibility, which is to be distinguished from the actual use, from the government of the world, and is compatible with the "exinanitio." (Still, says Calov, de pers. Chr. 316, it is to be ascribed to the humanity in the same manner as it essentially, truly, immeasurably belongs to the Logos; consequently, not as mere power over the world, but as absolute power (p. 318), with faculty also to make alive (pp. 373-401);—to which also are to be counted to belong, His miracles and the forgiveness of sin, pp. 382-386.) *Omniscience*, on the contrary, according to the view usually taken of it, is not in itself the mere possibility of knowing all things, but the actual knowledge of all. It is true, a distinction was drawn between the power of omniscience and the use thereof (*actus primus et secundus*): the divine nature always has both; the human in itself has neither the one nor the other, though in union with the Logos, in the state of exaltation, it has a share in both. As regards the state of humiliation, it was never denied that the humanity grew as to its own (*habitual*, subjective) experimental knowledge; that, consequently, there were things which it did not know; but, asked some, what then remains of the communication of omniscience, if the humanity in union with the Logos had not also the use of omniscience, even though a concealed use? For a merely potential omniscience is an actual ignorance; knowledge exists solely in *Actus*; the mere power to embrace all things in knowledge is possessed by human nature in itself, independently of the *Communicatio idiomatum*. Accordingly, some said,—The humanity of Christ, even on earth, in union with the Logos, who constantly knew all things, always actually knew all things, not indeed "*actu naturæ*," but "*actu personæ*." But what Christ always knew

“actu personæ,” κτήσει, or “actu primo,” the use thereof (actu secundo) He gave up according to the “natura humana.” (Compare the Dissert. under Joh. Fr. Mayer, 1707, “de omniscientia carnis Christi nihil ignorante,” by Pylus.) But that the person was omniscient, and that the humanity was united with the person, was allowed also by the Reformed. For this reason, Calov says,—The omniscience of the Logos pertains to the humanity, not merely “per identitatem personæ,” but through a true and real participation, so that, in virtue of the Unio, not merely the man Jesus (through the person of the Logos), but also His humanity, must be said to have been omniscient. Undoubtedly, however, He did not always use, but only when and as He willed, the wisdom which He always possessed, even as to His human nature. Strictly speaking, however, possession, as viewed here by Calov, necessarily passes over into use, or into actual knowledge; similarly to what Thumm taught in his *Majestas J. Chr. θεανθρ.* 1621, pp. 195 ff., 263 ff. For in Calov’s opinion, when Jesus says that He does not know the day of judgment (Mark xiii. 32), it refers merely to the knowledge appertaining to His humanity in itself, apart from the “Communicatio idiomatum,” as which, however, be it observed, it no longer really existed. But how there can be room for an human acquisition of knowledge, if the humanity had, from the very beginning, actual possession of omniscience through the person communicated to it, whilst, on the other hand, the person, as the person of the Logos, could not undergo an exinanition,—of this no further explanation is given. Ch. Matth. Pfaff remarks also, justly, that where omniscience is at all, it is in use. If there be but a complete *possession*, there is no longer a place for the acquirement of knowledge. Those who took this view, must accordingly either accept the conclusion drawn by the Tübingen school (κρύψις), or let fall the idea of perfect possession from the beginning. The latter alternative was taken in the eighteenth century. On the contrary, during the seventeenth century, we find that, where the procedure was a strictly logical one (as in the case of the Tübingen school), all, even a relative, dissolubility of the factors of the Person of Christ, which was necessary to the truth of the development and of the humanity, was denied. In Christ, knowledge did not precede volition even by a single moment, nor volition

knowledge, but the formation of resolves, consideration (*προαίρεσις*), had no place in Him, inasmuch as it would have presupposed a temporary ignorance, a temporary not having reflected. (So Thumm l. c. p. 265.) In like manner, there was no sort of antagonism between the sensual nature of Christ and His rational will, but a constant and immediate conformity of His will with His knowledge. Luther's words (see above, pp. 97 ff.),—"Christ did not at all times think, speak, will, know, and so forth, everything, any more than another pure, holy man,"—are either excused or artificially explained (p. 262). He speaks here merely of humanity in itself, as it would be apart from the *Unio*. Nay more, even the "*capacitas*" of the human nature for the divine is defined not to be "*physica*," but the result of the operation of grace,—and yet there cannot be this action prior to the susceptibility of human nature,—through and for the sake of the "*Unio personalis*" (pp. 188, 264); a consequence of which is, that this "*capacitas*" is completely deprived of its bearing on the *homousia* with us, and on the explanation of the possibility of the incarnation, inasmuch as it is itself rather miraculously imparted to the humanity, or appertains to it first subsequently to, because in consequence of, the *Unio*. If possible, *omnipresence* occasioned still greater difficulties. The Tübingen school already allowed merely an illocal *omnipresence* of the humanity of Christ with the universe, denying that it possessed divine immeasurableness, and that human articulation, symmetry, circumscription, were abolished; nay more, according to the difference of mundane objects, they allowed a more or less intimate fellowship of the humanity with them. But they say,—Through the *Logos*, who has the humanity with Him wherever He is, and to whom the universe is but a little thing (Isa. xl. 17), it is present to all things (*hoc omnipræsentiae divinæ tota plenitudine totaliter tota humana natura Christi particeps facta est*. Thumm, *Maj.* 187 ff., 172–194, 235), and that "*essentialiter et repletive*," not merely by volition and working from a distance:—indeed, the "*Unio mystica*" is not merely fellowship with Christ's will. Their main effort was directed to conceiving the humanity of Christ, not as shut in and imprisoned by space, but as freely embracing all things; and they took pains to show, not limitation from without to be an essential mark of the corporeal, but

merely circumscription in general, which again might be represented as a self-determination of that which in itself is illocal, or as an ebullition of the form out of this same illocal being (p. 238). But even Calov, the representative of Saxon Orthodoxy, says with emphasis, that this omnipresence is not to be conceived as naked "*substantialis adessentia*," but also as "*operativa*;" and he reduces those different stages of nearness to the distinctions of "*operationes potentiae, gratiae, gloriae*." The *κτῆσις* of this "*omnipræsentia*" the humanity has always had; but it has had the perfect use of this operative omnipresence without interruption, first since its sitting at the right hand of God. Calov, *de pers. Chr.* 401–438; *System.* vii. 364; Quenstedt iii. 185. Most of these writers lay the chief stress on the "*præsentissimum et potentissimum dominium*" of the humanity; and take pleasure in representing the matter as though they were willing to attribute higher things to the humanity than the Tübingen school, in that they speak not merely of its "*nuda adessentia*," but also of the "*operatio*." Bechmann indeed remarks, Christ's humanity is omnipresent through its knowledge, its power and action; but as far as concerns the substantial omnipresence, which without doubt pertains to God, the case is other with this attribute than with omniscience or omnipotence. For, it is true, through one and the same power and wisdom, which is identical as to number, the divine and the human natures are omniscient and omnipotent: the case is the same with the other attributes. The divine and human natures, however, cannot be omnipresent by one and the same omnipresence, but only by a different omnipresence, for the presence denotes the being itself, the being of a thing is identical with its nature and essence; consequently, the sameness of the omnipresence of the two natures would involve the sameness of their existence and essence, that is, Eutychianism. Whilst, therefore, a necessary omnipresence with the creatures, when they exist at all, must be attributed to the divine nature, the omnipresence of human nature can only be derived partly from omnipotence, and partly from the will, so far, namely, as both are directed to the human nature itself (*actu reflexo*). (Bechmann, *Annotation. uber. in Compend. Leonh. Hutteri*, 1690, *Loc. iii.* pp. 158 ff., specially 173.) On this supposition, however, the omnipresence ceases to be a per-

manent attribute of the humanity, immediately involved in the “*Unio personalis* ;” it must rather be regarded as an operation and deed of the God-man—although one relating to His own person—accomplished by His volition and ability, and inasmuch as thus brought about, no longer co-ordinate with the other attributes. The sameness of the divine attributes, both in the Logos and in the humanity, in opposition to all “*geminatio*,” was asserted against Brentz, especially by Chemnitz. (Compare also Calov, *de pers. Chr.* p. 344; *Syst.* vii. 358 ff.; Hollaz, *Exam. Theol. acroam.* ed. 1733, P. iii. p. 137.) Buddeus also, in his *Instit. Theol. dogm.* ed. 2, 1724, pp. 769 ff., insists again on the same thing, and says, that the identical argument which Bechmann advances against the sameness and oneness of the omnipresence may be urged against all attributes, inasmuch as “*re ipsa ab essentia divina realiter non differunt*.” With the idea of the twofold omnipresence, a principle of the old Suabian Christology again made its appearance (see above, pp. 185, 191), but with another tendency, inasmuch as it had taken more seriously the actual participation of the humanity in the divine attributes. Buddeus, however, does nothing towards the solution of the difficulty; he says merely, the humanity has omnipresence in a different way from the deity. Although he allowed that it is identical with “*immensitas*” and the divine “*essentia*,” he represents, not indeed “*nuda adessentia*,” but still “*adessentia operativa*,” in the strict sense, as pertaining to the humanity, and then takes his stand simply on the mystery.—Bechmann makes application further of a distinction between the *ἐνεργητικὰ*, which are transferred “*immediate*” and “*denominanter*,” and the *ἀνενέργητα*, which are transferred only “*mediate*,” “*indenominanter* ;” in the use of which Thumm already was a predecessor (l. c. p. 266). He says (p. 158),—Not all the attributes communicated to humanity can also be predicated of it. It participates in all, because it carries the Logos in itself; but in “*æternitas, immensitas*,” it only participates mediately. That only can be predicated of it itself, which is not opposed to its idea. But *infinitas* or *immensitas* and *æternitas* by themselves, being really identical with the essence of God Himself, contradict humanity as finite. This appears to imply that the other, and, in the stricter sense, communicable attributes, are not properly the essence of God.

Gradually it came to be said of all the quiescent attributes of God (*ἀνεέργητα*), that humanity participates in them only mediately, to wit, through the medium of the operative ones (Buddeus l. c. p. 765). Thereupon followed the further position, that human nature participates in the divine attributes, not immediately and “in concreto naturæ,” but solely in the person ; —which was also the doctrine of the Reformed Church.

NOTE 46, page 304.

He says,—As the Lutherans, particularly the Saxons, are unwilling to attribute the divine predicates to the humanity “formaliter” and “secundum intrinsecam denominationem,” they are plainly to be declared of it merely “secundum extrinsecam denominationem.” The old sense of the “Communicatio idiomatum,” as understood by the Scholastics and Melancthon, and also by Luther in the work concerning the last words of David, relates solely to the point, that the person has all the predicates of the natures. As far as concerns the genera Commun. idiomatum, which were subsequently added, we must distinguish between the “dona creata,” which the humanity has truly as its own, and the “dona increata,” which it may also have,—to wit, so far as the “persona” has them, and as the Logos works in and through the humanity as its *organ*. The person of the Logos, however, is incommunicable. Nay more, he refuses to hear anything whatever of an inclination (*propendere*) of the two natures to each other. Even in the humanity of Christ there are not two aspects alongside of each other, the original human and an appropriated divine aspect, but we must throughout abide by the eternal distinction of the two natures. The will of the Logos remains purely divine ; the will of the humanity purely human : he does not attempt to conciliate the two into the unity of the divine-human will. He shares, therefore, not merely the notion, revived also by his opponents, of an essential antagonism between the natures, but draws from them more logically the conclusions of the Reformed Church. He lets fall the fundamental Lutheran thought, and therefore marks no progress. On the contrary, he eloquently and strikingly shows that the doctrinal difference in the matter of Christology between the Reformed and Lutherans does not warrant a division of churches.

NOTE 47, page 305.

Compare Balth. Meisner. *Christologia sacra*, 1673, p. 80; Hollatius l. c. pp. 120, 139; Buddeus l. c. p. 757. Somewhat greater stress was laid by the Tübingen school than by the others, on the appropriation of the divine attributes to the humanity, in the manner in which Luther and Brentz had desired. (See, however, above, p. 300.) But the more the mysticism of the old Lutheran Christology disappeared before Scholasticism, the more did the view acquire the predominance, according to which, the *μετάδοσις* on the part of the Logos indeed was a reality, but not the *μέθεξις* on the part of the humanity. This was intended to be taught by the, not indeed mystical, but obscure formula, which conceals the contradiction beneath a mysterious expression:—the *Communicatio* takes place *καθ' ἑνωσιν, κατὰ συνδύασιν*. Accordingly, the divine attributes, which, instead of becoming actually human ones, as supra-human or contra-human remain standing alongside of the human, take up, as we have previously shown, a position which can only be compared with the “*dona superaddita*.” But as this was unsatisfactory, relatively both to the office of Christ, to the Holy Supper, and to the “*Unio personalis*,” we constantly find again traces of the opposed tendency towards a true *μέθεξις*. Without it, the continuous polemic waged against the Reformed would scarcely have had meaning and purpose.

NOTE 48, page 308.

Lütke-*mann*, “*de vero homine*” (compare Walch i. 175), and Balthasar Meisner (Walch iv. 643, 651), say, with Alexander of Halls, Thomas, Bonaventura, G. Biel, in order to avoid being compelled to assume that the death was a mere seeming one,—At the time of His death, Christ did not remain a true man, because the parts whose union constitute the man, were separated in death. It is taken for granted that humanity is an unity, so far as it consists of body and soul; but this unity ceased in death, consequently also, the *Unio* of the Logos with humanity as a whole ceased in death:—for, indeed, Christ had not an animated body in death. Albert Grauer, Reinboth, and others, also assumed this; compare Pfaff, “*De impersonalitate et perpetuitate humanæ Christi naturæ*,” pp. 54 ff. Opponents

like Mentzer, Hoe von Hoenegg, Gerhard, Quenstedt (Syst. P. iii. 597), Dannhauer, Feuerborn, Buddeus, seek to show that the personal union continued even in death; for although the natural union of soul and body was interrupted, the union of the two natures remained indissoluble. As Christ's soul was present to the body, even in the grave, in virtue of the "*Unio personalis*" and of the communicated omnipresence, and His body therefore underwent no corruption, it is difficult to see why He should not have been a true man in the grave. This, however, is just the question, whether His death is not reduced to a mere seeming, if the indissoluble, personal union, being complete from the very beginning, referred also to the body, in such a sense, that it continued to be animated by the Logos in virtue of the *Unio*, even after the separation from the soul. Compare above, Nicolaus von Cus. p. 449.

NOTE 49, page 315.

At the epoch now under consideration, Spain developed a great fruitfulness in dogmatical works; and the doctrine of the Person of Christ in particular, was subjected to the scholastic acuteness of a Fr. Didac. Alvarez, F. Suarez (Comment. et Disput. in P. iii. Thomæ, 1616, 1617, Mog. Tom. i. ii.), Vasquez (Comment. et Disput. in P. iii. Thomæ, Antv. 1621, Tom. i. ii.), Corduba, Mendoza, Roderich de Arriaga, and others. The Thomistic and Scotistic schools and their contests were continued, though without arriving at any tangible result. It must suffice to mention a few particulars. Special attention was devoted to the question of the personality of human nature. The Scotists (with whom, in particular, the Jesuit Suarez connected himself at many points, see i. 125-165, 27-30, 562 ff.; see above, Div. II. vol. i. p. 369) wished to make greater earnest with the full truth of the humanity, and therefore held more to the doctrine of Duns Scotus, who, like Des Cartes and the Monophysites, did not hold personality, which humanity was generally assumed to lack, to be a reality, but deemed it to be simply the limit of the "*natura*;" so that nothing failed the humanity of Christ of completeness; whereas others, on the contrary, regarded personality as a reality superadded to the "*natura*," be it in content or in form. The Scotists then say further,—The human nature of Christ, considered "*intrinsecus*,"

is not “*præcise impeccabilis*,” but merely through the Logos and His grace from without: Christ as man can be styled God’s adopted Son, if the expression is merely to mean, He was “*respectu Dei persona extranea*,” or if the adoption be referred merely to the particular nature individualized by the Logos. No less was His human will subjected to proper, natural commands, to honour God and His parents, and the like; for the law of nature is written in the heart of all men. He, however, was not bound, either by human or divine commands of a positive kind, but solely by certain tasks specially affecting Him. Still, His will being free, not merely from compulsion, but also from necessity, had also the freedom of indifference (freedom of choice) in regard to the commands which were binding upon Him (in *materia præcepti*). This may be reconciled with His actual “*impeccabilitas*,” by supposing that, though He had “*indifferentia moralis physica*,” notwithstanding the “*Unio hypostatica*,” still, “*ratione beatudinis*,” or in virtue of His blessedness, He was without actual indifference of will, His will being, on the contrary, always decided. The Thomists, however, who viewed the personality as something real, had the task of reconciling the impersonality of the humanity, or its having its being in the person of the Logos, with the completeness which was notwithstanding attributed to it. The one held personality to be something so essential to human nature, that they assumed it to be stirred by a natural tendency thereto; nay more, some of them said,—it would have attained the “*personalitas connaturalis*” to which it tended, even if the Word had not intervened. But even if this intervention were not conceived as a consumption of the human personality by the divine, there still remained behind an hindrance to the impulse towards personification, which was both foreign and external to the humanity. So in the case of Vasquez (Disp. 34), according to whom, the humanity of Christ, although it has in the “*Verbum*” the highest personality, yearns after its own personality, even in the Unio; because, without it, it cannot be in the true and full sense humanity. As the divine person was thus put quite too openly into an external and contingent position relatively to humanity, others went on to say,—This impulse of the humanity towards personification was not restrained, but satiated by the divine Ego; con-

sequently, the divine Ego is homogeneous to the human:—a position which they sought to justify by showing that the principles of all good, consequently also of the human personality, lie in the divine person. Such was the course taken by the Dominican Alvarez, who distinguished himself in general by acuteness and independence (Disput. 80, de incarn. divini Verbi, 1613). Dion. Petavius, with a view to preserving more completely the unity of the person, represented the Logos as lessening and humbling Himself (see his meritorious work, “De Incarnatione”). The antagonism to the Lutheran doctrine of the “Communicatio idiomatum” was continued, especially by Bellarmine (de Christo, Libr. iii.), by Gregory de Valencia (Comment. Tom. iv. Paris 1609, pp. 114 ff., 292), and others, down to Perrone. They held the transference to have affected the person alone (in concreto), not the nature, with which the great stress laid on the *θεοτόκος* of Cyrill stood in glaring contrast; for the idea of the *θεοτόκος* has much more affinity with the Lutheran than with the Catholic Christology; which latter, however, clung zealously to it from a regard to its Mariology. For the Holy Supper, Catholic dogmaticians assumed a “multi-locatio” instead of an “omnipræsentia;” nay more, Perrone in his Prælect. Theol. viii. 156 ff. inclines to the opinion, that the presence of a substance “respectu alterius” consists solely in its immediate *action* on the other; according to which supposition, there was no need for the body of Christ to be multiplied, but merely that it should act at many points at the same time. With this, however, the enjoyment of the body, its being worshipped, and so forth, are scarcely compatible.—They supposed the humanity of Christ to be incapable of receiving either omnipotence or omnipresence; for which reason, some refused it “adoratio,” such as is paid to God, and allowed it only “hyperdulia,” seeking in this way to justify the worship of the saints. Others, however, for the sake of the hypostatical Unio with the “Verbum,” attribute to it also the “supremum latriæ cultum” (for example, Perrone in his Prælect. Theol. T. vi. ed. 21, Ratisbon. 1854, pp. 212 ff.). This may be done without contradiction, where the divine “persona” is regarded not as something foreign to the humanity, but as having become its own “persona”—an idea which the oldest Lutheran dogmaticians alone strictly carried out. As a characteristic feature,

we may further mention the "Cultus of the most sacred heart of Jesus," and the controversy which took place regarding it. The object of this cultus is "*ipsum Cor Jesu, i.e., Cor personæ Verbi incarnati*;" the cultus is the "*supremus latræ cultus*." The heart of Jesus is made the special object of worship, because it is the seat of His pious impulses, and the symbol of His infinite love and His pains. "*Colitur cor Jesu in se ac prout est amoris symbolum*." This "*nova devotio*," which has its counterpart in the cultus of the five wounds, and which was protected and sanctioned by the Apostolic Chair (in 1787), in opposition to the Synod of Pistoia (1786), is most fully defended by Perrone (l. c. pp. 218—229). In this single part, the entire Person of Christ is worshipped; not, however, primarily the love of Christ, but, above all, the material heart of Jesus.—Some seek to avoid this materialistic superstition by representing the cultus as a mere symbolical one;—an expedient which clashes with Pius VI. "*Constitutio Auctorum fidei*." It is worthy of note how, in the invention of this cultus, Roman Catholic piety evinces the tendency, otherwise also characteristic of it, either to discept the totality of the person of the God-man, which it was unable to grasp, and then arbitrarily to treat a part as the whole, and as the representative of the whole; *or* to reduce that totality back as it were from the fulness and breadth of its personal actuality into the narrow limits of the germinal state:—for the personality of the God-man, when restricted to, and viewed solely in, the heart, loses its existence as an actuality, and becomes almost a mere substance. This is a feature we frequently observe also in Catholic art, which constantly represents Christ as the child of the mother. This preference for the *child* is a suspicious feature, particularly of the Post-Tridentine Catholicism; it thus, in characteristic manner, carried out its unconscious inclination to take back the incarnation, and to substitute for it in Mary a surrogate more accordant with its inclinations. Christ, thus reduced back to a child, or to His "Heart," is made the object of fondling, subjectivistic piety; and we perceive therein merely the Romish counterpart to the extravagances which made their appearance for a time in connection with Herrnhutianism during the preceding century. This subjective kind of piety has raised its head again very recently, and in a shape still more distinctly directed against the uniqueness of

the dignity of Christ, in the new dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary, promulgated in December 1854. And no better refutation of this dogma could be supplied, than the attempted speculative justification thereof, contained in the work entitled "*Das Geheimniss der unbefleckten Empfängniss in Harmonie mit Offenbarung und Vernunft u. s. w.*," Münster 1854. For if such Mariology is justifiable on the ground that the ideal of humanity needed to be manifested,—which ideal, requiring as it does the union of freedom and grace, was not presented in the God-man, because of His deity,—what can be clearer than that this form of piety has lost the humanity of Christ, and retains merely God clothed in the garb of a man?

NOTE 50, page 316.

In "*Erkenne dich selbst*" he seeks to show that man is a microcosm, the greatest work of God under heaven. He is the little world, and bears in himself all things which are found in heaven, on earth, and also beyond; nay more, man is the world (see "*Erkenne dich selbst*," cap. 4, 5, p. 11). Out of nothing God did not wish to make man, but to form him out of something, out of the great world; for we have a Creator so mighty, that He is able to include this great world in one fist, that is, in the microcosm (p. 13). Man is a son, born of two parents,—of an eternal and a transitory parent. He is a son of God, created by God in His likeness and image, with nature and attributes altogether like his Father God; and he is no God, and is equal to God (c. 6, p. 16). But he is also all creatures, because he has received from the great world two bodies: the outward, tangible body, from the earthly elements; and one which, though intangible, invisible, is yet natural and transitory, from the firmament and the stars. So also has he a double spirit: one from the world, the natural spirit; and the divine spirit, from God. He Himself, embracing these four elements in Himself, is (according to an expression of Theophrastus) the "*quinta essentia*."

NOTE 51, page 341.

Heidegg. L. ii. pp. 6 ff. "*Spiritus sancti tres actus fuerunt: 1. formatio naturæ humanæ ex sanguine et substantia Mariæ.*" (Here he speaks against the opinion held by other Reformed

theologians, for example, Mares. p. 480; Mastricht, pp. 496-499, that "spiritus s. patris vicem supplevit.") "2. Sanctificatio. 3. Carnis in unitatem personæ assumptio." Mastricht distinguishes, 1. Segregatio portiunculæ carnis et sanguinis; 2. ejus præparatio; 3. liberatio ab omni intemperie; 4. unio humanæ naturæ cum divina persona." In the view of Cloppenburg (compare Witsius l. c. p. 163), the birth from the Virgin does not secure the sinlessness of Christ, inasmuch as original sin is not transmitted by the male sex alone. The Holy Ghost is the cause of the sinlessness of Jesus; the birth from the Virgin had no influence on it—it is merely a *symbol* of the separation of Jesus from sinners. According to Coccejus and Mastricht, the seed of Mary was derived indeed from Adam, but "semen non animatum non est impurum; malitia non cadit in inanimatum irrationale," but merely "intemperies naturalis;" for which reason there is room for a "defæcatio ab intemperie physica." Mastr. l. c. pp. 492-500. But Christ, as a true son of Adam, might appear to be drawn into the sin and guilt of humanity further by the circumstance, that according to the theology of the covenants, Adam, as the covenant head, had received the law for all his descendants and fell. Mastricht replied, Christ was in Adam naturaliter, but not fœderaliter, when the command was given. To the God-man this command was not given; consequently He did not sin in Adam. God did not conclude the covenant of works with the God-man, nor with human nature, but with an human person, and in this person with mere men, who were capable of sinning, which the God-man was not, with such as were destined in any case to arise out of Adam; whereas the God-man was not destined to arise at all apart from sin. L. c. p. 507. Compare herewith above, pp. 308 ff.

NOTE 52, page 342.

Like the Heidelberg Catechism, they usually considered it to be the anguish of soul endured by Christ. This explanation of the descent into hell had not its ground and life in the antagonism to the Lutheran doctrine of the "Communicatio idiomatum," inasmuch as the Lutherans rather took pleasure in representing the Person of Christ as appearing also in Hades (for the Lutherans, on the contrary, held hell to be a single definite place, even as the Reformed regarded heaven). Nor

does the Reformed antipathy to a merely epideictical doing sufficiently account for that explanation of the descent into Hades, if nothing prevented Christ being conceived as active there. Indeed the Reformed dogmaticians do but transfer the triumph of "leading captivity captive" to another occasion, to wit, to the ascension. The *negative* consideration is rather of importance, that the Reformed Church repudiated every sort of middle condition between hell and heaven, even for the fathers of the Old Testament. In the future world there are none who are to be redeemed, and in homoousia with us the soul of Christ also passes into paradise immediately after death. We may thus explain the repudiation of the doctrine of the Greek (descensus into the intermediate kingdom for the purpose of preaching to the men who died before Christ), of the Romish (deliverance of the fathers of the Old Testament), and of the Lutheran Church (see above, p. 222, and Note 6). But this does not explain again why they did not strike out from the Symbolum the article relating to the descent into Hades, or understand it after the Old Zurich manner, to signify death and the grave. On the contrary, the only positive motive for the adoption of this doctrine by the Reformed Church that will bear examination, is the effort to make the suffering satisfaction of Christ appear as many-sided and complete as possible. The "ira dei" against evil, and the necessity of a complete satisfaction being offered to the honour of the divine righteousness, is so strongly asserted by the Reformed theologians, that the sufferings of Christ are considered to make up the deficiency of propitiatory virtue in the sufferings endured by the damned for their infinitely evil deserts. I rejoice in this matter to find myself coinciding with Güder's "Erscheinung J. Chr. unter den Todten," 1853. Schneckenburger takes another view of the matter; besides other passages, see pp. 8 ff.

NOTE 53, page 345.

A satisfaction of infinite value was necessary, and has been offered, regardless as to whether men were many or few; consequently also, regardless as to whether for all men who exist, or not for those who are not included amongst the elect. Mastricht says,—The "reatus" of men was infinite; so also the merit of Christ. But the infinite is not divisible; it is capable

neither of increase nor decrease. Christ could not and needed not to have done more for all, than He actually did. The service He rendered was an infinite one; He gained the "*meritoria virtualis reconciliatio*" which in itself would be sufficient for all (l. c. pp. 613 ff.). (Nay more, in a certain sense, the satisfaction of Christ referred also to the damned, so far as the satisfactory virtue of their punishment was thus supplemented.) Christ's work, however, undoubtedly referred above all to God, was designed to preserve the honour of His righteousness; and thus He lovingly embraces those whom God chooses;—indeed He had already done this within the Trinity. Accordingly, even in suffering, His "*intentio*" was directed solely to the elect (Mastr. l. c. 628).—The transferableness of the merit of Christ is arrived at even by those dogmaticians who regard every man, consequently also Christ, as by nature subject to the law (for example, Witsius); for they remind us, that though immediate glory would have been compatible with the obligation to obey the law, Christ out of love to us underwent the humiliation which is counted for our benefit, and by which He merited His own exaltation. This exaltation Maresius derives from the *Unio*, l. c. p. 509; Mastricht, however, says, because Christ's "*obedientia*" was "*infinita*," it sufficed both for Him and us (l. c. 627 ff.). Moreover, the law is binding only on men; He was God-man.

NOTE 54, page 346.

This is at the same time the fundamental thought of the Reformed doctrine of the Supper; for, though working through the medium of faith, it has also a relation to our body and the resurrection of life, in virtue of the powers which stream forth from the God-man. When Schneckenburger first of all maintains that the idea of satisfaction does not occupy a sufficiently important place in the doctrinal system of the Reformed Church, because it is not logically carried out in all directions, and that vital fellowship with Christ is substituted in its place (by which, undoubtedly, the "*obedientia activa*" of Christ would be raised above its *merely* imputative and forensic significance); and then again explains this vital fellowship with Christ to be the mere reception of the Holy Ghost, he does not correctly explain, but puts an arbitrary and unhistorical meaning into, the words.

He further gives a wrong representation of the process of justification, speaking as though the Reformed left no place for an "actus" before the divine "forum," before the sinner's being made actually righteous; whereas, on the contrary, the "actus forensis," by which sinners are declared righteous for the sake of Christ, is assigned, even though in other words, a place of the highest importance in the sphere of the divine decree concerning the elect. Indeed, this same decree is often enough described as a "pactum" in the Trinity, which is followed by the "executio" and by the effectuation of the mediatory objective and subjective conditions; as also by that of the knowledge of his "justificatio" or election in the sinner himself. The distinction between the two Confessions is here reducible to the difference in respect of freedom, in that the Lutheran Church represented the act of justification as conditioned by the "fides," which does not resist grace,—man being able to resist; whereas the Reformed held this very "fides" to be the consequence of election. If then the Reformed doctrine of predestination were given up, the distinction in the doctrine of justification would lose its basis and its kernel. For if the divine activity allows itself in any way whatever to be conditioned by the behaviour of an historical factor (of human freedom), that which the Reformed attributed to the one eternal act of election must then be distributed between several, the later ones of which are in each case conditioned by the conduct of men. In this way it becomes possible to conceive the "justificatio" of the sinner before the divine forum as a thing historically completed in the case of all who do not act "indigne."

NOTE 55, page 347.

Mastricht L. v. cap. 568 ff., cap. 17, pp. 602 ff., p. 605:—The "sessio ad dextram consists in majestate ac gloria tantum non infinita, tanta tamen, quanta in mediatorem *θεάνθρωπον* cadere potest. Qua se ostentat regem monarcham unicum, Psalm. 2, 6, et caput supremum ecclesiæ suæ, immo et in potentia cui omnia in cœlo in terra infra terram, seu velint seu nolint, subesse debeant." He does not therefore limit that which is involved in sitting at the right hand of God to the mere kingdom of grace. Heidegger (l. c. p. 81) says,—Christ

now rules through the outpouring of the Holy Ghost amongst His enemies, which is a complete act of authority, and by which He protects His people with word and promise. He exercises "intercessio" for us, which is no "precaria usurpatio potestatis," but "ut patronus causam nostram apud Deum agit." This form of His regiment will cease when the office of Mediator shall be no longer necessary. Then will the Church serve Christ eternally with cheerful and loving obedience and gratitude, without danger of going astray or sin, and united most intimately with its Head and King. Page 90: "Non obstante illa traditione regni Christus rex noster, caput nostrum, corpus suum spiritu et gloria implens mediator noster non promerens amplius, sed coronatus et coronans manebit et nos in uno corpore ipsi subjecti æternum beabimur."

NOTE 56, page 350.

Herm. Alex. Roëll in Franecker, a Cartesian, starts with the same premises as the Arminians on the *αὐτοθεότης* and the "generatio,"—to wit, that the Son, if He is generated and has not *αὐτοθεότης*, must be subordinated,—but draws the opposite conclusion, to wit, that inasmuch as the Logos may not be subordinated, generation cannot be predicated of Him, involving as it does many imperfections; for example, subjection to the conditions of time. Generation, in the Holy Scriptures, denotes revelation; it is not the eternal Logos who is designated Son in it, but merely the divine revelation through the humanity of Jesus, in which the invisible light has become visible. "Theses theol. de generatione filii;" and Diss. ii., de generatione filii, 1689 (against Camp. Vtringa), p. 43:—"Nomen filii dei significat quidem naturæ vere divinæ veram communionem sed quatenus manifestenda et manifestata fuit per singularem œconomiam, ob quam Messias et Rex Israël vocatur." Compare Scholten's "De leer der herformde kerk in hare grondbeginselen," Leyd. 1851, ed. 2, ii. 454 f., and i. 269 f.; Walch's "Religionsstreitigkeiten ausserhalb der lutherischen Kirche" i. 486 f., iii. 866 f. Nor has the word "Father" any reference to the eternal generation. For the rest, he confesses in his Theses three distinct persons; at first also he said,—The generation of the Son must only signify equality of essence and co-eternity with the Father. He appeared accordingly at the

beginning to teach three eternally co-existent divine beings, without giving any opinion as to their inner relation to each other. To this, however, he subsequently gave rather a Sabelian turn, in that, after doing away with the "character hypostaticus" taught by the Church, he referred the words Father and Son to revelation. He assumes, notwithstanding, an eternal destination of God to revelation in the flesh, and on this account admits the existence in the Deity of an eternal Sonship which related to this revelation. It would appear, however, that the Sonship thus admitted was a mere matter of name. He says, Diss. ii. 39,—"*Scripturam per distincta nomina indistinctarum personarum docere nos cognitionem voluisse; ipsa ergo nomina esse characteres personarum atque catenus characteristicas earum proprietates.*" "Persona" he appears to take in the old sense of *πρόσωπον*. Against him was published, even after his death, the judgment of the Faculty of the University of Leyden (after about twenty Provincial Synods had been held against him),—"Judicium ecclesiasticum quo opiniones quædam cl. Herm. Al. Roëll synodice damnatæ sunt, etc.," Leyd. 1723.

NOTE 57, page 357.

Wittich says, "post unionem naturarum duarum in Christo non λόγος dicitur persona, sed θεάνθρωπος est una persona; unio hypostatica est dicenda unio inter duo quæ sic unita constituunt personam humanam." He adds to this, § 26 and § 29, that the subsistentia (personality) nihil positivi addit substantiæ singulari; the human nature, therefore, did not need a sustentatio personalis (in the λόγος), but merely the universal divine sustenance.—On the mode of the Unio, Burmann expresses himself in the following manner (l. c.):—"Communicantur duæ substantiæ atque coalescunt in unam personam, ubi ita conjunguntur, ut actiones et passionες utriusque toti composito communi nomine appellato attribuantur. Per quod nihil quidem positivi illi substantiæ superadditur, sed tantum relatio atque inde denominatio aliqua per ordinationem seu divinam seu humanam." Human nature stands to the divine in the relation of an instrument, of a symbol of its presence.—Liberius (Epist. Theol. i. postulat. vii. propositio iv.) says,—Spirits can only enter into personal union by either mutually

revealing all their thoughts, and by the one allowing itself to be determined by the other, or by agreeing to constitute one whole, and willing that the attributes, doings, and sufferings of both should be attributed to both. *Proposit. iv.*: “*Deus non potest aliter uniri cum spiritu creato, quam consensu unicum totum componendi cum eo.*” In opposition to them wrote Maresius, and especially Petr. van Mastricht: “*Novitat Cartesian. gangræna,*” p. 524 f. Amongst the Lutherans, antagonists of theirs were Joh. Ad. Osiander, “*Collegium considerationum,*” cap. 18, p. 355; Schomer, “*de differentia unionis personalis et mysticæ,*” 1684; against Liberius, Cyprian. *Animadversiones ad Liberii de S. A. ep.* 1699; Zachariæ Grapii *theol. recens controversæ, t. iii., christolog. rec. contr. exhibens,* 1722, pp. 14–21; Budd. *Instit.* p. 747 ff.

NOTE 58, page 366.

De supplicationibus Christi pro semet ipso ex Hebr. v. 7, 1729. Christ was subject to and bound by the law to pray for Himself, not merely as a Saviour for our sake, but also as a man in Himself. Love also was communicated to Christ; and for love it is an inherent necessity to have the law ever before its eyes and to fulfil it. The opponents replied,—If Christ, as a man, was in Himself bound to render obedience, His nature cannot have been united with the divine, His holiness cannot have been infinite. It was possible for Him to sin, and an atonement has not yet been presented for us (compare Walch v. 440 ff.). *Haferung* was opposed, besides by several anonymous writers, by Löscher, in his “*Fortgesetzte Sammlung von alten und neuen theologischen Sachen,*” 1731, p. 973; Claudius, in his “*Gloria Christi a *φλυπίας* Haferungianis vindicata;*” Joh. Fr. Wagner and *Haferung’s* Respondens Krüger, “*Norma actionum Christi moralium sive vindiciæ gloriosæ domini nostri Jesu Christi,*” 1732, as an introduction into “*Christologia moralis et jus divinum naturæ Christi humanæ.*” Christ was not under obligation to pray for Himself or to fulfil the law as to His humanity; for He had the most perfect freedom and holiness, for His humanity did not constitute a person by itself, and therefore was under no obligations. He was Lord of the Sabbath, and so forth. In a better manner than Krüger, Löscher called attention to the truth, that the humanity of

Christ, having been from the beginning pure and holy, as the law requires, might very well be supposed to stand for itself in a relation to the law. He is *ἐννομος*. He, however, was unwilling to concede in any sort that the law was binding on the humanity of Christ. For was not the personal centre of that humanity the free Son of God? Haferung's arguments, however, were not refuted in this way. As early as 1563, Parsimonius (Georg Karg in Anspach) had said that Christ rendered obedience for Himself, and endured merely the penal sufferings for us. His aim, however, was, as was that of Haferung, to construct an ethical Christology; but (like J. Piscator) he supposed that the law binds either to obedience or to punishment, but not to both at the same time. What Christ has done need not be done by us; but we have to render obedience to the law, consequently Christ only rendered obedience for Himself. This question acquired soon afterwards still greater significance through Töllner than it did through Haferung.

NOTE 59, page 367.

Walch indeed (v. 886 ff.) supposes that what Christ prayed for, He begged on our behalf as Mediator, and not for Himself; but so certainly as salvation and blessedness consist not alone in the performances and works of Christ, but also in His person, even so certainly must He needs pray for His own glorification, in order to be able to pray for our salvation. Indeed this is the way of love, that for it, that which concerns ourselves and that which concerns others are inseparably connected. Such prayers of Christ for Himself were in no respect egoistical, because He had made the salvation of men a constituent element of His own personal pleasure. Further, supposes Walch (v. 589), obligation to obey the law involves in itself a moral necessity to do or to leave undone, and "abolishes the freedom which had been previously on that account affirmed. It arises out of a law, and always proceeds from a higher being, who is able to bind and command; for no one can lay an obligation on himself. Who now is to be considered as this higher being, if the Son of God is personally united with this man? And even supposing we advance no further than the humanity by itself, there can be no word of obligation, seeing that such human nature has not a subsistence of its own, and does not constitute a person by itself. The idea

of a person cannot be applied to the humanity of Christ by itself ; consequently also, the idea of obligation is inapplicable, for a law is binding on persons alone, not on natures : now the person of Christ was divine, and therefore cannot be bound." We see from this, how far removed was the thought of freedom in the law, of self-legislation, and the like, and how loose a relation the law was supposed to hold to the nature of man. In particular, however, we perceive how dogmaticians allowed themselves to be driven on by Haferung's principles to the doctrine of the impersonality of the human nature, which involved the overthrow of the principle of the "*Communicatio personarum*," which in the systems of Calov, Quenstedt, and so forth, as Maresius, for example, saw, supplied the foundation-stone of the entire edifice of the "*Communicatio naturarum et idiomatum*."

NOTE 60, page 368.

A particularly characteristic sign is, that from the eighteenth century onwards special stress began to be laid on the communication of the ethical attributes to the humanity. So in the works of Hollaz, Buddeus, Reusch, and others. The human soul of Christ was thus brought more distinctly within the range of vision. But even the more logical development of the doctrine of the "*Communicatio idiomatum*" might have led to asserting for the humanity greater independence, if, namely, the position had been taken up,—the *περιχωρησις* appertains not merely to the divine nature, but the human also permeates the divine. Such is the view taken by Hebenstreit in his "*de duarum Christi naturarum communicatione*," 1703, who appeals in support of his doctrine of an active "*permeatio*" of the humanity in the deity, not merely to the Tübingen theologians, Thumm and Osiander, who held the "*participatio utriusque naturæ*" to be reciprocal, but also to Calov's principle,—"*Quidquid vere personatur τῇ ὑποστάσει τοῦ λόγου, illud intime naturam τοῦ λόγου pervadit*." Herein lies the speculative thought, that humanity is to be conceived as a determination of the Logos Himself. He is thoroughly and completely determined as a man in Himself, not indeed *passivè*, for the Logos continues to be the originally actual entelechy. Reusch ("*Annotationes in Baieri Comp. Theol. posit.*" and "*Introduct. in theol. dogm.*" ed. 2) makes use of this thought in favour of the omnipresence

of the human nature. It is as easy (he means *easier*) to prove as the *πολυτοπία*: it signifies that the Logos is determined through the incarnation, and indeed, seeing that He is everywhere equal to Himself, in such a manner that there is no part of the Logos which was not determined by it. At another point also the following out of determinations of the old Christology led to prominence being given to the humanity. That the *person* of the Logos was communicated to the humanity as well as the attributes, was the universal doctrine in the seventeenth century. But the acute Reusch gave it the following turn,—that consequently the human nature, being personal, had free use of the divine attributes, and was therefore the acting subject, and not merely the organ of, or point of transition for, the acting person of the Logos (Introd. § 455). The way was intended to, and could, be broken for the assertion of the truth of the human development by the principle which we find in Sartorius (comp. p. 209), and already in Buddeus, that the “*Unio hypostatica*” signifies not the *modus* of the Unio (which must have been given with the Unio itself), but its goal.

NOTE 61, page 376.

Andreas Ottomar Gölicke, Professor of Medicine in Frankfurt on the Oder, in his “*Historia medicinæ universalis*,” 1717, assumed, like Johrenius, in his “*de Christo medico*,” that Christ is to be reckoned amongst the “*Medici*.” He supposed that He healed by supernatural, but also by natural means, as, for example, touching, laying on of hands, spittle, words. By touching, effluvia proceeded from the body of Christ to heal. The simple-minded narrators tell us that the healing was also conditioned by faith. In the case of the woman with the issue of blood, it was a divine and not a natural power that worked. Now, as Gölicke further drew back on the distinction between an ordinary man and the God-man, it was replied, that then the hypostasis does nothing towards explaining the miracles. What is remarkable in his case, as in that of Haferung, is that from the old doctrine, in its extreme form (the personification of the humanity by the Logos and the participation of the humanity in divine power), principles are derived which, by conceding to the humanity a real independence, form the transition-point to an entirely different Christology.

II.

NOTE A, page 16.

“Wird nun der Zustand fixirt, wo wir hinaus sind über Zeit und Statt, über das Viele, hineingerückt in das ewige Bewusstseyn ohne doch schon die Offenbarung der Liebe Gottes an uns zu haben, so blicken wir hinaus als in eine Wüste,—das ist das abstrakte Ewigkeitsbewusstsein, welches, wenn es nicht eigenwirkend, sondern Gotte gelassen ist, uns bei sich nicht stehen lässet. Die “Wüste,” das maasslose und weiselose Sein mag da momentan in optischer Täuschung als objective Beschaffenheit Gottes gedacht sein, während sie eigentlich nur die Entleerung des subjectiven Bewusstseins aussagt; aber diesem Reste areopagitischer Mystik tritt sofort als Correctiv zur Seite, dass aus der Wüste des unendlichen Meeres hervortrete das Bild der Klarheit, der Sohn Gottes, der nun aus dem finstern Grunde für uns und in uns geboren werde.”

NOTE B, page 41.

“Denn zwar der Möglichkeit nach ist der Intellectus in allen Menschen das All, und wächst stufenweise von der Möglichkeit in den Actus so dass, je grösser er wird, er desto kleiner der Potenz nach ist. Aber der Grösseste, da er die vollkommen actu existirende Gränze der Potenz aller intellektualen Natur ist, kann nicht anders existiren als so dass er auch Dasselbe ist was Gott, der Alles in Allem ist.”

